Dependence is a common phenomenon, wherever one looks: ecological systems, astronomy, human history, stock markets - but what is the logic of dependence? This book is the first to carry out a systematic logical study of this important concept, giving on the way a precise mathematical treatment of Hintikka’s independence friendly logic. Dependence logic adds the concept of dependence to first order logic. Here the syntax and semantics of dependence logic are studied, dependence logic is given an alternative game theoretic (...) semantics, and results about its complexity are proven. This is a graduate textbook suitable for a special course in logic in mathematics, philosophy and computer science departments, and contains over 200 exercises, many of which have a full solution at the end of the book. It is also accessible to readers, with a basic knowledge of logic, interested in new phenomena in logic. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 87, Issue 4, Page 986-1000, August 2021.

We discuss the differences between first-order set theory and second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics. We analyse these languages in terms of two levels of formalization. The analysis shows that if second-order logic is understood in its full semantics capable of characterizing categorically central mathematical concepts, it relies entirely on informal reasoning. On the other hand, if it is given a weak semantics, it loses its power in expressing concepts categorically. First-order set theory and second-order logic are not radically (...) different: the latter is a major fragment of the former. (shrink)

We show that the categoricity of second-order Peano axioms can be proved from the comprehension axioms. We also show that the categoricity of second-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms, given the order type of the ordinals, can be proved from the comprehension axioms. Thus these well-known categoricity results do not need the so-called “full” second-order logic, the Henkin second-order logic is enough. We also address the question of “consistency” of these axiom systems in the second-order sense, that is, the question of existence of (...) models for these systems. In both cases we give a consistency proof, but naturally we have to assume more than the mere comprehension axioms. (shrink)

The escalating planetary crises of human-induced climate change, the depletion of natural resources, and declining biodiversity call for urgent actions to be taken at all levels of society and by the global community. The current political strategy for a sustainable future that emphasizes economic and technological progress is insufficient to bring about the change required; an educational approach based on identities, values, ethics, and new worldviews is also needed. In this article Arto O. Salonen and his coauthors consider the (...) kind of pedagogy that could support a transformation of the human conception of reality into a form that both recognizes the connections and interactions between people, society, and the planet, and imparts an ethical orientation to action that strengthens the health and integrity of all entities. A theory of planetary social pedagogy (PSP) is based on traditional social pedagogy, which provides a theoretical framework for formal, nonformal, and informal education. PSP aims at building a deep holistic understanding of the relationship between the individual, society, and Earth by integrating the fragmented human conception and experience of reality by uniting the three dimensions of a social-ecological worldview: spatial, temporal, and ethical. Moreover, PSP is a cyclical learning process that alternates between cognitive, metacognitive, and epistemic levels of learning. The ultimate goal of using PSP is to lay the foundation for a fundamental transformation of the ideals, values, and culture that shape human behavior in ways necessary for securing a sustainable future. (shrink)

We try to answer the question which is the “right” foundation of mathematics, second order logic or set theory. Since the former is usually thought of as a formal language and the latter as a first order theory, we have to rephrase the question. We formulate what we call the second order view and a competing set theory view, and then discuss the merits of both views. On the surface these two views seem to be in manifest conflict with each (...) other. However, our conclusion is that it is very difficult to see any real difference between the two. We analyze a phenomenon we call internal categoricity which extends the familiar categoricity results of second order logic to Henkin models and show that set theory enjoys the same kind of internal categoricity. Thus the existence of non-standard models, which is usually taken as a property of first order set theory, and categoricity, which is usually taken as a property of second order axiomatizations, can coherently coexist when put into their proper context. We also take a fresh look at complete second order axiomatizations and give a hierarchy result for second order characterizable structures. Finally we consider the problem of existence in mathematics from both points of view and find that second order logic depends on what we call large domain assumptions, which come quite close to the meaning of the axioms of set theory. (shrink)

In this paper (except in Section 5) all quantifiers are assumedto be so called simple unaryquantifiers, and all models are assumedto be finite. We give a necessary and sufficientcondition for a quantifier to be definablein terms of monotone quantifiers. For amonotone quantifier we give a necessaryand sufficient condition for beingdefinable in terms of a given set of bounded monotonequantifiers. Finally, we give a necessaryand sufficient condition for a monotonequantifier to be definable in terms of agiven monotone quantifier.Our analysis shows that (...) the quantifierat least one half and its relatives behavedifferently than other monotone quantifiers. (shrink)

Truth, consistency and elementary equivalence can all be characterised in terms of games, namely the so-called evaluation game, the model-existence game, and the Ehrenfeucht–Fraisse game. We point out the great affinity of these games to each other and call this phenomenon the strategic balance in logic. In particular, we give explicit translations of strategies from one game to another.

This study examined Flow with Nature treatment, which is an integrative intervention based on eco and environmental psychology, psychotherapeutic theories and professional psychological practice. FWN is intended for depression rehabilitation with the help of social support, nature environments and FWN exercises. Exercises encourage sensing the environment, mindful awareness, psychological processing and focusing on the future. The FWN treatment proceeds in separate stages, which emphasise nature, group and FWN exercises differently. This study focused on the experiences of the participants in the (...) FWN treatment. Finnish adults who had been diagnosed with clinical depression took part in the FWN treatment and answered feedback questions. Answers were analysed using theory-based content analysis. Data were collected between spring 2019 and spring 2020. The majority of the participants were women and on average 44 years old. Content analysis revealed that the participant feedback answers were in agreement with the central theoretical themes of FWN. The participants emphasised the significance of nature, social support and exercises differently. Moreover, the significance of these ingredients differed according to the stages of treatment: in the horizon stage restorative and comprehensive nature experiences, in the growth stage social support and in the path stage environmental self-regulation were emphasised. These results are in accordance with the objectives of the stages and seem to support the phase-based rationale. The participants’ experiences of the key elements of the intervention, social support and nature environment were experienced mainly positively, which supports their inclusion in future intervention versions. In the future, FWN exercises should be developed to better enable participants’ possibilities for concentration and being present in the moment. Exercises should also be simplified to match the target group’s cognitive abilities. (shrink)

To support the sustainability of future cities, residents’ living spaces need to be built and used efficiently, while supporting residents’ communal wellbeing. Nordic superblock is a new planning, housing, and living concept in which residents of a neighborhood—a combination of city blocks—share yards, common spaces and utilities. Sharing living spaces is an essential element of this approach. In this study, our goal was to study the ways in which intelligent technology solutions—such as proactive, data-driven Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications—could support and (...) even motivate the use of common areas in superblocks. To this end, we conducted a two-phase qualitative study: in the first phase, potential superblock residents (N = 12) shared their perspectives of sharing of living spaces in general, and more specifically of how intelligent technologies could support sharing spaces. In the second phase, two workshops with experts (N = 7) were held to gather understanding of possibilities of intelligent technologies in meeting the residents’ expectations of space sharing. The results illustrate space sharing and communality as supportive factors for one another, enabled but also complicated by social interaction. Major possibilities for intelligent technologies to advance space sharing were seen in organizing the use of spaces and facilitating social interaction in the community. As an outcome, four roles incorporating several use purposes of intelligent technologies were found. The findings can inform the Human-Centered AI (HCAI) research and design improving sustainable living in future urban neighborhoods. (shrink)

The semantics of the independence friendly logic of Hintikka and Sandu is usually defined via a game of imperfect information. We give a definition in terms of a game of perfect information. We also give an Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game adequate for this logic and use it to define a Distributive Normal Form for independence friendly logic.

I will give a brief overview of Saharon Shelah’s work in mathematical logic. I will focus on three transformative contributions Shelah has made: stability theory, proper forcing and PCF theory. The first is in model theory and the other two are in set theory.

We show that the predicate “x is the power set of y” is ‐definable, if V = L[E] is an extender model constructed from a coherent sequences of extenders, provided that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal. Here is a predicate true of just the infinite cardinals. From this we conclude: the validities of second order logic are reducible to, the set of validities of the Härtig quantifier logic. Further we show that if no L[E] model has (...) a cardinal strong up to one of its ℵ‐fixed points, and, the Löwenheim number of this logic, is less than the least weakly inaccessible δ, then (i) is a limit of measurable cardinals of K, and (ii) the Weak Covering Lemma holds at δ. (shrink)

We show that if $$ satisfies the first-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms of set theory when the membership relation is ${ \in _1}$ and also when the membership relation is ${ \in _2}$, and in both cases the formulas are allowed to contain both ${ \in _1}$ and ${ \in _2}$, then $\left \cong \left$, and the isomorphism is definable in $$. This extends Zermelo’s 1930 theorem in [6].

This book comprises revised full versions of lectures given during the 9th European Summer School in Logic, Languages, and Information, ESSLLI'97, held in Aix-en-Provence, France, in August 1997. The six lectures presented introduce the reader to the state of the art in the area of generalized quantifiers and computation. Besides an introductory survey by the volume editor various aspects of generalized quantifiers are studied in depth.

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness.Any set (...) of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down toκ.If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ.Interpolation Property.If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languagesLκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory. (shrink)

We ask, when is a property of a model a logical property? According to the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion this is the case when the property is preserved by isomorphisms. We relate this to model-theoretic characteristics of abstract logics in which the model class is definable. This results in a graded concept of logicality in the terminology of Sagi [46]. We investigate which characteristics of logics, such as variants of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, Completeness theorem, and absoluteness, are relevant from the logicality (...) point of view, continuing earlier work by Bonnay, Feferman, and Sagi. We suggest that a logic is the more logical the closer it is to first order logic. We also offer a refinement of the result of McGee that logical properties of models can be expressed in $L_{\infty \infty }$ if the expression is allowed to depend on the cardinality of the model, based on replacing $L_{\infty \infty }$ by a “tamer” logic. (shrink)

The following problem is studied: How large and how small can the Löwenheim and Hanf numbers of unbounded logics be in relation to the most common large cardinals? The main result is that the Löwenheim number of the logic with the Härtig-quantifier can be consistently put in between any two of the first weakly inaccessible, the first weakly Mahlo, the first weakly compact, the first Ramsey, the first measurable and the first supercompact cardinals.

We study definability in terms of monotone generalized quantifiers satisfying Isomorphism Closure, Conservativity and Extension. Among the quantifiers with the latter three properties - here called CE quantifiers - one finds the interpretations of determiner phrases in natural languages. The property of monotonicity is also linguistically ubiquitous, though some determiners like an even number of are highly non-monotone. They are nevertheless definable in terms of monotone CE quantifiers: we give a necessary and sufficient condition for such definability. We further identify (...) a stronger form of monotonicity, called smoothness, which also has linguistic relevance, and we extend our considerations to smooth quantifiers. The results lead us to propose two tentative universals concerning monotonicity and natural language quantification. The notions involved as well as our proofs are presented using a graphical representation of quantifiers in the so-called number triangle. (shrink)

In this paper we develop an Ehrenfeucht‐Fraïssé game for. Unlike the standard Ehrenfeucht‐Fraïssé games which are modeled solely after the behavior of quantifiers, this new game also takes into account the behavior of connectives in logic. We prove the adequacy theorem for this game. We also apply the new game to prove complexity results about infinite binary strings.

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness.Any set (...) of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down toκ.If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ.Interpolation Property.If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languagesLκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory. (shrink)

We define a logic capable of expressing dependence of a variable on designated variables only. Thus has similar goals to the Henkin quantifiers of [4] and the independence friendly logic of [6] that it much resembles. The logic achieves these goals by realizing the desired dependence declarations of variables on the level of atomic formulas. By [3] and [17], ability to limit dependence relations between variables leads to existential second order expressive power. Our avoids some difficulties arising in the original (...) independence friendly logic from coupling the dependence declarations with existential quantifiers. As is the case with independence friendly logic, truth of is definable inside . We give such a definition for in the spirit of [11] and [2] and [1]. (shrink)

The Craig Interpolation Theorem is a fundamental property of rst order logic L!!. What happens if we strengthen rst order logic? Second order logic L 2 satises Craig for trivial reasons but on the other hand, L 2 is not very interesting from a fundational point of view.

The Craig Interpolation Theorem is intimately connected with the emergence of abstract logic and continues to be the driving force of the field. I will argue in this paper that the interpolation property is an important litmus test in abstract model theory for identifying “natural,” robust extensions of first order logic. My argument is supported by the observation that logics which satisfy the interpolation property usually also satisfy a Lindström type maximality theorem. Admittedly, the range of such logics is small.

We study descriptive set theory in the space ω1 ω 1 by letting trees with no uncountable branches play a similar role as countable ordinals in traditional descriptive set theory. By using such trees, we get, for example, a covering property for the class of Π 1 1 -sets of ω1 ω 1 . We call a family U of trees universal for a class V of trees if $\mathscr{U} \subseteq \mathscr{V}$ and every tree in V can be order-preservingly mapped (...) into a tree in U. It is well known that the class of countable trees with no infinite branches has a universal family of size ℵ 1 . We shall study the smallest cardinality of a universal family for the class of trees of cardinality ≤ℵ 1 with no uncountable branches. We prove that this cardinality can be 1 (under ¬CH) and any regular cardinal κ which satisfies ℵ 2 ≤ κ ≤ 2 ℵ 1 (under CH). This bears immediately on the covering property of the Π 1 1 -subsets of the space ω1 ω 1 . We also study the possible cardinalities of definable subsets of ω1 ω 1 . We show that the statement that every definable subset of ω1 ω 1 has cardinality $ or cardinality 2 ω1 is equiconsistent with ZFC (if n ≥ 3) and with ZFC plus an inaccessible (if n = 2). Finally, we define an analogue of the notion of a Borel set for the space ω1 ω 1 and prove a Souslin-Kleene type theorem for this notion. (shrink)

I contribute this paper on anonymity to honor the birthday of John Crossley. I am not only John’s friend, but also his grandson in the academic sense—as my doct.

We show that a coherent theory of partially ordered connectives can be developed along the same line as partially ordered quantification. We estimate the expressive power of various partially ordered connectives and use methods like Ehrenfeucht games and infinitary logic to get various undefinability results.

We study some large cardinals in terms of reflection, establishing new connections between the model-theoretic and the set-theoretic approaches.