The paper examines the perspectives of an exchange between the phenomenological ontology of Martin Heidegger and a theory of history in the context of the problem of interpretative approaches in historical writing. The hypothesis is that the analyses offered by Heidegger in Being and Time and Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity provide the foundation for mapping out new perspectives in the concept of interpretative approaches. The concept of interpretativeapproaches came to be actively used in academic texts relatively recently, since the (...) 1980’s, and has often been employed quite unreflectively. But its wide currency, its heterogeneous and unreflective usage turned the concept of interpretative approaches into a theoretical problem. This paper will present a possible answer to that problem by examining the conceptual foundations of a redefined concept of interpretative approaches, drawn from the lectures read by Heidegger in the summer semester of 1923, more precisely §§16–28, 21–26, and the relevant discussion in Being and Time, starting with §12 and focusing on Part I,Chapter 5 (mainly §§32 and 33). (shrink)

This paper examines whether, and in what contexts, Duhem’s and Poincaré’s views can be regarded as conventionalist or structural realist. After analysing the three different contexts in which conventionalism is attributed to them – in the context of the aim of science, the underdetermination problem and the epistemological status of certain principles – I show that neither Duhem’s nor Poincaré’s arguments can be regarded as conventionalist. I argue that Duhem and Poincaré offer different solutions to the problem of theory choice, (...) differ in their stances towards scientific knowledge and the status of scientific principles, making their epistemological claims substantially different. (shrink)

The holistic thesis developed by Pierre Duhem challenges the idea that our evidence can conclusively falsify a theory. Given that no scientific theory is tested in isolation, a negative experiment can always be attributed to components other than the theory we test – to the auxiliary hypotheses and background assumptions. How do scientists decide whether the experimental result undermines the theory or points at an error in the underlying assumptions? Duhem argues that we cannot offer a rule that directs when (...) the scientist should employ a radical or conservative strategy in light of a negative result, and ultimately they will appeal to their intuition. More recently philosophers have offered a number of strategies of how to locate error and justify the abandonment of a theory or an auxiliary hypothesis. This Element analyses Duhem's response to holism and subsequent accounts of how the problem can be resolved. (shrink)

In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur, who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman’s relativised a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to show that the conjunction of Friedman’s relativised a priori with structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman’s view and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of McArthur’s argument. (...) This compatibility is usually questioned, due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman’s view, which clashes with the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman’s view, but more importantly I question whether Friedman’s view really implies mind dependence. (shrink)

This paper challenges the appeal to theory virtues in theory choice as well as the appeal to the intellectual and moral virtues of an agent as determining unique choices between empirically equivalent theories. After arguing that theoretical virtues do not determine the choice of one theory at the expense of another theory, I argue that nor does the appeal to intellectual and moral virtues single out one agent, who defends a particular theory, and exclude another agent defending an alternative theory. (...) I analyse Duhem’s concept of good sense and its recent interpretation in terms of virtue epistemology. I argue that the virtue epistemological interpretation does not show how good sense leads to conclusive choices and scientific progress. (shrink)

Can experiments be appreciated for their aesthetic value and what would this appreciation be focused on? This chapter identifies a number of categories that are the focus on our aesthetic appreciation of experiments and shows how these categories are rather stable across different experimental traditions. It is argued that we can find aesthetic value in the phenomena unveiled in the experimental set up, the instruments and tolls used, the results that are obtained, the process of conceptualisation of the experimental set (...) up, the experimental design and the very performance of the experiment. The chapter draws a distinction between immediately accessible to the senses beauty and intellectual beauty and argues that the ultimate source of aesthetic value is to be found in the relationship between design and significance. (shrink)

The article examines the postmodern strategy of transition from “being community” to “community of being”. Justified by its heuristic significance for the socio-philosophical knowledge. So, criticizing traditional metaphysics, postmodernism has made possible the justification of the specific socio-philosophical objectivity: “social philosophy” in this case means not the philosophy of “on social”, but the philosophy of “social”.

In “On Certainty” Wittgenstein regards doubting as meaningful and reasonable only in a context providing language game where some background is taken for granted. Doubt, just as knowledge, should be backed up by an argument, only this time, one presenting reasons for uncertainty. Common sense propositions constitute part of the background for the arguments of doubting and because of their function and place within the system of language, they are regarded as indubitable. I discuss critically the idea of linguistically determined (...) indubitability and advocate the possibility of a different kind of doubt, one that does not require its own justification and is still a reasonable epistemic attitude. Such doubt characterizes the states of affairs where the certainty of a proposition is not yet rationally established. I argue that, language does not limit us in doubting and in doubting reasonably. (shrink)

The terms “contemplation” and “standpoint,” as used by Lukács, have almost disappeared from the vocabulary of scholars studying the contemporary world of work. This paper aims to rehabilitate these terms by arguing that, despite its shortcomings, a Lukácsian approach offers a valuable perspective for examining labor experiences. I first outline the foundations of Lukács's reification theory by focusing on objective reification. Then, I reconstruct the concepts of contemplation and having a standpoint of experience by surveying Lukác's analysis of how different (...) actors in capitalism experience reality. I conclude by exploring the implications of reification theory for analyzing market-centered regimes of control. The article can be read as an invitation for researchers investigating the world of labor to reengage with reification theory. (shrink)

The article summarized the results of the research activity of Andrey Rossokhin, which is devoted to studying the dynamics of reflection in the altered states of consciousness in the course of psychoanalytic process. These states of consciousness are characterized by transformation of the semantic space of the subject and changing forms of categorization with a transition from socially normed to new ways of rationalizing internal experience and experiences take place. By theoretical and empirical analyses, A. Rossokhin concluded that through means (...) of the internal dialogue during the altered states of consciousness, it carries out an active reflexive rethinking activity both previously non-reflective mental content and the very strategies of reflection with the internal dialogue. This leads to qualitative alteration in value-meaning formations, activates, and brings about the personality integration into a new, more complete state. (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic analysis of Poincaré’s understanding of beauty in science. In particular, the paper examines the epistemic significance Poincaré attributes to aesthetic judgement by reconstructing and analysing his arguments on simplicity and unity in science. I offer a consistent reconstruction of Poincaré’s account and show that for Poincaré simplicity and unity are regulative principles, linked to the aim of science—that of achieving understanding of how phenomena relate. I show how Poincaré’s account of beauty in science can be (...) incorporated within his wider philosophy of science. (shrink)

I examine implications for structural realism of Michael Friedman’s view about relativized a priori principles. Friedman's argument implies that there is structural preservation of constitutive principles in theory change, which suggests that the structural realist should be committed to these principles, given that they satisfy her criterion of ontological commitment. Since these principles are not regarded as representing physical structure, I argue that a dilemma arises for the structural realist. Either a distinction between mathematical structures that represent and mathematical structures (...) that do not represent needs to be drawn, in order to block the structural realist from ontologically committing to relativized a priori principles, or the structural realist must ontologically commit to relativized a priori principles. Due to the dynamical nature of relativized a priori principles, the first option is untenable. The second option reveals implications for structural realism but also problems for Friedman's view. (shrink)

A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a system of knowledge, perceptual beliefs seem to bear more importance than other members of the coherent set do. They are more stable in the face of confronting evidence, and may be preserved despite their degrading effect on the coherence properties of the system. This appears to be inconsistent with coherentism, according to which beliefs cannot possess independent credibility. In order to abide by the coherence theory, (...) one must explain the stability of perceptual beliefs in belief revision in a manner that does not rely on foundationalist premises. A suggestion about the personal justification of perceptual beliefs in terms of coherence is presented in the paper to explain their stability in belief revision processes. The coherence of perceptual beliefs and a network account of knowledge are advocated in order to avoid weak foundationalism and to provide a new perspective to the normative problems of epistemic justification. (shrink)

The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry has raised significant discussions in the recent literature. A number of authors have recently explored the link between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science with the aim to show whether epistemic virtues can contribute to the resolution of the problem of theory choice. This paper analyses how intellectual virtues can be beneficial for successful resolution of theory choice. We explore the role of virtues as well as vices in scientific inquiry and their (...) beneficial effects in the context of theory choice. We argue that vices can play a role in widening the set of potential candidate theories and support our claim with historical examples and normative arguments from formal social epistemology. We argue that even though virtues appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific success, they have a positive effect because they accelerate successful convergence amongst scientists in theory choice situations. (shrink)

Discussions on the trustworthiness of science concern scientific objectivity. Scientific products, methods, and institutions are objective in three different senses. In each case, the notion of objectivity is applied to the outcomes of the scientific enterprise. This interpretation neglects the human side of objectivity. The trust in science is rational only when it is not grounded in an impersonal view of knowledge. Since trust is a value that connects people, society places its credence not in a system of propositions, a (...) methodology, a tradition, or even—an institution, but rather in the living people that practice science today. (shrink)

The article introduces theories of epistemic justification to the problems of understanding in communication. Two dominant approaches in contemporary epistemology — foundationalism and coherentism — are applied in intercultural discourse. Since the intended meaning of utterances in communication is reached through inference, beliefs about the intended meaning are justified with respect to the evidence of communicative behaviour and context. Tracing the difficulties of intercultural dialogue, the article argues that the coherentist method of justification is more useful than foundationalist one. Coherentism (...) is consistent with the open-mindedness and unprejudiced reasoning, both of which are crucial parts of intercultural competency. (shrink)

A growing literature in philosophy of science focuses on the role of surprise in scientific practice. The aesthetic dimension of science is also gaining momentum in very recent discussions. While surprising results have been recognised as playing an important epistemic role in science, the literature so far has primarily focused on establishing the power of simulations and thought experiments as compared to experiments and the epistemic superiority of novel predictions over accommodations. In this paper we offer the first empirical analysis (...) of the role of surprise as an aesthetic response, drawing from in-depth interviews with 215 scientists in four countries. We identify what roles scientists assign to surprising results, show that surprise is often experienced as an aesthetic response and identify properties, triggers, and outcomes of surprise in science. (shrink)

The notion of contact algebra is one of the main tools in the region-based theory of space. It is an extension of Boolean algebra with an additional relation C called contact. There are some problems related to the motivation of the operation of Boolean complementation. Because of this operation is dropped and the language of distributive lattices is extended by considering as non-definable primitives the relations of contact, nontangential inclusion and dual contact. It is obtained an axiomatization of the theory (...) consisting of the universal formulas in the language true in all contact algebras. The structures in, satisfying the axioms in question, are called extended distributive contact lattices. In this paper we consider several logics, corresponding to EDCL. We give completeness theorems with respect to both algebraic and topological semantics for these logics. It turns out that they are decidable. (shrink)

The performative representation of the Spanish Roma woman reveals a historical journey that brings her closer to many symbolic elaborations of the feminine, giving her a special affinity with the imaginary concerning the colonized woman, particularly with the Orientalist vision. Developed initially by the travelling intellectuals in Spain who sought a fusion of the topics of sexualized exoticism, the myth was reworked by local artists and thinkers without undermining their power to silence and make invisible the reality of the most (...) vulnerable and most represented members of the ethnic group, their women. Today, a growing awareness of the importance of collective action directs Roma women to initiatives such as the revision of their historical memory, at the intersection between the external gaze and self-perception. These searches lead to the pioneering creation of community museum institutions, which have arisen around feminine Roma associations and are a symptom of an emerging desire to be heard. Based on the terminological tools shared by women and memory studies, this article seeks the personal dimension of this invitation to listen. The authors analyse a series of interviews with Roma women that investigate the social agents of representation, self-representation and their conceptual and experiential foundations. (shrink)

Scientists often use aesthetic values in the evaluation and choice of theories. Aesthetic values are not only regarded as leading to practically more useful theories but are often taken to stand in a special epistemic relation to the truth of a theory such that the aesthetic merit of a theory is evidence of its truth. This paper explores what aesthetic considerations influence scientists' reasoning, how such aesthetic values relate to the utility of a scientific theory, and how one can justify (...) the epistemic role for such values. The paper examines ways in which the link between beauty and truth can be defended, the challenges facing such accounts, and explores alternative epistemic roles for aesthetic values in scientific practice. (shrink)

This article starts an engagement on the aesthetics of experiments and offers an account for analysing how aesthetics features in the design, evaluation and reception of experiments. I identify two dimensions of aesthetic evaluation of experiments: design and significance. When it comes to design, a number of qualities, such as simplicity, economy and aptness, are analysed and illustrated with the famous Meselson-Stahl experiment. Beautiful experiments are also regarded to make significant discoveries, but I argue against a narrow construal of experimental (...) aims. By drawing on the plurality of goals experimenters have and diversity of aesthetic responses, I argue that experiments are aesthetically appreciated both when they discover and when they produce disruptive results. (shrink)

_This article delves into the dynamic nature of ethical frameworks, arguing that moral paradigms are not static but rather evolve in response to societal shifts, technological advancements, and evolving understandings of ourselves and the world around us. Through a historical lens, we examine major transitions in ethical thought, highlighting how societal changes such as the rise of democracy, the Industrial Revolution, and globalization have reshaped our understanding of right and wrong. We then explore the impact of emerging technologies, such as (...) artificial intelligence and bioengineering, on ethical landscapes, prompting us to re-evaluate traditional principles and grapple with novel dilemmas. Ultimately, this article calls for an embrace of ethical dynamism, advocating for an ongoing process of critical reflection, dialogue, and adaptation to navigate the complex moral landscape of a constantly changing world._. (shrink)

There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in science, (...) and show that it is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social consensus account against objections that highlight the positive role of diversity and division of labour in science. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom does not indicate a shift from instrumentalism to scientific realism. I examine the implications of Poincaré’s acceptance of the existence of the atom for our current understanding of his philosophy of science. Specifically, how can we understand Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom in structural realist terms? I examine his 1912 paper carefully and suggest that it does not entail scientific realism in the sense of acceptance of the fundamental existence (...) of atoms but rather, argues against fundamental entities. I argue that Poincaré’s paper motivates a non-fundamentalist view about the world, and that this is compatible with his structuralism. (shrink)