Finding true love is a journey of transformation obstructed by numerous psychological obstacles. _Being in Love_ expands the traditional field of psychoanalytic couple therapy, and explores therapeutic methods of working through the obstacles leading to true love. Becoming who we are is an inherently relational journey: we uncover our truest nature and become most authentically real through the difficult and fearful, yet transformative intersubjective crucibles of our intimate relationships. In this book, Judith Pickering draws comparisons between Bion's concept (...) of becoming in O, and being in love. She searches for pathways that lead away from relational confusion towards the discovery of genuine transformational relationships, and works towards finding better ways of relating to one another. This is achieved by encouraging couples to enjoy the actual presence, humanity, otherness and particularity of each other rather than expecting a partner to conform to our own expectations, projections, desires and presuppositions. Pickering draws on clinical material, contemporary psychoanalysis, cultural themes from the worlds of mythology and literature, and a wealth of therapeutic techniques in this fresh approach to couple therapy. _Being in Love_ will therefore interest students and practitioners of psychoanalysis, psychology, and couple therapy, as well as all of those seeking to be more authentic in their relationships. (shrink)

A look at political ethics covers cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal and misanthropy, and is accompanied by a description of modern public opinion about ...

The use of "theory" in feminist analysis has been said to threaten feminism as a political force. This collection of work by leading feminist scholars engages with the question of the political status of poststructuralism theory within feminism. Against the view that the use of post-structuralism necessarily weakens feminism, 'Feminists Theorize the Political' affirms the contemporary debate over theory as politically rich and consequential. In laying the theoretical groundwork for the volume, Butler and Scott posed a number of questions to (...) prominent legal scholars, literary critics, philosophers, political theorists, historians, and cultural theorists. The essays do not settle the questions but generate new and productive directions for them. The volume as a whole valorizes the unsettling power and politics of theory. The essays in 'Feminists Theorize the Political' speak to the questions that emerge from the convergence of feminism and poststructuralism: What happens to feminist critique when traditional foundations--experience, history, universal norms--are called into question? Can feminist theory problematize the notion of the subject without losing its political effectivity? Which version of the subject is to questioned, and how does that questioning open up possibilities for reformulating agency, power, and sites of political resistance? What are the consequences of a specifically feminist reformulation of difference? What are the uses and limits of a poststructuralist critique of binary logic for the theorization of racial and class differences, the position of the subaltern? This anthology represents a diverse array of theoretical work within feminist theory with strong political stakes. Although not all of the authors subscribe to poststructuralism, (and few would concede post-structuralism is a monolithic enterprise), each offers an innovative feminist analysis that is in some way motivated in and by the poststructuralist challenge. 'Feminists Theorize The Political' addresses a range of feminist concerns, including productive freedom, anti-discrimination law, rape, and formulating power in terms of exclusion, difference and hierarchy. (shrink)

In this paper I use philosophical accounts on the relationship between trust and knowledge in science to apprehend this relationship on the Web. I argue that trust and knowledge are fundamentally entangled in our epistemic practices. Yet despite this fundamental entanglement, we do not trust blindly. Instead we make use of knowledge to rationally place or withdraw trust. We use knowledge about the sources of epistemic content as well as general background knowledge to assess epistemic claims. Hence, although we may (...) have a default to trust, we remain and should remain epistemically vigilant; we look out and need to look out for signs of insincerity and dishonesty in our attempts to know. A fundamental requirement for such vigilance is transparency: in order to critically assess epistemic agents, content and processes, we need to be able to access and address them. On the Web, this request for transparency becomes particularly pressing if (a) trust is placed in unknown human epistemic agents and (b) if it is placed in non-human agents, such as algorithms. I give examples of the entanglement between knowledge and trust on the Web and draw conclusions about the forms of transparency needed in such systems to support epistemically vigilant behaviour, which empowers users to become responsible and accountable knowers. (shrink)

In 1935, when the U.S. Supreme Court’s new building opened and displayed the phrase “Equal Justice Under Law,” racial segregation was commonplace, as were barriers limiting opportunities for men and women of all colors to participate in economic and political life. The justices on the Court and the lawyers appearing before them reflected those facts; almost all were white men. Today, the Supreme Court’s inscription has become its motto, read as if it always referenced an understanding of equality that has (...) become central to the identity and the legitimacy of courts. The judiciary “looks” somewhat different than it did and, in a sense, has become more “representative” of the range of people appearing in courts. Given the role that courts had played in sustaining discrimination, the impression that courts ought to welcome everyone is a major achievement. Yet, to assess the impact of new judicial demographics requires analysis of other major alterations in U.S. courts—the influx of diverse litigants newly entitled to pursue legal claims; the economic barriers facing many claimants; the emergence of judiciaries as agency-like promoters of agendas; and the displacement of public adjudication through the privatization of dispute resolution. Studies of women as judges focus mostly on their rulings, but probing the “difference that difference makes” requires looking beyond judicial opinions. Courts in the United States have developed structural capacities to propose rules and legislation, create education programs, commission research and task forces, and lobby for resources. When women of all colors and men of color became lawyers and judges, they created affinity organizations and pressed courts to research court-based bias and to revise rules of ethics, doctrine, and practice. Those changes are part of the impact of diversification within the legal profession, as is the backlash against affirmative efforts to reform practices. Another difference of the last decades is that new rights have brought into court many claimants with limited means. Participatory participation remains elusive, while the “justice gap” is pervasive. Worse yet, in some jurisdictions, courts have served as “revenue centers,” using court-imposed assessments as income. Failure to pay “legal financial obligations” can result in suspension of driver’s licenses, the loss of voting rights, and other sanctions levied disproportionately on people who are poor and of color. Instead of being seen as fonts of fairness, courts are coming to be identified as sites of inequality. In addition, many courts have embraced alternative forms of dispute resolution that make both processes and outcomes less visible to the public. Through doctrine and rules, U.S. courts have shifted their own practices as well as enforced mandates imposed on consumers and employers that push them out of court and out of class or joint actions. In sum, the new faces on the bench ought not to obscure that the project of representation, inclusion, and equality is far from complete. The vivid inequalities in courts are problems for courts because such disparities undermine their ability to be places of justice. (shrink)

This paper contributes data from Paraguayan Guaraní (Tupí-Guaraní) to the discussion of how temporal reference is determined in tenseless languages. The empirical focus of this study is on finite clauses headed by verbs inflected only for person/number information, which are compatible only with non-future temporal reference in most matrix clause contexts. The paper first explores the possibility of accounting for the temporal reference of such clauses with a phonologically empty non-future tense morpheme, along the lines of Matthewson’s (Linguist Philos 29:673–713, (...) 2006 ) analysis of a similar phenomenon in St’át’imcets (Salish). This analysis is then contrasted with one according to which temporal reference is not constrained by tense in Paraguayan Guaraní, but only by context and temporal adverbials. A comparison of the two analyses, both of which are couched in a dynamic semantic framework, suggests empirical and theoretical advantages of the tenseless analysis over the tensed one. The paper concludes with a discussion of cross-linguistic variation of temporal reference in tensed and tenseless languages. (shrink)

By arguing that his use of representations at the core of Durkheim's sociological thought, this book makes a unique contribution to Durkheimian studies which have recently been dominated by postivist and functionalist interpretaions, and reveals a thinker very much in tune with contemporary developments in philosophy, linguistics and sociology.

Moral theory -- Abortion -- Genetic engineering, cloning, and stem cell research -- Euthanasia and assisted suicide -- The death penalty -- Drug and alcohol use -- Sexual intimacy and marriage -- Feminism, motherhood, and the workplace -- Freedom of speech -- Racial discrimination and global justice.

The four books suggested for review in this article are very disparate; so what shall be attempted here is to bring them into conversation with each other, but also to explore what they reflect about recent scholarship and how they contribute to current debate.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling (1775-1854) was a colleague of Hegel, Holderlin, Fichte, Goethe, Schlegel, and Schiller. Always a champion of Romanticism, Schelling advocated a philosophy which emphasized intuition over reason, which maintained aesthetics and the creative imagination to be of the highest value. At the same time, Schelling's concerns for the self and the rational make him a major precursor to existentialism and phenomenology. Schelling has exercised a subterranean influence on modern thought. His diverse writings have not given rise (...) to a system or school of thought; rather, individual philosophers have been influenced by the resonance of his ideas and their influence on contemporary ideas and movements. The New Schelling brings together a wide-ranging set of essays which elaborate the connections between Schelling and other thinkers - such as Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, Deleuze, and Lacan - and argue for the unexpected modernity of Schelling's work. (shrink)

An introductory level text designed to explain and review basic ideas concerning the role of law in society. Assuming no previous knowledge of the field, the volume examines the theoretical and empirical dimensions of law in society from political, sociological, psychological and philosophical perspectives.

Natural mimicry is ubiquitous. Plants mimic animals, animals mimic plants, animals mimic each other and animals may even mimic counterfactual states that deceive or distract other animals. Almost all natural mimicry is based on iconicity which hence anchors it in real world resemblances. The vast majority of natural mimicry is done unconsciously but when humans mimic, they know what they are doing. As Merlin Donald suggest, mimicry may in fact have played a crucial role in the emergence of the human (...) condition, allowing new forms of cognition to emerge. Here it is suggested that the role played by mimicry may have involved the evolution of a capacity for metaphorical perception, where an object may not only be seen ‘as is’ but also ‘as if’ it was a functional mimic of something else. This new form of mimicry made possible new forms of communication, co-operation and creative engagement with the environment. Once these developed to the point where they produced symbolic systems and other cultural tools, the nature of human mimicry expanded radically. No longer anchored in resemblance, it became detached and qualitatively distinct from natural forms. The consequences of this detachment are now becoming clear. (shrink)

The target article says surprisingly little about the possible role of shared circuits in language and communication. This commentary considers how they might contribute to linguistic communication, particularly during dialogue. We argue that shared circuits are used to promote alignment between linguistic representations at many levels and to support production-based emulation of linguistic input during comprehension.

Using selections from writers like Margaret Atwood, Octavia Butler, Marion Zimmer Bradley, Karen Joy Fowler, Ursula K. Le Guin, James Tiptree jr., and many others, this collection shows how the imagined worlds of science fiction create hold experiments for testing feminist hypotheses and for interpreting philosophical questions about humanity, gender, equality and more. Four main themes: Part 1, 'Human nature and reality', concentrates on whether there is an intrinsic difference between males and females. Part 2, 'Dystopias: the worst of all (...) possible worlds', portrays misogynistic societies uncomfortably familiar to the early 21st-century reader. Part 3, 'Separatist utopias: worlds of difference', assembles stories that scrutinize both the virtues and vices of separatism. In Part 4, 'Androgynous utopias: worlds of equality', the authors create worlds that anticipate the consequences, good and bad, of perfect sexual equality in education, intelligence, capability, and reproduction. (shrink)

Resumo (200 palavras) Podem-se encontrar diferentes conceitos na história da Ética. Esse artigo lida com a ideia que se deve identificar um conceito de Ética para se discutir sobre sua relação com Educação. Moral é um conceito que aparece quando se pensa sobre Ética. Por isso uma discussão sobre o conceito de Moral e sua relação com Ética é apresentado. Discutir Ética significa entender o conceito na sociedade porque Ética não pode acontecer a uma pessoa sozinha. Pessoas se relacionam na (...) sociedade e Ética é o fundamento básico da vida social. Antes que se possa observar Ética na sociedade como um conjunto, é possível descobrir que Ética começa na vida da família. A escola é o lugar específico na sociedade que ajuda a família a construir a relação entre Ética e Educação. Filósofos e educadores concordam sobre a importância de educar crianças para serem cidadãos éticos, mas os conceitos de Ética que eles possam usar são de algum modo diferente. Ética Relativa e Ética Universal são os principais grupos de conceitos encontrados na literatura. Concluímos que para se tornar inteiramente um ser humano, cada pessoa precisa se sentir integrada à humanidade e isto somente é possível por meio de conceitos universais de ética. Palavras chaves – ética – educação – moral – família - escola - sociedade (200 words) We can find different concepts in history of Ethics. This article deals with the idea that it is necessary to identify a concept of Ethics in order to discuss about its relation to Education. Moral is a concept that comes to mind when we think about Ethics. Because of this a discussion about this concept and its relation to Ethics is presented. To discuss Ethics means to understand it in society because it can’t happen to a person alone. People relate themselves in society and Ethics is the basic foundation to social life. Before we can observe Ethics in society as a whole it is possible to discover that Ethics begins in family life. School is the specific place in society that helps family to build the relation between Ethics and Education. Philosophers and educators agree about the importance of educating children to be ethical citizens but concepts of Ethics they may use are somehow different. Relative Ethics and Universal Ethics are the major groups of concepts that we can find in literature. We conclude that to become a whole human being each person needs to feel integrated to humankind and this is only possible through universal concepts of Ethics. Keywords – ethics – education – moral – family – school - society  . (shrink)

In this essay I argue for a line of descent, in terms of methodology as an apologist, from J.H. Newman to G.K. Chesterton, and hence to C.S. Lewis. I analyse aspects of Chesterton's methodology as an apologist which strongly suggest the influence of Newman. I then argue that Newman may have exercised a greater influence on Lewis's methodology as an apologist, through Chesterton, than has previously been realised. This raises questions for future study concerning Newman's possible influence, not only on (...) Lewis, but on the other Inklings and related thinkers such as Dorothy Sayers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ConclusionNeil PickeringAs mentioned in my Introduction, and I am delighted to repeat now, the commentaries provided by Calvin Ho and Chua Hong Choon are both excellent. In reading them, some further thoughts were raised for me, and I briefly reflect on these now.In his legal commentary, Calvin Ho makes a plausible argument that Mr. T has the capacity (and hence the right) to make decisions in his current state (...) about his healthcare, and refers to two legal tests of decision-making competency laid down in the Singapore Mental Capacity Act (2008), which he believes Mr. T would pass. A question arises from each of the legal tests which Ho described.The first test involves the question of whether there is any “impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of Mr. T’s mind or brain”. The claim made by Ho is that there is no impairment or dysfunction of Mr. T’s mind or brain. But, this raises a question: what are the functions of the mind? Christopher Boorse suggested that “We may surely assume … that the main function of perceptual and intellectual processes is to give us knowledge about the world” and against this standard “schizophrenia and all other psychoses with thought disorders look objectively unhealthy”.1 Further — and here is the specific point of discussion in relation to Mr. T — does his continuing denial that he is ill (his lack of insight) also constitute such a dysfunction? Is one function of our mind to tell us things about the functioning of our minds — to correct errors, spot illusions and self-deceptions, and respond to beliefs which are odd? If so, then perhaps Mr. T’s lack of insight indicates the presence of a dysfunction.The second test which (mainly for the sake of completeness) Calvin Ho refers to comprises a list of requirements for decision-making capacity. These are relevant if a dysfunction is identified by the first test. These are:(1). Understand information given to him;(2). Retain that information long enough to make the decision;(3). Use or weigh up that information as part of the process of decision-making; and(4). Communicate his decision.These requirements are familiar from other accounts of decision [End Page 222] making capacity, but at least some of these accounts have added a further requirement, “the ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences”.2 This is not merely the ability to understand what one is being told but also the ability “to apply the information abstractly understood to [one’s] own situation”. Potentially, Mr. T would fail this test. He frequently lacks insight into the fact that he is unwell, that is to say, he does not seem to appreciate that the information he is being given is true of him.I turn now to the clinical commentary by Dr. Chua. What chiefly struck me from this was the determination to engage with the patient as a person. Medication is not the first resort; rather, many other interpersonal approaches can and should be tried first. Medication is of course one aspect of treatment — and in some cases, any hope of any sort of engagement with a patient may rely upon some medical intervention succeeding. Perhaps Mr. T will turn out to be a patient of this kind, who can only be engaged in conversation about his experiences and the state of his mind if he has first taken a course of pills. But it has, over a number of years of speaking to psychiatrist colleagues, been borne in upon me that the psychiatrist himself or herself is a fundamental element of mental healthcare. The psychiatrist is not merely a route to help, the dispenser of prescriptions for pills, but someone with whom the patient can talk to and explore his or her experiences. In short, part of the therapeutic relationship which psychiatrists seek to establish is just a personal relationship. I am sure this is simply obvious to most clinicians and indeed to those who suffer from mental ill health and their caregivers. But sometimes, the obvious is worth pointing out.Indeed, the desire to engage with Mr. T as a person... (shrink)

Thomas Szasz, the radical critic of state-supported psychiatry, and root and branch sceptic about mental illness, died in September 2012. Based on the obituary1 and editorial comment in The Lancet2 and the response his work commonly elicits, it is evident that there will be mixed reviews of his impact and of the cogency of his position.Certainly, some have seen him as a notable figure from the past. There is a sense in which, as far as Szasz's critique of psychiatry goes, (...) it did not really change at all in its essence from the time it was first explicitly expressed in his writings of the 1960s right up to his last publications and talks in the 2010s. He started his 1960 paper The Myth of Mental Illness3 with the assertion that there is no such thing as mental illness, and this has been an underlying pedal note to all his many pronouncements in this area ever since. Personally, I have always found his written interventions in debates right up to the present to be highly readable and intellectually sharp; he was adept at creating variations on the Szaszian theme. In one of his earlier book length texts, The Manufacture of Madness,4 he likens the contemporary idea that people have mental illness to the historical idea that some people were witches, and he parallels the institutions of modern state-supported psychiatry to those of the Inquisition. In articles he later published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, he likened mental illness to ‘phlogiston’—the non-existent substance that supposedly explained combustion5 and claimed the term ‘mental …. (shrink)

A dynamic threshold, which controls the nature and course of learning, is a pivotal concept in Page's general localist framework. This commentary addresses various issues surrounding biologically plausible implementations for such thresholds. Relevant previous research is noted and the particular difficulties relating to the creation of so-called instance representations are highlighted. It is stressed that these issues also apply to distributed models.

In his recent edition of Aeschylus' Persae Garvie prints the second strophe of the amoibaion ὀτοτοτοῖ, µάταντὰ πολλὰ βέλεα παµµιγῆ 270γᾶς ἀπ᾽ ᾿Ασίδος ἦλθεν, αἰαῖ,δᾴαν Ἑλλάδα χώραν.