We investigate the impact of perceived greenwashing on customer satisfaction. Unlike prior research that largely examines customer perceptions associated with irresponsible behavior, we focus on cases where firms overcommit and/or do not deliver on promised socially responsible actions. We theorize that this type of greenwashing is associated with lower customer satisfaction because customers perceive greenwashing through the lens of corporate hypocrisy. Using data from the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) for U.S. companies during the period 2008–2016, we document a negative (...) link between perceived greenwashing related to green product innovation (GPI) and the ACSI index. We demonstrate that this effect is primarily triggered by corporate policies exceeding the corresponding implementation actions and not by lower levels of implementation. We also show that a firm’s capability reputation mitigates the negative effect of greenwashing on customer satisfaction. Moreover, we conduct an experiment and provide evidence confirming that GPI greenwashing is in fact perceived by customers as corporate hypocrisy. (shrink)

Speculative logical theory, as provided in Hegel’s Science of Logic, consists of three main parts: the logic of being, the logic of essence, and the logic of the concept. The peculiar character of each logic’s starting point determines the most general character of each logic’s development. The present paper aims at making explicit the character of the starting-point of the third logic, the logic of the concept. This starting-point is exemplified by the category of universality. It is shown (a) that (...) the fundamental determination of this category is the harmonious unit y of self-identity and full determinacy and (b) that this unity has necessarily the logical structure of “double shining.” The latter is described in detail and justification is provided as to why it is preferred from “single shining.” I conclude the paper by defending the structure of “double shining” against certain objections raised against it by Friedrike Schick and Christian Iber. (shrink)

Hegel’s Science of Logic is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest works of European philosophy. However, its contribution to arguably the most important philosophical problem, Pyrrhonian scepticism, has never been examined in any detail. Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement fills a great lacuna in Hegel scholarship by convincingly proving that the dialectic of the judgement in Hegel’s Science of Logic successfully refutes this kind of scepticism. Although Ioannis Trisokkas has written the book primarily for those students (...) of philosophy who already have an interest in Hegel’s epistemology and philosophy of language and/or his Science of Logic, it will also appeal to those who investigate the problem of scepticism independently of the Hegel corpus. (shrink)

Scientific realists endeavour to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that despite the demise of empirically successful theories the parts of those theories responsible for their success do in fact survive theory change. If, as some anti-realists have recently suggested, those parts of theories that are responsible for their success are only identifiable in retrospect, namely as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialised for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The (...) aim of this paper is to counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts independently from their survival. (shrink)

Ovid's disclaimers in theArs Amatorianeed to be read in this context. My main argument is that, in his disclaimers, Ovid is rendering his female readership socially unrecognizable, rather than excluding respectable virgins andmatronaefrom his audience.Ars1.31–4, Ovid's programmatic statement about his work's target audience, is a case in point. A closer look at the passage shows that he does not necessarily warn off Roman wives and marriageable girls:este procul, uittae tenues, insigne pudoris,quaeque tegis medios instita longa pedes:nos Venerem tutam concessaque furta (...) canemusinque meo nullum carmine crimen erit. Ov.Ars Am.1.31–4Stay away, slender fillets, symbol of modesty,and you, long hem, who cover half the feet:we shall sing of safe sex and permitted cheatingand there will be no wrong in my song. (shrink)

El fenómeno de que una rama relativamente autónoma de la ciencia sea absorbida por, o “reducida” a, otra disciplina es innegable y es una característica recurrente de la historia de la ciencia moderna, y no hay razón para suponer que dicho fenómeno no continuará teniendo lugar en el futuro. Esto afirmaba Ernest Nagel hace exactamente setenta años en el intento por justificar la necesidad de esclarecer la reducción científica (NAGEL, 1949, p. 100). Incluso varios años antes reclamaba el que no (...) se contara con un estudio cuidadoso de la naturaleza de la reducción ni siquiera por parte de aquellos cuya preocupación exclusiva era la lógica de la ciencia (NAGEL, 1935, p. 46). Los posteriores debates acerca de la noción de reducción en la ciencia estuvieron motivados especialmente a partir del modelo de reducción nageliano; el cual ha tenido tanto innumerables adherentes como variadas objeciones. Entre las respuestas inmediatas ante los problemas que adolecía este modelo clásico, puede contarse la ofrecida por el programa estructuralista como una de las primeras. En este trabajo se expondrá lo relativo a la noción de reducción en el marco del programa estructuralista. Una vez presentado este recorrido, se intentará un análisis ulterior acerca de la condición de reducción en sentido ontológico (MOULINES, 1984) tomando en cuenta uno de los más actuales refinamientos del marco conceptual estructuralista como lo es la noción de subestructura parcial escalonada. (shrink)

Plato's Laches, the dialogue devoted to the discovery of courage, is generally considered a failure, as the interlocutors' various definitions ultimately prove insufficient. Laches, however, notes that a definition of this kind can only be assessed by considering whether the speaker's words and deeds are in harmony. In fact he goes one step further, and admits that deeds are far more persuasive than words. He therefore declares that he is willing to let Socrates, whose deeds on the battlefield speak volumes, (...) say whatever he pleases. Although himself content to deal with words, Socrates is well aware that, as far as others are concerned, Laches is right. During his defence, for example, Socrates proposes to convince the jury that he is not afraid of death by offering them 'great proofs'; not words, but what they value, namely deeds. On his final day, having undergone a lengthy and complex attempt to persuade his friends that death is nothing to be afraid of, Socrates leaves them with a deed attuned to his word, and thus becomes, in Nietzsche's words, 'the emblem . . . above the entrance gate of science'. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe affinities between Jean Bodin's and King James VI/i's political theories have been recognized, and the fact that James had owned Bodin's Six livres de la république has been recorded, but Bodin's specific influence on James has remained nebulous. This article examines the evidence for James's direct engagement with Bodin, by studying James's copy of the Six livres alongside James's political treatises. It provides substantial new archival evidence for Bodin's influence on James's political thought and, thereby, on Scottish and English (...) theories of sovereignty. (shrink)

In June 2018 the Texan philosopher and distinguished bioethicist Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. crossed the great divide to meet his maker, as he would probably put it. His work remains till now the most systematic effort to fully revise Bioethics based on the doctrines of the Orthodox Christian theology, while it is also apreciseaccount ofEthics and Bioethics in the “after God” era. Engelhardt was anexcellent master of ancient Greek, medieval, western and eastern philosophy, and after heconverted from the Roman Catholic to (...) the Eastern Orthodox Church – officially the Orthodox Catholic Church – he indulged in the works of the Holy Fathers andbecame greatly influenced by them. This is clearlymanifest in his views and continuous reference to Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers. His conversion crucially influenced not only his bioethical views, but also his entire philosophical system. This magnificent journey obviously turned the Texan philosopher into a true Theologist – not in the academic sense, but in the one the Orthodox Catholic Church accepts, according to which “a Theologist is a person of God, from God, before God and speaks to praise God”. Engelhardt was not the first to deal with bioethical issues under the spectrum of Orthodox Theology, but he was the first to unravel both secular and Western-Church Bioethics and suggest a totally different version of Bioethicsbased on the principles of Orthodox ethics, the ceremonial and esoteric life of the Orthodox Church, having previously made himself a true communicant of both the paternal tradition and dogmatic teaching. (shrink)

Buddhadhamma. Natural Law and Values for Life. Phra Prayudh Payutto. Translated by Grant A. Olsen. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY 1995. xxiv, 302 pp. Cloth $59.50, pbk $19.95. ISBN 0-7914-2631-9/2632-7.

Structural realists of nearly all stripes endorse the structural continuity claim. Roughly speaking, this is the claim that the structure of successful scientific theories survives theory change because it has latched on to the structure of the world. In this paper I elaborate, elucidate and modify the structural continuity claim and its associated argument. I do so without presupposing a particular conception of structure that favours this or that kind of structural realism. Instead I focus on how structural realists can (...) best account for the neutrally formulated historical facts. The result, I hope, crystallises some of the shared commitments, desiderata and limits of structural realists. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its rivals.

In a recent PSA paper (2001a) as well as some other papers ((1995), (2000), (2001b)) and a book chapter (1999, ch. 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: 1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR for short), 2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves, and 3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing.

Let us call ‘veridicalism’ the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view’s greatest threat, the so-called ‘theory-ladenness’ of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is typically (...) not detrimental to their veridicality or at least not irreversibly so. Central to the defence of veridicalism are two principles: that of internal similarities and that of internal dissimilarities. (shrink)

Nowadays, aesthetics are generally considered as a crucial aspect that affects the way we confront things, events, and states of affairs. However, the functional role of aesthetics in the interaction between agent and environment has not been addressed effectively. Our objective here is to provide an explanation concerning the role of aesthetics, and especially, of the aesthetic experience as a fundamental bodily and emotional activity in the respective interactions. An explanation of the functional role of the aesthetic experience could offer (...) new orientations to our understanding of embodied cognition and of aesthetics as a fundamental part of it. We argue that aesthetic experience, especially its emotional dimension, is an evaluative process that influences the anticipation for stable and successful interactions with the environment. In other words, aesthetics facilitates sense-making as they affect what might be anticipated by an action tendency with respect to an environment. (shrink)

In this paper, we would show how the logical object “square of opposition”, viewed as semiotic object, has been historically transformed since its appearance in Aristotle’s texts until the works of Vasiliev. These transformations were accompanied each time with a new understanding and interpretation of Aristotle’s original text and, in the last case, with a transformation of its geometric configuration. The initial textual codification of the theory of opposition in Aristotle’s works is transformed into a diagrammatic one, based on a (...) new “reading” of the Aristotelian text by the medieval scholars that altered the semantics of the O form. Further, based on the medieval “Neo-Aristotelian” reading, the logicians of the nineteenth century suggest new diagrammatic representations, based on new interpretations of quantification of judgements within the algebraic and the functional logical traditions. In all these interpretations, the original square configuration remains invariant. However, Nikolai A. Vasiliev marks a turning point in history. He explicitly attacks the established logical tradition and suggests a new alternation of semantics of the O form, based on Aristotelian concepts that were neglected in the Aristotelian tradition of logic, notably the concept of indefinite judgement. This leads to a configurational transformation of the “square” of opposition into a “triangle”, where the points standing for the O and I forms are contracted into one point, the M form that now stands for particular judgement with altered semantics. The new transformation goes beyond the Aristotelian logic paradigm to a new “Non-Aristotelian” logic, i.e. to paraconsistent logic, although the argumentation used in support of it is phrased in Aristotelian style and the context of discovery is foundational. It establishes a bifurcation point in the development of logic. No unique logic is recognized, but different logics concerning different domains. One branch of logic remains to be the “Neo-Aristotelian” one, while the new logic is “Non-Aristotelian”. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate two potential ways to experimentally test the thesis that observation is theory-laden. One is a proposal due to Schurz (J Gen Philos Sci 46:139–153, 2015) and the other my own. The two are compared and found to have some features in common. One such feature is that both proposals seek to create conditions that compel test subjects with diverse theoretical backgrounds to resort to bare (or at least as bare as possible) observational judgments. Thus, if (...) judgments made under those conditions are convergent across test subjects, the said convergence would lend credibility to the view that theory-neutral observations are feasible. This still leaves the question of why any such convergence exists unanswered. Towards the end of the paper, it is argued that the best explanation for observational judgment convergence is the veridicality of those judgments. (shrink)

Ce texte s’inscrit dans le prolongement d’un effort endurci pour penser les modalités complexes du dialogue entre la psychanalyse lacanienne et la phénoménologie française dans la seconde moitié du xx e siècle. Plus exactement, il s’agit ici d’indiquer les raisons objectives, à la fois théoriques et pratiques, qui expliquent la violence de la réception française du De l’interprétation de Paul Ricœur, en mettant en perspective les positions respectives du philosophe et celles du psychanalyste Jacques Lacan lors du colloque de Bonneval (...) sur l’Inconscient d’octobre 1960. L’analyse détaillée du texte “Le conscient et l’inconscient” – élément du corpus ricœurien trop souvent négligé – au regard de l’enseignement lacanien du tournant des années 1960 doit en outre permettre de dégager deux théories de l’interprétation antagonistes, afin d’indiquer pour finir les points concrets de divergence entre les orientations “ricœurienne” et “lacanienne” de la clinique psychanalytique. (shrink)

This book examines the place of physical bodies, a major topic of natural philosophy that has occupied philosophers since antiquity. Aristotle's conceptions of place (topos) and the void (kenon), as expounded in the 'Physics', were systematically repudiated by John Philoponus (ca. 485-570) in his philosophical commentary on that work. The primary philosophical concern of the present study is the in-depth investigation of the concept of place established by Philoponus, putting forward the claim that the latter offers satisfactory solutions to problems (...) raised by Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition regarding the nature of place. Philoponus' account proposes a specific physical model of how physical bodies exist and move in place, and regards place as an intrinsic reality of the physical cosmos. Due to exactly this model, his account may be considered as strictly pertaining to the study of physics, thereby constituting a remarkable episode in the history of philosophy and science. (shrink)

Sitting. A Guide to Good Meditation Posture. Kamalashila. Windhorse Publications, Glasgow 1988. 28 pp. £1.95.

The Historical Buddha. H. W. Schumann. Translated by M. O'C Walshe. Arkana, London 1989. xi, 274 pp., 17 illustrations. £5.99..

Transforming the Mind, Healing the World. Joseph Goldstein. Paulist Press, New York and Mahwah, NJ., 1994. 51 pp. No price given.

The epistemic form of structural realism asserts that our knowledge of the world is restricted to its structural features. Several proponents of this view assume that the world possesses non-structural features; features which, according to their view, cannot be known. In other words, they assume that there is, or, there ought to be (on the basis of normative arguments in epistemology), always a gap between our epistemological and ontological commitments. The ontic form of structural realism denies that this is, or (...) ought to be, the case. Proponents of this view argue that the perfect alignment of epistemological and ontological commitments is a highly desirable metatheoretical feature. They argue this on the basis of the prima facie sensible principle that our ontological commitments ought never to overreach our epistemic ones. Naturally the issue of alignment transcends the debate between the epistemic and the ontic structural realists. Is it in principle impossible for there to be circumstances under which we ought to subscribe to the misalignment of epistemological and ontological commitments? What do the different answers to this question entail for ontic structural realism? (shrink)

The concern with the objectivity of observations is as old as empirical study itself. Protagoras’ assertion that ‘Man is the measure of all things’, though not particularly directed at observations, raised general doubts concerning the objectivity of our beliefs. In the twentieth century, the concern has been brought under the banner ‘theory-ladenness of observation’. In simple terms, since observations are conducted and formulated in theory-specific contexts, they are inadvertently imbued with the prejudices of those contexts - the terms ‘theory’ and (...) ‘observation’ are here broadly construed. Accordingly, it is argued, observations cannot be neutral in the testing of theories. (shrink)

Conducted almost exclusively at the epistemological level the scientific realism debate often ignores metaphysical niceties. In the face of the scientific realist’s systematic appeal to metaphysical notions like causation and natural kinds the neglect seems dissonant. Chakravartty aspires to overturn it with a bespoke metaphysics for scientific realism. In pursuing this aim, he undrapes a more comprehensive vision of the scientific realist viewpoint, including a distinctive epistemology.

In this paper, we explore certain exemplifications of transgression in the history and philosophy of mathematics. We recognize transgressive acts in the transition from a “real” to an “imaginary” world. Further, we suggest the concept of proof-events that transgress traditional concepts of mathematical proof. The theory of proof-events provides us with means to identify transgressive acts in the development of a discovery proof-event. These concern the creative understanding of a purported mathematical proof by reconstructing the meaning conveyed by it, eventually (...) supplementing it, surpassing stylistic hindrances in the narrative formulated by a prover, exceeding the boundaries of the (local) logic of a prover, etc. Finally, we identify transgressive acts with discontinuous points of change in the development of proof-events and suggest formal measures for their recognition. (shrink)

Constantin Caratheodory offered the first systematic and contradiction free formulation of thermodynamics on the basis of his mathematical work on Pfaff forms. Moreover, his work on measure theory provided the basis for later improved formulations of thermodynamics and physics of continua where extensive variables are measures and intensive variables are densities. Caratheodory was the first to see that measure theory and not topology is the natural tool to understand the difficulties (ergodicity, approach to equilibrium, irreversibility) in the Foundations of Statistical (...) Physics. He gave a measure-theoretic proof of Poincaré's recurrence theorem in 1919. This work paved the way for Birkhoff to identify later ergodicity as metric transitivity and for Koopman and von Neumann to introduce spectral analysis of dynamical systems in Hilbert spaces. Mixing provided an explanation of the approach to equilibrium but not of irreversibility. The recent extension of spectral theory of dynamical systems to locally convex spaces, achieved by the Brussels–Austin groups, gives new nontrivial time asymmetric spectral decompositions for unstable and/or non-integrable systems. In this way irreversibility is resolved in a natural way. (shrink)

Long before Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion Theory, Thomas Hobbes’s account of self-interest and risk assessment formed the basis of a powerful argument for the benefits of negative appeals. Dismissing the pursuit of highest and final goods as inherently incapable of yielding collective action, Hobbes proposed a method focusing instead on the highest evil, something that individuals with different goals could agree on as a barrier to their respective pursuits. In his own theory, that evil was violent death in the (...) dystopian setting of his notorious state of nature. The staying power of Hobbes’s memorable image itself validates Hobbes’s rationale and offers important reminders regarding the limits of utopian appeals to collective action. (shrink)

The unauthorized 1650 publication of The Elements of Law broke Hobbes’s treatise into two parts that were inconsistent with his own division of the work. This obscured what is arguably the most important insight into Hobbes’s method: his account of how human beings use language to instigate and appease others. I review the evidence of how the publication history of the Elements resulted in a break between I.13 and I.14 that Hobbes did not intend. I then argue that as the (...) description of the very method that Hobbes was using to counteract dangerous dogmatists and appease his fellow citizens, the discussion in question made sense in a work intended for private circulation but not in treatises to be read by those on whom the method was to be applied. I show how reading I.13 and I.14 together, as Hobbes had intended, shows that Hobbes never changed his mind about rhetoric. (shrink)