ABSTRACT Although basic values have been linked with unethical attitudes and behavior in non-sport contexts, their association with doping in sport has yet to be established. We examined the relationships between basic values and doping likelihood. College athletes rated the importance of basic values using the Portrait Values Questionnaire Revised and indicated their likelihood of doping in a hypothetical scenario. In terms of basic value dimensions, self-enhancement values were positively related to doping likelihood, openness to change values were unrelated to (...) doping likelihood, and self-transcendence and conservation values were negatively related to doping likelihood. In terms of the values categories, the values-doping relationship was best characterized by an unethicality pattern of coefficients. In conclusion, the current evidence extends the values-unethicality relationship to the context of sport and confirms that doping resembles other forms of unethical behavior. (shrink)

L'auteur analyse les pensées de W. James, A. N. Whitehead et de G. Marcel qui ont en commun une volonté de prendre la mesure de la réalité dans toute son épaisseur, les opposant aux grands systèmes idéalistes et dialectiques qui les ont précédées.

La pensée de Whitehead sur la vie est placée ici dans une perspective comparatiste, incluant le programme organiciste de Cantor en philosophie de la nature et le rôle accordé à la différence de potentiel chez Bergson et Whitehead. On commente également la doctrine écologique et evolutionniste de la vie de Processus et réalité, ainsi que la relation établie par Whitehead entre organisme et symbolisme. Whitehead's thought on life is hereby set within a comparatist view, including Cantor's (...) organicist programme in the philosophy of nature and the part granted to the difference of potential in Bergson and Whitehead. We here also comment the ecological and evolutionistic doctrine of life in Process and Reality, together with the relationship set by Whitehead between organism and symbolism. (shrink)

Ce livre se propose d'examiner le questionnement métaphysique tel que le manifeste l'oeuvre d'A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947) à l'aide d'outils empruntés à Eric Weil (1904-1977). L'oeuvre de Whitehead trouve sa formulation la plus achevée dans 'Process and reality' (1929), où est développée la thèse selon laquelle toute réalité peut être interprétée en termes de "processus" plus ou moins complexes. cette vision, que l'on pourrait rapprocher de celle de Bergson, est riche de nombreuses applications, entre autres l'esthétique, la morale, la (...) politique et la religion. On étudie donc d'abord ici les relations entre ces divers champs pratiques et leur reprise par la métaphysique. Sans remettre en question la profondeur de cette vision, on la prolonge en une seconde étape, afin de dessiner l'intention philosophique qui lui est sous-jacente. Pour ce faire, l'auteur utilise une distinction faite par Weil entre les catégories que celui-ci appelle 'métaphysiques' et celles qu'il nomme 'philosophiques'. (shrink)

La réflexion whiteheadienne sur les Rythmes Éducatifs, par son insistance sur le concept de Procès, nous permet sans doute d'aborder plus sereinement les problèmes actuels de l'éducation, caractérisée par un mouvement perpétuel des matières et des acteurs. LA conception whiteheadienne, en insistant davantage sur le rythme de l'éducation que sur les contenus, contribue en effet à faire avancer l'idée que la méthode la plus efficace pour obtenir les efficacité et créativité est de rester, dans un processus pédagogique, aussi proche que (...) possible d'un monde global en devenir, pour en dégager une réalité nouvelle déterminée, laquelle pourra ensuite être intégrée à ce monde, avant que celui-ci ne fasse l'objet d'une nouvelle saisie. SAisie imaginaire du tout, perception dans ce tout d'une réalité déterminée, ensuite réintégrée à l'ensemble, voilà les trois phases de la nature, mais aussi celle du " procès " particulier qui s'appelle l'apprentissage. (shrink)

In a first section, we discuss Quine’s claim according to which identity is a logical notion. We point out that Quine mixes up various types of identities: trivial (or diagonal) identity, Leibniz identity, etc.; and this leads him to commit several mistakes. In a second section, we review Quine’s criticisms to various philosophers (Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Leibniz, etc.), who ac-cording to him made confusion between names and objects in defining identity. We show that in fact only Korzybski can be accused (...) of such confusion. In a third section, we analyze the relation between identity and entity. We notice that for Quine a river is the result of the identification of river stages, but that he admits it as an entity by opposition to squareness, which according to him is a result of an identification process of higher abtraction. (shrink)

Résumé Les lectures respectives que A.N. Whitehead et Éric Weil font de la réflexion morale kantienne semblent reposer sur des conceptions différentes de l’appel à la pratique. Il y a lieu de s’interroger sur le rapport entre loi physique et loi éthique chez Whitehead, de même que sur la morale et la politique qu’implique sa longue réflexion sur la persuasion dans Adventures of Ideas. L’interprétation qu’offre Éric Weil de Kant permet de penser autrement la persuasion démocratique.The ways in (...) which A.N. Whitehead and Éric Weil read Kant’s moral reflection seem to rest on differing conceptions of practical calls to action. We try here to reflect on the relation between physical and ethical law according to Whitehead, as well as on both the morals and politics implied in his thoughts on persuasion as exemplified in Adventures of Ideas. The interpretation of Kant by Éric Weil enables one to think democratic persuasion differently. (shrink)

Préface. -- William James d'après sa correspondance. -- La philosophie spéculative de Whitehead. -- Le Journal métaphysique de Gabriel Marcel.

In a first section, we discuss Quine’s claim according to which identity is a logical notion. We point out that Quine mixes up various types of identities: trivial (or diagonal) identity, Leibniz identity, etc.; and this leads him to commit several mistakes. In a second section, we review Quine’s criticisms to various philosophers (Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Leibniz, etc.), who according to him made confusion between names and objects in defining identity. We show that in fact only Korzybski can be accused (...) of such confusion. In a third section, we analyze the relation between identity and entity. We notice that for Quine a river is the result of the identification of river stages, but that he admits it as an entity by opposition to squareness, which according to him is a result of an identification process of higher abstraction. (shrink)

— Selon Bergson « le problème de la personnalité peut être considéré comme le problème central de la philosophie ». Whitehead ajoute que « chaque philosophie doit offrir une doctrine de l’identité personnelle ». Mais l’existence d’un moi substantiel semble un défi à la Métaphysique du Processus. C’est pourquoi le problème de la personnalité offre à cette philosophie une épreuve cruciale. Notre étude montre comment Whitehead la surmonte. Au passage l’opposition entre Substance et Processus est questionnée sur le (...) cas crucial de la Mémoire. La caractérisation, par G. Deleuze, des catégorèmes whiteheadiens comme « notions nomades » trouve là un usage éclairant.— According to Bergson, « the problem of personality may be regarded as the central problem of philosophy ». Whitehead adds : « Any philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal identity. » But in Process Metaphysics, the existence of a substantial ego seems a challenge. So the problem of personality provides a crucial test for this philosophy. Our paper shows how Whitehead passes this test. By the way, the very disjunction between Substance and Process is itself questioned on the crucial case of Memory. The characterisation of Whitehead’s Categories as « nomadic notions » by G. Deleuze receives here a use as an insight. (shrink)

In I'd Rather Be Dead Than Be a Girl, John Marcus Sweeney explains a threefold thesis of a study that language influences how human beings perceive reality, that the development of theoretical constructs can help explain resistances to and possibilities for inclusive language, and that the implementation of inclusive language is an important goal for religious education." "The study begins with a description of the problem to be considered, that is, the role of sexist language in perpetuating sexual discrimination. Beginning (...) in the third chapter, insights from Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism, Benjamin Lee Whorf's principle of linguistic relativity, and Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology are used to investigate the stubbornness of sexist linguistic habits and the bases for developing inclusive linguistic habits. Finally, inclusive language is shown to be important for religious education, and some strategies for implementing inclusive language are presented."--Jacket. (shrink)

This commentary considers Wahl’s 1942 “Poetry as Spiritual Exercise” in the context of his interests in radical empiricism and process metaphysics. In doing so, it raises appreciation for the complexity of his thought, identifies specific notes of influence on Gilles Deleuze, and responds to worries that Wahl’s notion of spiritual exercise is predominantly a form of withdrawal, quietism, or retreat from the horrors of World War Two. For Wahl, rather than passive contemplation of a determinate artifact, poetry is a mode (...) of experience that, to speak with Whitehead and James, is a making. This experience of poetry develops affordances of thought that strengthen existential capacity for remaining open to uncertainty, fragility, and vulnerability. (shrink)

In “Ruyer’s Relation to Whitehead”, Fabrice Colonna seeks to establish the exact presence of Whitehead in the French philosopher’s work. The indisputable points of connection between the two thinkers, concerning the importance of metaphysics, the critics of the materialistic scheme, the relevance of a renewed platonism, should nevertheless not obscure certain differences in emphasis, which are apparent in the problem of the compounds beings and about certain principles of speculative theology, to which both of them have found deeply (...) original ways. (shrink)

The contents of this book were originally delivered at Trinity College in the autumn of 1919 as the inaugural course of Tarner lectures.

This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...) intentional, I argue against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. I instead propose that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ‘position-taking’. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition in an attempt to think past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is a new view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value. (shrink)

The first three chapters are personal history, highly picturesque and amusing, illumined by flashes of his lively humor....From here the chapters go on into Philosophy, Education, and Science. covering a span of thrity years though these writings do, they are surprizingly unified. Atlantic.

In conversation analysis, through Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, and others, the conceptual architecture is joined at the hip to a technical architecture of transcripts, sequence, and turn productions. That the conceptual was to be found and demonstrated in the material detail of temporal productions was central to CA’s extraordinary innovations. As with CA, an Epistemic CA has the task of giving evidence of its conceptual order in actual materials, and thus animating the materials to show them. The task and relationship are (...) emblematically reflexive: we shall find the expression ‘Oh’ indexing ‘changes of state’ or ‘inapposite inquiries’, for example, as of the account-able animations of turns and sequences of turns. Our shared attachments to sequential analysis deliver the expectation that we shall see how Epistemic order is achieved on actual occasions, through actual materials, rendered as transcript. The discussion turns to how the Epistemic Program engages and acquits this analytic expectation. (shrink)