We propose a view of identity beyond the individual in what we call interpersonal interidentities (IIIs). Within this approach, IIIs comprise collections of entangled stabilities that emerge in recurrent social interaction and manifest for those who instantiate them as relatively invariant though ever-evolving patterns of being (or more accurately, becoming) together. Herein, we consider the processes responsible for the emergence of these IIIs from the perspective of an enactive cognitive science. Our proposal hinges primarily on the development of two related (...) notions: enhabiting and coenhabiting. First, we introduce the notion of enhabiting, a set of processes at the individual level whereby structural interdependencies stabilise and thereafter undergird the habits, networks of habits, and personal identities through which we make sense of our experience. Articulating this position we lean on the notion of a tendency towards an optimal grip, though offering it a developmental framing, whereby iterative states of selective openness help realise relatively stable autonomous personal identities with their own norms of self-regulation. We then extend many of the notions found applicable here to an account of social coenhabiting, in particular, we introduce the notion of tending towards a co-optimal grip as central to the development of social habits, networks of habits, and ultimately IIIs. Such structures, we propose, also emerge as autonomous structures with their own norms of self-regulation. We wind down our account with some reflections on the implications of these structures outside of the interactions wherein they come into being and offer some thoughts about the complex animations of the individual embodied subjects that instantiate them. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Mentalism, the claim that all the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition by a subject S are mental states of S. My objection to mentalism is that there is a special kind of fact (what I call a "support fact") that contributes to the justification of any belief, and that is not mental. My argument against mentalism, then, is the following: Anti-mentalism argument: 1. If mentalism is (...) true, then support facts are mental. 2. Support facts are not mental. Therefore, 3. Mentalism is not true. In what follows I explain what support facts are, and then defend each of the premises of my argument. I conclude with some remarks regarding the relevance of my argument for the larger internalism/externalism debate(s) in epistemology. (shrink)

Si a cierta doxa filosófico-ideológica en plena promoción le parece válido el caracterizar a todo Occidente como a esa civilización racionalista que arraiga en la revolución científica, filosófica y aun política que Descartes emblematizaría mejor que nadie, por poco que profundicemos en el análisis ..

In this study first we delineate an overview of the main philosophical positions on the problem of the distinction between mental acts and physical acts in man. There follows an exposition of the topic, inspired by Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s principles. Sensitive operations are physical, but in the sense of an ‘elevated body,’ thanks to a higher formal dimension, which informs the organic basis. Intellectual operations, by contrast, are completely immaterial, though they act united to the sensitive cerebral basis. Accordingly, they (...) have neurological correlations, guided by the intentional causality of the intellect. The intellectual act and its neural basis form a unique act, which is integrated by several cognitive dimensions. Our intelligence uses the brain as an intrinsic instrument, but we also need external ‘cognitive’instruments, namely written texts and computers. The intellectual development of people can be explained by the interaction of these different dimensions. (shrink)

Desde la llegada al poder de Hugo Chávez, en las elecciones de 1998, comenzó la configuración de unas nuevas relaciones de poder en el sistema político venezolano (SPV). Estas relaciones estaban determinadas por la naturaleza de los actores políticos que accedieron al poder, el funcionamiento ..

En este trabajo se estudia el intelecto agente según Vincentio Quintiano Brixiense (s. XVI). Su descripción es netamente tomista, pues sostiene que existe en el alma, que es una potencia factiva, que está separado de órgano, impasible, ente en acto y realmente distinto del posible. Sus operaciones son abstraer, causar el conocer de los primeros principios y activar al posible, respecto del cual es previo y superior. Ambos son inmortales y eternos, y tras esta vida no conocerán como ahora.

En este artículo, luego de una breve sinopsis de la historia del concepto de participación, se analizan las ventajas e inconvenientes de la teoría de la participación para, finalente, estudiar lo que, siguiendo a Tomás de Aquino, se puede llamar participación predicamental y trascendental. Conforme a esta distinción ambas participaciones serían reales, pero la predicamental sólo se aplicaría a realidades físicas, mientras que la trascendental se atribuiría a los trascendentales metafísicos (ser, verdad, bien, belleza...). Se concluye de este análisis que (...) la noción de "participación", que tradicionalmente se emplea de modo general en las diversas disciplinas filosóficas, es pertinente que sea sustituida en cada rama del saber filosófico por otra más adecuada. Así, en filosofía de la naturaleza parece más conveniente hablar de "causar"; en metafísica, de "crear"; y en antropología, de "coexistir". (shrink)

The paper critically examines Bobbio's famous disctinction between legal positivism as a method, a theory and an ideology. The author first highlights certain problems of the distinction itself and then focuses on Bobbio's self-determined position within it. Delving on Bobbio's analysis of the concepts of basic norm and rule of recognition, he demonstrates how Bobbio's later rejection of these two concepts implies acceptance of positivistic legal theory and ideology – despite the fact that he explicitly rejected them in the first (...) place. The reason for this Bobbio's slip is found in his absorbtion in the positivist legal culture which is permeated with the internal point of view on the law. The author suggests rejecting Bobbio's tripartite disctinction of legal positivism and proposes instead to view this as a set of seldom indvisible standpoints forming a specific legal culture. (shrink)

In 1967 Macedonio Fernández proposed new perspectives to read and write the Latin American novel with El museo de la novela de la Eterna. This article will analyze some of the metafictional games which the Argentinean writer played in his great work. At the same time, it will show how these games developed –with their unique style– foundational concepts of Literature Studies, presented in theory streams such as Formalism, Structuralism and Postmodernism.

El presente artículo analiza, en su primera parte, aspectos recurrentes de la personalidad del comisario Maigret, famoso personaje de ficción del novelista belga Simenon. A continuación se procura advertir dos aparentes aporías cognoscitivas que plantean esas recurrencias: – Por un lado, la resuelta negación de método por parte del comisario compaginada con un comportamiento indagatorio idiosincrásico; – Por otro lado, unos resultados policiacos sorprendentes a la par que se supone, durante el desarrollo de las investigaciones, una permanente suspensión del pensamiento. (...) Para resolver estas contradicciones aparentemente irresolubles, se recurrirá, en el último apartado a dos categorías cognoscitivas elaboradas por la filosofía: el ya clásico conocimiento por connaturalidad; y la conciencia concomitante o inobjetiva, prestando especial atención, en lo referente a esta modalidad de conciencia, a la obra del filósofo español Antonio Millán- Puelles. (shrink)