The purpose of this paper is to refute an argument against the doctrine of creation presented by sartre in "being and nothingness". The central contention of this paper is that sartre is wrong in asserting that the otherness of the creature from God implies a distinctness of existence of the creature from God which renders creation impossible. The main body of the paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, An attempt is made to show that the biblical (...) treatment of creation does not carry with it the broken-Backed notion which sartre attributes to creation. In the second part, The biblical singers and chroniclers are shown to hold the view that god's otherness is not that of a distinct existence from the creature because they see god's being as that of "presence". Finally, By reflection on a creation passage in "amos", We are enabled to see that the presence/being concept of God helps make intelligible at least one example of the usage of creation language in the old testament. (edited). (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. There are various grounds for objecting to Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism, but none hold any water. The most common (...) objections are easily dismissed on the basis of the objector’s ignorance that Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism is unique and not subject to the same objections faced by the version of superdeterminism originally put forth by Dr. John Bell. Other objections based on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can be dismissed, because Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism disproves the Copenhagen interpretation and there is no direct evidence that the Copenhagen interpretation is true. Finally, a wide range of remaining objections can be dismissed for various specific reasons. (shrink)

The beginning of Plato's Philebus contains a puzzling argument: Socrates says that pleasures are different, and that this somehow supports the contention that not all pleasures are good (contrary to what the hedonist interlocutor, Protarchus, maintains). His argument has a bad reputation in the literature, and more to the point it is confusing. This paper sheds light on Socrates' argument by making use of principles from contemporary metaphysics. I argue that Socrates thinks of pleasure as exhibiting the structure that metaphysicians (...) today associate with determinables and determinates. Specifically, he thinks that what makes each pleasure a pleasure is a unique profile, which simultaneously differentiates it from other pleasures. As a result, the kind, 'pleasure', is really a relational principle of coherence between the different kinds of pleasure. I argue that, based on this metaphysical picture, we can see why Socrates thinks that it is possible that some pleasures are bad, contrary to hedonism. Beyond making sense of the dialectic in the Philebus, my paper advances a growing literature on the interesting metaphysical views developed in this section of Plato's dialogue. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism dismantles the main philosophical teachings of Friedrich Nietzsche, who professed self-construction of meaning in life through (...) one’s own will to power. However, it is impossible to self-construct meaning in life in the absence of cause and effect in physics. Moreover, superdeterminism strongly suggests the existence of a supremely intelligent God, who predetermined everything that happens in the universe, including the lives and thoughts of all human beings. Meaning in life is God given under the philosophy of superdeterminism. God is anything but dead. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The physics principle of locality states that an object is influenced directly only by its immediate surroundings due to causality. (...) However, the non-local phenomenon of spin measurement correlations observed in entangled particle pairs violates the principle of locality. This violation strongly suggests that the principle of locality and its foundational premise that cause and effect in physics are real are both false. Rather, the laws of physics are non-local or universal describing the organization of our whole static block universe without cause and effect in physics. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. In a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics, what we might traditionally call dynamic behavior or (...) causal relationships is reinterpreted as static patterns across the dimension of time described as correlations. If particles are statically patterned to behave a certain way through the dimension of time, one does not need a causal mechanism to account for their behavior. It is the wrong assumption that cause and effect in physics are real that leads to the imaginary belief in the real existence of quantum fields. A superdeterministic interpretation of the universe is one where all events, whether past, present or future, are predetermined and already exist in our static block universe and correlations between those events can produce patterns of behavior in those events through the dimension of time. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The scientifically verified bomb tester experiment also confirms the absence of cause and effect in physics. In this experiment, a (...) photon is directed towards a photon detecting “bomb” that will explode if it comes into contact with the photon preventing the photon from being detected at a later point. Remarkably, the experiment allows for determining whether a bomb is functional or not without detonating it. This is achieved by placing the bomb in one of the paths of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. If a bomb is live, its mere presence without detonation alters the photon's quantum superposition, changing the interference pattern observed. This experiment demonstrates that a “probabilistic cause” can have a real effect on whether a photon is detected later on despite possibilities not being real by definition. In other words, the bomb tester experiment proves a real effect without any interaction with a real cause confirming that cause and effect are merely illusory appearances of underlying correlations. (shrink)

A common assumption is that psychological egoism, the view that a person can do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest, combined with ought-implies-can, the view that a person morally ought to do an act only if she can do it, entails the view – call it OIB – that a person morally ought to do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest. I argue that psychological egoism and (...) ought-implies-can, interpreted fairly, use “can” in different ways; consequently, they do not entail OIB. They entail something similar to OIB, but not OIB itself. From these facts several significant results follow, each concerning arguments or assumptions about psychological, ethical, or rational egoism. For instance, they undermine the view that psychological egoism rules out those other two forms of egoism. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism dismantles the philosophical teachings of Jean-Paul Sartre, who professed that humans are condemned to be free, (...) burdened with the responsibility of creating their own essence through their choices. However, it is impossible for human beings to self-construct their own essence through their choices in the absence of cause and effect in physics. Moreover, superdeterminism strongly suggests the existence of a supremely intelligent God, who predetermined everything that happens in the universe, including the lives and thoughts of all human beings. Human essence is God given under the philosophy of superdeterminism co-existing with human existence in our static block universe. (shrink)

In reply to the readily inferable denial, in para. 304 of the papal exhortation Amoris Laetitia, that there are any exceptionless negative moral norms, this article (1) recalls and reaffirms the philosophical and doctrinal tradition’s thesis that there are such norms. It then (2) sketches what is involved in identifying a kinds of act by its object; (3) reflects briefly on the three successive and different iterations of the teaching of the Catechism of the Catholic Church on capital punishment; and (...) (4) draws attention to the Catechism’s notable but little discussed, non-pacifist teaching against all intending to kill, even in just war. ------------------------------------ Received: 30/04/2024. Reviewed: 25/09/2024. Accepted: 7/10/2024. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism rejects the main philosophical teachings of Ludwig Feuerbach, who argued that belief in a fictitious God (...) only distracts humanity from its potential to make the world a better place. Feuerbach was incorrect in his assertion that material reality does not support the existence of an immaterial God, because experimentally verified scientific data supporting Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the correlations observed in the spin measurement results of entangled particles provided circumstantial scientific evidence of the existence of God, who created our superdeterministic universe outside of spacetime. Moreover, God must have predetermined Christianity to be the predominant world religion allowing the reasonable inference of the truth of the Christian claim about the nature of God and the afterlife. Because God saw fit to predetermine Christianity as His world religion, it seems very unlikely that God would have predetermined the future of humanity to forget Christianity and opt-in for the atheism Feuerbach suggested. (shrink)

This chapter analyses several pages of handwritten notes in which G. E. M. Anscombe explores her disagreement with Wittgenstein’s view of the will and of moral value. While the notes are undated, there is strong textual evidence for dating them to a period no later than the mid-1950s: first, because elements in them parallel what Anscombe wrote about Wittgenstein in a pair of letters to The Tablet in 1954; and second, because lines from the notes are mirrored in both the (...) first edition of /Intention/, published in 1957 and deriving from lectures that Anscombe delivered in Hilary Term (January-March) of that year, and /An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus/, published in 1958 and deriving from lectures delivered in the Michaelmas (October-December) and Hilary Terms of 1957-1958. Because of this, the notes shed new light on the philosophical background to the conception of the will and of voluntary and intentional action that Anscombe works out in /Intention/—including the inspiration for her well-known formula, “I do what happens,” which appears verbatim in these notes. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism dismisses many commonly held beliefs as illusions of our static block universe. People widely believe in (...) many things which simply are not true under Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism. Rather, these false beliefs are merely illusions caused by our static block universe without cause and effect in physics. These illusions include cause and effect in physics, locality, motion, an open future, free will on Earth, the independent existence of objects, and time as a flowing river or background ticking clock. However, the idea of illusions in our block universe is quite old with its roots in Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity first published in 1905. So, we need to recognize that our common sense is being fooled by illusions created by our static block universe. (shrink)

From early in his philosophical career, Spinoza took a central part of his project to involve identifying the nature and scope of human power. For, he argues, "The better the mind understands its own powers, the more easily it can direct itself and propose rules to itself" (TIE[40]). Thus, the practical goals of living well, and of building a stable, well- functioning social order, are both intimately connected to the metaphysics of power. This entry provides an overview of Spinoza’s account (...) of power, both in his metaphysics and in his politics. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism based on Dr. Hansson’s proof relies on a superdeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics. This interpretation says (...) that quantum level behavior is predetermined in our static block universe without cause and effect in physics to exactly match the predictions of QFT for the behavior of real physical entities, like particles, without the real existence of quantum fields. The superdeterministic interpretation should be favored over the QFT, Copenhagen or Many Worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics, because Dr. Hansson proved that cause and effect in physics are not real and those other interpretations rely on cause and effect in physics. (shrink)

In The Moral Problem, Smith defended an analysis of moral judgments based on a number of platitudes about morality. The platitudes are supposed to constitute conceptual constraints which an analysis of moral terms must capture “on pain of not being an analysis of moral terms at all”. This paper discusses this philosophical methodology in light of the fact that the propositions identified as platitudes are not obvious truths – they are propositions we can be uncertain about. This, we argue, is (...) a kind of fundamental philosophical uncertainty, and we develop an account of fundamental uncertainty (for both philosophical and other issues). The key to understand such uncertainty, on our view, is conceptual opacity – i.e., that the content and reference of concepts is not necessarily transparent to competent concept users. We argue that Smith’s own view of conceptual analysis in TMP provides one plausible explanation of fundamental uncertainty. However, we also argue that another potential explanation is conceptual indeterminacy. If some fundamental philosophical uncertainties are best explained in this way, the implication is that there is no determinately correct analysis of the target terms and concepts. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism is also supported by recent research in quantum physics experimentally verifying the reality of negative time (...) delay. The exiting of a photon peak prior to the entrance of the same peak into a medium is best explained by this apparent effect-like event occurring prior to and correlated with the cause-like event in a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. Our superdeterministic universe can be predetermined to exhibit everything a quantum field theory interpretation of negative time delay predicts without any reliance on unobservable quantum fields. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism counters the Problem of Evil with the Evolution Theodicy. The Problem of Evil challenges the compatibility (...) of the existence of evil with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God, who could and should prevent all evil. The Evolution Theodicy says that evil as necessary for the creation of life from natural processes cannot be avoided by God. If the only available natural process for creating life within a static block reality is Darwinian evolution which leads to evil, then that is the process God must use for the great good that created life exist. (shrink)

"Singular thing" (res singulares) is one of the terms Spinoza uses to denote finite particulars. The term figures prominently in most of his philosophical works. However, its precise meaning evolves from its earliest appearance in the TIE to its final appearance in the Ethics. In the Ethics, the definition of the term (i) stipulates that singular things are finite and (ii) specifies the conditions under which many things compose one singular thing. However, in Spinoza’s earlier writings, the term is not (...) restricted to finite and mutable things, nor is it associated with the composition of one (singular) thing from many distinct things. This short entry traces those shifts in meaning. (shrink)

Many of Spinoza’s arguments, ranging from his metaphysics to his political philosophy, draw on claims about the relationship between part (pars) and whole (totus). This entry surveys Spinoza’s views about the metaphysics of parts and wholes, as well as the various ways that mereological concepts figure in different elements of his system.

Both of Spinoza’s major political works make frequent use of the concept of right (jus). However, his understanding of right–both natural right and political right–is not moralistic. That is, to have (a) right is not an intrinsic moral status, such that others have a moral obligation either to provide some benefit or to avoid interference with the rightsholder. For Spinoza, if someone lacks the actual power to take some action or secure some benefit, they also lack the right to take (...) that action or obtain that benefit. The same point applies to political authorities: when a political authority lacks the power to enact some law, it is simply false that they have the right to enact that law. Spinoza holds that in our political thinking, we must confront the actual distribution of power in the world, not "a Fantasy, possible only in a Utopia, or in the golden age of the Poets" (TP1.1). This entry examines three components of Spinoza’s view of right: his doctrine of natural right; his account of how people transfer their natural right to a central authority to form a civil order; and his notion of being sui juris, in command of one’s own right. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that a poem is expressive, even self-expressive? How can listeners be said to self-identify with the expressive content of a lyric? What is the relevant notion of ‘self’ here, and how does it help explain the communicative dimension of the lyric arts? Might the answer to these questions tell us something about the social and cognitive value of the lyric arts? This paper uses a discussion of Karen Simecek’s superb The Philosophy of Lyric Voice (...) to explore these issues. (shrink)

We explore the connection between four major inferential paradigms in statistical science and inferential practice in current econometrics. We develop the argument that econometrics is still largely characterized by John Stuart Mill’s conception of statistical inference from data, who saw a distinction between ‘theorists’ and ‘practical men’. We follow up with a review of all empirical papers published in the Top 5 economics journals in the period 2000–2018 (N = 2,258). In spite of Rodrik’s [(2015). Economics rules: The rights (...) and wrongs of the dismal science. W. W. Norton & Company] much-debated notion of economics that sees issues of model selection at the core of the discipline, the ‘theory first’ / ‘pre-eminence of theory’ approach vastly dominates in the sample (94.0%). When model selection and model uncertainty is accounted for, this largely happens under the frequentist statistical paradigm. This finding may be explained by frequentism’s special role as an ‘orientational paradigm’ (Hoyningen-Huene and Kincaid, [2023]. What makes economics special: Orientational paradigms. Journal of Economic Methodology, 30(2), 188–202) in economics. (shrink)

There are extensive literatures on two kinds of non-anthropocentric values: animal welfare and such environmental goods as biodiversity and ecosystem integrity. These values are also widely recognized and have influenced public policy. But there is no generally accepted overarching conception of the welfare of life on Earth. Such conceptions are described here, their potential utility is explained, and various objections and difficulties are addressed. So broad a conception of welfare must have multiple components, including an expansive conception of physical health (...) and, for sentient life forms, a conception of hedonic well-being. These are incommensurable, so methods are needed for accommodating and aggregating incommensurable values. Such methods are described. Finally, three problems of application are briefly discussed: establishing well-grounded measures of welfare, obtaining the data necessary to use them, and making the results intelligible to decision-makers and the public. (shrink)

This paper explores the theme of religious naturalism, attempting to clarify different salient meanings for both component terms. We consider what forms of religious naturalism may recommend themselves as serious options for contemporary religious commitment. We argue that a viable robustly religious naturalist option may be built on the idea that the natural Universe has an overall purpose.

This paper explores the limitations of artificial intelligence (AI) in fulfilling the obligations inherent in close personal relationships, particularly in the context of loneliness. While AI technologies may offer some of the goods that we associate with close personal relationships, they lack the capacity for genuine commitment and individualized care that characterize human interactions. The finitude of human existence—our cognitive, emotional, and temporal limitations— and our capacity to make judgments concerning distinct kinds of value imbues human relationships with significance that (...) AI cannot replicate. (shrink)

Taking a critical perspective more political than that usually adopted by classicists, John Alvis demonstrates in this study that the Iliad, Odyssey and Aeneid each present a distinct political teaching regarding human ends and the form of civil society most conducive to the realization of those ends. Referring to the mysterious "plan of Zeus" announced in the opening lines of the Iliad but never explained, Alvis argues that both Homer's Zeus and Virgil's Jupiter guide their heroes to embody principles (...) of natural justice that in turn found political constitutions. The Political Plan of Zeus represents the first comprehensive theory of the meaning of Zeus's providence in both Homeric poems, a new interpretation of the muse in Homer, and the first attempt to compare the Aeneid with Platonic-Aristotelian teaching on the nature of man and the problem of empire. This book will be of interest to upper-level undergraduates and scholars of politics, philosophy, and the classics. (shrink)

Keywords: geology instrument probe Earth interior crust magma core crack underground nuclear explosion molten iron China Syndrome melting rock Published in the December-2003 issue of Analog Science Fiction & Fact Magazine ; This column was written and submitted 06/22/2003 and is copyrighted ©2003 by John G. Cramer. All rights reserved. No part may be reproduced in any form without the explicit permission of the author.

The paper argues for a model of polysemy based on the blueprint offered by Paul Pietroski whereby the meaning of a lexical item is an instruction to fetch a concept from an address. We show that the bare idea of fetching admits of a deep construal, where a concept is fetched, and a shallow construal, where the instruction merely links a lexical item to an address without automatically retrieving anything from the address; retrieval only occurs when the item is embedded (...) within a syntactic structure. We offer considerations in favour of the shallow construal, which is consistent with a root conception of lexical items. (shrink)

Technological unemployment is what happens when automation eliminates jobs and not enough new jobs arrive to employ everyone, leaving part of the workforce permanently unemployed. Who owns the money that used to pay them? Business owners will argue that it’s theirs. I will argue that it’s not. I consider and refute several arguments for their claim, and then argue that this money is collective property. Because it’s collective property, we can use it to fund basic incomes for the technologically unemployed (...) without violating anyone’s property rights. Moreover, it is equal in amount to the total incomes lost to technological unemployment, and therefore big enough to fund a decent standard of living for the unemployed, no matter how numerous they are. This is a new kind of collective property, distinct and different from other collective properties, such as the natural world, employment rents, and social capital. (shrink)

In response to a recent article by Myron Penner, April Cordero, and Amanda Nichols in this journal, this essay offers a critical analysis. Their article makes a case against gender essentialism rooted in biology, drawing from the biology of sex determination. While commending their thorough exposition of the science of sex determination, we argue that most of their anthropological conclusions are unfounded. After reviewing their article, we present several criticisms that undermine their case. In particular, we take issue with the (...) authors’ methodological commitments and demonstrate that the evidence they present from the science of human sex determination does not convincingly support rejecting an essentialist view of biological sex. Furthermore, we argue that human sexuality solidifies into a binary and fixed state following sex determination during gestation. Contrary to the original essay, our analysis concludes that the science of sex determination leaves wide open the possibility that some biology-based form of gender essentialism is true. (shrink)

Concerns about the dangers of social comparison emerge in multiples places in Kierkegaard’s authorship. I argue that these concerns—and his critique of the role of “the public”—take on a new relevance in the digital age. In this article, I focus on one area where concerns about the risks of social comparison are paramount: the contemporary debate about moral grandstanding or “virtue-signaling”. Neil Levy and Evan Westra have recently attempted to defend virtue-signaling against Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke’s critique. I argue (...) that these defences fail and that a consideration of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers is critical to seeing why. The over-confidence to which they give rise exacerbates certain vices with the potential to do moral, social and epistemic harm: I focus in particular on self-righteousness (complementing Kierkegaard’s discussion of envy). I then argue that Kierkegaard’s contrast between the religious category of the “single individual”—the genuine person of “character”—and the person who effectively appeals to the authority of some version of “the public” deepens our understanding of why we should reject defences of virtue-signaling. It helps us to distinguish between two kinds of virtue-signaler (“superficial enthusiasts” and “clear-eyed cynics”), both of whom contribute, in different ways, to the negative impacts of the vice of self-righteousness. Contrary to Levy’s claim that virtue-signaling is virtuous, I conclude that typically it is closer to vice than to virtue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews How Philosophy Uses Its Past. By John Herman Randall, Jr. Foreword by Cornelius Krus~. (The Matehette Lectures, Wesleyan University, 1961; New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv + 106. $3.50.) One could easily characterize this small volume as a minor masterpiece on a major theme. It is an admirable statement from the pen of one of America's leading thinkers in both the history (...) of philosopy and philosophy "proper." Actually the distinction between these two fields of philosophic activity becomes superfluous since Professor Randall has an elaborate theory of his own, whereby to do philosophy and do it well involves, in a serious and inescapable way, competent performance in the history of philosophy. How Philosophy UsesIts Past may have to be read, and I propose here that it should, as the general introduction to Randall's projected three volumes of his monumental The Career of Philosophy, of which only Volume One has been published. The close analyses of specific men and issues presented in the latter work can be seen as the evidence meant to corroborate the thesis asserted in How Philosophy Uses Its Past. In his own words: "It remains true that it is impossible to gain insight into the history of philosophical ideas--into the dimensions of philosophizing--without being led to formulate a philosophy of cultural change" (p. 20). Randall has made in this volume a significant contribution if only by way of focusing his powerful lens on three central issues: (1) how genuine philosophizing is still "metaphysical" thinking; (2) why it is necessary to undertake a thorough investigation of the antecedents leading up to our prevailing philosophies of experience; (3) how to understand the seemingly chaotic situation in our philosophical affairs, under the age-old distinction of the "one and many." In a critical and appreciative article on Lovejoy, Randall stated his reservations toward Lovejoy's "atomistic" conception of intellectual history and proceeded to note that the history of philosophy has a philosophic function iust as philosophy has historical dimensions such that when adequately explored can tell us much about the nature and limits of our own philosophizing.1 A permeative thesis in the volume under review is that to do "history of philosophy" is to do "philosophy." To show how and why Randall believes this to be the case, we must consider in some detail three of his main themes: the redefinition of metaphysics, the broader conception of experience, and the "one and many" aspect of contemporary philosophy. One may go so far as to say that Randall is doing philosophy just as he is formulating a theory of the philosophy, for the sake of responding philosophically to the stated problems. But to respond philosophically is something that one must learn in conjunction with the examination of the historical past of philosophy. Randall thus believes, on the evidence gathered, that philosophy has revealed itself to be "a clarification and criticism of fundamental beliefs involved in all the great enterprises of human culture, science, art, religion, the moral, social and practical activity, when some new idea or some altered experience has impinged upon them and generated intellectual tensions and maladjustments" (pp. 19; 100). This way of understanding philosophy affects his approach to every problem he mentions. Indeed, even the denial of the importance of the history of philosophy is rooted in historical processes which must be understood before the denial can be fully illumined. Without historical knowledge, he argues even our decisions will suffer (p. 14). Randall calls his approach to defining philosophical problems "operational." Accordingly, we do not know whether we have a philosophical problem until a philosophical response has occurred. Looking back from the response to what it was that philosophers responded to, we See Randall's "Arthur O. Lovejoy and the History of Ideas," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,XXII (1963), 475-479; also book under review, p. 36. [1071 108 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY discover that these were problems that emerged "whenever strife of ideas and experiences forced men back to the fundamental assumptions in any field" (p. 18). Briefly put, the response has always been that of analysing, clarifying, criticizing and reconstructing "fundamental assumptions." The problems vary and... (shrink)

In _The Political Economy of the Spectacle and Postmodern Caste_, John Asimakopoulos analyzes the political economy of the spectacle conceptualized by philosophers like Guy Debord through a broad interdisciplinary-nonsectarian approach concluding every society is a caste system legitimized by ideology.

Mind 116:462 (2007): 371–85. (A reply to John Broome’s comment, “Wide or Narrow Scope?”).

Education is twice over concerned with human nature, most extensively as it is presupposed in the pursuit of diverse aims, and more specifically, as understanding it and applying such understanding are themselves made objects of study and teaching. The latter was a principal concern of ancient, renaissance and enlightenment humanists. These and others who focussed on the human condition have tended to arrive at one of the three attitudes: the celebratory, the gloomy and the condemnatory. Recent decades have seen tyrannies, (...) global wars, campaigns of genocide, economic crises, seemingly irreconcilable political polarisation, man‐made environmental degradation and other evils. Besides posing practical challenges, these put in question ideas of historical progress, of social harmony and of personal flourishing, and thereby have implications for an understanding of the human condition and for what to teach concerning it, and what qualities of character to seek to inculcate. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that the wellknown date of Medieval Philosophy, which stretches from 500 to 1500, hides its richness and influences (from previous thought and to posterior thought) and, at the same time, applies extremely rigid boundaries. Facing this theory here is defended the idea of a Long Middle Ages in the Philosophy of the broad Western tradition, which stretches from 200 to 1700. Along these pages, this thesis will be justified, and some objections will be faced, such (...) as that it homogenizes different types of philosophy, that it underestimates the importance of modern science, or that it overlooks Renaissance Philosophy. (shrink)

One of the aims of phenomenology was to uncover a logic of the sensible world. This essay shows how rhythm can be understood as a logic of the sensible world and how rhythm is not only a profoundly aesthetic experience but one integral to phenomenological reflection. The essay highlights how aesthetic experiences accomplish phenomenological reductions and how phenomenological reflection demands a continued inquiry into the ways intelligibility first opens from within the sensible world. Rhythm is shown to be a preverbal (...) logic and expressive power that takes place between sensing and the sensible. The essay explores how art and phenomenology draw upon rhythms to bring forth senses of experience that normally get passed over and escape conceptual determination. The investigation digs beneath predicated experience and propositional language to reveal how rhythm is a preverbal mode of inquiry that takes place between solicitations made by the sensible and the body’s sensitive responsiveness. Rhythm establishes an original synchronic relation to sensible things that allows nascent forms of intelligibility to come into a dynamic and living clarity. However, rhythms comprise a latent form of intentionality that precedes the act-object schema of intentionality. As a form of intentionality rooted in the senses, rhythm is shown to be a mode of transport that effectuates absorptive experiences which pose unique challenges for phenomenological reflection and aesthetic theory. Nonetheless, rhythm helps clarify one way in which sources of intelligibility not only grow out of the sensible world but retain an enduring aesthetic quality. (shrink)

Human Rights and Common Good collects John Finnis's wide-ranging work on central issues in political philosophy. The subjects explored include the general theory of political community and justice; the nature and role of human rights; national territory and migrants' and non-citizens' rights; the justification of punishment; and the public control of euthanasia, abortion, and marriage.

The Seductions of Psychoanalysis reflects on the history of psychoanalysis, its conceptual foundations and its relation to other disciplines. John Forrester probes the origins of psychoanalysis and its most beguiling concept, the transference, which is at once its institutional axis and experimental core. He explores the most seductive of all recent psychoanalytic traditions, that inspired by Jacques Lacan, whose radical questioning of psychoanalytic effects has been continued implicitly by Michel Foucault and explicitly by Jacques Derrida. Other key questions addressed (...) include the significance of speech in the talking cure, and the relationship between the 'real' of psychoanalysis and the fictionality of the 'truth' it offers. Dr Forrester also focuses on the relationship between psychoanalysis and the feminine, on analysis and gossip, on the borderline of seduction and rape, and on the women who have played such a crucial role in the history of psychoanalysis, as patients, analysts or both. (shrink)

This article begins with an account of some of the different views on the nature of free will which have been expressed by historically important Muslim thinkers. The views of both Muslim philosophers and theologians are addressed. It is demonstrated that some held compatibilist views while others held libertarian views. In the second half of the paper, Robert Kane gives a summary account of the latest version of his libertarian view of free will, putting it in relation to the Muslim (...) views considered in the first half of the paper. (shrink)

How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy asks and answers two central questions: What is rationality in international politics? Are states rational? We begin with a summary of our arguments in the book and explain why we find the existing literature on the rational actor assumption wanting. Next we respond to our critics, who challenge our position on both conceptual and empirical grounds. We conclude with a discussion of the relationship between rationality and realism.