There is renewed scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of constitutional revolutions and the explanations for the rise of constitutional courts around the world. At the same time, there is growing discussion of democratic backsliding and concern that democracies are exhibiting extremism, weakening of opposition forces and constitutional courts, and violations of civil and political rights that are pertinent to vibrant democracies. Scholars try to study both phenomena and understand the relationship between them. Israel is an important (...) case study for both agendas. This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, one of the greatest jurists of our time with a worldwide reputation for revolutionizing both Israeli constitutional law and comparative constitutional law. It explains the tactics and strategy used by Barak to revolutionize Israeli constitutional law on issues of reasonableness, proportionality, standing, justiciability, constitutional review, equality, and supra-constitutional law. It reveals how each revolution paved the way for the next. It offers explanations for the effectiveness of these judicially-led revolutions as well as possible bases for their legitimation. Barak was a common law judge and ultimately treated parliamentary sovereignty as a doctrine arising from common law and constrained by common law, though he never quite put it in these terms. The Article concludes with explanations for the political backlash experienced by the current Israeli Supreme Court that some have characterized as democratic backsliding. It argues that the Court contributes to the development of law as part of a dialog and interaction between the different branches of government. As the Court operates within these dynamics, it must understand and take into account the institutional, political, and social environments in which it operates to preserve legitimacy and achieve efficacy. Barak was a strategic player that laid foundations for an expansive judicial power, but his Court was very prudent in utilizing that power. His successors may have contributed unintentionally to the backlash against the Court by following Barak’s substantive jurisprudence, but not necessarily his prudent tactics and strategy. (shrink)

Decisions made so far by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany have always been characterized by their writing and content, even down to details, precision, accuracy, professional legal style of writing, always clear in the elaboration and adjudication of cases from its competence, but surprisingly, in our country, only a few have paid attention to the German Court in a scientific context, which can be seen from the only few materials we possess in the Albanian language. The (...) purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this Court, so that the comparative aspects can be made, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages, in case of dictating the state need for reform of the Constitutional Courts. Those who have institutionalized this constitutional institution know its value in the system of constitutional justice, which performs it in terms of protection of constitutions, its principles and value, and most importantly in the protection of freedoms and rights of human beings and citizens. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, to this date, has conveyed the efficiency of the protection of the German legal order, the serious approach and law interpretation, for the protection of freedoms and human rights, which ranks this court into a high level among all other powers in the German law system. The author, in the following paper, gives an overview of this Court starting with its history, organization and functioning, which today undoubtedly constitutes one of the most important constitutional courts in the world. (shrink)

Religion-state issues are particularly contentious in the Israeli context and they are often resolved by litigation before the Supreme Court in its capacity as the High Court of Justice. A recent controversy that reached Israel’s High Court of Justice in 2005 involved a petition to recognize the validity of non-Orthodox conversions to Judaism. This paper examines the role of the press in constructing the controversy and the image of the High Court (...) of Justice by analyzing all the reports and editorials in both an elite and in a popular newspaper, published from a week before the decision was issued until to 1 month afterwards. It looks at the visual, inter-textual and linguistic features of the articles and analyzes the frames used in representing the Court, the petitioners, and the controversy. We found that two distinct frames were used by the papers to convey the essence of the controversy in the Tushbeim case. While the organizing idea in Haaretz, the elite newspaper, was one of Israel as a civic state, Yediot, the popular newspaper, emphasized the religious dimension of Israeli nationhood. Moreover, contrary to widespread perceptions of the popular press, it presented a wider range of views than did the elite newspaper, which tended to praise the Court and to support the decision. However, both papers avoided challenges to the basic issue of whether religious authorities should control the definition of the character of Israel as a Jewish State. Thus, the media in effect defined the terms of the struggle over the Jewish identity of the state within consensual boundaries. (shrink)

The extent to which the legal doctrine addresses manifestations of constitutionalism has been constantly growing. However, the majority of research in constitutionalism focuses on the analysis of the power of the Constitution and the fundamental principles entrenched in it whereas ordinary branches of law, including civil procedure, affected by the constitutional law remains outside the scope of a deeper analysis. The author of the present paper is convinced that certain aspects of the impact of constitutional justice on (...) such branches as, in particular, civil procedure deserve deeper interest. The modest scope of the paper precludes an extensive analysis of the role of the Constitution as a fundamental binding Act and today’s abundant doctrine of Lithuania’s Constitutional Court in civil procedure. Therefore, the present paper is confined to an analysis of individual aspects of direct application of the Constitution and the doctrine of the Constitutional Court. The article analyses the power of the Constitution and its impact on the civil procedure as an Act laying down the fundamental principles binding the legislator in adopting procedural instruments and principles to be followed by courts and as a remedy for violations of rights or a tool to address loopholes and collisions of law. Courts of general jurisdiction perform the control of legitimacy of legal Acts by checking their compliance with the Constitution in individual cases and by applying to the Constitutional Court for repeal of anticonstitutional norms or by applying the Constitution as an Act of direct effect to eliminate loopholes, interpret statutes and deal with collisions of legal norms. The author believes that the fact that the courts of general jurisdiction frequently raise questions of incompliance of legal Acts with the Constitution and decisively apply to the Constitutional Court evidences a high level of legal culture and legal consciousness of the judges. That fact may also serve as a precondition for the growth of confidence in the judiciary as judicial procedures may contain no uncertainties as to the constitutionality of the statutes to be followed in litigation. (shrink)

The article presents the argument that administrative decision-making should be understood as devoted to balancing between conflicting interests of individuals or groups, usually when none of the affected parties has predefined legal rights that are relevant to the substantial content of the administrative decision. Administrative decisions often have a direct effect not only on human and civil rights issues, but also on matters bearing on the quality of life, living conditions, prices of regulated products, and the allocation of government funds. (...) Since the decision as to which interest should prevail in the conflict is a distributive one and has many possible answers, the role of administrative law is primarily to ensure that these decisions are made fairly, with due weight given to the conflicting interests of the various groups and individuals involved. With this as background, the article shows how the doctrines of positive administrative law are designed to meet the challenge of coping with conflicting interests in the administrative decision-making process, using such examples as the prohibitions against decision-makers’ conflicts of interest and the rules regarding interest representation and judicial review. In the second part, the article applies the interest perspective to the administrative decision-making process in order to analyze the highly extensive regulation of land resources in Israel. The analysis concentrates on the Israeli Supreme Court decision in one of the most controversial petitions brought before it: against administrative decisions on the development of formerly agricultural lands. (shrink)

Resumo O autor defende uma descrição normativa fraca do constitucionalismo internacional à luz de dois factos: a contínua relevância da soberania do Estado face à hegemonia de superpotências e a necessidade imperiosa de um regime supranacional eficaz de direitos humanos. Ao defender uma institucionalização constitucional de direitos humanos, que inclui aspectos de justiça processual e material, mostra-se que, como nos casos domésticos, tal institucionalização pode e, talvez deva, incorporar um procedimento de controlo judicial que ascende ao nível de controlo constitucional. (...) De facto, o parecer do Tribunal Europeu de Justiça no caso Kadi estabeleceu um possível precedente para o controlo do Conselho de Segurança no sentido do cumprimento dos direitos humanos e outras normas peremptórias. Dada a necessidade de perícia técnico legal para a elaboração de tal controlo, um caso prima facie pode ser feito para o estabelecimento de um Tribunal Constitucional especializado ao nível internacional. Contudo, dado o impacto desempenhado pelo poder político na resolução técnica da adjudicação de casos específicos e concretos, dentro de um sistema jurídico altamente fragmentado, e dado o facto de que o controlo constitucional também toca questões mais abstractas e menos técnicos de justiça social, o autor recomenda, que a função de controlo constitucional seja disseminada por várias instituições globais, incluindo a actual Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas e na esfera pública global. O controlo constitucional pluricêntrico, bem como a institucionalização dos direitos humanos decorre do desacordo multicultural existente acerca do significado desses direitos e da ameaça da hegemonia de superpotências sobre as instituições globais. Assim antecipa-se também a realização de uma constitucionalização mais monista no Direito Internacional com o crescimento da solidariedade global entre os povos. Palavras-chave : Constitucionalização, Controlo Constitucional, Direitos Humanos, Habermas, Nações Unidades, Pluralismo LegalI defend a weakly normative description of international constitutionalism in light of two facts: the continued salience of state sovereignty in the face of superpower hegemony and the overriding need for an effective supranational human rights regime. In arguing for a constitutional institutionalization of human rights that includes aspects of procedural and substantive justice, I show that, as in the domestic case, such an institutionalization could and perhaps should incorporate a procedure for judicial review ascending to the level of constitutional review. In fact, the European Court of Justice’s review of the Kadi case establishes a possible precedent for reviewing Security Council compliance with human rights and other peremptory norms. Given the need for technical legal expertise in elaborating such review, a prima facie case can be made for establishing a specialized constitutional court at the international level. However, given the impact that political power plays in the technical resolution of concrete, case-specific adjudication within a highly fragmented legal system, and given the fact that constitutional review also touches on more abstract and less technical issues of social justice, I recommend that the function of constitutional review be dispersed in several global institutions, including the current United Nations General Assembly and a global public sphere. The pluralization of constitutional review and the accompanying interpretation and institutionalization of human rights recognizes existing multicultural disagreement on the meaning of human rights and the threat of superpower hegemony over global institutions while anticipating the realization of a more monistic constitutionalization of international law with the growth of global solidarity between peoples. Keywords : Constitutional Review, Constitutionalization, Habermas, Human Rights, Legal Pluralism, United Nations. (shrink)

The Supreme Court of Idaho held, in Idaho Association of Chiropractic Physicians, Inc. v. Alcorn, No. 23787,1999 WL 134677, at *1, that insurance regulations of health care services must apply equally to all providers. The Idaho legislature enacted the Small Employer Health Insurance Availability Act, Idaho Code § 41-4701, and the Individual Health Insurance Availability Act, id. § 41-5201, which is to be implemented by the Idaho Small Employer and Individual Health Reinsurance Program. The goal of the legislation is (...) to make health insurance available and affordable to small employers and their employees, and to individuals who would not otherwise have health insurance. Accordingly, the Program promulgated the following rule: “Chiropractic services will be subject to one thousand dollars per year limit.” Idaho Ass’n of Chiropractic Physicians, 1999 WL 134677, at *1.The plaintiff, the Idaho Association of Chiropractic Physicians, sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendant, James M. Alcorn, director of the Idaho State Department of Insurance, on equal protection and due process grounds. (shrink)

This essay focuses on proportionality stricto sensu as a consequential test of balancing. The basic balancing rule establishes a general criterion for deciding between the marginal benefit to the public good and the marginal limit to human rights. Based on the Israeli constitutional jurisprudence, this essay supports the adoption of a principled balancing approach that translates the basic balancing rule into a series of principled balancing tests, taking into account the importance of the rights and the type of restriction. (...) This approach provides better guidance to the balancer , restricts wide discretion in balancing, and makes the act of balancing more transparent, more structured, and more foreseeable. The advantages of proportionality stricto sensu with its three levels of abstraction are several. It stresses the need to always look for a justification of a limit on human rights; it structures the mind of the balancer; it is transparent; it creates a proper dialog between the political brunches and the judiciary, and it adds to the objectivity of judicial discretion. Proportionality stricto sensu however has it critics: some claim that it attempts to balance incommensurable items; others that balancing is irrational. The answer to the critics is that it is a common base for comparison, namely the social marginal importance and that the balancing rules—basic, principled, concrete—supply a rational basis for balancing. A democracy must entrust the judiciary—the unelected independent judiciary—to be the final decision-maker—subject to constitutional amendments—about proper ends that cannot be achieved because they are not proportionality stricto sensu. (shrink)

In this Article I argue that the citizenship status of Israel’s Palestinian citizens has been eroding since the "events" of October 2000 and that, as a result, Israel, within its rpe-1967 borders, may be moving from a form of democracy that has been termed "ethnic democracy" towards a form of non-democratic state that has been termed "ethnocracy." My argument is based primarily on two legal documents: the new Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, 2003, which denies Palestinian citizens the right (...) to unite with their closest family members who are residents of the Occupied Territories, and the decision of the High Court of Justice that upheld the constitutionality of this law in 2006. Two other developments that seem to support my thesis are analyzed as well: the "events" of October 2000 themselves and the report of the state commission of inquiry that investigated these events, and the plan, advanced by Yvette Lieberman and his political party, "Yisrael Beytenu," to shift the border between Israel and the West Bank westward, depriving tens of thousands of citizen-Palestinians of their Israeli citizenship. (shrink)

"Case notes." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (199), pp. 34–35.

The article aims at resolving the issue whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has an exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to resolve disputes between Member States, stemming from provisions of an international treaty, a party to which is the EU. This problem is especially relevant in cases when a mixed international agreement envisages independent institutions of dispute resolution. The position of the CJEU is expressed (...) in the case of Mox Plant. The European Commission applied to the CJEU against Ireland, because it considered that Ireland, which started an arbitration procedure against United Kingdom under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has infringed the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU under Article 344 of the TFEU. The EU is also a Contracting Party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore according to the consistence case practice of the Court, the provisions of the Convention that fall under the competence of the Union constitute an indivisible part of the EU legal system. Only in such case when a provision of a treaty is attributed to exclusive competence of the Member States, the jurisdiction of the CJEU regarding that provision can be negated. Thus, when deciding on the issue of exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU in principle, a problem of attribution of the EU and Member States’ competences arises. (shrink)

Notwithstanding constant “crises of confidence,” a high number of international disputes lay at the docket of the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In the word of Judge Rosalyn Higgins, states are turning to the ICJ for the peaceful settlement of their disputes. The option provided by the Charter of the United Nations in limiting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to certain categories of disputes, clearly contributes to convening a greater number of states to (...) accept this international jurisdiction, resolve their disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. Not surprisingly, only a few declarations provided in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court do not contain any reservation as to the limits of the Court’s competence. Interwar Lithuania contributed heavily to the strengthening of international justice. It was amongst the first members of the League of Nations to recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice and remained its faithful supporter until the very end of the Court’s activities. International justice provided at least titular security guarantees for the young nation. This faith of the Lithuanian government in relying on international justice was rewarded in full. The Lithuanian State defended its legitimate place amongst the independent nations and successfully stood up for its interests in all three cases before the Permanent Court. (shrink)

The Article explores relationships between contemporary international human rights and democracy. In what respects are they two sides of the same coin, in what respects are they different coins? Do they depend on and complete each other? Can the two be in contradiction? The Article looks at these questions from several perspectives, including their historical connections, the changing definitions and understandings of each, their functional links, their determinacy, and their character as universal phenomena. It also indicates ways in which courts, (...) which have long interpreted and applied human rights, now also reach decisions about constitutional issues by drawing on their conception of democracy. (shrink)

With the arrival of another wave of “boat people” to Australian waters in late 2009, issues of human rights of asylum seekers and refugees once again became a major feature of the political landscape. Claims of “queue jumping” were made, particularly by some sections of the media, and they may seem populist, but they are also ironic, given the protracted efforts on the part of the federal government to stymie any orderly appeals process, largely through resort to “privative clauses”. Such (...) clauses demonstrate the many ways in which human rights of those seeking asylum in far-off lands and are potential future immigrants, who often lack much-touted needed papers, yet who are for the most part genuine refugees, are subject to the slings and arrows of political fortune (and misfortune). Approaching the courts if treated unfairly or seeking a further decision as to your fate would seem one of the fundamental premises of human rights. Yet privative clauses—or attempts to ouster the jurisdiction of the courts and to insulate decisions from appeal—have become an increasingly frequent feature of the Australian migration legislation. With a seemingly watertight federal constitutional power set in stone since 1901, to deal with migration and aliens, and without the tempered contemporary update of a federal Bill of Rights, the Australian federal government has been able to narrow the grounds of judicial review in those contexts. We argue that the concerted efforts to deny such fundamental rights of appeal to those most in need of the full armoury of the protection of the law in a modern, affluent democracy, constitutes both a breach of their human rights and a breach of core constitutional principles such as separation of powers. Those principles may not be formally articulated in the text of the Australian Constitution, but in our view they are implicit in the constitutional arrangements, and hence we can conclude with the arguments of former Justice of the High Court of Australia, Michael Kirby, who asked—to whom does sovereignty truly belong? (shrink)

Wallace, Max On 20 June 2012 the High Court of Australia handed down their decision in Willliams v The Commonwealth. The case concerned the question of whether it was unconstitutional for the federal government to fund religious chaplains in public schools. The argument against the funding was on technical, financial grounds. The government had avoided making a law in the parliament to fund the chaplains. That way, they were able to avoid a legal complaint that the funding breached (...) Australia's s.116, the section in the constitution that mimics America's First Amendment. The funding therefore would avoid a major dispute over separation of church and state. (shrink)

The materials consist of a co-authored, peer-reviewed book, a co-authored, peer-reviewed book chapter, 30 single authored peer-reviewed journal papers, and 15 co-authored peer-reviewed journal papers, of which I was the lead author on 8 papers. There are 32 papers from Australasian journals, at least two of which are also regarded as international. 22 papers are published in international journals. The co-authored book was favourably described in his foreword by Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia. (...) The refereed chapter is contained in an issue of the Australian Legal Monographs series. The papers constitute a body of work in Australasian and international contexts in a field which is relatively new to academic achievement, broadly understood as philosophy of medicine, medical ethics and health law. The journals in which the papers are published include two of the most highly regarded bioethics journals in the world, Australia’s leading medical journal, the two leading world medical education journals, Australia’s leading journal for health and medical law, and the Torts Law Journal, an Australian journal which is recognized as one of the world’s leading journals in the field of tort law. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Enlightenment and Its Antecedents Equal Rights and American Constitutional Law Liberty and Equality under the Constitution The Radical Critique and the Radical Dilemma Rawls Dworkin Equality of Capabilities Equality Unmodified or Spheres of Justice Is Equality a Value? References.

This book examines the role of the EU in ensuring privacy and data protection on the internet. It describes and demonstrates the importance of privacy and data protection for our democracies and how the enjoyment of these rights is challenged by, particularly, big data and mass surveillance. The book takes the perspective of the EU mandate under Article 16 TFEU. It analyses the contributions of the specific actors and roles within the EU framework: the judiciary, the EU legislator, the independent (...) supervisory authorities, the cooperation mechanisms of these authorities, as well as the EU as actor in the external domain. Article 16 TFEU enables the Court of the Justice of the EU to play its role as constitutional court and to set high standards for fundamental rights protection. It obliges the European Parliament and the Council to lay down legislation that encompasses all processing of personal data. It confirms control by independent supervisory authorities as an essential element of data protection and it gives the EU a strong mandate to act in the global arena. The analysis shows that EU powers can be successfully used in a legitimate and effective manner and that this subject could be a success story for the EU, in times of widespread euroskepsis. It demonstrates that the Member States remain important players in ensuring privacy and data protection. In order to be a success story, the key stakeholders should be prepared to go the extra mile, so it is argued in the book. The book is based on academic research for which the author received a double doctorate at the University of Amsterdam and the Vrije Universiteit Brussels. It builds on a long inside experience within the European institutions, as well as within the community of data protection and data protection authorities. It is a must read in a time where the setting of EU privacy and data protection is changing dramatically, not only as a result of the rapidly evolving information society, but also because of important legal developments such as the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation. This book will appeal to all those who are in some way involved in making this regulation work. It will also appeal to people interested in the institutional framework of the European Union and in the role of the Union of promoting fundamental rights, also in the wider world.. (shrink)

The doctrine of Ultra Petita has been the subject of much criticism and poses a threat to constitutional justice. This article examines the doctrine in operation inside of Indonesia where the Constitutional Court appears to have expanded its jurisdiction by not only reviewing or analysing but also by invalidating or annulling acts. The impact of this is a creation of a high-degree of legal uncertainty and ambiguity in the judicial process. The article argues that instead (...) of making use of the extra-constitutional Ultra Petita doctrine, the Indonesian Constitutional Court should return to a black letter approach to the law, thereby promoting certainty and coherence. (shrink)

The article deals with the question whether a state might be held liable for the infringement of constitutional law if its national court of last instance violates the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union under the conditions laid down in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and developed in the case-law of the Court. Relying on the well-established (...) practice of the European Court of Human Rights, which accepts that in theory an arbitrary decision not to refer a question for a preliminary ruling could infringe the right to a fair trial established in the ECHR, the author analyses whether constitutional courts of Germany, Czech Republic, Spain and Lithuania have elaborated the equivalent practice and if so, whether they have established any specific criteria that national courts are required to bring into play in order to substantiate the decision not to refer. (shrink)

This article examines the process for the eviction of tenants, which offers landlords a swift path for obtaining an eviction order against their tenants, as a case study exposing the politics of procedure. It shows that the PET is but one stage in a longstanding battle waged between two interest groups—landlords and tenants—involving both substantive law and procedural law. But while the story of their conflict over substantive law, fought in the parliament through the regular legislative process, is well-known, the (...) story of the procedural amendments, despite their immense impact, remains shrouded in mystery and is told here for the first time. The reason for that, we argue, is that despite the vast impact of procedure on substantive right, many in the Israeli legal system mistakenly view civil procedure rules as highly technical and neutral directives for the day-to-day operation of the litigation process. The conclusion from such a view is that rulemaking should be left to expert legal technicians and court administrators and that transparency mechanisms or public participation are to be avoided as unnecessary due to the costs and burdens they impose on the rulemaking process. The article concludes with a call for overhauling the rulemaking process in Israel. We argue that the secretive and opaque process is anathema to democracy. Bearing in mind that procedural rules are inevitably imbued with substantive values and have an enormous effect on the substantive rights of the citizenry, the rulemaking process should be radically altered to enable all interested parties to take part in the process, making it far more transparent and subject to public scrutiny in all its stages. (shrink)

_Contexts of Justice,_ highly acclaimed when it was published in Germany, provides a significant new intervention into the important debate between communitarianism and liberalism. Rainer Forst argues for a theory of "contexts of justice" that leads beyond the narrow confines of this debate as it has been understood until now and posits the possibility of a new conception of social and political justice. This book brings refreshing clarity to a complex topic as it provides a synthesis of (...) traditions and theories that leads to a truly original approach. Forst makes a four-part distinction to decipher the debate between communitarianism and liberalism. These four parts concern the constitution of the self, the neutrality of law, the ethos of democracy, and the opposition between universalism and contextualism. He shows that a comprehensive theory of justice needs to take these different contexts adequately into account. He discusses recent debates about discursive democracy and feminist critiques of liberalism, and addresses such topics as multiculturalism and civil society. (shrink)

The article analyses the problem of using European constitutional heritage in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia when interpreting the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. The author analyses several judgments of the Constitutional Court of Latvia, wherein the Court refers to European legal heritage, when interpreting separate norms of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. Such practice is particularly evident in two categories of cases. The influence of (...) European legal heritage is most clearly expressed in cases where the Court ascertains the essence of the continuity doctrine and when interpreting human rights enshrined in the Constitution (the Satversme). The author notes that constitutional courts reveal two tendencies. On the one hand, a constitutional court cannot ignore the international context. European courts are influenced by European Union law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. On the other hand, constitutional court judges in every country have sworn to be loyal to the national constitution and thus have a duty to exercise constitutional control. These tendencies are not necessarily objectionable. On the contrary–knowledge of the international legal context helps the Constitutional Court exercise its mission. (shrink)

In societies of high legal culture, criminal law is regarded as a protective and repressive measure of the state, as an imperative of crime and inevitable punishment (as a strict rule). Therefore, the article attempts to show the fact that the entirety of the provisions and norms of criminal law, consolidated in a modern democratic state under the rule of law (or, at least, a state that is attempting to become such a state), allows for the assertion that the (...) purpose of criminal law is coordination or, at least, the balance of the interests of conflicting subjects—the victim and the culprit, the culprit and the state. Thus, by means of criminal law, one can try to attain legal concord in seemingly irreconcilable situations. The reality of such striving is confirmed by court practice and statistics in criminal justice. The article analyses the origin of the reconciliation function, essentially a new aspect of criminal law. A position is formed that the fundamentals of such a function of criminal law are “laid” by the provisions of the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania that the striving of the Nation is an open, just and harmonious civil society and a state under the rule of law. For the implementation of these provisions, one makes use of the possibilities of penal law-making and respectively corrects the penal policy. (shrink)

This article critically evaluates the possible impact of the Charter on the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union and national constitutional courts. While it is premature to provide a definitive assessment of the kind of collaboration that these courts will develop, it is crucial to identify a number of features of the new landscape that will influence the direction in which the relationship between the CJEU and constitutional courts will evolve. This article (...) discusses several reasons that may result in better or a higher number of judicial interactions, as well as factors that may create tension or cause problems in the relationship between the CJEU and national constitutional courts. As such, it offers a framework that may help us to understand future post-Charter judgments by these courts setting out how they conceive their engagement with their counterpart on fundamental rights issues. (shrink)

Then newly elected Labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, made a historic statement of “Sorry” for past injustices to Australian Indigenous peoples at the opening of the 2008 federal parliament. In the long-standing absence of a constitutional ‘foundational principle’ to shape positive federal initiatives in this context, there has been speculation that the emphatic Sorry Statement may presage formal constitutional recognition. The debate is long overdue in a nation that only overturned the legal fiction of terra nullius and recognised (...) native title to lan with the High Court’s decision in Mabo in 1992. This article explores the implications of the Sorry Statement in the context of reparations for the generations removed from their families under assimilation policies (known since the Bringing Them Home Inquiry as the Stolen Generations). We draw out the utility of recent human rights statutes—such as the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)—as a mechanism for facilitating justice, including compensation for past wrongs. Our primary concern here is whether existing legal processes in Australia hold further capacity to provide reparation for Australian Indigenous peoples or whether their potential in that regard is already exhausted. We compare common law and statutory developments in other international jurisdictions, such as Canada, as an indication of what can be achieved by the law to facilitate better legal, economic and social outcomes for Indigenous peoples. The year 2008 also saw Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper express his apology to residential school victims in the Canadian Parliament, providing thematic and symbolic echoes across these two former colonies, which, despite remaining under the British monarchy, both forge their own path into the future, while confronting their own unique colonial past. We suggest that the momentum provided by the recent public apology and statement of “Sorry” by the newly elected Australian Prime Minister must not be lost. This symbolic utterance as a first act of the 2008 parliamentary year stood in stark contrast to the long-standing recalcitrance of the former Prime Minister John Howard on the matter of a formal apology. Rather than a return to a law enforcement-inspired “three strikes and you’re out” approach, Australia stands poised for an overdue constitutional and human rights-inspired “three ‘sorries’ and you’re in”. (shrink)

The main subject of the present research is the enforcement of the European Union law in the domestic legal order. This topic was chosen considering the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community and especially its declaration No. 17 on primacy of EU law. This article will explain the meaning of primacy of the European Union law and the resulting problems in some EU Member States, as well as possible solutions (...) to tackle the problems. The primacy of the European Union law over the national law was recognised as one of the constitutive principles of the European Union. The article includes relevant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that deal with the rules concerning the legal requirements of the primacy of the European Union law in the EU primary law. The European Court of Justice has developed the meaning of the principle of primacy, which means that the European Union law should take precedence over national law (even over constitutional provisions) and should there be any conflicts between EU law and national law, every national court is obliged to apply the law of the European Union. The main issue of this article is analysing the principle of primacy of the European Union law over the Lithuanian law. (shrink)

The constitutional right to self-expression, used by societies professing democratic values (Constitution, Article 25), is a highly important feature for forming the political will of the citizenry. A broad, multi-sided public discussion on all issues of public interest is only possible with the existence of an appropriate amount of freedom of information. A strong mechanism for disseminating information that operates between citizens and the parliament is able to generate a sphere for discussion and mutual influence which are essential for (...) indirect democracy. A discussion’s depth, quality and comprehensiveness constitute important factors which determine the correctness of choices made by citizens and politicians. Mainly, it is the free press which fosters communication between political parties and citizens. The role of the “watchdog” is fundamental to revealing the circumstances under which politicians or other public persons make different political and administrative decisions. This is what permits the identification of motives for rulings and the circumstances under which they were approved. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study is the understanding of Gentili's position on the law of the sea as expressed in his classic De iure belli . The key constitutive elements turn out to be: 1) the idea of the sea as 'res communis' to all mankind, which amounts to the concept of 'freedom of the sea'; 2) 'jurisdiction' of the coastal state on the adjacent sea, even on the high seas, in order to police crime and prevent/punish piracy. (...) As such these two key elements, if taken in isolation, are rooted in the civil law tradition, but their true meaning can only be captured by placing them in the intellectual framework of which they constitute an integral part. Firstly, the epistemic structure of discourse hinges on the new science of natural jurisprudence, as applied to the subject of 'ius gentium bellicum'; secondly, the constituent theoretical languages emanate from a distinctive combination of civil law, scholastic-theological and humanist traditions. This procedure enables us to highlight the strikingly original and distinctly modern traits of Gentili's perspective on the law of the sea, which emerges as a corollary of his project of international/global order. A project that is based on the crucial notion of 'respublica magna' of mankind, a notion encompassing the two notions of 'freedom' and 'jurisdiction' that constitute and define the legal regime of the sea.The Stoic humanist notion of universal human society as 'corpus unum' implies, first of all, 'freedom of intercourse', or 'ius communicationis', to start from 'free passage' and 'freedom of commerce'. It is in the context of his argument about these basic freedoms that Gentili is finally led to discuss the subject of the 'law of the sea'. But, not only the concept of 'res communis', or 'freedom of use', but also the concept of 'jurisdiction', or 'protection', are strictly related to the same foundational concept of 'respublica magna'. This is a crucial characteristic of Gentili's approach to world order that is proved by reference to two cardinal points of his new 'cosmopolitan justice': 1) the 'international right to punish', as exemplified by the legitimacy of the wars of 'humanitarian intervention' and of the wars in support of the 'common law of mankind'; 2) the 'occupation of vacant land', which again underlines the relevance of the principle of 'jurisdiction' by striking a balance between the principle of 'free use' of nature and the 'jurisdiction' of the local ruler.Such a reconstruction definitely rejects the traditional image of Gentili as a supporter of 'maritime protectionism', on the ground of his Advocatio Hispanica published posthumously in 1613 and containing his pleadings as Spanish advocate before the Court of Admiralty. The guiding assumption here is that the book is strictly of a forensic character and as such devoid of any coherent theoretical substance. To the contrary, in his De iure belli, far from anticipating the English position in favour of 'mare clausum', Gentili tends to anticipate the essentials of Grotius' position, especially at the level of the ethic of the 'modern cosmopolis' and the related theme of colonial empire. On this very plane of discourse, Gentili's thinking transcends the so-called battle of the books and emerges as especially significant in illuminating the wider and deeper intellectual currents that contributed to the development of what were to become basic standard positions of modern international theory. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the general principles established in the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights while applying and interpreting the Article 3 of the First Protocol of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which provides: „The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.“ Article (...) 3 of the First Protocol enshrines a fundamental principle for effective political democracy, and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system. It refers not only to positive obligation of the Contracting State to organize democratic elections, but also guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election, although this is not explicitly stated in it. These rights are not absolute; there is room for “implied limitations” and Contracting States are given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere. However, these limitations must be such that the rights in question were not curtailed to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness, should be imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim and should not be disproportionate. (shrink)

Regardless of unpredictable and contingent geopolitical events such as last year’s surprising rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, this coming year will certainly witness a large surge in patriotism. The Winter Olympics in February, and the World Cup in the summer, both promise to whip national sentiments into a fever pitch. One other thing is certain, though: journals of philosophy and ethics will continue to debate the virtues of cosmopolitanism, as this number of Ethical Perspectives does (...) through its contributions below.Why is this? Why do philosophers and academics hold on to this idea of cosmopolitanism, an idea utterly lacking in the convictions of the general public? Is it perhaps because the first cosmopolitans were in fact philosophers? The first to identify himself as a cosmopolitan was Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato’s dialogues paint many of the Sophists in cosmopolitan hues. Although people generally support the idea of internationalism as far as it promotes trade, travel, and football tournaments, once it begins to meddle in internal affairs, as it does with outsourcing and transnational constitutions, they tend to fall back upon the patria. They killed Socrates for corrupting the youth of Athens, not the youth of the world.Whether it is the service and manufacturing industries of Asia and India ‘stealing’ American jobs, or widespread fears of Brussels’ legendary bureaucrats, the non-academic public consistently turns from its tepid embrace of cosmopolitanism to patriotism whenever threatened. Are we too quick to label this as self-interest or even selfishness? Or is there something else at work in the debate between cosmopolitanism and patriotism? Some approaches to cosmopolitanism are certainly guilty of an absolute removal of difference, of wishing away the nation state, of replacing it with an international body based on purely universal principles, and of wiping away the competencies of nations on many levels. The call for the world state can come across as an appeal for an anodyne and internationalist homogeneity based on a clinical morality that, for all its sensitivity, runs roughshod over the well-engrained cultural, legal, and social beliefs of many peoples.Clearly, this is what many Europeans fear, and to a large degree, Americans as well in their dislike for the International Court of Justice. Even the economic hegemony of outsourcing removes national power, and replaces it with pure economic rationality.Our contributors below do not advocate these reductions, although some may point to them. Key to each contribution below is sensitivity to the world as it is, to its need for difference even in the face of an ever-increasing globalisation that sometimes is connected with cosmopolitanism. Yet, every proponent of cosmopolitanism must sketch how it is possible in practice. Of course, an obvious problem is how to dwell consequently as a cosmopolitan. Not many contemporary cosmopolitans would be prepared to follow Diogenes’ commitment to rootlessness: living in exile after having been included in a forgery conviction aimed at his father, the ascetic Diogenes called a barrel his home. Such was his drive to live a levelled life that he cast away his only bowl upon seeing a poor peasant boy drinking from cupped hands. Today’s cosmopolitan leads a much more prosaic life, and hence the problem with cosmopolitanism begins as something mundane. Does not a cosmopolitan still pay national taxes? Does not a cosmopolitan still need a national passport and second country visas? But, the questions quickly turn ontological: how can one shed oneself of one’s nationality, of one’s belonging, as if it is just an accident of one’s own constitution, instead of as an important property of one’s own constitution? In other words, belonging is important: a citizen of the world still values citizenship. Clearly, the absolute cosmopolitan reduction is an absurdity: one is always rooted, in some sense. Even cosmopolitanism is rooted in a specific Western mindset, and is no self-evident preference of human existence.As Rudi Visker’s contribution so clearly shows through an investigation of the narcissism of minor differences, these questions revolve around the question of confrontation with alterity. What I am, in no small way plays off what I am not. I cannot be everything, if I am something. Freud’s analysis of minor differences reveals that members of a group identify with that group on the basis these minor differences. What is self-evident to a particular culture marks that culture off from another culture, a culture that by definition does not share the same set of the self-evident. To be a foreigner, as any ex-patriot can attest, is to stand outside of the self-evident, whether this means interpreting gestures, understanding commercial practices, or, as Freud would have it, staying on the correct side of national taboos. There is thus a dialectic of inner and outer, a dialectic which refuses a reduction of one to the other. As Visker puts it, recognising the stranger within oneself is quite different than recognising the stranger outside of oneself, and to confuse these as being the same is not only to misunderstand the very issue at stake, it is also a dangerous trivialisation of difference.But clearly, there is something viable and laudable in the idea of cosmopolitanism, since it stresses the universal moral community of humanity. Cosmopolitanism is an attempt to see all human subjects as subject to the same moral law. Indeed, the sort of federation to which cosmopolitanism leads, at least in a modified Kantian expression as Bert van Roermund tells us, even gives us good grounds to recognise the legitimacy and moral equivalence of states. Importantly, the international legal order does not draw its power from any supranational force, but from the choice of independent national actors to recognise it. Hence, this cosmopolitan order depends on nationhood, and good standing within this order depends on the degree to which a country decides to participate. Again, the universal here depends on well-rooted particularity, a particularity able to choose for the universal.What do we do, then, with outlaw nations, those nations that are hostile to the choice for the universal? Through a clear reading of Hegel, Paul Cobben proposes that the metric for a state’s legality is the measure to which it permits the moral freedom of its citizens to bloom. A free person requires a free legal order; only in such can a person obtain the full measure of human rights due. States that do not permit this blooming are illegitimate; they contradict the nature of the human person, and citizens dwelling under the yoke of these have the right to ask for outside assistance in removing this illegitimate power above them. However, for this plea to be met, two conditions must obtain: the oppressed people must have the wherewithal to form a political order after the removal of the illegitimate state, and the action must be grounded in the principles and support of a legal community, which in essence would be a world federation of states. In fact, it is morally incumbent upon all legal states to aim at such a world federation, upon pain of contradiction.Our duty to others does not end with the politically oppressed; the economically oppressed also lay a moral claim upon us. So, as Toon Vandevelde asks in his contribution, what about the global poor? The poor are hungry and in need of shelter and a future, but to address these issues at the level of rights is in a way heartless: what good does it do to legislate that everyone has the right to food, when this right can never be called upon, or enforced, in any meaningful sense? Moreover, approaches that demand non-prioritised generosity not only ignore the fundamental economic fact of scarcity, they also run the risk of creating the moral hazard of dependence on charity. The true cosmopolitan approach is the recognition of our common humanity and of our concomitant duty to help others as far as this help does not endanger us. This duty is compounded by the marginalisation of the poor through globalisation, a globalisation that they did not ask for. The extent of our help is indeterminate, but its direction is clear: it must aim to integrate those poor who wish it within our international systems, and so to ease their own transitions from poverty.Both Gil Anidjar and Maria Bonnafous-Boucher continue this theme of economy, but each from a highly specific viewpoint. Indeed, their contributions are perhaps somewhat darker, delving into an aspect of the unspoken underneath the choice for the universal. Anidjar begins with the relation between religion and economy within the interplay of Judaism and Christianity, whereas Bonnafous-Boucher focuses on the development of political economy through a Foucaultian lens. Although highly distinct contributions, both share the insight that the economy is now the central theme of our power structures, and that economy, isolated from questions of morality or justice, must likewise play a decisive role within the structure of cosmopolitanism, or, at minimum, the political unity of peoples. For, national government long ago ceded to a promiscuous mix of governance, and religion to economy. This nexus enthrones governance as an economic rationale stripped of all other trappings, and inscribes any possible cosmopolitanism within a framework of an aggressive capitalism, a kind of economic theology, a kind of hegemony in which state boundaries are essentially liquefied. Capital, after all, knows no boundaries. (shrink)

_Contexts of Justice,_ highly acclaimed when it was published in Germany, provides a significant new intervention into the important debate between communitarianism and liberalism. Rainer Forst argues for a theory of "contexts of justice" that leads beyond the narrow confines of this debate as it has been understood until now and posits the possibility of a new conception of social and political justice. This book brings refreshing clarity to a complex topic as it provides a synthesis of (...) traditions and theories that leads to a truly original approach. Forst makes a four-part distinction to decipher the debate between communitarianism and liberalism. These four parts concern the constitution of the self, the neutrality of law, the ethos of democracy, and the opposition between universalism and contextualism. He shows that a comprehensive theory of justice needs to take these different contexts adequately into account. He discusses recent debates about discursive democracy and feminist critiques of liberalism, and addresses such topics as multiculturalism and civil society. (shrink)

American historians have generally accepted Richard Hofstadter's thesis that the scientism of Social Darwinism, or more appropriately, Spencerianism, dominated American thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and nowhere more enthusiastically or more purposively than within the conservative business community, which used Herbert Spencer's scientism to justify corporate business practices and to rewrite American Constitutional law to protect property interests against governmental regulations. Following Sharlin's general exposition of Herbert Spencer's scientism, this paper examines in detail the validity (...) of the Hofstadter thesis as applied to the notorious Lochner v. New York Supreme Court opinion of 1905. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are offered as a repudiation of the generally accepted belief that it was the conservative activists on the Court who were guilty of Spencerian scientism. On the contrary, the argument is presented that it was Justice Holmes and the liberal reformers who found the evolutionary doctrines of Spencer congenial to their efforts of identifying needed reinterpretations of the American Constitution with biological evolution. (shrink)

The High Court's verdict is a major step forward insofar as that the existing institutionalized GSS torture practices are declared unlawful and are no longer possible in any institutionalized form. It appears, however, likely that Israel will attempt to reintroduce the legal use of different forms of “physical pressure” under specific circumstances. The legality of these forms in Israel is then likely to be tested by a High Court of Justice which is still clearly ambivalent (...) and far from unequivocal in declaring all forms of physical means during interrogations to be unlawful. Whereas the Court's ruling declaring the present guidelines and various practices of “moderate physical force” unlawful is a positive step from a human rights perspective and in the context of the Middle East peace process, its significance might thus eventually turn out to be less of a breakthrough than initially thought. The international community has ample reason to continue to follow Israel critically regarding possible infractions of the Convention and the ICCPR. (shrink)

In the following paper sources of a constitution are put in question in general, and more specifically, the constitutional culture of the European Union Law is being investigated in-depth with regard to principles of deliberative democracy and rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The change of a law application paradigm as well as the change of a legal systems’ nature are taken into account.

This article has as its theme the analysis of the separation of powers and the rule of democracy, in addition to the possibility of the Constitutional Court be composed of people appointed by the President of the Republic, not fulfilling the democratic rule, and make the control of constitutionality of laws, created through democratic process. Will be answered: the separation of powers obey the democratic rule? When the Legislature fails to fulfill its function of legislating, opens the opportunity (...) for the Supreme Court, as the Constitutional Court that is, create, through judicial activism, silent rules? That injured the democratic rule? (shrink)

Drawing on themes important in moral and political philosophy, much of the scholarship on the constitutional law of privacy in the United States distinguishes between privacy understood as a person's control over information and privacy understood as a person's ability to make autonomous decisions. For example, Katz v. United States established the framework for analyzing whether police activity constituted a “search” subject to the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the police either obtain a warrant before conducting a search or otherwise (...) act reasonably. The defendant was a professional gambler who knew enough about police techniques to use a public telephone to make his business calls. Police agents attached a listening device to the outside of the phone booth, and sought to use the recordings against the defendant. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the Fourth Amendment had been violated. Justice John Marshall Harlan's influential concurring opinion asserted that a person's privacy, in the sense of control over information, depended on two factors: “that a person have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Fourth Amendment cases like Katz involve informational control; they define the circumstances under which the government may acquire information from or about a person without first obtaining the person's agreement. In contrast, cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, which barred the state from making it a criminal offense to use contraceptives, and Roe v. Wade, which restricted the state's power to prohibit or regulate abortions, used the language of privacy rights to protect a much broader interest in autonomous decision-making. Seeing these cases and related ones through lenseees provided by moral and political philosophy, scholars have attempted to describe what a morally sound constitutional law of privacy would be, and the broadest sense, dworkinian. That is, they seek to provide an account of privacy with two characteristics: it is broadly consistent with the relevant constitutional decisions, and it is the most morally attractive account possible that satisfies the requirement of consistency with the decisions. (shrink)

Attaining and maintaining a substantial Jewish majority in Israel has been one of the basic goals of the State of Israel since its early years. A substantial Jewish majority within the borders of the state is thought to be necessary in order to preserve its Jewish nature. Many believe that the demographic consideration also stood behind the enactment of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law , 2003, which prohibits granting Israeli citizenship and residency to Palestinians from the West Bank (...) and the Gaza Strip, and prevents, inter alia, Israeli Arabs from living in Israel with their Palestinian spouses. I examine the legitimacy of the demographic consideration from the perspective of liberal political theory. I conclude that demography can, in principle, be a legitimate consideration in deciding immigration policy, and its justification can be derived from the liberal justification of the right to national self-determination. However, the demographic consideration must be assigned its proper role and weight relative to other important liberal values such as equality and other human rights. I suggest that the demographic consideration might be legitimate only to the extent that it is not used to justify immigration policies that violate constitutional rights. I then discuss the Supreme Court decision concerning the constitutionality of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law. I demonstrate that, contrary to statements by the judges themselves, the demographic consideration played a key role in the opinions of several judges. It was, however, a hidden consideration. It was not openly acknowledged and discussed. Consequently, a careful examination and balancing of the demographic consideration could not take place. The result was that the actual influence of the demographic consideration on the outcome of the case was much stronger than can be reasonably justified according to liberal principles of justice. (shrink)

The dynamics of the superior judiciary in Pakistan have undergone a drastic transformation in its approach and working in post 2007 emergency followed by a landmark movement of civil and legal fraternity for restoration of constitutional supremacy. The neo-jurisprudence is being applauded and criticized at the same time. The excessive use of Suo-motto and public interest litigation at one hand and frequent judicial review of executive and legislative action on other have been the main source of contention between judiciary (...) and other two pillars of state, legislature and executive. The Superior Court is being recognized as the ultimate savior of fundamental rights and guardian of the constitution as well as rights of the people. At the other extreme, the criticism like activist judiciary; disrespect for popular will and making rather interpreting law are most commonly attributed to Superior Judiciary. The study is qualitative in nature and presents a comparative analysis of trends in Superior Court before and after Lawyers’ movement. The study also aims in justifying the proactive approach especially in providing social justice on failure of state organs to respond to the exigency of time. (shrink)

This essay deals with conditions, challenges and perspectives concerning the legal system of the European Union after the Lisbon treaty has entered into force. It starts out by recalling constitutional principles such as primacy, direct effect and consistent interpretation of the European legal order on the one hand and the relationship of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts – notably pointing out the importance of the preliminary procedure (Article 267 TFEU) – on the other (...) hand. In addition, characteristics of the legal system of the European Union such as the integration of national legal systems are highlighted. It is accentuated that the legal community of the European Union depends on the acceptance by all 27 Member States. Furthermore, the normative quality of European law-making is discussed as well as the necessity for a sufficient democratic legitimation of European Law. As impressively illustrated by the financial crisis, the European Union is much better equipped with possibilities to effectively fulfil regulatory tasks than any Member State. The author shows developments with regard to European Union citizenship, non-discrimination, the Charter of Fundamental Rights - that is now equipped with binding character – and the vertical distribution of competences between the European Union and the Member States, including explanations relating to subsidiarity requirements and their judicial review. Moreover, challenges to the institutions of the European Union are discussed. (shrink)

This article maintains that it is the constitutional responsibility of the courts, here the courts of the State of Michigan, to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules. The article is written in response to the views expressed by some Justices of the Michigan Supreme Court that separation of powers concerns should impose significant limits on the power of the courts to establish and develop the common law of Michigan. Specifically, the contention is (...) that policymaking is exclusively the province of the legislature, so that the courts cannot properly formulate common law rules that may have significant social and economic effects. The article strongly disagrees with the proposition that there is any kind of constitutional constraint, either prudential or structural, on the power, and indeed, the constitutional responsibility of the Michigan courts (or the courts of any state) to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules.The judicial power given to the Michigan courts by the Michigan Constitution includes the power to do what courts have always done in the Anglo-American legal system. The judicial power gives the courts the responsibility to adjudicate controversies between private persons and in the process to develop a common law through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. In so doing, the courts may properly take into account considerations of social and economic policy just as the legislature does when it engages in the process of enacting legislation. The difference between what the courts do and what the legislature does is a difference in process, not a difference in substance. Judicial policymaking takes place within the judicial process, that is, in the adjudication of controversies between persons in which the courts promulgate common law rules. The common law develops in a line of growth through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis, and to the extent that there are limitations on the development of the common law, these are limitations that inhere in the judicial process itself. When the courts, for example, consider whether a new claim or a new defense should be recognized by the common law, they must consider whether that new claim or defense properly follows in the line of growth from existing doctrine and precedent. But if the courts conclude that it does, that is, if the claim or defense is consistent with the line of growth of existing doctrine and precedent, the courts are not constrained from recognizing the claim or defense on the ground that the substance of the claim or defense is a matter for the legislature rather than for the courts or that the resulting common law rule may have significant social and economic effects. The legislature, in contrast, enacts legislation through the legislative process. That process is a freewheeling one, often dependent on political compromise and completely unrestrained by the kind of limitations that inhere the judicial process. There is no legislative concept of line of growth, and the legislature can and often does enact legislation that brings about fundamental societal change or reverses the course of public policy. In our constitutional system, the most important questions of public policy are, of course, determined by the Legislature. Where the legislature disagrees with the policy choices reflected in a common law rule, the legislature has the power to enact legislation changing the common law rule. But there are many areas of private law where the legislature has not acted. In our constitutional system, where the matter in issue is not covered or preempted by legislation, the courts may formulate a common law rule to cover that matter, and in so doing may engage in judicial policymaking. Judicial policymaking is a part of the development of the common law, and the courts cannot avoid their responsibility to engage in judicial policymaking to the extent that it is necessary in the process of formulating the common law. As a constitutional matter, there are no separation of powers considerations that prohibit the courts from engaging in judicial policymaking. This part of the article traces judicial policymaking and the common law back to the seminal writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo.The article then discusses at length judicial policymaking and the development of the common law in Michigan. It shows that the clearest history of judicial policymaking in development of the common law is the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century that were promulgated in the wake of the Industrial Revolution to protect the newly-emerging industries. During that time the courts in Michigan and elsewhere grafted on to the general principles of negligence law liability rules such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine, all of which had the effect of denying recovery to workers and other victims of industrial accidents. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, however, the Michigan Supreme Court began excising its constitutional power to make changes in the common law, expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan. Emphasizing that "rules created by the court could be altered by the court," and that the court had a "corrective responsibility when dealing with judge-made law," the Court, in approximately a 30 year period: eliminated the imputed negligence doctrine, under which the driver's negligence was imputed to the passenger in the passenger's suit against a third party; eliminated charitable immunity as a defense to a tort action; held that a wife could maintain at tort action for loss of her husband's consortium; abrogated the defense of assumption of risk, which had been applied outside of the employment area, held that there could be recovery for pre-natal injuries and finally abolished contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in favor of a comparative negligence approach. In these cases the Court discussed the relevant policy considerations influencing their decisions with respect to the common law rule at issue. In the last quarter century, the Court continued to take into account policy considerations in developing the common law, but not infrequently there was disagreement on the Court as to where policy considerations should lead, with some Justices arguing that policy considerations supported the imposition of tort liability, while other Justices argued that they did not.The article concludes that it has been demonstrated that in the development of the common law of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court has at all times engaged in judicial policymaking. From the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century designed to protect the newly-emerging industries in this state, to the Court's exercise of its power to change the common law in Michigan over a 30 year period by expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan, to its recognition of new claims, such as a child's right to recover for loss of a parent's consortium caused by a negligent injury, to its imposition of limits on tort recovery, such as the open and obvious doctrine, the Court has invoked considerations of policy in support of its decisions. In these cases, the Court's invocation of policy considerations was sometimes accompanied by substantial disagreement among members of the Court over where policy should lead, but at no time did the Court ever suggest that separation of powers considerations should somehow operate as a kind of restraint on the Court's use of policy in the development of the common law. It is the power and responsibility of the Michigan Courts under the Michigan Constitution to make policy choices in formulating the common law. (shrink)

This contribution aims at discussing constitutional democracy in the age of populisms, by explaining how populist movements oppose liberal-democratic constitutionalism and by presenting the thesis of a so-called ‘populist constitutionalism’, as proposed by Mark Tushnet. In the first section, a general and analytic exploration of populist phenomena will be drawn, by focusing on the so-called thesis of a ‘populist’ constitutionalism. In the second part, Tushnet’s arguments for a populist constitutionalism will be presented, through the analysis of his two main (...) contributions: Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, in which Tushnet develops his critique of legal constitutionalism and judicial review as an undemocratic power by unelected justices, and Authoritarian Constitutionalism, a recent article in which Tushnet distinguishes between ‘authoritarian’ and ‘populist’ definitions of constitutionalism. In conclusion, such arguments will be discussed, by proposing a critical response to Tushnet’s position and presenting some risks of a majoritarian and populist constitutional democracy. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the goal of finding influential legal precedents by quantitative methods. A lot of work has been made in this direction worldwide, especially in the context of common law jurisdictions. However, this type of work is extremely scarce in the Brazilian literature. In addition, our work also contributes to the research of network analysis and the law by applying these methods to unprecedented amount of data and narrowing our inquiry to a single law area, corporate (...) law. Furthermore, whereas most of the literature applying network analysis to judicial decisions had access to readily available data on the citations to precedent within each ruling, our raw data was nothing but the full text of decisions. We focus on data produced by the Superior Court of Justice, the highest court in Brazil for matters of federal law, including statutory interpretation of civil, criminal and corporate law. The Court issued an astonishing 282040 opinions tagged as related to corporate law between 2008 and 2018. This amount of cases is unparalleled internationally for superior courts and for studies in network analysis and law. In our results, we rank precedents quantitatively based on the citations they receive and make. We also qualitatively analyze some of the results, especially related to groups identified in the network with the Modularity algorithm. Our findings also reveal that corporate law jurisprudence in the STJ is quantitatively dominated by a few legal issues around one single theme that is only tangentially related to corporate law. That is, a type of contract used for the expansion of telephone landlines, which also allowed the consumer to become a shareholder of the telecommunication company. This comparison is especially pertinent because the utter lack of data on the quantitative weight of STJ precedents means the national literature has been operating in a void of objective measurements, one which has been filled with cherry-picked rulings and subjective ranking criteria. (shrink)

The article focuses on the new institute of the Lithuanian law of constitutional justice procedure – the dissenting opinion of a Constitutional Court justice as it is consolidated in the Law on the Constitutional Court. It is argued that the current statutory regulation is defective in essence because it creates preconditions for diminishing the quality of both the final act of the Constitutional Court (especially when the dissenting opinion is to be (...) filed by the judge rapporteur) and the dissenting opinion under preparation. The narrative is half-normative and half-behavioural: the institute is analysed in the context of established procedural practice of the Constitutional Court as an extremely collegial institution (also due to the statutory regulation), as well as in the context of the current condition of the public discourse in Lithuania. Namely, statutory regulation allows filing a dissenting opinion (which is not distinguished from the concurring opinion) within three working days after the public announcement of the decision (ruling, conclusion) of the Constitutional Court. Consequently, it is hardly possible to argue that the justice who filed the opinion did not do this in view of the immediate reaction to the decision by the media, the society, or the establishment, and even that he or she did not do this because such reaction took place. Also, the three-day period mentioned above puts any justice ready to file a dissenting (or concurring) opinion into the position where he or she simultaneously needs to participate in the collegial activity of the Court in deciding cases, as well as to write the dissenting (concurring) opinion. In the article, the legislative proposal is presented that the Law on the Constitutional Court should be amended so as to allow for a relatively long time span between the adoption of the decision (ruling, conclusion) and its announcement to the public at large. However, it is not suggested that the general mode of collectivism as dictated by the Law and as implemented in the established practice of the Constitutional Court shall be abandoned. By this article, the author continues his research on the matter as commenced in his two earlier articles (of 2011 and 2012). (shrink)

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is shaped by the language in which it is drafted—i.e. French. However, because French is rarely the mother tongue of those drafting that case law, the texts produced are often stilted and awkward. In addition, those drafting such case law are constrained in their use of language and style of writing. These factors have led to the development of a ‘Court French’ which necessarily shapes the (...) case law produced and has implications for its development, particularly insofar as it inevitably leads to a type of precedent in that case law. That case law also undergoes many permutations of translation into and out of up to 23 different languages. The resultant texts that make up the case law are hybrid in nature—consisting of a blend of cultural and linguistic patterns, constrained by a rigid formulistic drafting style and put through many permutations of translation. The present paper investigates the production of the Court’s multilingual case law and considers whether the hybrid nature of that case law can actually aid the presentation of a ‘uniform’ EU case law. (shrink)

Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context is the first book ever published in English to provide an international examination of the Italian Constitutional Court, offering a comprehensive analysis of its principal lines of jurisprudence, historical origins, organization, procedures, and its current engagement with transnational European law. The ItCC represents one of the strongest and most successful examples of constitutional judicial review, and is distinctive in its structure, institutional dimensions, and well-developed jurisprudence. Moreover, the ItCC has (...) developed a distinctive voice among global constitutional actors in its adjudication of a broad range of topics from fundamental rights and liberties to the allocations of governmental power and regionalism. Nevertheless, in global constitutional dialog, the voice of the ItCC has been almost entirely absent due to a relative lack of both English translations of its decisions and of focused scholarly commentary in English.This book describes the "Italian Style" in global constitutional adjudication, and aims to elevate Italian constitutional jurisprudence to an active participant role in global constitutional discourse. The authors have carefully structured the work to allow the ItCC's own voice to emerge. It presents broad syntheses of major areas of the Court's case law, provides excerpts from notable decisions in a narrative and analytical context, addresses the tension between the ItCC and the Court of Cassation, and positions the development, character, and importance of the ItCC's jurisprudence in the larger arc of global judicial dialog. (shrink)