Martin Buber believed that life's deepest truth lies in human relationships. In this classic work he puts this belief into practice, applying it to the concrete problems of contemporary society.

Wie ist es moglich, dass der Mensch als freiwilliger Urheber seiner Handlungen - seien sie moralisch gut oder bose - angesehen werden kann? Die Studie verfolgt historisch-systematisch verschiedene im Ausgang von Kant hervorgebrachte Antworten auf diese Frage - bei Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottlieb Fichte und Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Die Studie zeigt, dass diese Freiheitsdebatte in einer grosseren Tradition von Entwurfen willentlicher Selbstbestimmung steht, die sich uber Leibniz, Duns Scotus und Thomas von Aquin bis hin zu Augustinus (...) zuruckverfolgen lassen und im Begriff des liberum arbitrium voluntatis, einer reflektierten und moralisch qualifizierten Entscheidungsfreiheit, ihren systematischen Bezugspunkt haben. (shrink)

Abstract“Sign stimuli” elicit specific patterns of behavior when an organism's motivation is appropriate. In the toad, visually released prey-catching involves orienting toward the prey, approaching, fixating, and snapping. For these action patterns to be selected and released, the prey must be recognized and localized in space. Toads discriminate prey from nonprey by certain spatiotemporal stimulus features. The stimulus-response relations are mediated by innate releasing mechanisms (RMs) with recognition properties partly modifiable by experience. Striato-pretecto-tectal connectivity determines the RM's recognition and localization (...) properties, whereas medialpallio-thalamo-tectal circuitry makes the system sensitive to changes in internal state and to prior history of exposure to stimuli. RMs encode the diverse stimulus conditions referring to the same prey object through different combinations of “specialized” tectal neurons, involving cells selectively tuned to prey features. The prey-selective neurons express the outcome of information processing in functional units consisting of interconnected cells. Excitatory and inhibitory interactions among feature-sensitive tectal and pretectal neurons specify the perceptual operations involved in distinguishing the prey from its background, selecting its features, and discriminating it from predators. Other connections indicate stimulus location. The results of these analyses are transmitted by specialized neurons projecting from the tectum to bulbar/spinal motor systems, providing a sensorimotor interface. Specific combinations of such projective neurons – mediating feature- and space-related messages – form “command releasing systems” that activate corresponding motor pattern generators for appropriate prey-catching action patterns. (shrink)

This paper analyzes responsible human–machine interaction concerning artificial neural networks (ANNs) and large language models (LLMs) by considering the extension of human agency and autonomy by means of artificial intelligence (AI). Thereby, the paper draws on the sociological concept of “interobjectivity,” first introduced by Bruno Latour, and applies it to technologically situated and interconnected agency. Drawing on Don Ihde’s phenomenology of human-technology relations, this interobjective account of AI allows to understand human–machine interaction as embedded in the social lifeworld. Finally, the (...) paper develops a connectionist account of responsible AI, thereby focusing on patterns such as social goals and actions. (shrink)

The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this paper, I discuss several interpretations of the distinction that can be found in the literature: the Motivational Interpretation, the Scope Interpretation, and the Goal Interpretation, and argue that none of these interpretations is entirely convincing. I propose a novel interpretation of the distinction, which I call the Normative Force Interpretation, according to which the distinction between (...) agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons concerns the normative force that these reasons can have for agents. (shrink)

Unter dem Namen "Oracula Sibyllina" ist eine Sammlung in Hexametern abgefasster Pseudoorakel uberliefert mit den Buchern 1-8 und 11-14 in etwa 4230 Versen. Die fruhesten Teile entstanden im judischen Milieu seit der 2. Halfte des 1. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.; nach 150 n. Chr. wurden diese durch christliche Autoren rezipiert, erganzt und uberarbeitet. Die historischen Anspielungen reichen bis in das 3. nachchristliche Jahrhundert; die Endfassung wurde wohl im 6. Jahrhundert abgeschlossen. Der Legende nach hat Tarquinius Superbus, der letzte legendare Konig Roms, (...) die Bucher direkt von der Sibylle von Cumae erworben. Im Tempel des Iuppiter Capitolinus aufbewahrt und von 15 Priestern gehutet, durften sie nur eingesehen werden, wenn der Senat dies wegen beangstigender Vorzeichen anordnete. Im Jahr 83 v. Chr. vernichtete ein Brand auf dem Kapitol die Sammlung, eine neue wurde aufgrund von Nachforschungen an griechischen Sibyllenheiligtumern zusammengestellt.". (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 24 Heft: 1 Seiten: 219-232.

Let A[ω]ω be a maximal almost disjoint family and assume P is a forcing notion. Say A is P-indestructible if A is still maximal in any P-generic extension. We investigate P-indestructibility for several classical forcing notions P. In particular, we provide a combinatorial characterization of P-indestructibility and, assuming a fragment of MA, we construct maximal almost disjoint families which are P-indestructible yet Q-destructible for several pairs of forcing notions . We close with a detailed investigation of iterated Sacks indestructibility.

In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and (...) affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles. (shrink)

It is relatively consistent with ZFC that every countable $FU_{fin} $ space of weight N₁ is metrizable. This provides a partial answer to a question of G. Gruenhage and P. Szeptycki [GS1].

Ludwik Fleck, Edmund Husserl : on the historicity of scientific knowledge -- Gaston Bachelard : the concept of "phenomenotechnique" -- Georges Canguilhem : epistemological history -- Pisum : Carl Correns's experiments on Xenia, 1896-99 -- Eudorina : Max Hartmann's experiments on biological regulation in protozoa, 1914-21 -- Ephestia : Alfred Kähn's experimental design for a developmental physiological -- Genetics, 1924-45 -- Tobacco mosaic virus : virus research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Biochemistry and Biology, 1937-45 -- The concept of (...) the gene : molecular biological perspectives -- The liquid scintillation counter : traces of radioactivity -- The concept of information : the writings of François Jacob -- Intersections -- Preparations -- The economy of the scribble. (shrink)

We investigate some aspects of bounding, splitting, and almost disjointness. In particular, we investigate the relationship between the bounding number, the closed almost disjointness number, the splitting number, and the existence of certain kinds of splitting families.

Infra-experimentality. Traces ; Models ; Making visible ; Grafting ; Protocols -- Supra-experimentality. Shapes of time ; Experimental cultures ; Knowing and narrating ; Thinking wild ; Eulogy of the fragment -- Postscript.

In a recent paper, Sven Danielsson argued that the ‘original paradoxes' of deontic logic, in particular Ross's paradox and Prior's paradox of derived obligation, can be solved by restricting the modal inheritance rule. I argue that this does not solve the paradoxes.

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction that is underlying Freedom’s Right undermines Critical Theory’s aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that (...) abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom’s Right entails no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom’s Right. I show that Honneth’s own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom’s Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments. (shrink)

This paper analyses falsely implicating from the point of view of Gricean theory of implicature, focusing on the Story of the Mate and the Captain which is a classical example of lying while saying the truth. It is argued that the case of falsely implicating should be included within a general definition of lying. Whether Particularised Conversational Implicatures (PCI), as in the Story of the Mate and the Captain, and Generalised Conversational Implicatures (GCI) behave differently with regard to falsely implicating (...) is discussed with reference to Levinson's theory of presumptive meaning [Levinson, Stephen C., 2000. Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalised Conversational Implicature. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass]. It turns out that, in contrast to PCIs, the case where the assertion is false and the implicature is true is not possible with GCIs. In addition, tautology and irony are analysed, and some repercussions on the speech act notion of lying are pointed out. (shrink)

Let κ < λ be regular uncountable cardinals. Using a finite support iteration (in fact a matrix iteration) of ccc posets we obtain the consistency of b = a = κ < s = λ. If μ is a measurable cardinal and μ < κ < λ, then using similar techniques we obtain the consistency of b = κ < a = s = λ.

Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason (...) in order to construct the illusion according to which we are not bound to the absolute demand of the moral law, but rather subject to exceptions and excuses. Finally, the paper interprets the three rules of “common sense” in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment in terms of an antidote to rationalizing. (shrink)

Welche Art von Gegenständen untersucht die Mathematik und in welchem Sinne existieren diese Gegenstände? Warum dürfen wir die Aussagen der Mathematik zu unserem Wissen zählen und wie lassen sich diese Aussagen rechtfertigen? Eine Philosophie der Mathematik versucht solche Fragen zu beantworten. In dieser Einführung stellen wir maßgeblichen Positionen in der Philosophie der Mathematik vor und formulieren die Essenz dieser Positionen in möglichst einfachen Thesen. Der Leser erfährt, auf welche Philosophen eine Position zurückgeht und in welchem historischen Kontext diese entstand. Ausgehend (...) von Grundintuitionen und wissenschaftlichen Befunden lässt sich für oder gegen eine These in der Philosophie der Mathematik argumentieren. Solche Argumente bilden den zweiten Schwerpunkt dieses Buches. Das Buch soll den Leser dazu anregen über die Philosophie der Mathematik nachzudenken und eine eigene Position zu formulieren und für diese zu argumentieren. (shrink)

René Descartes included a picture of his "mesolabium" twice in his "Géométrie". The functioning of this device is shown in an interactive simulation and it is further explained. The mesolabium was used by Descartes to compute multidimensional roots. It illustrated Descartes' classification of curves according to their grade of composition. Furthermore, it showed against the opinion of the ancients that composite curves were a legitmate part of geometry. Finally, by its means Descartes established continuous movement as a definitory criterion for (...) geometric constructability. (shrink)

Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her (...) own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will address the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür in and after Kant. The aim of my chapter is to defend it against the charge of irrationality and mere chance, and to rehabilitate it from a historical and analytic point of view. I will analyze Kant’s use of the word “Willkür”, and chronologically follow the semantic and systematic changes in his philosophical work. Finally, I address recent attempts to revitalize the concept of Willkür in the (...) analytic debate by referring to the work of Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane. I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of libera arbitria. Whereas the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae can be interpreted in terms of the pejorative sense of “Willkür”—as mere chance—the liberum arbitrium voluntatis equals a reflective kind of Willkür—literal Will-kür —which involves freedom of the will. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove argues against the proportionality principle that it cannot accommodate important phenomena of our moral practice, namely forgiveness, love, and ambition: each of the cases involve pro- or contra-attitudes that are disproportionate to the intrinsic value or disvalue of their object. In this commentary, I offer alternative interpretations of forgiveness, love, and ambition and show that each of these phenomena is in line with the proportionality principle.

In this paper, I will reconstruct Kant’s theory of illusion from the perspective of his transcendental philosophy. I argue that it is Kant’s theory of dialectic as the “logic of illusion” that grounds both theoretical and practical error and that traces them back to a common root: the operation of rationalizing by theoretical and practical reason. I analyze different kinds of theoretical and practical errors and show how they are grounded in reason’s general propensity to rationalize. The paper exposes this (...) common root and shows which rules Kant develops in order to avoid rationalizing. (shrink)

In classical philosophy of time, present time mainly has been considered in its fleetingness: it is transition, in the Platonic meaning of the sudden or in the Aristotelian sense of discreet moment and isolated intensity that escapes possible perception. Through the idea of subjective constitution of time, Husserl’s phenomenology tries to spread the moment. He transcends the idea of linear and empty time in modern philosophy. Phenomenological description of time experience analyses the filled character of the moment that can be (...) detained in the performance of consciousness. As a consequence of the temporality of consciousness, he nevertheless remains in the temporal conception of presence. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, however, is able to grasp the spacial meaning of presence. In his perspective of a phenomenology of perception, presence can be understood as a space surrounding the body, as a field of present things given in perception. Merleau-Ponty recovers the ancient sense of ‘praesentia’ as a fundamental concept of being in the world. (shrink)

When a conflict of duties arises, a resolution is often sought by use of an ordering of priority or importance. This paper examines how such a conflict resolution works, compares mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, and gives preference to one developed by Brewka and Nebel. I distinguish between two cases – that some conflicts may remain unresolved, and that a priority ordering can be determined that resolves all – and provide semantics and axiomatic systems for accordingly defined (...) dyadic deontic operators. (shrink)

We prove that in many situations it is consistent with ZFC that part of the invariants involved in Cichon's diagram are equal to $\kappa$ while the others are equal to $\lambda$, where $\kappa < \lambda$ are both arbitrary regular uncountable cardinals. We extend some of these results to the case when $\lambda$ is singular. We also show that $\mathrm{cf}) < \kappa_A$ is consistent with ZFC.

Contrary to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theoretical critique of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique has been almost unknown. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant. I will concentrate on the so‐called Reinhold's dilemma, which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions in Kant. Also, I shall explain how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a new action theory and by sharply distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's (...) practical significance by relating his conception of individual freedom to recent theories of volitional self‐determination. (shrink)

In sport, perceptual skill training software is intended to assist tactical training in the field. The aim of this field study was to test whether ‘laboratory-based’ pattern recall training would augment tactical skill training performed on the field. Twenty-six soccer players between 14-16 years of age from a single team participated in this study and were divided into three groups. The first received field training on a specific tactical skill plus cognitive training sessions on the pattern recall task. The second (...) performed only the field training while the third group served as a control group and had field training on other topics. The task on the pre-, post- and retention tests was to recall specific soccer patterns displayed on a computer screen. Results showed significant changes between pre- to post-test performance. There was no significant interaction between groups and tests but the effect size was large. From pre- to retention-test, there was a significant difference between tests and an interaction between groups and tests, but no main effect difference between groups. On the basis of significance testing only retention was affected by the additional training, however, descriptive results and effect sizes from pre- to post-test were as expected and suggested there were learning benefits. Together these results indicate that augmented perceptual-cognitive training might be beneficial, but some limitations in our study design (e.g., missing field test, missing placebo group, etc.) need to be improved in future work. (shrink)

The article presents Dewey’s own understanding of rationality by reconstructing his criticism of idealism. For Dewey, idealism is an important and valuable expression of the modern idea that both knowledge and values are historical products of human self-determination. Thus, it rightly defends the power of thought against the uncritical claims of mere religious and social authority. Yet idealism, Dewey claims, still misconceives that human power by ultimately treating it as a merely intellectual power, thus following the philosophical tradition. For Dewey, (...) however, human thought and reasoning have to be understood in a much broader way. Dewey decenters thought by arguing that it is a natural, dependent and essentially temporal process, in which the intellectual elements only play a subordinate role. Thought, he claims, does not only have a history; furthermore, thinking only matters to human beings precisely because it is open to reflective change. Dewey’s position, thus, can be seen as an attempt to preserve the existential importance of philosophical self-reflection by binding thought to history and change in a radical way. (shrink)