Das Buch legt in geschichtlicher Reihenfolge dar, wie sich herausragende Denker des Abendlandes Gott geistig und geistlich angenähert haben und wer für sie Gott im Wesentlichen war. So war für die antiken Philosophen Platon und Plotin das Göttliche vor allem das Gute, Schöne oder Eine. Als christliche Denker suchten dann im Früh- und Hochmittelalter Augustinus, Richard von St. Viktor und Thomas von Aquin auf je eigene Weise die Dreieinheit Gottes zu erklären. Am Beginn der Neuzeit endete die lebenslange Suche des (...) Nikolaus von Kues nach dem angemessensten Gottesbegriff schliesslich beim "Können selbst." In der Neuzeit erfuhr Teresa von Avila Gott als das Innerste ihrer Seele, während ihr Ordensbruder Johannes vom Kreuz Gott als lebendige Liebesflamme erlebte. In seinen "Meditationen" bestimmte Descartes Gott als das vollkommenste Wesen. Wiederum dem dreieinen Gott näherte sich Hegel mit seiner spekulativen Lehre vom Reich des Vaters, des Sohnes und des Geistes. Für Hans Urs von Balthasar war im 20. Jh. das stellvertretende Leiden des Gottessohnes für uns Menschen von entscheidender Bedeutung. Im selben Zeitraum verstand Karl Rahner Gott primär als das heilige Geheimnis. Anhand eines Hauptwerkes oder mehrerer Werke wird jeweils der Weg oder ein Weg dieser Denker zu Gott nachgezeichnet. Ausserdem werden mithilfe neuerer angelsächsischer Diskussionen einige Eigenschaften Gottes erörtert: sein Schöpfertum sowie seine Allmacht, Allwissenheit und Ewigkeit.-- Back cover. (shrink)

In seinem Werk "Philosophie als Lebensform" vertritt Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) die These, dass die Philosophie bis zu Beginn der hochmittelalterlichen Scholastik nicht primar Wissenschaft mit Anspruch auf systematische Stimmigkeit und Objektivitat sei, sondern auf einen psychologisch-padagogischen Effekt fur die Lebenspraxis abziele: Die Philosophie der hellenistischen und romischen Epoche stellt sich als eine Lebensweise, eine Lebenskunst und eine Seinsweise dar. Es geht darum, das Sein des Menschen zu verwandeln und ihm zum Gluck zu verhelfen. Das fruhe Christentum sowie das mittelalterliche Monchtum (...) knupften daran an und verstanden das spirituelle Leben als philosophia, die durch die Praxis geistiger Ubungen in Christus den alten Menschen ablegt und den neuen anzieht (vgl. Eph 4,22-24). In der Mystik, die seit Dionysius Areopagita (ca. 500 n. Chr.) zu einem expliziten Inhalt des Denkens wird, spitzt sich dieses Spannungsverhaltnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu. Per definitionem ist Mystik eine uberwaltigende Erfahrung, die alle Affekte involviert. Aber genau diese Erfahrung wird schon in der vorchristlichen griechischen Philosophie zum Inhalt einer rationalen Reflexion. Dementsprechend oszilliert der Begriff einer theologia mystica zwischen unmittelbarem Erleben und systematischer Theorie. Mit Beitragen von Rolf Darge, Lioba Fau OSB, Paul D. Hellmeier OP, Johannes Herzgsell SJ, William J. Hoye, Johann Kreuzer, Isabelle Mandrella, Johannes Schaber OSB, Christian Schafer, Peter Sloterdijk, Wolfgang Speyer und Martin Thurner. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms and Elliott Sober, who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, Savage’s model —can (...) actually be vindicated in evolutionary biology, provided that the pay-offs are computed in inclusive fitness terms. I also show that the use of this model is better avoided when pay-offs are non-additive, or when certain causal influences affect the outcome of natural selection. The result is a partial rehabilitation of this mode of thinking, conditional on both the additivity of the pay-off structure and the absence of any form of manipulation or coercion. _1_ Introduction _2_ When Natural Selection and Rational Deliberation Part Ways _3_ A Simple Solution: Redefining the Pay-offs in Inclusive Fitness Terms _4_ Sober on Inclusive Fitness Maximization _5_ Inclusive Fitness with Non-additive Pay-offs _6_ Causal Influences and the Savage– Hamilton Model _6.1_ Reciprocity and partner choice _6.2_ Coercion and manipulation _7_ Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency--the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others (...) focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesus H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout. (shrink)

In der Literatur finden sich zahlreiche Hinweise, dass die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern in demokratischen Regierungssystemen besser funktioniert als in autokratischen Alternativen. Klassischerweise wird diese Beobachtung durch Unterschiede in den Anreizstrukturen demokratischer und autokratischer Entscheidungsverfahren erklärt (vgl. de Mesquita et al. 2005; Olson 2000). Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert eine weitere Erklä- rung für Unterschiede zwischen den unterschiedlichen Regierungstypen. Aufbauend auf die Debatte zur epistemischen Rechtfertigung demokrati- scher Entscheidungsverfahren (siehe Estlund 2000, Estlund und Landemo- re 2012, 2018) analysieren wir, ob demokratische (...) Regime auch einen insti- tutionell bedingten epistemischen Vorteil haben. Wir untersuchen diese Frage mit Hilfe eines Modells, in dem Akteure vor der Aufgabe stehen, das optimale Niveau öffentlicher Gütern zu bestimmen. Es gilt für die Akteure also, den optimalen Steuersatz zu schätzen. Wir implementieren dieses Modell in eine agentenbasierte Computersimulation und analysie- ren, wie gut es Akteuren innerhalb von zwei idealtypisch verfassten, po- litischen Systemen (Demokratie und Autokratie) gelingt, diese Aufgabe zu lösen. Die resultierenden Ergebnisse erlauben uns, die epistemische Qualität von demokratischen und nicht-demokratischen, kollektiven Ent- scheidungsverfahren zu vergleichen. Wir finden erstens einen positiven Effekt der epistemischen Vielfalt großer Gruppen, die in demokratischen Entscheidungsverfahren zur Geltung kommt (für ähnliche Ergebnisse im Gebiet wissenschaftlicher Gemeinschaften siehe Zollman 2010, O'Connor und Bruner 2019). Zweitens zeigt sich überraschenderweise, dass demokra- tische Entscheidungsverfahren am besten abschneiden, wenn die Bürger auch ihre eigenen Bedürfnisse priorisieren und kommunizieren, anstatt in ihren Interaktionen mit ihren Mitbürgern lediglich das optimale Niveau des öffentlichen Nutzens aus der Sicht der Gruppe zu kommunizieren. Schließlich findet sich ein positiver Effekt von zeitlich begrenzten Deli- berationsphasen auf die epistemische Qualität kollektiver Abstimmungser- gebnisse. (shrink)

In social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own (expected) reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms ([1994], [1996]) and Elliott Sober ([1998]), who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, (...) Savage’s model ([1954])—can actually be vindicated in evolutionary biology, provided that the pay-offs are computed in inclusive fitness terms. I also show that the use of this model is better avoided when pay-offs are non-additive, or when certain causal influences (due to manipulative behaviours) affect the outcome of natural selection. The result is a partial rehabilitation of this mode of thinking, conditional on both the additivity of the pay-off structure and the absence of any form of manipulation or coercion. 1 Introduction2 When Natural Selection and Rational Deliberation Part Ways3 A Simple Solution: Redefining the Pay-offs in Inclusive Fitness Terms4 Sober on Inclusive Fitness Maximization5 Inclusive Fitness with Non-additive Pay-offs6 Causal Influences and the Savage– Hamilton Model6.1 Reciprocity and partner choice6.2 Coercion and manipulation7 ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

The term ‘identity politics’ is used to refer to a wide range of political movements. In this paper, we look at the theoretical ideas underpinning two strongly, mutually opposed forms of identity politics, and identify some crucial differences between them. We critically compare the identitarian ideology of the New Right with feminist standpoint theory, focusing on two issues: relativism and essentialism. In carrying out this critical comparison we illuminate under-theorized aspects of both new right identitarianism and standpoint theory; demonstrate how (...) the two are distinct; reveal the depth and pervasiveness of the new right ideology’s flaws; and show what a coherent left-wing identity politics could look like. (shrink)

Isaac Levi is more interested in inquiry and how it progresses than he is in metaphysics. Questions concerning the role of disposition predicates in inquiry are more central to him than those concerning the nature and reality of dispositions. It has not stopped him from giving me and others very useful metaphysical advice. Currently, where empirical metaphysics is in vogue, there is every reason to see whether the two forms of philosophical interest might interlock substantially. Levi has stimulating ideas indeed (...) on the two forms of philosophical interest, and has recently summarized them in the slogan: “The reality of dispositions is a work in progress”. We can learn much about what kinds of dispositions are acceptable from tracing and comparing the histories of successful and less successful disposition predicates in scientific inquiry. Levi explores one route along which dispositions become real. His idea is that the introduction of dispositions facilitates covering law explanation by increasing the number of laws. The successful disposition predicate eventually becomes integrated in scientific theory, much like an ordinary theoretical term, whereas the unsuccessful does not. My impression is that Levi thinks that this is the only way a disposition can become real. To evaluate this claim, an alternative course suggested by Jon Elster is introduced. I then try to bring out the differences between Levi's and Elster's views on dispositions, partly by suggesting that they resemble two aspects of full explanations discussed by Wesley Salmon. But more about that below. (shrink)

Thinking about organisms as if they were rational agents which could choose their own phenotypic traits according to their fitness values is a common heuristic in the field of evolutionary theory. In a 1998 paper, however, Elliott Sober has emphasized several alleged shortcomings of this kind of analogical reasoning when applied to the analysis of social behaviors. According to him, the main flaw of this heuristic is that it proves to be a misleading tool when it is used for predicting (...) the evolution of cooperation. Here, I show that these charges raised against the heuristic use of this analogy are misguided. I argue, contra Sober, that such a heuristic turns out to be a perfect predictive tool in all relevant contexts where cooperation can at least evolve. Moreover, I argue that it constitutes a powerful and sufficient methodological framework for the analysis of social evolution. (shrink)

Über das Moralische an der Moral : der evaluative Charakter moralischer Wertungen und die Problematik deontischer Moralauffassungen -- Der konkrete und der generalisierte Andere : über das Verhältnis von Moral und Politik -- Moralische Dilemmata und die Grenzen der Moral -- Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte -- Warum Gerechtigkeit? : über die normative Verfasstheit der sozialen Welt in Auseinandersetzung mit Amartya Sens Theorie der Gerechtigkeit -- Was ist Religion? : über die Präsenz des Ewigen im Zeitlichen und das Verhältnis von religiöser und (...) säkularer Wirklichkeitsauffassung -- Weltgestaltung als ethische Aufgabe : über die Bedeutung der Reformation für die Entstehung des ethischen Denkens der Moderne -- Über die spirituelle Dimension der Medizin -- Bioethik oder "Biomacht?" : über intellektuelle Mythifizierung. (shrink)

In recent years, the construct of mindfulness has gained growing attention in psychological research. However, little is known about the effects of mindfulness on interpersonal interactions and social relationships at work. Addressing this gap, the purpose of this study was to investigate the role of mindfulness in leader-follower-relationships. Building on prior research, we hypothesize that leaders’ mindfulness is reflected in a specific communication style (“mindfulness in communication”), which is positively related to followers’ satisfaction with their leaders. We used nested survey (...) data from 34 leaders and 98 followers from various organizations and tested mediation hypotheses using hierarchical linear modeling. Our hypotheses were confirmed by our data. Leaders’ self-reported mindfulness showed a positive relationship with several aspects of followers’ satisfaction. This relationship was fully mediated by leaders’ mindfulness in communication as perceived by their followers. Our findings emphasize the potential value of mindfulness in workplace settings. They provide empirical evidence for a positive link between leaders’ dispositional mindfulness and the wellbeing of their followers, indicating that mindfulness is not solely an individual resource but also fosters interpersonal skills. By examining leaders’ mindfulness in communication as an explanatory process, we created additional clarification about how leaders’ mindfulness relates to followers’ perceptions. Moreover, by suggesting mindfulness in communication as a behavioral correlate of mindfulness, we offered a promising starting point for indirect measures of mindfulness. (shrink)

In this investigation we explore a general strategy for constructing modal theories where the modal notion is conceived as a predicate. The idea of this strategy is to develop modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth. In this first paper of our two part investigation we develop the general strategy and then apply it to the axiomatic theory of truth Friedman-Sheard. We thereby obtain the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. The theory Modal Friedman-Sheard is then discussed from three different perspectives. First, we (...) show that Modal Friedman-Sheard preserves theoremhood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic. Second, we turn to semantic aspects and develop a modal semantics for the newly developed theory. Third, we investigate whether the modal predicate of Modal Friedman-Sheard can be understood along the lines of a proposal of Kripke, namely as a truth predicate modified by a modal operator. (shrink)

In this second and last paper of the two part investigation on "Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth" we apply a general strategy for constructing modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth to the theory Kripke-Feferman. This general strategy was developed in the first part of our investigation. Applying the strategy to Kripke-Feferman leads to the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman which we discuss from the three perspectives that we had already considered in the first paper, where we discussed the theory Modal (...) Friedman-Sheard. That is, we first show that Modal Kripke-Feferman preserves theoremhood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic. Second, we develop a modal semantics fitting the newly developed theory. Third, we investigate whether the modal predicate of Modal Kripke-Feferman can be understood along the lines of a proposal of Kripke, namely as a truth predicate modified by a modal operator. (shrink)

Der Band gibt wichtige Impulse für die methodologische Reflexion der historischen Kulturwissenschaften. Er geht auf eine Tagung zurück, deren Thema "Dichtung und Wahrheit. Zum Verhältnis von Narration und Erklärung in den Kultur-, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften" war. Die Autoren greifen zum ersten Mal im kulturwissenschaftlichen Kontext Anregungen vor allem aus der Analytischen Philosophie auf und diskutieren ihren Wert für historisches und kulturwissenschaftliches Arbeiten. Im Fokus der Untersuchungen steht eine Begriffstrias, die für die Sozial-, Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften gleichermaßen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (...) eine große Herausforderung darstellt: Erklären, Verstehen und Erzählen. (shrink)

Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird ausgeführt, dass das psychoanalytische Geschehen sich in mehreren Dimensionen entfaltet. Drei solcher Dimensionen – als Bedeutung (Erkenntnis), Berührung (Kontakt) und Bewegung (Ereignis) bezeichnet – werden beschrieben und deren dimensionale Charakteristik auf die Sinnesqualitäten des Sehens, des Berührungssinnes und des Hörens bezogen. Es wird gezeigt, dass sie Raum und Zeit auf je eigene Weise konstituieren und somit einander inkommensurable, durch keine logische oder dialektische Operation in eine Einheit überführbare Aprioritäten darstellen. Mit deren Unvereinbarkeit ist auch auf (...) Grenzen theoretisch-begrifflicher Bemächtigung verwiesen, womit die Frage nach der Reichweite metapsychologischer Begriffe, etwa des Begriffs des Unbewussten, aufgeworfen ist. Von hier aus wird in einem Ausblick nach der Begegnung als organisierendem Phantasma der analytischen Situation gefragt und – auf dem Weg einer Erörterung des Begegnungsbegriffs bei Martin Buber – versucht, Begegnung dimensional näher zu bestimmen. (shrink)

Despite growing evidence to the contrary, researchers continue to posit causal links between cannabis, crime, psychosis, and violence. These spurious connections are rooted in history and fueled decades of structural limitations that shaped how researchers studied cannabis. Until recently, research in this area was explicitly funded to link cannabis use and harm and ignore any potential benefits. Post-prohibition cannabis research has failed to replicate the dire findings of the past. This article outlines how the history of controlling cannabis research has (...) led to various harms, injustices, and ethical complications. We compare commonly cited research from both the prohibition and post-prohibition eras and argue that many popular claims about the dangers of cannabis are the result of ethical lapses by researchers, journals, and funders. We propose researchers in this area adopt a duty of care in cannabis research going forward. This would oblige individual researchers to establish robust research designs, employ careful analytic strategies, and acknowledge limitations in more detail. This duty involves the institutional recognition by funders, journals, and others that cannabis research has been deliberately misconstrued to criminalize, stigmatize, and pathologize. (shrink)

This chapter examines the deep connections between biological organization, agency, and evolution by natural selection. Using Griesemer’s account of the reproducer, I argue that the basic unit of evolution is not a genetic replicator, but a complex hierarchical life cycle. Understanding the self-maintaining and self-proliferating properties of evolvable reproducers requires an organizational account of ontogenesis and reproduction. This leads us to an extended and disambiguated set of minimal conditions for evolution by natural selection—including revised or new principles of heredity, variation, (...) and ontogenesis. More importantly, the continuous maintenance of biological organization within and across generations implies that all evolvable systems are agents or contain agents among their parts. This means that we ought to take agency seriously—to better understand the concept and its role in explaining biological phenomena—if we aim to obtain an organismic theory of evolution in the original spirit of Darwin’s struggle for existence. This kind of understanding must rely on an agential perspective on evolution, complementing and succeeding existing structural, functional, and processual approaches. I sketch a tentative outline of such an agential perspective and present a survey of methodological and conceptual challenges that will have to be overcome if we are to properly implement it. (shrink)

We propose that episodic thought (i.e., episodic memory and imagination) is a domain where the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) could be fruitfully applied. On the one hand, LoTH could explain the structure of what is encoded into and retrieved from long-term memory. On the other, LoTH can help make sense of how episodic contents come to play such a large variety of different cognitive roles after they have been retrieved.

In a recent opinion piece, Denis Duboule has claimed that the increasing shift towards systems biology is driving evolutionary and developmental biology apart, and that a true reunification of these two disciplines within the framework of evolutionary developmental biology may easily take another 100 years. He identifies methodological, epistemological, and social differences as causes for this supposed separation. Our article provides a contrasting view. We argue that Duboule’s prediction is based on a one-sided understanding of systems biology as a science (...) that is only interested in functional, not evolutionary, aspects of biological processes. Instead, we propose a research program for an evolutionary systems biology, which is based on local exploration of the configuration space in evolving developmental systems. We call this approach—which is based on reverse engineering, simulation, and mathematical analysis—the natural history of configuration space. We discuss a number of illustrative examples that demonstrate the past success of local exploration, as opposed to global mapping, in different biological contexts. We argue that this pragmatic mode of inquiry can be extended and applied to the mathematical analysis of the developmental repertoire and evolutionary potential of evolving developmental mechanisms and that evolutionary systems biology so conceived provides a pragmatic epistemological framework for the EvoDevo synthesis. (shrink)

Dispositions and tendencies feature significantly in the biomedical domain and therefore in representations of knowledge of that domain. They are not only important for specific applications like an infectious disease ontology, but also as part of a general strategy for modelling knowledge about molecular interactions. But the task of representing dispositions in some formal ontological systems is fraught with several problems, which are partly due to the fact that Description Logics can only deal well with binary relations. The paper will (...) discuss some of the results of the philosophical debate about dispositions, in order to see whether the formal relations needed to represent dispositions can be broken down to binary relations. Finally, we will discuss problems arising from the possibility of the absence of realizations, of multi-track or multi-trigger dispositions and offer suggestions on how to deal with them. (shrink)

Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on (...) more than one cause. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupré 1993; Glennan 1997, pp. 605-626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based mechanisms. The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1-25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of any ontic account, how well it performs in causal situations where—at the explanandum level of mechanism—no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first situation presents an explanandum-problem and the second situation presents an explanans-problem—I will argue—both of which threaten activity-based frameworks. (shrink)

Despite decades of empirical happiness research, there is still little evidence for the positive effect of economic growth on life satisfaction. This poses a major challenge to welfare economic theory and to normative conceptions of socio-economic development. This book endeavours to explain these findings and to make sense of their ethical implications. While most of the existing literature on empirical happiness research is ultimately interested in understanding how to improve human lives and societal development, the ethical backdrop against which these (...) findings are evaluated is rarely made explicit. In contrast to this, Professor Hirata focuses on the role happiness should play in an ethically founded conception of good development. Taking a development ethics perspective, this book proposes a nuanced conception of happiness that includes both its affective and its normative dimensions and embeds this in a comprehensive conception of good development. The argument is that happiness should not be regarded as the only thing that determines a good life and that good development cannot sensibly be thought of as a matter of maximizing happiness. Happiness should rather be seen as an important indicator for the presence or absence of those concerns that really matter to people: the reasons that give rise to happiness. This book should be of interest to students and researchers of economics, psychology and development studies. (shrink)