Scientists and philosophers alike debate whether various systems such as plants and bacteria exercise cognition. One strategy for resolving such debates is to ground claims about nonhuman cognition in evidence from mathematical models of cognitive capacities. In this article, I show that proponents of this strategy face two major challenges: demarcating phenomenological models from process models and overcoming underdetermination by model fit. I argue that even if the demarcation problem is resolved, fitting a process model to behavioral data is, on (...) its own, not strong evidence for any cognitive process, let alone processes shared with humans. (shrink)

Social anxiety occurs in everyday social interactions, yet the real-world factors that shape the moment-to-moment experience of social anxiety have not been fully explored. Using ecological momentary assessments (smartphone-based, five signals a day for 21 days), the present study examined the associations between state social anxiety (SSA) and characteristics of interaction partners in varied contexts, and how these momentary associations differed with trait social anxiety (TSA). Ninety-two participants (54% female, age from 18 to 34) completed 4185 momentary reports. Results from (...) multilevel models showed that perceived judgmentalness and unfamiliarity of interaction partners were positively associated with SSA, and the associations were stronger for the high TSA group (n = 30) compared to a control group (n = 62). Exploratory analyses with various types of interaction partners and social settings revealed noticeable group differences in how the types were associated with SSA (e.g. acquaintance, close friend/romantic partner) and how they influenced the effect of judgmentalness and unfamiliarity on SSA (e.g. authority, work/school). Overall, the findings highlight the role of contextual associations in social anxiety, and the benefits and the need for more comprehensive approaches with EMA in studying social anxiety, particularly its contextual aspects. (shrink)

Many philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure. This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) believe that, and it seems to them as though, objects (...) persist by enduring rather than perduring. Second, that most people have a view of change on which enduring but not perduring objects count as changing. Third, that one reason why the folk represent time as dynamical is because it seems to them, and they believe that, they endure through time. We found no evidence to support these claims. While there are certainly plenty of ‘folk’ endurantists in the population we tested, there are also plenty of ‘folk’ perdurantists. We did not find robust evidence that a majority of people believed that, or it seemed to them as though, objects endure rather than perdure. We conclude that many arguments in favour of endurantism that appeal to folk beliefs about, or experiences of, persisting objects and change rest on views about those beliefs and experiences that are empirically unsupported. There is no evidence to suggest that endurantism is the folk friendly view of persistence, and so we should stop treating it as such without argument. (shrink)

Obsession toward technology has a long background of parallel evolution between humans and machines. This obsession became irrevocable when AI began to be a part of our daily lives. However, this AI integration became a subject of controversy when the fear of AI advancement in acquiring consciousness crept among mankind. Artificial consciousness is a long-debated topic in the field of artificial intelligence and neuroscience which has many ethical challenges and threats in society ranging from daily chores to Mars missions. This (...) paper deals with the impact of AI-based science fiction films in society. This study aims to investigate the fascinating AI concept of artificial consciousness in light of posthuman terminology, technological singularity and superintelligence by analyzing the set of science fiction films to project the actual difference between science fictional AI and operational AI. Further, this paper explores the theoretical possibilities of artificial consciousness through a range of neuroscientific theories that are related to AI development. These theories are built toward prospective artificial consciousness in AI. This study discloses the posthuman fallacies that are built around the fear of AI acquiring artificial consciousness and its outcome. (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists largely agree that fake news is not just necessarily untruthful, but necessarily insincere: it’s produced either with the intention to deceive or an indifference toward its truth. Against this, I argue insincerity is neither a necessary nor obviously typical feature of fake news. The main argument proceeds in two stages. The first, methodological step develops classification criteria for identifying instances of fake news. By attending to expressed theoretical and practical interests, I observe how our classification practices (...) turn on worries about fake news’s unique political-epistemic risks. From this, I argue (i) theories of fake news should capture independent mechanisms that realise these risks and (ii) the manifestation of them suffices for classifying a news story as fake news. The second step applies the classification criteria to bad science journalism. I argue the systematic epistemic faults in bad science journalism manifest the same political-epistemic risks we see in fake news, which suffices to justify classifying it as fake news. But since such faults aren’t plausibly attributed to its propagators being insincere, insincerity doesn’t function independently as a mechanism for realising fake news’s political-epistemic risks. Thus, I conclude, we should exclude insincerity from our accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

In the present study, we tested whether civic identity consisting of moral and political identity via the bifactor model of civic identity with the Stanford Civic Purpose dataset. Previous research in youth development proposed that civic identity consists of two closely related identity constructs, i.e., moral and political identity. Given the bifactor model in factor analysis assumes the presence of both the general and specific factors, we hypothesized that the bifactor model would better fit the data than conventional alternative models. (...) Thus, we compared the candidate models, including the bifactor model, with confirmatory factor analysis. To address the concern about the potential overfitting of the bifactor model, we additionally conducted cross-validation and measurement invariance tests across different gender groups and time points. The analysis results supported our hypothesis that the bifactor model better fitted the data. Both the cross-validation and measurement invariance test results suggested that the overfitting issue was not a significant concern. In the present study, we empirically demonstrated that the bifactor model of civic identity consisting of moral and political identity, which was supposed to be more consistent with the theoretical and conceptual framework of civic identity, better fitted the data than conventional alternative models. (shrink)

The ‘smart city’ has been driven by advances in information and communication technologies, with the aim of integrating these technologies with urban infrastructures for improved optimisation, automation and control. Smart cities have emerged as a response to the challenges faced by megacities and are likely to manifest the ‘datafying’ society in the public space. However, the pervasive nature of data collection, continuous analysis and inference, and long-term data storage result in a potentially problematic reconfiguration of society that undermines individual and (...) collective autonomy. This article proposes the concept of ‘data autonomy’ as a guiding principle for the development of smart cities, addressing challenges related to the potential misuse of personal data, sphere transgression, and datafied gentrification. Section II. explores concerns related to data protection law, which can be understood as a proxy for the relationship between the individual and society, highlighting power dynamics and the autonomy of individuals and communities. Section III. discusses the concept of sphere transgression, where tech giants expand their influence in society without adequate expertise or accountability. Section IV. examines the potential impact of datafied gentrification on individual and collective autonomy. Building on the challenges identified throughout these sections, this paper proposes ‘data autonomy’ as a guiding principle for smart city development in section V., promoting a value-based approach centred on human dignity. To make it practicable, increased interdisciplinary collaboration in the development of smart cities is needed, with a particular focus on improved design and impact assessment methodologies. (shrink)

The concept of flourishing has recently come into vogue within various areas of the humanities and social sciences (e.g. philosophy, psychology, economics, health, education). This article focuses on its potential role within education, where the retrieval of flourishing has perhaps been most visible of all the recent areas of interest, setting in motion what some have called a ‘flourishing bandwagon’. This bandwagon has blazed a trail for the somewhat radical view that flourishing can be seen not only as a significant (...) aim, but even the central aim, of all educational endeavours. Recent criticisms of the flourishing view focus on its potential vacuity and its unhelpful conflation of general and laudable, but uneducable, socio-political and psycho-moral aims with educable ones, hence placing unreasonable burdens on practitioners. After providing a brief historical and conceptual backdrop, this article aims at fleshing out and finessing the scope of education for flourishing and, hence at responding to the recent critics. This is done inter alia through an analogy with health where a similar theoretical problem beckons about possible conceptual underpopulations and overpopulations of the content of the aim of health itself. (shrink)

Molyneux’s question asks whether a person born blind who has learned to identify shapes by touch could, if suddenly granted sight, immediately identify shapes visually. This question has often been used to structure discussions of whether there is a “rational connection” between sight and touch—whether it is possible to rationally doubt whether the same shape properties are both seen and felt. I distinguish two questions under this general heading. The first concerns, roughly, whether the visual and haptic perception of shape (...) is rationally connected in normally sighted perceivers. The second concerns, roughly, whether the visual and haptic perception of shape is rationally connected in all possible perceivers. I argue that real-world implementations of Molyneux’s question are irrelevant to the first question, but potentially relevant to the second. However, I also argue that the second question does not have the philosophical significance it is sometimes claimed to have. In particular, it cannot be used to adjudicate debates about whether the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is primarily determined “externally” by the worldly properties we perceive, or “internally” by physiological or functional properties of our brains. (shrink)

Halakha consists of a variety of laws that determine the halakhic status of various actions. Halakhic laws, by their very nature, have a general aspect in that they apply to all similar actions under similar conditions. In this paper, I examine, from a philosophical-analytical point of view, the relationship between the general aspect of the halakhic laws and the fact that these laws apply to particular actions. After the introduction, this paper is divided into three parts. First, I distinguish between (...) two competing theses regarding the "metaphysical order" between the general aspect of halakhic law and its individual cases. The first one, I call 'Halakhic Generalism', according to which the general aspect of Halakhic law has essential precedence. The second one I refer to as 'Halakhic Particularism', according to which the general aspect of the halakhic law is nothing more than a generalization of all its individual cases. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the particularist position has the power to justify a unique and puzzling halakhic principle. According to this principle, in cases of normative over-determination where the same action is forbidden due to two different halakhic laws, then "a prohibition does not apply to a prohibition". Finally, I compare the reasoning I offer for this principle to alternative justifications of said principle. I argue that, compared to the alternatives, the particularist position provides the best explanation for the principle. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the nature of halakhic facts and I frame the discussion in a broader meta-ethical context. Most of the existing literature on the philosophy of halakha has focused on the contrast between ‘Halakhic Realism’ and ‘Halakhic Nominalism’. This theoretical contrast is vague and includes a wide range of theories. Inspired by the meta-ethical literature, I propose to focus the discussion on views that can be called ‘Halakhic Naturalism’ and ‘Halakhic Non-naturalism’. I present, develop and distinguish between (...) different meanings of 'naturalism' and consider arguments for and against 'Halakhic Naturalism'. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present and demonstrate the fruitful encounter between meta-ethics and the philosophy of halakha. Second, to present, evaluate and promote the substantive discussion of naturalistic and non-naturalistic views. (shrink)

People have sought ways to improve their physical and mental capabilities for thousands of years. For those of us who believe that human enhancement technologies include clothes, tools and weapons, the politics of enhancement started in prehistory. The norms of pre-industrial societies that only certain castes or genders could touch specific tools or wear certain clothes were preliminary politics of enhancement. Prosthetic limbs are thousands of years old, and by the 15th century, there were multiple experiments with vaccination around the (...) world. Although it would be appropriate to write a history of the various forms of empowerment that have taken place since the dawn of civilisation, this volume – that now we can present to the lectors – will be on the debates about human enhancement that began in the early 20th century, once modern medicine had begun to suggest actual technologies for human augmentation. Before examining the relationship between human enhancement and biopolitics (the subject of our work), it is helpful to say a few words about the series in which this volume appears, a series that bears the same title as this first text and which opens with contributions from the best scientific experts on the subject. (shrink)

In Wollstonecraft’s early writings, she articulates the foundational theological and philosophical principles that would underpin her work throughout her career. One difference between her early and later work lies in the way that the values to which she refers are combined. Whereas Wollstonecraft at first appeals to the separate ideals of independence, equality, and virtue, from the 1790s onwards she integrates these into a characteristic republican framework that was in common use amongst dissenting theorists at the time. The set of (...) values on which Wollstonecraft draws, and the version of the republican framework that she develops, closely resemble those of Richard Price with whose work she was familiar. Examining the structural similarities between their respective models, I argue, gives us an insight into the systematic manner of aspects of Wollstonecraft’s own thought. It also allows us to see how Wollstonecraft goes beyond the republicanism of Price and others as she develops her own feminist solutions to the problems of structural domination. (shrink)

This article argues that a phenomenological notion of “lived body” emerges in the Zhuangzi’s 莊子 critique of the Confucian body of ritual and morality. It also argues that a philosophical account of body cannot be reduced to a Sinological account. This article draws on the phenomenological distinction between “object body” and “lived body,” especially the “three ontological dimensions” of Jean-Paul Sartre to argue that the Zhuangzi criticizes the Confucian body of ritual and morality as being a “body-for-others” and that it (...) maintains a concept of “lived body.” Finally, it argues that through such methods of cultivation as “sitting and forgetting” a liberation of the body is achieved where one is connected to dao 道 and achieves a state of heightened experience. (shrink)

It is now widely expected that climate change will be serious enough that a very large number of people will be displaced from their homes because of events relating to or resulting from climate change. Such events may include rising sea levels (and resulting increased salination of ground water), stronger hurricanes and tropical storms, drought, floods, increased and more intense wildfires, and other extreme or (previously) unusual weather events. Although estimates vary widely, it seems very likely that many millions of (...) people—perhaps hundreds of millions if sufficient precautions are not taken—will be forced from their homes by these events related to climate change. In the public imagination, much of the attention has been on ‘climate refugees’, where this is taken to mean people who have crossed borders. However, there is good reason to believe that a very large percentage—probably a significant majority—of displacement resulting from climate change will be, or could be, internal. In this chapter I argue that there are likely to be a large number of cases where internal displacement related to climate change is of international concern, and where, therefore, states have significant moral reasons to provide assistance, either directly to those displaced, or else to the state in which the displacement has taken place. My claim is that internal displacement arising from climate change is of international concern and so grounds a duty of aid by states able to provide it, when this displacement threatens the basic human rights of those displaced, and when the local or domestic government cannot or will not take the necessary steps to meet the needs and protect the rights of those who are displaced. (The uploaded version of this paper is an uncorrected proof. Please cite and refer to the published version.). (shrink)

Edward Stuart Russell (1887–1954) was a central figure in the philosophy of biology during the first half of the twentieth century. Although he worked as a government fisheries scientist for much of his life, he still managed to establish himself as one of the most prominent biological theorists of his time. The views he developed, which were antireductionistic, organism-centred, and teleological, challenged the prevailing mechanistic orthodoxy. His book 'The Interpretation of Development and Heredity' (1930) provides one of themost incisive critiques (...) of the chromosomal theory of the gene ever published, and it has acquired a renewed relevance in light of recent empirical findings. Russell’s interest in the theoretical problems of biology is as much historical as philosophical, and many of his works, particularly his first book 'Form and Function' (1916), are still regarded today as landmark contributions to the history of biological thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Grounding Psychiatry in the Body and the Social WorldLaurence J. Kirmayer, MD, FRCPC, FCAHS, FRSC (bio)The sensing body is like an open circuit that completes itself only in things, in others, in the surrounding earth.—David Abram (2012)Giulio Ongaro has written an interesting set of papers that aim to advance our thinking about ‘externalist’ (i.e., social) approaches to psychiatry by rehearsing an enactivist account of mental disorder and elaborating an (...) ethnographic example of social explanation rooted in a different cultural ontology and system of healing. I am completely onboard with his calls for more attention to the social world in psychiatric theory, research, and practice. What is especially novel in his work is the use of ethnographic research to inform philosophical thinking about psychiatry.Despite my enthusiasm for this effort, I have three concerns with his argument that I can only briefly outline in this commentary: i) the lack of attention to a large body of work in social epidemiology, psychosomatics, and cultural psychiatry that speaks directly to the goals of the biopsychosocial (BPS) approach and that vitiates much of the recent critique of that model; ii) the use of an ethnographic example to idealize an ‘externalist’ system of medicine that patently cannot address the many social structural and sociophysiological processes that psychiatry needs to understand; and iii) most importantly from a philosophical perspective, the fact that the enactivist framework he endorses actually breaks down the distinctions between internalist/externalist psychiatry and naturalist/constructivist ontologies around which he organizes his critique and proposed remedy (Kirmayer & Ramstead, 2017).Integration and the BPS ApproachOngaro’s first paper begins by acknowledging the recent critiques of the BPS approach that claim the BPS leaves vague or underspecified the ways in which the biological, psychological and social domains interact to give rise to mental disorders and how they can be included in systematic case formulation to guide assessment and treatment [End Page 315] intervention. Ongaro notes that current efforts to elaborate an embodied, enactivist approach to psychiatry hold the promise of outlining a more systematic approach to the relationship between levels or domains in the BPS. However, he argues this still leaves psychiatry with excessive emphasis on ‘internalizing’ explanations that appeal to biological or psychological processes within the person to characterize mental disorders. He suggests that this needs to be complemented by an externalizing approach that gives due weight to social processes. The dominant approaches leave the social world underspecified and he notes psychiatry lacks an “ontology of the social.”To some extent, this recent critique—not by Ongaro but by some of the authors he cites—reveals a lack of familiarity or engagement with a rich literature in social epidemiology, psychosomatics and sociosomatics that has long demonstrated the close links between social and physiological processes (Krieger, 2021). This research has produced multiple examples of these relationships detailing their mechanisms and dynamics in ways that do not privilege internal processes. There is no problem identifying many specific instances of these links; for example, research has examined how exposure to racism and discrimination results in increased risk for psychiatric disorders (Kirkbride et al., 2024). We have listed many other such mechanisms related to depression in a recent paper (Gómez-Carrillo & Kirmayer, 2023). This work does not yield a single overarching model or explanation but reveals diverse kinds of mechanisms that interact in a multilevel system that includes both dynamic and linguistic modes (Gómez-Carrillo et al., 2023). Integration occurs in the functioning of this system and cannot be captured in any monolithic theory. This is not a limitation of the BPS, simply a reflection of the complexity of human beings.Can we have a general theory of the links between dimensions or domains in the BPS or will it always remain a piecemeal account that depends on the details of specific systems? Given the many different kinds of processes involved, it seems unrealistic to expect a totalizing theory. If so, both research and clinical work need practical ways to assess the myriad pathways and processes involved in psychiatric disorders in order to formulate cases efficiently, identify a manageable subset of factors to consider in a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Four Majestic Philosophical Thoroughbreds and a Deranged DonkeyWesley J. Wildman (bio)I. IntroductionFor me, this special issue is miraculous fun. I'm so grateful in an undirected way that the universe affords such possibilities. To think, the human project might have ended already had any one of a litany of disasters occurred, from asteroid collisions to our dalliance with self-destructive technologies. No more friends. No more wonderful and silly philosophical arguments. (...) But the human project hasn't ended, not this week anyway, and here we are, celebrating the American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, and enjoying a vigorous exchange of ideas.I'm also grateful in a directed way to specific people—to LeRon Shults and Robert Neville for editing the book that inspired this discussion, Religion in Multidisciplinary Perspective,1 to LeRon for editing this special issue, and additionally to Lisa Landoe Hedrick, Bin Song, Demian Wheeler, Bob, and LeRon for their contributions. These five friends have done me a great honor.It is fascinating—as well as a rare privilege—to witness how one's writings land in the minds and lives of diverse readers. What I hope that means is that there is more to say and write, more insights to wring from the drenched, raggedy fabric of reality, more reason to joyfully embrace the inassimilable density of value that confronts us. That is cause for celebration. Surely this is one reason we dabble in philosophy, dancing atop the brooding axiological depths, telling stories about what lies beneath, and occasionally fighting with one another about what matters most in those stories. To me, making that vision of the depth dimension of reality count for the wellbeing of others is what matters most. But I'm up for quibbling over stories, too; it's a welcome diversion from the daily labors of practical, prosocial philosophy.A word about the peculiar title of this essay is in order. Aren't philosophical theologians supposed to be more serious than that? In fact, the title refers to a memorable experience I shared with my old friend Larry Martin when we worked together in Piedmont, California. One weekend we trekked into [End Page 83] the California mountains to go white-water rafting. It was my first time to experience this particular form of joyful intensity, and I was glad for Larry's company.We were two and the rafts were large, so we were teamed with a crew of Pentecostal church leaders for whom the rafting day was a bonding adventure. Between them and Larry and me, we took up several rafts. We set off through class-four rapids, which I later found out was a rather extreme introduction to white-water rafting. Fortunately, nothing terrible happened to me, apart from a bruised knee when the base of the raft slammed onto a rock right where I was perched. One raft flipped but it wasn't ours and everyone survived.We were exhausted but strangely energized when we pulled into a clearing for lunch. There we found a great pile of sandwiches wrapped in foil, just begging to be eaten by famished rafters. Unwisely, I reached for one, only to discover that this group of Pentecostal church leaders wanted to pray over their meal first. Suitably humbled, and simultaneously impressed with their ability to delay gratification, I listened as they prayed—all of them speaking in tongues—for a seemingly endless period of time.After a minute, I noticed movement in the corner of my vision, my eyes remaining inappropriately open during this act of prayer. I turned to see a donkey walk out of the woods and come to rest in a corner of the clearing. It began braying, expressing a bizarre kind of sympathy with the tongues-talkers, I supposed. As the outburst of glossolalia wound down, the donkey turned and walked back into the forest.To say that I was astonished is a gross understatement. Was that a corporate Saint Francis of Assisi moment? A coincidence to end all coincidences? A practical joke played by two people from the rafting company in an extremely realistic donkey suit? The full measure of my astonishment lies in my... (shrink)

There is a near consensus among philosophers of science whose research focuses on science and values that the ideal of value-free science is untenable, and that science not only is, but normatively must be, value-laden in some respect. The consensus is far from complete; with some regularity, defenses of the value-free ideal (VFI) as well as critiques of major arguments against the VFI surface in the literature. I review and respond to many of the recent defenses of the VFI and (...) show that they generally fail to meet the mark. In the process, I articulate what the current burden of argument for a defense of the VFI ought to be, given the state of the literature. (shrink)

The ability to identify which citizens are democratically competent and which fall beneath the relevant standard of competence bears on numerous questions in democratic theory. These include questions about the distribution of the franchise, the type of civic education that democratic governments should provide to their citizens, and how we might prevent democratic backsliding. In this paper, we aim to identify and defend a criterion of minimal democratic competence. Specifically, we argue that a voter should be regarded as minimally democratically (...) competent with respect to a given election if and only if that voter knows how to vote for the candidates or policies that, if chosen, would not predictably bring about the end of that electoral democracy, and intends to vote that way. (shrink)

It is often remarked that Iris Murdoch’s thought deeply influenced the landscape of twentieth-century moral philosophy. It is certainly true that she inspired a generation of Anglo-American philosophers who sought to critique the moral philosophy of their day. However, these philosophers drew almost exclusively from her early philosophical thought, most notably The Sovereignty of Good. When it came to Murdoch’s second book, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (MGM), moral philosophers and scholars alike found it hard to place within contemporary (...) moral philosophy.Our aim in this paper is to offer a reading of MGM that is resolute in its commitment to do justice to the book’s resistance against domestication within standard moral philosophy, while taking Murdoch at her word when she writes that her “whole argument can be read as moral philosophy” (MGM, 740). This commitment allows us to read MGM as an integrated unity. More importantly, it allows us to reassess Murdoch’s place in twentieth-century philosophy and to propose MGM as one of the works seeking to transform it. Our hope is that our reading will interest any philosopher who feels that something essential is missing in current typical practices in the discipline. (shrink)

It is often remarked that Iris Murdoch’s thought deeply influenced the landscape of twentieth-century moral philosophy. It is certainly true that she inspired a generation of Anglo-American philosophers who sought to critique the moral philosophy of their day. However, these philosophers drew almost exclusively from her early philosophical thought, most notably The Sovereignty of Good. When it came to Murdoch’s second book, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (MGM), moral philosophers and scholars alike found it hard to place within contemporary (...) moral philosophy.Our aim in this paper is to offer a reading of MGM that is resolute in its commitment to do justice to the book’s resistance against domestication within standard moral philosophy, while taking Murdoch at her word when she writes that her “whole argument can be read as moral philosophy” (MGM, 740). This commitment allows us to read MGM as an integrated unity. More importantly, it allows us to reassess Murdoch’s place in twentieth-century philosophy and to propose MGM as one of the works seeking to transform it. Our hope is that our reading will interest any philosopher who feels that something essential is missing in current typical practices in the discipline. (shrink)

This article reports a study of how leading U.S. business schools incorporate one important dimension of corporate citizenship—corporate involvement in community economic development (CI/CED)—in their curricula and programs. Corporate citizenship, or social responsibility, is shown to have several important and unexpected locations in business education. In addition, the authors develop a rationale forwhy and howspecific topics such as CI/CED as well as the general topic of corporate citizenship are appropriate for business school attention.

Historians of political thought have done important and insightful work on women’s history of political thought. This scholarship has proliferated since the mid to late twentieth century and has focused largely on the feminist aspects of their thought. Although this was at first a necessary and crucial correction of prior neglect, I argue that by now this has turned into an overcorrection. By turning to the early reception and rediscovery of two eighteenth-century English female political thinkers, Mary Astell (1666–1731) and (...) Catharine Macaulay (1731–1791), I show that this feminist focus can stand in the way of inclusion by obscuring other important aspects of women’s political thought. I also contend that the feminist focus implies an unfair double standard where women – as opposed to canonical men – are thought of as worthy of inclusion only if they espoused or anticipated ideas that would seem agreeable from a present perspective. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that, if we want to do justice to the feminist aim of comprehensive inclusion of past female thinkers, we must learn to look beyond women’s feminist thought in history and to embrace their afeminist and even anti-feminist thought. (shrink)

Sometimes what we perceive appears other than it is. The term ‘illusion’ is often used to capture the broad variety of cases in which this occurs. But some of these cases are better described as cases of imaginative perception—cases in which what we perceive appears as we imagine it to be. I argue that imaginative perception is to be sharply contrasted with illusions variously conceived as cases of misleading appearance and cases of perceptual error. By removing the blanket term ‘illusion’ (...) from our description of such cases, we can better see the underlying complex of cognitive processes they involve. (shrink)

The class of defeasible logics is only vaguely defined – it is defined by a few exemplars and the general idea of efficient reasoning with defeasible rules. The recent definition of the defeasible logic DL(∂||) introduced new features to such logics, which have repercussions that we explore. In particular, we define a class of logics that accommodates the new logic while retaining the traditional properties of defeasible logics.

According to ‘transformative’ theories of rationality, human rational mental capacities cannot be completely explained using the theories and concepts of natural science because rational mental states stand to one another in irreducibly normative relations of justification. Certain transformative theorists propose that a capacity counts as rational if a ‘Why?’ question is applicable to some exercises of that capacity. But ‘Why?’ questions are in principle applicable to any intentional action, like walking over there, or deliberately holding one’s breath. Transformative rationality therefore (...) seems to entail that capacities for walking or breathing are rational and hence escape complete scientific explanation. Yet it would be surprising to learn that physiology, medicine, and biology could not completely explain such capacities. Given the ‘Why?’ question criterion for a rational capacity, there is a danger of ‘rationality’ creeping into capacities that (one might think) should submit to scientific explanation, and even into sub-individual processes. This is the ‘Problem of ‘Creeping Rationalism’’. After introducing the problem, I consider potential ways a transformative theorist could try to avoid the problem by limiting the scope of what capacities are ‘transformed’ by rationality. I argue that initially promising proposals to do this are either circular, or are incompatible with core commitments of the theory. (shrink)

Joseph HenryWoodger (1894–1981) was one of the foremost theoretical biologists of the twentieth century. Starting out his career as an experimental embryologist and cytologist, Woodger became increasingly interested in the conceptual foundations of biology. Eventually, he abandoned all empirical research so that he could devote himself fully to studying the structure of biological theories. Perhaps his major accomplishment was the 500-page treatise 'Biological Principles: A Critical Study' (1929), which systematically investigated the epistemological basis of biological knowledge through an analysis of (...) its central concepts. Today, he is mostly remembered for his audacious monograph 'The Axiomatic Method in Biology' (1937), which remains the most ambitious attempt to reformulate the propositions of biology (especially genetics, embryology, and taxonomy) using the tools of symbolic logic and pure mathematics. Woodger is also known for establishing the Theoretical Biology Club, and for introducing the ‘Bauplan’ concept into Anglophone biology. The insect Terpandrus Woodgeri (Woodger’s Gumleaf Katydid) is named in his honour. (shrink)

Infants who are born extremely prematurely can survive if they receive intensive medical treatment. However, they also have a high chance of dying, and a proportion of survivors have long-term health problems and disabilities. In many parts of the world, if parents request it, an extremely premature infant can receive palliative care rather than active survival-focused care at birth. But there are variations between countries as to whether or when this is permitted. To help inform ethical debates across Asia and (...) more widely, we present two contrasting views about parental discretion and the treatment of extremely preterm infants. In questions of this nature, disagreement and dissensus are inevitable. Differences in the outcomes of treatment, the resources available, and the values of society mean that we should not expect a uniform approach. We identify points of potential consensus and compromise despite disagreement. (shrink)

This article advocates and explores a human rights method of ethics as a contribution to the process of moral decision-making. A human rights approach is richer than is often understood and can offer a practically relevant and emotionally well-grounded framework that is helpful for linking local situations and global concerns.

What are the limits of Left Wittgensteinianism's point- and need-based account of conceptual change? Based upon Wittgenstein's account of certainty and the riverbed analogy for conceptual change in On Certainty, the question is raised whether Queloz and Cueni's redevelopment of Left Wittgensteinianism can account for the multiplicitous forms of change these concepts are subject to. I argue that Left Wittgensteinianism can only partially do so, because it overemphasises the role of criticism-driven conceptual change, due to its focus on the reason-based (...) contingency of the practices of a local ‘we’. In response, it is argued that Left Wittgensteinianism should be fortified with (i) gradual changes to concepts' sociocultural constraints that concept-users are unaware of and (ii) evolutionary and environmental changes to the biological determinants of natural constraints of conceptual cores. In the end, there are conceptual practices like holding for certain that are generally, and fully contingent, but simultaneously inevitable not only for ‘us’ but also for many other delimitations of ‘we’. Subsequently, the compatibility of this Wittgensteinian account of conceptual change with pragmatic genealogy is discussed. It is concluded that thinking about conceptual changes to practices cannot be about the possibility of criticism alone nor succeed without the inclusion thereof. (shrink)

What does it mean to be a bioethicist? How should the role(s) of bioethics be understood in the context of a world of intense value conflict and polarisation? Bioethics is—in all its various forms and traditions—potentially well-positioned to contribute to addressing many of the most pressing challenges of value polarisation and conflict in diverse societies. However, realising this potential is going to require moving beyond currently foregrounded methods and developing new models for engaging with moral disagreement. This paper proposes an (...) approach, ‘adversarial cooperation,’ drawing on the concepts of ‘adversarial collaboration’ from the sciences and ‘antagonistic cooperation’ from the humanities. Adversarial cooperation aims to combine the rigour and structured methodology of adversarial collaboration with the cultural sensitivity and expansive vision of antagonistic cooperation. The paper also addresses key challenges to adversarial cooperation, including ethical considerations, tensions between substantive and procedural values, the problem of misinformation and the need for decision-making amidst ongoing disagreement. Ultimately, adversarial cooperation suggests a reimagining of bioethical expertise, emphasising skills in mediation, the arts and humanities and participatory decision-making alongside established philosophical competencies. This implies a model of normative bioethical authority grounded in the ability to facilitate inclusive and trustworthy processes of moral deliberation. Realising the potential of adversarial cooperation will require significant changes in bioethics training and practice, as well as a commitment to reflexivity, humility and the amplification of marginalised voices. By embracing this approach, bioethics can play a vital role in navigating the complex moral landscapes of pluralistic societies. (shrink)

Conflicts in the Pentecostal church leadership have been growing since time immemorial. However, leadership disputes have become traumatic and tragic in Zimbabwe to the extent that junior pastors are committing suicide and killing each other because of these conflicts. The article uses the practical theological framework to explore the complex intersections of conflict within the Pentecostal church, analysing the various factors and dynamics contributing to these conflicts. This work examines and addresses the ramifications of a leadership conflict within the Apostolic (...) Faith Mission (AFM). The junior pastors, who have been impacted by the leadership dispute, have endured trauma stemming from the ongoing conflict among the church’s prominent leaders, which is the central focus of this study. To better understand the lived experience of trauma among these pastors, a qualitative research design was employed. Through purposeful sampling and face-to-face interviews, participants were given the opportunity to share their narratives of leadership trauma. The result is that junior pastors are internalising the trauma, which is affecting them spiritually, emotionally and physically in ministry. This article proposes a healing methodology utilising the Gerkin and Positive Deconstruction approach.Contribution: This study leverages a practical theological framework to examine the challenges of providing pastoral care for junior ministers who were impacted by leadership disputes within AFM thereby contributing to Pentecostal approaches to care. (shrink)

Trypophobia is a relatively common aversion to clusters of holes. There is no consensus yet on which emotions are involved in Trypophobia nor in its functional utility. This report investigates the role of disgust using contamination tasks in two studies, which contrast people with an aversion to trypophobic stimuli to those without. In Study 1, participants reported their emotional reactions to imagined contamination of trypophobic images. In Study 2, participants evaluated physically present trypophobic, disgust, fear, and control stimuli. The capacity (...) of these stimuli to contaminate other objects was established using a chain of contagion task. Across both studies, contamination was present, however, only those with an aversion to trypophobic stimuli evidenced contamination on the chain of contagion task, a hallmark of disgust responding. Elevated levels were not only reported for disgust, but also alongside fear/anxiety. Participant reports suggest an underlying disease avoidance mechanism in Trypophobia, with trypophobic participants demonstrating an exaggerated response to such stimuli involving disgust and fear/anxiety, which is also seen in small animal phobia, BII, and C-OCD. Implications, particularly for treatment are discussed. (shrink)

The public University is an actor capable of energizing local ecosystems to transform the territory, and open innovation is its instrument of connection with the environment. University open innovation was studied through factor analysis by the principal components’ method in Mexico and Colombia. Data were collected in 54 research groups of two public universities. The analysis showed that the first six components explain 82.479% of the variance of the university open innovation model. The coincidences were evidenced in the factors that (...) affect the general process of open innovation in Universities of Mexico and in Colombia. It was concluded that open innovation is a relevant mechanism for linking the University with its environment. (shrink)

We read the four commentaries on our article with much interest.1 Each response provides stimulating discussion, and below we have attempted to respond to specific issues that they have raised. We regret that we are not able to respond point-by-point to each of them. However, before our responses, it may benefit the reader if we briefly summarise the claims in our article. First, we hold two presuppositions: (1) xenotransplantation research will inevitably continue for the foreseeable future, and (2) causing suffering (...) and pain requires sufficient justification and should be mitigated where possible. Second, based on these two presuppositions, we posit an argument for the further genetic modification of pigs for xenotransplantation that would eliminate certain experiences of pain and suffering should it become possible to do so. Gibson,2 in his commentary, is sceptical—for good reason—that ‘xenotransplantation-motivated disenhancement would be a temporary stopgap until the organ and tissue shortage problem is solved via less contentious means’. Gibson’s argument is grounded in the fact that the biotechnology industry—of which xenotransplantation is part of—is beholden to economic and market forces that would likely perpetuate constancy, thereby making it difficult to transition away from using disenhanced genetically engineered pigs for xenotransplantation. This point is well taken, …. (shrink)

Históricamente, los estudios de desastres han presentado dos comprensiones antagónicas de las catástrofes: singularidades extremas que producen historia o procesos que perpetúan estructuras sociopolíticas e inequidades. Mediante un análisis del terremoto de 1970 en Ancash, Perú, y su influencia en la implementación de discursos de (des)aceleración en medio de grandes transformaciones en la sociedad peruana, este artículo presenta una comprensión alternativa de los desastres más allá de la disrupción y continuidad, para enfocarse en las articulaciones temporales que estos producen. Al (...) ser concebidos como dispositivos temporales, los desastres tienen la capacidad de reestructurar ritmos, escalas y temporalidades de manera heterogénea y múltiple. El artículo pretende aportar argumentos que, aunque basados en el terremoto de Ancash, pueden aplicarse a otros debates sobre catástrofes, crisis y desastres como desencadenantes de aceleración y desaceleración económica, social o cultural. (shrink)

James Burnett, Lord Monboddo’s (1714–1799) contribution to Scottish Enlightenment thinking on race is regularly held to be twofold. As a Lord of Session, he supposedly defended slavery on Aristotelian grounds, infamously voting against Joseph Knight’s freedom in Knight v. Wedderburn (1778). In his philosophical writings, Monboddo is known for his arguments in favour of the humanity of orangutangs, which scholars have claimed informed both his own views on slavery and also wider apologetics for the trade. At the same time, Monboddo (...) is frequently cited as providing a fulsome defence of the achievements of black Africans against Hume’s footnote in ‘Of Natural Characters’ (added in 1753). The full significance of Monboddo’s counterexample to Hume’s claims, the civilization of black ancient Egypt, has not been adequately understood. In this article I undertake a deep dive into Monboddo’s views on race, slavery, and the black origins of civilization present in his largely ignored six-volume Antient Metaphysics (1779–1799). The arguments that emerge show that Monboddo was not quite the apologist for enslaving black Africans as he is sometimes presented as being, but also that his thought was far from the enlightened Scottish mainstream. (shrink)

In an earlier essay, I argued that King Xuan 宣 sacrifices a sheep rather than an ox to save money, and that Mengzi 孟子 offers the king an alternative, benign rationale for the substitution in order to overcome the king’s reluctance to improve his own character. In the current essay, I defend my interpretation of the dialogue between King Xuan and Mengzi, and highlight two further points. First, Mengzi does not always mean what he says. Dramatic context is crucial to (...) interpretation, and the context reveals that Mengzi is manipulating the king with flattering falsehoods rather than persuading him with sound arguments. Second, although Mengzi maintains that human nature includes sprouts of virtue, he recognizes that some people’s sprouts are dormant or overgrown with weeds (vices). He provides a deceptive strategy for gaining interlocutors’ buy-in to the project of virtue cultivation, and other strategies (deliberately misdescribed as “extension”) for the eradication of vices. (shrink)

Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks opens with a discussion of language in the colonial setting. I argue that this is at least in part due to Fanon’s background in phenomenology, and the crucial role that intersubjectivity plays in the phenomenological account of the subject. I begin by demonstrating the phenomenological underpinnings of Fanon’s chapter on language. I then further develop the background phenomenological account of the subject, showing how this informs Fanon’s project. I then develop a sonic account of (...) the subject, arguing that metaphors of sound best represent the phenomenological account of the subject. Finally, I build on this sonic account to draw out the implications for our thinking about communication and liberation in Fanon’s work and beyond. (shrink)