Grounding, understood as a primitive posit operative in contexts where metaphysical dependence is at issue, is not able on its own to do any substantive work in characterizing or illuminating metaphysical dependence---or so I argue in 'No Work for a Theory of Grounding' (Inquiry, 2014). Such illumination rather requires appeal to specific metaphysical relations---type or token identity, functional realization, the determinable-determinate relation, the mereological part-whole relation, and so on---of the sort typically at issue in these contexts. In that case, why (...) posit 'big-G' Grounding in addition to the 'small-g' grounding relations already in the metaphysician's toolkit? The best reasons for doing so stem from the Unity argument, according to which the further posit of Grounding is motivated as an apt unifier of the specific relations, and the Priority argument, according to which Grounding is needed in order to fix the direction of priority of the specific relations. I previously considered versions of these arguments, and argued that they did not succeed; in two papers, however, Jonathan Schaffer aims to develop a better version of the Unity argument, and offers certain objections to my reasons for rejecting the Priority argument. Here I consider these new arguments for Grounding. (shrink)

An approach to explaining the nature and source of logic and its laws with a rich historical tradition takes the laws of logic to be laws of thought. This view seems intuitively compelling, after all, logic seems to be intimately related with how we think. But how exactly should we understand it? And what arguments can we give in favour? I will propose one line of argument for the claim that the laws of logic are laws of thought. I will (...) motivate the claim that there is a certain phenomenon, namely, that there are logical principles which are immune to rational doubt. I will then give an argument to the best explanation; I will argue that the best explanation of this phenomenon is to take the laws of logic to be constitutive-normative laws of thought. The proposal, and some responses to potential objections, will have a notably Kantian flavour. (shrink)

Newtonian forces are pushes and pulls, possessing magnitude and direction, that are exerted (in the first instance) by objects, and which cause (in particular) motions. I defend Newtonian forces against the four best reasons for denying or doubting their existence. A running theme in my defense of forces will be the suggestion that Newtonian Mechanics is a special science, and as such has certain prima facie ontological rights and privileges, that may be maintained against various challenges.

Every paper in this collection is worth reading, for one reason or another. Still, due to certain problematic metametaphysical presuppositions most of these discussions miss the deeper mark, on the pessimist as well as the optimist side. My reasons for thinking this come from considering how best to answer three metametaphysical questions. First, why be pessimistic about metaphysics – why be Carnapian in a post-positivist age? There is, I’ll suggest, a post-positivist strategy for reviving Carnapian pessimism, but it is almost (...) entirely neglected here; and the motivations that pessimists offer instead are not compelling. Second, why think that the best way to approach metametaphysical questions is by attention to features of language, and in particular to quantifier semantics, in ordinary or ontological language(s)? Here again we are offered little motivation for this supposition, which, notwithstanding its acceptance by nearly all contributors, faces clear difficulties. Third, granting that quantification is somehow bound up with first-order questions about what exists, what is the nature of this connection, and what are the associated implications for metametaphysics? Here I find the accounts of the connection on offer implausible, especially as compared to an alternative that makes better sense of metaphysical practice and disagreement. The moral following consideration of these questions is that real progress in metametaphysics is likely to occur less by attention to semantic issues pertaining to representation, translation and quantification and more to non-semantic issues pertaining to epistemology and metaphysical determinacy. (shrink)

Numerous studies have found that many people believe that a provocatively dressed woman is at greater risk for sexual assault and bears some responsibility for her assault if she is attacked. Furthermore, in legal, academic, and public debates about sexual assault the appropriateness of the term ‘provocative’ as a descriptor of certain kinds of women’s clothing is rarely questioned. Thus, there is a widespread but largely unquestioned belief that it is appropriate to describe revealing or suggestive women’s clothing as ‘provocative’ (...) and that women who wear such clothing could provoke sexual assault and harassment from men. Yet it is rarely noted that only women’s clothing is described as sexually provocative. Men’s clothing, no matter how revealing, is never described as provocative. Why is this the case? This Article challenges the assumption that it is appropriate to describe women’s clothing as provocative. Drawing on on models of the legal defense of provocation and research on objectification and responsibility, this Article demonstrates that continued use of ‘provocative’ term normalizes and entrenches deeply problematic attitudes about women’s responsibility for men’s sexual behavior. The social interpretation of women’s clothing as provocative arises from the privileged social and legal status of men’s sexual arousal and the objectification of women’s bodies. Describing women’s clothing as provocative thus reinforces a problematic conception of women’s bodies and sexuality that is connected to women’s experiences of their bodies, their clothes, and shapes their vulnerability to sexual assault and social and legal attitudes to such attacks. (shrink)

I first discuss Kit Fine's distinctive 'schema-based' approach to metaphysical theorizing, which aims to identify general principles accommodating any intelligible application of the notion, by attention to his accounts of essence and dependence. I then raise some specific concerns about the general principles Fine takes to schematically characterize these notions. In particular, I present various counterexamples to Fine's essence -based account of ontological dependence. The problem, roughly speaking, is that Fine supposes that an object's essence makes reference to just what (...) it ontologically depends on, but various cases suggest that an object's essence can also make reference to what ontologically depends on it, either by way of composition or causation. As such, Fine's account of ontological dependence is subject to the same objection he raises against modal accounts of essence and dependence---that is, of being insufficiently ecumenical. (shrink)

Background: While the solid organ transplant evaluation process is designed to function equitably, discriminatory practices remain, resulting in disparities in access for persons with disabilities. Physical function and frailty status are often-cited factors in establishing transplant, despite limited consensus on their assessment and impact. Objective: The purpose of this study was to describe how transplant healthcare professionals conceptualize the relationship between physical disability and transplant candidacy. Methods: A convenience sample of multidisciplinary transplant was solicited to respond to an electronic survey (...) between February and March 2024. Results: Of the 126 professionals contacted, 43 participants responded, yielding a response rate of 34 %. The majority of participants (88 %) held contradictory views of physical disability as it relates to transplant candidacy (p = 0.049). Men were more likely to endorse awareness of bias when evaluating transplant candidates (p = 0.008). Professional discipline was significantly associated with perception of transplant process fairness, impact of bias, and interpretation of quality of life. Iterative thematic analysis revealed a propensity to conflate frailty with physical disability. Conclusions: Multidisciplinary transplant professionals rarely endorsed overtly ableist sentiments. However, responses highlighted inconsistent, unclear, and at times contradictory conceptions of physical function and physical disability, which may contribute to disparate access to solid organ transplant for individuals with physical disability. (shrink)

1. During the 1960s and 1970s, Keith Donnellan (1966, 1970, 1974) and Saul Kripke ([1972] 1980) developed influential critiques of then-prevailing ‘description theories’ of reference. In place of s...

This article has two aims. The first is to introduce some novel data that highlight rather surprising pragmatic abilities in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The second is to consider a possible implication of these data for an emerging empirical methodology in philosophy of language and mind. In pursuing the first aim, we expect our main audience to be clinicians and linguists interested in pragmatics. It is when we turn to methodological issues that we hope to pique the interest of philosophers. (...) Still, the methodological issue becomes pressing precisely because of the empirical finding—thus the first part is important for the philosophical readers as well. The game plan is as follows. Given our intended dual audience, we begin with background on autism and pragmatics. Some of this material will be familiar to some of our readership, but few will know all of it. (Those who do are invited to skip these sections.) We then present some results from our pilot study on a corpus of speech by people with ASD. The heart of our finding is that certain speakers with ASD, who have severe trouble with familiar pragmatic phenomena such as metaphor and conversational implicature, exhibit surprising abilities with respect to what is often called “pragmatic determinants of what is said.” We turn next to a possible implication of this finding: It seems to suggest that hitherto seemingly promising evidence from ASD about the semantics/pragmatics boundary is.. (shrink)

The capability approach was developed as a response to the ‘equality of what?’ question, which asks what the metric of equality should be. The alternative answers are, broadly, welfare, resources or capabilities. G.A. Cohen has raised influential criticisms of this last response. He suggests that the capability approach’s focus on individuals’ freedom – their capability to control their own lives – renders its view of well-being excessively ‘athletic’, ignoring benefits achieved passively, without the active involvement of the benefitted individual. However, (...) positing ‘capabilities’ as the appropriate metric of distributive justice need not commit capability theorists to a comprehensive account of well-being, and so not to the athletic conception Cohen ascribes to them. Their aim can, instead, be to delineate legitimate government action and guide egalitarian public policy. Capabilities, in this context, are not just components of individual well-being; they must also be the appropriate goal of just distributive policies. When understood in this way, as a guide to policy, I will argue that the capability approach’s focus on ‘athletic’ individual freedom and control is justified: in the public domain, it is important not just that individuals receive ‘benefits’, but that they participate in their achievement. (shrink)

In his recent book, Shared and Institutional Agency, Bratman attempts to defend realism about institutional agency while appealing only to ontologically modest foundations. Here I argue that this ontologically modest foundation leaves Bratman unable to provide plausible accounts of institutional evidence, institutional belief, and the reasons for which institutions believe and act. Given that these phenomena are key to our moral and epistemic evaluation of institutions and their actions, this is a serious failing. Instead, we should defend a more robust (...) realism about institutional agency. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to make some headway in understanding the notion of zero-grounding. The account of grounding in terms of generalized identity, proposed by Correia and Skiles (2019), is employed to clarify issues of ground and zero-ground. I discuss some options for accommodating zero-grounding. According to one option, we slide dangerously close to violating the irreflexivity of ground. According to another option, zero-grounding leads to a worrying kind of overdetermination. A third option offers a way out, but (...) a challenge remains of how best to make sense of it. I further contend that these arguments broaden to concern any notion of grounding according to which groundees are “nothing over and above” their grounds. Ultimately, the aim of this paper is exploratory. It lays out some of the different options and challenges that face the grounding theorist who wants to make sense of zero-grounding. (shrink)

It is often said that consequentialism violates the separateness of persons. But what does this mean? Existing interpretations are often unclear, or let consequentialism off easy: because they target amendable parts of the consequentialist framework, they can be sidestepped by more subtle versions of the theory. Consequentialism's opponents, however, might hope for a stronger interpretation––one which suggests that the separateness of persons objection presses a distinct and powerful charge against consequentialist theory. This paper proposes such an interpretation. It starts from (...) the fact that, unlike other moral theories, consequentialism determines how to act by looking at features such as states of affairs or outcomes. Yet, crucially, states of affairs or outcomes often make reference to, or extend across, more than one person. Thus, they implicitly and necessarily group together different individuals. In the proposal of this paper, it is this part of consequentialism which violates the separateness of persons. (shrink)

The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “Thirders” and “Halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty’s credence that a coin lands Heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the Experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used for self-locating beliefs or centered propositions. (...) We also explore what fair prices Sleeping Beauty computes for gambles that she might be offered during the Experiment. (shrink)

Given the long-standing controversy about whether the brain-dead should be considered alive in an irreversible coma or dead despite displaying apparent signs of life, the ethical and policy issues posed when family members insist on continued treatment are not as simple as commentators have claimed. In this article, we consider the kind of policy that should be adopted to manage a family's insistence that their brain-dead loved one continues to receive supportive care. We argue that while it would be ethically (...) inappropriate to continue to devote scarce acute care resources to such patients in a hospital setting, it may not be ethically inappropriate for patients to receive these resources in certain other settings. Thus, if a family insists on continuing to care for their brain-dead loved at their home, we should not, from a policy perspective, interfere with the family's wishes. We also argue that healthcare professionals should make some effort to facilitate the transfer of brain-dead patients to these other settings when families insist on continued treatment despite being informed about the lack of any potential for recovery of consciousness. Our arguments are strengthened by the fact that patients in a persistent vegetative state, who, when correctly diagnosed, also have no potential for recovery of consciousness, are routinely transferred from hospitals to nursing homes or long-term care facilities where they continue to be ventilated, tube fed and to receive other supportive care. We also briefly explore the question of who should be responsible for the costs of such treatment at the long-term care facility. (shrink)

This paper examines an attempt made in a series of articles (Stanley, 2002, et al.) to create a syntactic placeholder for contextual information. The initial shortcoming of Stanley’s proposal is that it does not easily integrate these placeholders with domain‐restricting information syntactically encoded elsewhere in the utterance. Thus, Stanley makes erroneous predictions in the case of sentences in which quantifier‐restricting information encoded in (for example) a prepositional phrase conflicts with quantifier‐restriction valued by context is internally incoherent. I explore the space (...) of possible solutions that are available to Stanley, demonstrating how each results in its own interpretation problem and, ultimately, fails. In doing so, I argue that Stanley’s syntactic approach to contextual restriction is untenable. (shrink)

Innovations in information technologies have facilitated the development of new styles of research networks and forms of governance. This is evident in genomics where increasingly, research is carried out by large, interdisciplinary consortia focussing on a specific research endeavour. The UK10K project is an example of a human genomics consortium funded to provide insights into the genomics of rare conditions, and establish a community resource from generated sequence data. To achieve its objectives according to the agreed timetable, the UK10K project (...) established an internal governance system to expedite the research and to deal with the complex issues that arose. The project’s governance structure exemplifies a new form of network governance called ‘pop-up’ governance. ‘Pop-up’ because: it was put together quickly, existed for a specific period, was designed for a specific purpose, and was dismantled easily on project completion. In this paper, we use UK10K to describe how ‘pop-up’ governance works on the ground and how relational, hierarchical and contractual governance mechanisms are used in this new form of network governance. (shrink)

In this article we take off from critiques of psychological and school bullying typologies as creating problematic binary categories of bully and victim and neglecting sociocultural aspects of gender and sexuality. We review bullying research informed by Judith Butler’s theories of discursive performativity, which help us to understand how subjectification works through performative repetitions of heterosexual gender norms. We then build on these insights drawing on the feminist new materialist approach of Karen Barad’s posthuman performativity, which we argue enlarges our (...) scope of inquiry in profound ways. Barad’s theories suggest we move from psychological models of the inter-personal, and from Butlerian notions of discursive subjectification, to ideas of discursive-material intra-action to consider the more-thanhuman relationalities of bullying. Throughout the article, we demonstrate the approach using examples from qualitative research with teens in the UK and Australia, exploring nonhuman agentic matter such as space, objects and time as shaping the constitution of gender and sexual bullying events. Specifically we examine the discursive-material agential intraactions of skirts and hair through which ‘girl’ and ‘boy’ and ‘slut’ and ‘gay’ materialise in school spacetimematterings. In our conclusion we briefly suggest how the new materialism helps to shift the frame of attention and responses informing gendered intraactions in schools. (shrink)

The ideological nature of public health is a problem for the profession. Ideological uniformity in the field of public health undermines scholars’ and officials’ legitimacy and compromises their ability effectively to prevent death and disease. I first provide some evidence that public health is ideological and then I argue that the ideology of public health is counterproductive. Additionally, public officials are also likely to violate people’s rights in trying to advance their ideology through public health policy. In light of these (...) moral considerations against the ideological nature of public health, there are compelling reasons for people to resist the expanding scope of public health insofar as it consists in the further imposition of this counterproductive and harmful ideology. I therefore conclude that the profession would be more effective and just if public health officials and scholars focused more narrowly on improving health outcomes instead of promoting their broader ideological agenda through public health policy. (shrink)

Volume 33, Issue 1, January 2025, Page 213-221.

In the December 2006 edition of Harvard Business Review , Michael Porter and Mark Kramer argue that by approaching corporate social responsibility (CSR) based on corporate priorities, strengths and abilities, firms can develop socially and fiscally responsible solutions to current CSR issues, which will provide operational and competitive advantages. We agree that an effective approach to CSR includes a mapping of strategy, risk and opportunity. However, we also caution that the identification of these to the exclusion of societal input may (...) not be to the corporation's advantage. Instead, an investment in both strategic analysis and social capital can pay off from a social and an organizational standpoint. Compared with their larger counterparts, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) frequently have stronger relationships with their internal and external stakeholders that foster the development of social capital. As such, we believe that the sector offers a unique opportunity to identify additional models and frameworks in order to approach a strategic CSR model as espoused by Porter and Kramer. This paper explores a case study of one Canadian SME that uses a community development framework called Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) for its CSR programming. Because ABCD relies heavily on the development and maintenance of social capital and can be utilized to attain set objectives, we propose that it provides a supplementary framework through which the arguments of Porter and Kramer can be expanded. In applying the ABCD framework for CSR, we can begin to establish a programme that supports strategy, integrates employees and stakeholders towards a common vision, and creates unique and sustainable alternatives towards the resolution of social and corporate goals. (shrink)

This paper raises a worry about the non-identity intuition. As one part of the non-identity problem, the non-identity intuition tells us that when choosing between bringing a person with a good life into existence and bringing a person with a great life into existence, we have moral reason to bring the person with a great life into existence. But there is a worry to be had about the non-identity intuition. Because the non-identity intuition compares future persons exclusively in regard to (...) their well-being, the non-identity intuition values future persons solely for the well-being enjoyed by each of them. Therefore, or so the worry goes, the non-identity intuition fails to be compatible with what it means to value persons for their own sake. (shrink)

There are more than 350,000 health apps available in public app stores. The extolled benefits of health apps are numerous and well documented. However, there are also concerns that poor-quality apps, marketed directly to consumers, threaten the tenets of evidence-based medicine and expose individuals to the risk of harm. This study addresses this issue by assessing the overall quality of evidence publicly available to support the effectiveness claims of health apps marketed directly to consumers. To assess the quality of evidence (...) available to the public to support the effectiveness claims of health apps marketed directly to consumers, an audit was conducted of a purposive sample of apps available on the Apple App Store. We find the quality of evidence available to support the effectiveness claims of health apps marketed directly to consumers to be poor. Less than half of the 220 apps (44%) we audited state that they have evidence to support their claims of effectiveness and, of these allegedly evidence-based apps, more than 70% rely publicly on either very low or low-quality evidence. For the minority of app developers that do publish studies, significant methodological limitations are commonplace. Finally, there is a pronounced tendency for apps—particularly mental health and diagnostic apps—to either borrow evidence generated in other (typically offline) contexts or to rely exclusively on unsubstantiated, unpublished user metrics as evidence to support their effectiveness claims. Health apps represent a significant opportunity for individual consumers and healthcare systems. Nevertheless, this opportunity will be missed if the health apps market continues to be flooded by poor quality, poorly evidenced, and potentially unsafe apps. It must be accepted that a continuing lag in generating high-quality publicly available evidence of app effectiveness and safety is not inevitable: it is a choice. Just because it will be challenging to raise the quality of the evidence base publicly available to support the claims of health apps, this does not mean that the bar for evidence quality should be lowered. Innovation for innovation’s sake must not be prioritized over public health and safety. (shrink)

In the Origins of Kant’s Aesthetics, Robert Clewis characterises Kant’s early views of aesthetic normativity in terms of a synthesis of a rationalist appeal to laws of sensibility and an empiricist appeal to rules of taste that are arrived at through consensus about great works of art. On the consensus approach, sharing the experience of beauty with others is itself a source of pleasure and normativity. For Clewis, the mature Kant no longer ties aesthetic normativity to sociality, but instead grounds (...) it in the a priori principle of judgement. In these comments, I challenge Clewis’ narrative about Kant’s development and argue that the mature Kant continues to connect aesthetic normativity to the sociality of taste. (shrink)

The target article raises important questions about the applicability of experimental social psychology research on topics with policy implications. This commentary focuses on the importance of attending to a variety of factors to improve ecological validity as well as considering the ultimate factors shaping behavior and the role of natural categories in the stability of stereotypes and their influence.

Long term care (LTC) facilities are fraught with unique ethical challenges. Unlike in the acute care setting, where patients are admitted for a temporary period and then discharged to the next leve...

The rise of managed care initiated a steady decline in solo and small group physician practices and the emergence of new delivery models built around large health care organizations. Health care reform has only accelerated this trend as public and private payors shift to new payment methodologies that reward clinical and financial integration among providers. As a result, patients increasingly receive care from physicians and other health professionals organized into collaborative partnerships with one another and institutional providers, such as hospitals. (...) As described below, this new organizational dynamic profoundly influences the clinical judgment of physicians. No longer can society simply depend on the professionalism of individual physicians to ensure ethical integrity in the health care setting. Rather, ethical integrity in the health care setting also requires a strong foundation of organizational ethics. (shrink)

This book addresses the nature of consciousness and the relation of mind to brain, body, and the material world. Against mechanistic and physicalist approaches, it employs a literary worldview that accommodates plural narratives, including those of neuroscience, pharmacology, psychology, and everyday experience.

The meaning of intelligence has varied across time and place, with these varied constructions holding consequences for people and society at large. There is, however, little consensus around what intelligence actually means and how the construct should be applied. Educational discourses, including textbooks used to train teachers, have commonly been the site for the dissemination of ‘authoritative’ information surrounding intelligence. In this article, we present findings from a discourse analysis informed by discursive psychology of passages related to defining and measuring (...) intelligence taken from 10 educational psychology textbooks designed for university students studying to become teachers. Our research question was: How is the dilemmatic nature of the construct of intelligence managed in introductory educational psychology textbooks at the level of discourse? We discuss the function of sequencing and topic displays and how the textbook authors navigated the ideological dilemmas surrounding the construct of intelligence. We conclude by pointing to the implications for teacher training and the importance of social constructionist projects that place into question presumably ‘real’ psychological constructs. (shrink)

Following Janko's suggestion that two trimeters cited at Strabo, Geography 8.6.20 form a couplet from an unknown, possibly Aristophanic comedy, this note explores the resonance and meaning of the third citation contained in the same chapter of the geographer's work. It proposes that this third citation, which relates to a Corinthian hetaira's work at the loom and is possibly from either the same or a different comedy, contains a joke hinting at the Odyssey and alternative traditions regarding Penelope's chastity. This (...) Odyssean echo thematically connects this citation to the comic trimeters, which also contain clear allusions to the Odyssey. (shrink)

El artículo analiza los temas de elección presentes en la estructuración de la ética de Edmund Husserl. Los temas presentes en Lecciones de ética y teoría general de los valores (1908/2009), Introducción a la ética (1920/2009) y Europa: crisis y renovación (1923/2014) asignan a la ética su lugar no sólo dentro de un marco formal y orientador. constitución, pero sobre todo, frente a la estructura trascendental de la conciencia que responde a la dimensión material específica de la propia ética. La (...) singularidad de los temas de elección en el pensamiento ético husserliano permite comprender el aporte de la fenomenología a la ética contemporánea en la necesidad de conciliar un plan formal que responda a una materialidad conflictiva mediante el retorno a una ética que encuentra su fundamento en la dimensión antropológica. (shrink)

Presents profiles of such well-known authors and celebrities as Susan Sontag, Beverly Sills, Bernard Malamud, Isaac Bashevis Singer, and Joseph Brodsky.

The sociological dimension of science is studied using the discovery of the Wasserman reaction and its accidental application as a test for syphilis as a basis, ...

Increased technological and pharmacological interventions in patient care when patient outcomes are uncertain have been linked to the escalation in moral and ethical dilemmas experienced by health care providers in acute care settings. Health care research has shown that facilities that are able to attract and retain nursing staff in a competitive environment and provide high quality care have the capacity for nurses to process and resolve moral and ethical dilemmas. This article reports on the findings of a systematic review (...) of the empirical literature (1980 — February 2007) on the effects of unresolved moral distress and poor ethical climate on nurse turnover. Articles were sought to answer the review question: Does unresolved moral distress and a poor organizational ethical climate increase nurse turnover? Nine articles met the criteria of the review process. Although the prevailing sentiment was that poor ethical climate and moral distress caused staff turnover, definitive answers to the review question remain elusive because there are limited data that confidently support this statement. (shrink)

Pt. I. The apparent good. Evaluative cognition -- Perceiving the good -- Phantasia and the apparent good -- pt. II. The apparent good and non-rational motivation. Passions and the apparent good -- Akrasia and the apparent good -- pt. III. The apparent good and rational motivation. Phantasia and deliberation -- Happiness, virtue, and the apparent good -- Practical induction -- Conclusion : Aristotle's practical empiricism.