The interconnections, common interests, and other linkages between the Jewish and Islamic traditions have long been a matter of interest to academics. Today the need to understand these relationships, and to emphasize commonalities rather than conflicts, is of the greatest public interest. The present volume of studies, likely the first such collection in the scholarly literature, explores the full range of interconnections between Jews and Muslims in all fields (intellectual history, religion, philosophy, social history, etc.) and in all periods, from (...) the Middle Ages till today. The essays have been written by some twenty distinguished scholars from North America, Europe, and Israel. The volume is dedicated to our esteemed colleague Joel L. Kraemer, John Barrows Professor Emeritus in the Divinity School and on the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago. In the course of his distinguished career Professor Kraemer has made major contributions to our understanding of the intellectual and cultural history of the Jews in the Arabic world, Islamic and Jewish philosophy and their sources in ancient philosophy, the humanistic renaissance in Islam (on which he published two seminal monographs), and Maimonides (on which he has published many important papers and is completing a biography and a translation of Maimonides' letters, to appear in the Yale Judaica Series). (shrink)

Plotinus’s theory of dual selfhood has ethical norms built into it, all of which derive from the ontological superiority of the higher (or undescended) soul in us overthe body-soul compound. The moral life, as it is presented in the Enneads, is a life of self-perfection, devoted to the care of the higher self. Such a conception of morality is prone to strike modern readers as either ‘egoistic’ or unduly austere. If there is no doubt that Plotinus’s ethics is exceptionally austere, (...) it will be argued below that it is not ‘egoistic.’ To that effect, the following questions will be addressed: Are the virtues, civic as well as purificatory, mere means to Plotinus’s metaphysically conceived ethical goal? To what extent must the lower self abnegate itself so as to enable the higher self to ascend to Intellect and beyond? And if self-perfection lies at the centre of the Plotinian moral life, is there any conceptual room left in it for other-regarding norms of conduct? A close reading of selected passages from Plotinus’s tractate I.2[19] On Virtues and tractate VI.8[39] On Free Will and the Will of the One will, it is claimed, bring elements of answer to these questions. (shrink)

This review article is a discussion of Charles Larmore's book The Autonomy of Morality. After presenting an outline of Larmore's position, it focuses on three critical issues: whether Larmore is right to see Kant as an anti-realist; whether he deals adequately with the threat to autonomy posed by the apparent obligatoriness of morality; and whether he establishes that the constructivist idea of practical reason as self-legislating must really be as unconstrained and empty as he suggests.

The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene (...) or FDE. This blocks the usual road to fixed-point results for Kripke's theory of truth within these semantics and consequently the paper is predominantly an exploration of fixed point results for Kripke's theory of truth within non-monotone semantics. Using the theory of quasi-inductive definitions we show that in case of the subjunctive theories of knowledge the so-called Kripke jump will have fixed points despite the non-monotonicity of the semantics: Kripke's theory of truth can be successfully applied in the framework of subjunctive theories of knowledge. (shrink)

From Kierkegaard’s famous polemic against Hegel’s system, and Marx’s rejection of the “mysticism” of reason, to Heidegger’s claim that Hegel completes the tradition of western metaphysics, and contemporary critics’ identification of Hegel as the authoritative spokesman — the “Master” — for the principles of unity and identity, a standard view has governed interpretations and evaluations of Hegel’s philosophy. Though familiarity with the positions just cited reveals considerable disparity, one does not need an especially discerning eye to recognize the common features (...) of the figures drawn. Hegel is, in all of them, the philosopher of the Absolute, the proponent of metaphysics without equal in the modern world. (shrink)

Plato's Hesiod is a neglected topic, scholars having long regarded Plato's Homer as a more promising field of inquiry. My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that this particular bias of scholarly attention, although understandable, is unjustified. Of no other dialogue is this truer than of the Ion.

A fundamental change in the understanding of interpreting has taken place since the beginning of this century. Many interpreters no longer believe that in interpreting we discover the meaning of what was said or done. Meaning is understood as a product of interpreting, not its object: interpretations are constructions. This change does not free interpreters from the constraints of objectivity and it does not contribute to the lowering of standards for evaluating interpretations.

Walter Benjamin's influence on Theodor Adorno centers on the former's early philosophy of language, which drew on manifold sources, including importantly the theological writings of Johann Georg Hamann. Adorno adapts this “expressivist” philosophy of language as part of a critique of Hegel's dialectic that forms the basis for Adorno's understanding of epistemology and social criticism. The result of this tempered influence is that Benjamin's and Adorno's projects share a great deal of common ground and vocabulary, but diverge in fundamental ways. (...) These tensions come to the fore in Adorno's 1930s criticisms of Benjamin's unfinished Arcades Project. Of particular import are their respective understandings of Benjamin's notion of a constellation. For Adorno the constellation is a response to the dialectical tension in the relation between subject and object, while for Benjamin it transcends that relation. (shrink)

(2013). Hegel's Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 807-810. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2013.792778.

This paper considers how both Levinas and Løgstrup seek to explain how love of the neighbour is possible. It focuses on a criticism of Levinas made by Merold Westphal, which follows Kierkegaard in arguing on Lutheran grounds that such love first requires a relation to God as a “middle term,” but that Levinas cannot appeal to this relation to account for neighbour love, as for him the God relation itself arises through love of the neighbour. In response, the paper explores (...) how Løgstrup, while working in a Lutheran tradition, like Levinas also sees neighbour love as arising without any prior God relation, showing how the accounts that each offer of how this is possible serve to complement each other. (shrink)

This paper considers A. W. Moore’s treatment of Hegel in his book The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things. The paper begins by setting out the context that Moore gives to his discussion of Hegel, and the themes that he focuses on. It then considers the ways in which Moore judges Hegel to fall short, showing how they relate to Moore’s reading of Spinoza and of Deleuze. It is argued that there are ways of conceiving of Hegel’s position (...) that could be said to escape Moore’s objections, but at the very least he shows how they can be pressed against some important parts of Hegel’s text, if not others; thus one of the many ways in which Moore’s book is significant is in underlining the importance of this challenge. (shrink)

Unlike most books on Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language begins from the initial articulation of his thoughts in his first drafts, conversations, and lectures, and attends closely to the process of revision that led to the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. This introductory chapter provides information about the nature of the Wittgenstein papers, summarizes the rationale for reading his work in this way, and outlines the reading of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that this approach yields. This discussion on the (...) development of Wittgenstein’s thought emphasizes the role of his changing conception of the nature of experience and its relationship to the world, the closely related problem of the relationship between ordinary language and its analysis, his later conception of the role of analogies in generating — and dissolving — philosophical problems, the parallels with psychoanalysis, and the variety of philosophical methods employed in his later philosophical writing. There is also an overview of a central theme of the book as a whole: the contrast Wittgenstein drew between “ordinary” and “philosophical” ways of looking at things when he wrote the Tractatus, and how that contrast was transformed in his subsequent writing, focusing on his contrast between “primary” and “secondary” worlds and his notion of a “phenomenological language”. (shrink)

This book explores the complex relationship between the idealism and pragmatism, showing how they share important common ground, and illustrating their intertwined histories. This book was first published as a special issue of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.