Training on the Law of armed conflict employs different rationales to motivate soldiers and to induce their compliance with LOAC rules. Of these, none is as controversial, or as potentially...

Even though International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is, strictly speaking, a branch of international law serving as the body of laws governing the conduct of armed conflicts, it functions also, and perhaps to a greater extent, as a moral system (either followed or rejected) for the armies involved in armed conflicts. As utilitarians already noticed, the development of legal systems was powerfully influenced by moral opinion, and conversely, moral standards had been profoundly influenced by law, so (...) that the content of many legal rules mirrored moral rules or principles. Law, like morality, is interested in creating a good society: enabling people to live together in a community and inculcating a sense of social responsibility. However, despite these similarities between the systems, law and morality differ in some of their objectives and in the methods they use for achieving their goals and sustaining human behavior. The application of this conclusion to IHL and the analysis of both its historical nascence in the nineteenth century and the philosophical concepts informing it suggests that IHL serves more the purposes of a moral system than those of a legal system. This claim is strengthened by the analysis of two examples of legal rules of IHL: the proportionality principle in causing collateral damage and the instruction that preventive (or targeted) killings should be used as a last resort. (shrink)

Cyber warfare is becoming a new reality with new battles fought everyday on virtual battlefields. For a century and a half, International Humanitarian Law has been a sentry for victims of wars guaranteeing their legal protection from the calamities of war, trying hard to respond to Clausewitz’s “chameleon of war”. Cyber conflict marks new chameleon’s colour together with the unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomic battle systems and other technologies deployed on battlefields. However, it would be greatly erroneous to claim (...) that the International Humanitarian Law may not apply to the new phenomena just because it is caused by the advanced technology. Even if the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are already sixty years old, the International Humanitarian Law in itself has at minimum customary response mechanism, granting, in a spirit of Marten’s clause, protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience (Protocol I). Notwithstanding, some more complicated fundamental issues also have to be addressed: how the use of cybernetic weapons and means may affect the classic notion of armed conflict? How it can be interpreted in the light of new technologies, i.e. can we still rely on a classic understanding of weapon’s kinetic effect as the main element, or shall we embrace effectsbased “Schmitt’s criteria”. If it so happens, will it make an act without apparent damage to a person/property equal to military hostilities, required by the armed conflict notion and justify the real-life response to it. The effective or overall control tests were used for the attribution of non-state actor’s activity to the state party of an armed conflict but these tests might not meet its purpose in the virtual battlefield of loose networks and open-source communities. If the concept of armed conflict is treated more flexibly, other changes (including issues of attribution) may follow, as well. Perhaps this is the way how the combatant institute will evolve. With classic combatant’s criteria impossible to apply on virtual battlefields, one of the options would be to elaborate concepts of “constant combat function” and “direct participation in hostilities” more precisely, as well as to reconsider state’s affiliation requirements. (shrink)

Environmental protection in times of armed conflicts, irrespective internal or international, is rarely considered as a prioritized concern. Due to the concept of state sovereignty, this is especially problematic when examining interaction of warfare and environmental protection in non-international hostilities. Not only it is challenging to find any exhaustive and explicit legal provisions regulating the matter, but this issue has also been forgotten by international legal scholars. Therefore, in this article the author reviews written and customary (...) norms laid down in documents of various branches of international law, such as international humanitarian law, human rights law, environmental law and international criminal law, which directly or by way of interpretation may favour environmental protection in times of internal armed conflict. This is to be done in order to gather information about the sufficiency of legal framework on preservation of the environment in times of noninternational armed conflicts. After doing this research, a few possible means to improve current legal framework are suggested. The author suggests to impose civil liability, enact new comprehensive document, initiate changes in international criminal law and other. (shrink)

This book explores topical issues in military ethics by according peace a central role within an interdisciplinary framework. Whilst war and peace have traditionally been viewed through the lens of philosophical enquiry, political issues and theological ideas - as well as common sense - have also influenced people's understanding of armed conflicts with regards to both the moral issues they raise and the policies and actions they require. Comprised of fourteen essays on the role and application of peace, the (...) book places emphasis on it's philosophical, moral, theological, technological, and practical implications. Starting with an overview of Kantian perspectives on peace, it moves to discussions of the Just War debates, religious conceptualizations of peace, and the role of peace in modern war technology and cyber-security. Finally concluding with discussions of the psychological and medical impacts of war and peace on both the individual and the larger society, this collection offers a contribution to the field and will be of interest to a wide audience. Chapters 4, 6 and 10 of this book are available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com. (shrink)

The use of private military force by states has been a long-standing phenomena in the history of warfare. Armies of mercenaries, privateering and recruitment of foreign nationals into armed forces have been common during the Middle Ages and later on. However, with the invention of effective firearms and artillery, standing regular armies, conscription and other developments that resulted in the essential rise of costs of war, the role of private military entrepreneurs diminished. By the end of XIXth century the (...) state became almost the only subject that was able to wage a full-scale war. Nevertheless, already in the middle of the XXth century mercenarism has been reborn in Africa’s colonial and post-colonial wars. The end of the XXth century and the beginning of the XXI century witnesses an enormous rise of private security and military companies (PSMC) that are hired to perform different functions related to use of force not only by states, but also by other clients such as international organisations, transnational corporations, etc. A PSMC may be defined as a profit-seeking private enterprise, which is established according to the national law of the state and which is providing, on the basis of a contract, services directly or indirectly connected with the use of military force or its institutions whether in time of armed conflict or peace, notwithstanding how such company describes itself. International humanitarian law has no specific regulation of PSMC. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to state that the activity of PSMC is not regulated, because international humanitarian law in any case, in one or another way, is applicable to the personnel of PSMC if it is engaged in armed conflict of either international or non-international character. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to EU military operations outside of the European Union (EU). It describes where the Union has performed best: promoting the development, acceptance, and respect of IHL by others. EU restrictive measures may be taken in its commercial policy, its foreign and security policy, and its development cooperation policy. A field in which the European Union may have a direct impact on violations of IHL is the export of arms. (...) EU member states continue to be involved in armed conflicts, but EU law did not govern their involvement. Therefore, the relationship between IHL and EU law is fortunately not (yet) an issue of daily concern for practitioners and EU institutions. In the instances in which the European Union has been a military actor abroad, IHL arguably did not apply because the Union had not become a party to an armed conflict. (shrink)

As part of a roundtable on “Balancing Legal Norms, Moral Values, and National Interests,” this essay describes the humanitarian diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by comparing it conceptually with other forms of advocacy and illustrating it with the ICRC's recent experience in the Yemen crisis. Humanitarian diplomacy is examined as one particular way of balancing legal norms, moral values, and national interests in the pursuit of greater respect for international humanitarian (...) law (IHL) and principled humanitarian action in armed conflicts. The essay looks back to ancient history for archetypal forms of humanitarian advocacy in various cultural traditions. It then describes humanitarian diplomacy's practice of discreet diplomacy and confidential dialogue with all parties to a conflict, and compares its relatively “quiet” approach with the “loud” approach of outrage activism focused on “naming and shaming,” which tends to be the norm today. The essay argues that there is an important and complementary place for the ICRC's style of humanitarian diplomacy alongside other forms of advocacy even in the face of criticism that the ICRC is sometimes publicly silent about what it knows of atrocities and avoids naming and shaming. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The core teaching of Buddhism revolves around understanding and alleviating suffering. Since the purpose of international humanitarian law (IHL) is to minimise suffering during armed conflict, by protecting the innocent and restricting the means and methods of warfare, Buddhists should support IHL. In this paper, I try not to utilise the Buddha’s well-known teachings such as karma, impermanence, non-self, emptiness, compassion and so on, to explain why Buddhists should support IHL. Instead, I present how and why (...) Buddhism underlines the importance of secular ethics, indicating that humanity comes first for Buddhism, which would be the main reason for Buddhists to support IHL. Buddhist monks such as Yinshun and the 14th Dalai Lama view common humanity, conventional morality and inner values as the grounds for Buddhism. An enhancement of humanity and the promotion of morality are also part of the way of Buddhist practice. Viewed from a humanistic perspective, Buddhism may endorse all laws, rules, and regulations that are in the best interest of the public and align with values such as peace, freedom, equality, justice, benevolence, and more, regardless of whether they are applied internationally or domestically. Buddhism upholds IHL for similar reasons. (shrink)

The role of physicians in armed conflict -- International humanitarian law -- International criminal law -- Customary status of international humanitarian law -- The relevant human rights norms applicable to the work of physicians in armed conflict -- The interpretation of the reference to medical ethics and generally accepted medical standards pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties -- Medical ethics in international law -- A pluralistic approach to medical (...) ethics -- The documents by the World Medical Association (WMA) -- Conclusion, recommendations and outlook. (shrink)

My critical commentary focuses on Victor Tadros’ analysis of accountability for violations of the (revised) laws of armed conflict (LOAC) that he lays out (Tadr.

The trend toward the “humanization” of international law reflects a greater emphasis on individuals rather than simply states as objects of concern. The advance of human rights law (HRL) has been an important impetus for this trend. Some observers suggest that humanization can be furthered even more by applying HRL rather than international humanitarian law (IHL) to hostilities between states and nonstate armed groups, unless a state explicitly declares that it is engaged in an armed (...) conflict. This essay argues, however, that a court should not defer to a state's characterization of hostilities, but should base its analysis on whether hostilities meet the criteria for an armed conflict. Applying HRL to hostilities that effectively are an armed conflict but not acknowledged as such risks diluting the legitimacy and normative force of HRL. On the one hand, if a court applies conventional stringent HRL standards, this body of law may be seen as unrealistic and is likely to be ignored. On the other hand, a court that adapts HRL standards to armed conflict may need to take a consequentialist approach at odds with HRL's deontological foundations. Clearly differentiating between HRL and IHL may thus best promote the humanization of warfare. (shrink)

More than a quarter of the global population of two billion children live in Islamic countries; therefore, their protection is vital while a handful of them are suffering from lack of hygiene, education, and poverty. The current armed conflict in different ways also has an effect and seriously impacts children as victims and associates in armed groups. Organization of Islamic Conference as a collective voice of its 57 members, initiated a series of efforts in this regard. Islamic texts (...) and traditions show significant importance for child protection, but what has been done until today by OIC as a main intergovernmental Organization guided by Islamic principles, values and norms, is not sufficient. Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam is the first human rights binding document adopted by OIC as part of consecutive efforts of OIC to promote protection of children. Although it is regarded as an important step, its adequacy for protection of children affected by armed conflicts is under question. Furthermore, in comparison to International Humanitarian Law and Convention on the Rights of the Child, it does not reflect proportionately and further provisions for children affected, with regard to the extent and the dimensions of conflicts in Islamic countries. (shrink)

The dissertation deals with the questions surrounding the legal, ethical and strategic aspects of armed drones in warfare. This is a vast and complex field, however, one where there remains more conflict and debate than actual consensus. -/- One of the many themes addressed during the course of this research was an examination of the evolution of modern asymmetric transnational armed conflict. It is the opinion of the author that this phenomenon represents a “grey-zone”; an entirely new paradigm (...) of warfare. International terrorism has not been dealt with in a cohesive fashion. Any international prosecution of terrorism which has been conducted has been either “sectoral” adopting a piecemeal typological approach or has been carried out at the domestic level. -/- A novel approach to the problem, of sub-national actors with transnational reach, was proposed, by attributing certain groups with a new legal personality, that of “Stateless International Entities”, or “SIEs”. Those groups who possess, for all intents and purposes, the same attributes as those of States, could then be judged for their behavior before an international tribunal. Other important topics addressed in this research include an examination of important case law, targeted killing, autonomy, preemption versus prevention, imminence versus intent, the find, fix and finish paradigm, the impact of the media, and the role of the CIA, and finally, the flawed reasoning which adopts technology as a form of strategy. (shrink)

There is an intrinsic connection between genocide and colonialism where both concepts are in close proximity and are based on the logic of elimination. The fact that an active genocide of the Palestinian people continues in 2024 is extremely disturbing. A plethora of human rights laws and principles complement and reinforce the protections afforded under international humanitarian law. These laws were developed in order to prevent historical atrocities from repeating themselves. As history is re-written, it is submitted that (...) these laws, while good on paper, are not being put into practice in the case of Palestine. This article reflects on the application of specific international humanitarian laws, namely protecting healthcare, preserving nutrition and safeguarding children during times of conflict, and analyses how these protections are being flouted in the case of Gaza. (shrink)

The book offers insights on whether international law can shape the politics of the Security Council and, conversely, the extent to which the latter contribute to the development of international law. By providing a systematic analysis of the quantity and quality of international legal instruments referred to in the text of resolutions, the book reconstructs patterns of the Security Council's behavioural regularities and assesses them against the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which establishes its mandate. The (...) analysis is divided into three periods - the origins and Cold War period, post-Cold War period and the twenty-first century - and assesses the resolutions passed in each period by thematic category. The book argues that while international law plays an important role in shaping the politics of the Security Council, the Council's resolutions do not contribute significantly to the development of international law. (shrink)

Armed reprisals are the limited use of military force in response to unlawful actions perpetrated against states. Historically, reprisals provided a military remedy for states that had been wronged by another state without having to resort to all-out war in order to counter or deter such wrongful actions. While reprisals are broadly believed to have been outlawed by the UN Charter, states continue to routinely undertake such self-help measures. As part of the roundtable, “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” this (...) essay examines the doctrine of armed reprisals in light of recent instances of states using force “short of war” in this manner. We argue that the ban on reprisals has been largely ignored by states, and that recent attempts to apply the laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain are further weakening this prohibition. We conclude that this is a potentially dangerous development that lowers the bar for resorting to military force, risking escalation and thereby further destabilizing the international system. (shrink)

The revisionist critique of conventional just war theory has undoubtedly scored some important victories. Walzer’s elegantly unified defense of combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity has been seriously undermined. This critical success has not, however, been matched by positive arguments, which when applied to the messy reality of war would deprive states and soldiers of the permission to fight wars that are plausibly thought to be justified. The appeal to law that is sought to resolve this objection by casting it (...) as a practical concern, a pragmatic worry about implementation, which while germane to debates over the laws of war, need not undermine our convictions in the fundamental principles the revisionists advocate. This response is inadequate. Revisionists have not shown that soldiers should obey the laws of war, in practice, when they conflict with their other moral reasons – our worries about application remain intact. Moreover, a theory of war that offers only an account of the laws of war, and a set of fundamental principles developed in abstraction from feasibility constraints, is radically incomplete. We need to know how to apply those fundamental principles, and whether, when applied, they lead to defensible conclusions. Only two options seem to remain. Perhaps the revisionists’ arguments for their chosen fundamental principles are sufficiently compelling that we should stick with them, and accept their troubling conclusions – in other words, accept pacifism. Alternatively, we need to revise our fundamental principles, so that when applied they yield conclusions that we can more confidently endorse. -/- Though it does not save the revisionist view from the responsibility dilemma and cognate objections, the appeal to law does raise an important, and previously inadequately theorized, question – or, rather, resurrects a neglected topic, discussed in depth by historical just war theorists such as Grotius and Vattel. There are good grounds for distinguishing the laws of war from the morality of war, and for adjusting the former to accommodate predictable noncompliance, that should not impact on our account of the latter. Nonetheless, I have argued that there are some profound moral insights underlying both combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity: specifically, we cannot infer from a combatant’s side having not satisfied jus ad bellum that he may not justifiably use lethal force; and other things equal, it is more wrongful to harm a nonliable noncombatant than to harm a nonliable combatant. (shrink)

This book analyzes emergency legislations formed in response to terrorism. In recognition that different countries, with different legal traditions, have different solutions, it adopts a comparative point of view. The countries profiled include America, France, Israel, Poland, Germany and United Kingdom. The goal is not to offer judgment on one response or the other. Rather, the contributors offer a comprehensive and thoughtful examination of the entire concept. In the process, they draw attention to the inadaptability of traditional legal and philosophical (...) categories in a new and changing political world. The contributors first criticize the idea of these legislations. They then go on to develop different models to respond to these crises. They build a general analytical framework by answering such questions as: What is an emergency legislation? What kinds of emergencies justify laws of this nature? Why is contemporary terrorism such a specific emergency justifying new laws? Using legal and philosophical reflections, this study looks at how we are changing society. Coverage also provides historical experiences of emergency legislations to further illustrate this point. In the end, readers will gain insight into the long-term consequences of these legislations and how they modify the very work of the rule of law. (shrink)

International humanitarian law and international human rights law both prohibit the use of child soldiers in armed conflict. The protection afforded to children is problematic because the age a child may become a soldier and what constitutes child “soldiering” fluctuates between States and cultures. Differing levels of children soldiers’ protection leave them vulnerable to particular abuses. This paper examines some different attitudes and approaches towards the use of child soldiers and concludes that international human rights (...) law and international humanitarian law does not adequately protect children. (shrink)

Combatants who attempt to obey the laws of war often have to take considerable risks in order to effectively discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Sometimes this task is made even more complicated by systemic factors which influence their ability to discriminate effectively without unduly risking their lives or the mission. If they fail to do so, civilians often pay the price. In this paper, I argue that to the extent that non-combatants benefit from the attempt to fight justly, and (...) to the extent that wars in which combatants attempt to fight justly can be understood as a system of social cooperation which produces both burdens and benefits, non-combatants have a responsibility to shoulder their fair share of these burdens. Thus, if combatants (and by extension enemy non-combatants) are disproportionately burdened in a conflict, non-combatants ought to take on some costs, for instance in order to reduce the strain imposed on combatants by systemic factors such as the availability and distribution of resources. (shrink)

In a significant early case, the ICTY commented: “The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person…. The general principle of respect for human dignity is . . . the very raison d'être of international humanitarian law and human rights law.” Is it true that international humanitarian law and international human rights law share the same (...) “essence,” and that essence is the general principle of respect for human dignity? Is it true that, in the words of Charles Beitz, humanitarian law is “perhaps better described as the law of ‘human rights in armed conflicts’”? To answer yes, I argue, amounts to a reinterpretation of IHL that drifts far from its history. This reinterpretation is what I label human rights thinking . In its origins, IHL was not designed to protect human dignity, but to reduce human suffering; it was a form of disaster relief. Human rights law, by contrast, originated as a blueprint for the kind of peacetime societies that would no longer plunge the world into what the UN Charter calls the “untold sorrow” of war. Nevertheless, law changes. Perhaps the nature of IHL has evolved over time in the direction of human rights thinking, and should evolve that way. That is the view I defend-–with some qualifications-–in the final sections of this essay. First, I explore the very different genealogies of IHL and human rights law, and explain how human rights thinking migrated into IHL. I attribute the migration to international criminal law, military occupations, and reactions to the U.S. war on terrorism. In the final sections, I explore two ways human rights thinking can be pursued in wars. One of them, I will argue, overplays and overestimates what human rights thinking can accomplish. It does so by, in effect, willing away fundamental differences between war and peace. The other is an approach that I have defended for more than three decades. It consists, at bottom, of taking a civilian’s-eye view of the disasters of war and reading the law accordingly-–recognizing, one might say, that Mother Courage and her children matter just as much to the law of war as Henry V and his band of brothers. (shrink)

The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the crucial role of technology in modern warfare. The use of digital networks, information infrastructure, space technology, and artificial intelligence has distinct military advantages, but raises challenges as well. This essay focuses on the way it exacerbates a rather familiar challenge: the “civilianization of warfare.” Today's high-technology warfare lowers the threshold for civilian participation in the war effort. A notable example is the widespread use of smartphone apps by Ukrainian civilians, who thereby help the armed (...) forces defend against Russian aggression. Through the lenses of international humanitarian law, conventional just war theory, and revisionist just war theory, this essay evaluates the normative dimensions of such civilian participation. The analysis shows that civilians can lose their legal protections when they use these apps to directly participate in hostilities, and this loss of immunity can be justified by Michael Walzer's conventional just war theory. Revisionism, however, puts the justness of the war at the forefront, and so sheds doubt on the moral liability of Ukrainian civilians. Considering the broader implications, including the blurring combatant-civilian distinction, indicates that such civilianization of warfare should not be welcomed; the risks will often outweigh the benefits. At a minimum, states ought to exercise restraint in mobilizing civilians and inform them of the implications of their actions. (shrink)

Efforts to ban Autonomous Weapon Systems were both unsuccessful and controversial. Simultaneously the need to address the detrimental aspects of AWS development and proliferation continues to grow in scope and urgency. The article presents several regulatory solutions capable of addressing the issue while simultaneously respecting the requirements of military necessity and so attracting a broad consensus. Two much stricter solutions – regional AWS bans and adoption of a no first use policy – are also presented as fallback strategies in case (...) achieving AWS’ compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict proved elusive. Together, the solutions presented form an outline of a flexible regulatory strategy able to adjust to different technological outcomes and providing a sensible compromise to solve the current deadlock on the AWS issue. (shrink)

Traditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in an unjust war of aggression and soldiers on the opposing side seeking to defend their country are morally equal as long as each obeys the rules of combat. Revisionist scholars, however, maintain that soldiers who fight for an unjust cause bear at least some responsibility (...) for advancing an immoral end, even if they otherwise fight ethically. This article examines the attitudes of the American public regarding the moral equality of combatants. Utilizing an original survey experiment, we find that the public's moral reasoning is generally more consistent with that of the revisionists than with traditional just war theory. Americans in our study judged soldiers who participate in unjust wars as less ethical than soldiers in just wars, even when their battlefield conduct is identical, and a large proportion supported harsh punishments for soldiers simply for participating in unjust wars. We also find, however, that much of the American public is willing to extend the moral license of just cause significantly further than revisionist scholars advocate: half of the Americans in our survey were willing to allow an unambiguous war crime—a massacre of innocent women and children—to go unpunished when the act was committed by soldiers fighting for a just cause. Our findings suggest that incorporation of revisionist principles into the laws of war would reinforce dangerous moral intuitions encouraging the killing of civilians. (shrink)

Starting from 2009, national courts of the EU Member States for the first time gained a “real” right to request the EU Court of Justice for preliminary rulings in asylum matters. First judgments of this Court demonstrate equivocal tendencies: some are blaming the Court for incompetence in asylum matters, others believe that the adoption of authoritative decisions at the European level will assist in developing consistent practice of applying asylum law in the European Union, something that failed at international (...) level due to absence of a single authoritative body to provide guidance on interpretation and application of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Considering that the judgments of the EU Court are part of the EU law, the Member States should develop their national asylum law with due regard being taken to those judgments. By the beginning of 2012, the Court has issued eight judgments on the interpretation of various problematic issues of EU asylum law. This Article analyses the jurisprudence of the EU Court in asylum cases, related to the granting of refugee status and subsidiary protection. It also provides a critical evaluation of those judgments. The main objective of the Article is to familiarise the relevant Lithuanian institutions and lawyers with the first judgments of the EU Court in asylum cases and encourage discussions concerning the application of rules established by the Court in the Lithuanian context. Due to limited size, this Article presents the analysis of two EU Court judgments adopted on interpretation of the 2004 Qualification Directive: Elgafaji v. The Netherlands (2009) dealing with granting of subsidiary protection, and Abdulla and others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2010), dealing with cessation of refugee status. The value of those judgments first of all lies in the guidance they provided to the Member States on such concepts as: protection in a situation of an armed conflict, agents of protection, effectiveness of protection; as well as determination of a relationship between refugee status and subsidiary protection, relationship of the Qualification Directive with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), also cessation of protection. Elgafaji decision, while quite liberal with regard to persons seeking international protection, is not so liberally applied in the Member States’ practice and does not in itself guarantee positive outcome of the application of a concrete individual fleeing from an armed conflict, or a liberal approach to granting subsidiary protection in the Member States. Based on Elgafaji judgment it is clear that: Art. 15(b) of the Qualification Directive correspond to Art. 3 ECHR, while Art. 15(c) provides additional protection and in that it expands the Member States’ obligations beyond the ECHR to provide protection to persons fleeing in situations of armed conflict. While not every person arriving from an armed conflict situation would automatically fall under the granting of subsidiary protection, in certain exceptional situations indiscriminate violence may amount to individual threat without invoking personal circumstances. The EU Court departed from the individualisation requirement applied by the European Court of Human Rights in Art. 3 cases and did not also rely on international humanitarian law, by introducing a “sliding scale” formula for establishing an individual threat in armed conflict situation instead. This formula addressed the alleged internal discrepancy between “individual threat” and “indiscriminate violence”. The Abdulla decision brought in the human rights and law enforcement perspectives to the interpretation of cessation clauses, however it represents a rather superficial approach in the context of the analysed concepts (e.g. towards effectiveness of protection provided by the multinational armed forces) and is likely to be incompatible with the latest legislative trends in the EU asylum instruments (e.g. determination of refugee status and subsidiary protection by means of a single procedure) and the recent jurisprudence under the ECHR (e.g. failure to ensure a minimum standard of living may violate the ECHR). (shrink)

The book is an accurate and accessible introduction to the complex and dynamic field of transitional and post-conflict justice, providing an overview of its recurring concepts and debated issues. Particular attention is reserved to how these concepts and issues have been addressed, both theoretically and literally, by lawyers, policy-makers, international bodies, and other actors informing the practice. By presenting significant, if undeniably disputable, alternatives to mainstream theories and past methods of addressing past injustice and (re)building a democratic state, the (...) work aims to illustrate some foundational themes of transitional justice that have emerged from a diverse set of discussions. The author's position thus arrives from a careful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of answers to the question: how, after a traumatic social experience, is justice restored? (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, we will highlight the correspondences between the Socially Engaged Buddhism movement, especially as defined in the practice of the late Thich Nhat Hanh, and the core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence originally adopted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. These principles also underpin the neutral, impartial and independent approach to humanitarian action, used by agencies working under the auspices of the United Nations’ Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Office for the (...) Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, along with those who have signed the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief. We hope this paper is a modest but useful contribution to create better understanding and to generate dialogue among different stakeholders in the humanitarian field, particularly in the context of armed conflict. (shrink)

The focus on the moral rights of combatants in the ethics of war ignores a very important point: although morally unjust combatants cannot be considered moral equals to just combatants, especially with regard to the right to kill, there are sound moral reasons why the laws of war should accept a kind of equality between them, a concept referred to as “reduced legal equality.” Reduced legal equality is not about equal moral rights but about granting legal immunity to combatants for (...) their conduct in accordance with the laws of war. This article shows that reduced legal equality of combatants is not only the morally best legal regulation in our nonideal international world but also the correct interpretation of international law. (shrink)

The re-examination of the classification of modern armed conflicts is done through the analysis of humanitarian law and the available data on armed conflicts, by combining the legal, political and ethical dimensions of war and the statistical indicators of modern conflicts.The author answers the questions about: Defining the conflict according to the various philosophical, social and legal criteria with the cultural, legal and political basis of the war and the corresponding reasons for the occurrence and prolongation of (...) the conflicts; and the main trends of the conflicts through the numerous presences of the conflicts on the global scene, the number of victims, the regional displacement of the conflicts and the role of the Islamic State.In the analysis of the conflicts, the complexity of the modern conflicts through the expanded categories of victims and combatants, as well as the need for the protection of the victims, are emphasized.Hence the research touches on the issue of the applicability of the legal and illegal combatant categories and the corresponding immunity that follows them.Researching the trends of modern armed conflicts cannot avoid the ethical dimensions surrounding the category of child soldiers. From a methodological point of view, the problem of determining precise statistics for the indirectly killed civilians, who continue to represent the largest category, remains unsolved. (shrink)

Contemporary just war theory is divided into two broad camps: revisionists and traditionalists. Traditionalists seek to provide moral foundations for something close to current international law, and in particular the laws of armed conflict. Although they propose improvements, they do so cautiously. Revisionists argue that international law is at best a pragmatic fiction—it lacks deeper moral foundations. In this article, I present the contemporary history of analytical just war theory, from the origins of contemporary traditionalist just war (...) theory in Michael Walzer's work to the revisionist critique of Walzer and the subsequent revival of traditionalism. I discuss central questions of methodology, as well as consider the morality of resorting to war and the morality of conduct in war. I show that although the revisionists exposed philosophical shortcomings in Walzer's arguments, their radical conclusions should prompt us not to reject the broad contemporary consensus, but instead to seek better arguments to underpin it. (shrink)

Changing faces of war and war-like situations have led in recent years to new forms of military deployment. They range from the so called "war on terrorism" with e.g Operation Enduring Freedom or humanitarian interventions (e.g. Kosovo 1999) to deployments within disaster relief missions as lately in Haiti. These pose not only moral, legal, and organizational challenges to states and the international community but also put individual soldiers and military (medical) personnel in situations that their classical formation does (...) not prepare them for. For they face (i) situations not sufficiently covered/ regulated by international humanitarian (IHL) law and/or (ii) tasks that are not within the range of the "classical soldier". These changing needs require new forms of education in the military and highlight the role of ethical education as many of the dilemmas cannot be resolved by sole reference to the IHL. In addition to a solid knowledge of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), military personnel should therefore acquire fundamental skills of ethical reasoning in dilemma situations. Our article aims at (i) outlining the goals of a military medical ethics education that responds to these needs and the practical challenges of present-day military deployment and (ii) present how the ICMM tries to integrate these goals in its educational program. (shrink)

Beginning with the support given by religious groups to humanitarian intervention for the protection of basic human rights in the debates of the 1990s, this essay examines the use of the human rights idea in relation to international law on armed conflict, the “Responsibility To Protect” doctrine, and the development of the idea of sovereignty associated with the “Westphalian system” of international order, identifying a dilemma: that the idea of human rights undergirds both the principle of (...) non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and the idea of an international responsibility for humanitarian intervention in cases of oppression. The pre-Westphalian conception of sovereignty as moral responsibility for the common good is then examined as an alternative that avoids this dilemma, and the essay concludes by suggesting that religious ethics also has other resources that, if used, may shed useful light on resolving this problem. (shrink)

The question of military intervention for humanitarian purposes is a major focus for international law, the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO, and the foreign policies of nations. Against this background, the 2011 bombing in Libya by Western nations has occasioned renewed interest and concern about armed humanitarian intervention and the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. This volume brings together new essays by leading international, philosophical, and political thinkers on the moral and legal issues (...) involved in AHI, and contains both critical and positive views of AHI. Topics include the problem of abuse and needed limitations, the future viability of RtoP and some of its problematic implications, the possibility of AHI providing space for peaceful political protest, and how AHI might be integrated with post-war justice. It is an important collection for those studying political philosophy, international relations, and humanitarian law. (shrink)

War has changed so much that it barely resembles the paradigmatic cases of armed conflict that just war theories and international humanitarian law seemed to have had in mind even a few decades ago. The changing character of war includes not only the use of new technology such as drones, but probably more problematically the changing temporal and spatial scope of war and the changing character of actors in war. These changes give rise to worries about what (...) counts as war and thus what norms to use in evaluating a particular conflict. In this paper, I develop an argument that the changing character of war gives us reasons to take reductionist revisions of just war theory seriously. By reductionist theories of war I mean those revisions within the just war tradition that suggest that we can use ordinary peacetime interpersonal analyses of moral responsibility and liability to harm to decide what justice requires in times of war. (shrink)

This book challenges the World Medical Associationâ (TM)s (WMA) International Code of Ethics statement in 2004, which declared that â ~medical ethics in armed conflict is identical to medical ethics in times of peaceâ (TM). This is achieved by examining the professional, ethical, and legal conflicts in British Military healthcare practice that occur in three distinct military environments. These are (i) the battlefield, (ii) the operational environment and (iii) the non-operational environment. As this conflict is exacerbated by the (...) need to achieve Operational Effectiveness, this book also explores the dual loyalty conflict that Military Health Care Professionals (MHCPs) encounter between following military orders and professional codes of practice. The method used to challenge the WMAâ (TM)s statement and explore these conflicts is the use of real-life problem-solving vignettes, which mirror actual ethical and professional conflicts and dilemmas that may occur in the three environments. The areas of law analysed similarly reflect the difficulties that MHCPs face when caring for the sick and wounded in violent locations when under attack. In particular, the book questions whether it is right for a MHCP to owe their patients a duty of care in hostile environments. This leads on to questioning if any MHCP could be protected by combat immunity where no duty of care is owed to fellow soldiers in the battlefield. The book also questions whether the standard of care should be variable in hostile environments. It also explores the dual loyalty conflict of a wounded senior officer refusing treatment from a junior officer. In addition, it examines the difficulties of a doctor maintaining patient confidentiality when a soldier refuses treatment for a psychological injury but wishes to redeploy to the battlefield. The book successfully challenges the WMAâ (TM)s statement. It also concludes by suggesting that neither a military-focused approach nor a professional healthcare-focused approach towards military healthcare is the best way to solve the dual loyalty conflict. (shrink)

Armed conflict in Darfur, west Sudan since 2003 has led to the influx of about 100 international humanitarian UN and non-governmental organizations to help the affected population. Many of their humanitarian interventions included the collection of human personal data and/or biosamples, and these activities are often associated with ethical issues. A systematic review was conducted to assess the proportion of publicly available online reports of the research activities undertaken on humans in Darfur between 2004 and 2012 (...) that mention obtaining ethical approval and/or informed consent. This systematic review is based on a systematic literature search of Complex Emergency Database, ReliefWeb, PubMed), followed by a hand search for the hardcopies of the eligible reports archived in the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters in Brussels. The online search showed that out of the 68 eligible studies, 13.2% reported gaining ethical approval and 42.6% that an informed consent was obtained from the participants. The CRED search included 138 eligible reports. None of these reports mentioned gaining ethical approval and 17 mentioned obtaining informed consent from their participants. The proportion of studies reporting ethical review and informed consent was smaller than might be expected, so we suggest five possible explanations for these findings. This review provides empirical evidence that can help in planning ethical conduct of research in humanitarian settings. (shrink)

The present article discusses a well-known religious philosophical and partially legal doctrine of the “Just war”, developed in the Christian tradition by St. Augustine, St. Tomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vittoria, Francisco Suarez, Hugo Grotius and many other thinkers. The main thesis of the doctrine is that war will be just only if it corresponds to certain criteria, such as autoritas principi (waged by the sovereign), justa causa (on just aim) and with recta intentio (animus) or the aim and will to (...) wage war in order to restore justice and not because of personal hate, revenge, lust for glory, etc. However, the impact of the doctrine was not limited by the Middle Ages and the Christian philosophic discourse. This doctrine shaped both emerging international law and international humanitarian law in one or another way. Even though it did not survive intact through the changing reality of the world, it is not so hard to trace the reflections of this doctrine even in contemporary international law. For example, while evaluating the armed conflict we still use the autoritas principi principle (armed conflicts may be fought only by defined subjects such as states or militarily - politically organised dissidents), moreover, when we are dealing with the concept of combatancy, the same principle applies in establishing whether a person is a legal fighter in the conflict or not, because his status directly stems from his belonging to the party of the conflict. With its strictly limited possibilities to use force, the contemporary jus contra bellum also somewhat resembles the doctrine, not only in the sense of justa causa (such as a possibility of unilateral use of force by the state only in self-defence) but also in recta intentio (e.g. the United Nations Security Council may order the use of force only with the intention to re-establish peace). Therefore, even though the doctrine is the product of the Middle Ages thought, it is not forgotten in our days. The possible military strike against Iran in order to stop it from developing nuclear weapon is already discussed in the light of this doctrine. Moreover, authors (though mainly not lawyers) discussing inadequacies of current international legal framework for the use of force (e.g. the need for humanitarian intervention) find their inspiration in the doctrine. (shrink)

This article briefly outlines what the medical duty is, and its special role in international law, before discussing the problems resulting from the dual role as doctor and soldier, which military doctors can expect to meet conceptually, and unfortunately in reality as well. With arguments based on international humanitarian law and ethics, this article shows that greater weight should be given to the medical role.

Allowing prisoners of war (POW) to be released on parole ceased to be practiced in early XX century, although for centuries it was quite common in European warfare. In this article I argue there are several powerful moral reasons to reinstate POW parole: the well- being of POW and their families, but also a chance to address the previously intractable problem of surrender to aircraft and autonomous weapons. I also argue that there are no good moral reasons not to allow (...) POW to accept parole, and that the reasons commonly put forward against the practice of parole are usually informed by antiquated and flawed ethical attitudes. I subsequently offer solutions for overcoming the practical obstacles to reinstating the practice of parole utilizing commonly available technology and self-enforcing diplomatic arrangements. I provide a detailed outline of such arrangements, addressing a number of possible objections and testing the model against several hypothetical scenarios. (shrink)

Since World War II human rights language has come to occupy a central place in moral and legal discourse on the justification and limitation of armed conflict. At the core of contemporary international humanitarian law, concern for human rights has also developed as a vehicle for identifying and expressing moral concerns held in common across diverse cultural systems.

This volume provides a comprehensive analysis of the history, development and other legal aspects relating to International Medical Law and covers issues arising from not only the physician-patient relationship, but also with many wider juridical relations involved in the broader field of medical care in the international arena.00After a general introduction, the book examines the evolution of medical law in different civilizations that existed all over the world. It systematically describes the sources of this law from conventions, treaties (...) along with discussing the important role played by the courts, international institutions and other bodies related to the medical field. The comprehensive coverage includes public health law, international spread and prevention of diseases. This volume covers medical ethics and clinical ethics; considerations to facets of the medical professionals and patients relationship such as rights and responsibilities of the physicians, beneficence, consent, privacy, rights of patients and risk management. Also covered are issues of international concern like medical criminal activities, human and drug trafficking, trade in human organs, human medical research, as well as matters dealing with bio-technology in relation to bio-safety, bio-security, bio-genetics, bio-ethics, and the role of medical personnel in armed conflicts. (shrink)

The laws are not silent in war, but what should they say? What is the moral function of the law of armed conflict? Should the law protect civilians who do not fight but help those who do? Should the law protect soldiers who perform non-combat functions or who may be safely captured? How certain should a soldier be that an individual is a combatant rather than a civilian before using lethal force? What risks should soldiers take on themselves to (...) avoid harming civilians? When do inaccurate weapons become unlawfully indiscriminate? When does 'collateral damage' to civilians become unlawfully disproportionate? Should civilians lose their legal rights by serving, voluntarily or involuntarily, as human shields? Finally, when should killing civilians constitute a war crime? These are the questions that Law and Morality at War answers, contributing to a cutting-edge international debate. Drawing on the concepts and methods of contemporary moral and legal philosophy, the book develops a normative framework within which the laws of war and international criminal law can be evaluated, criticized, and reformed. While several philosophical works critically examine the moral status of civilians and combatants, this book fills a gap, offering both an account of the laws of war and war crimes, and proposing how the law could be improved from a moral point of view. (shrink)

The law of armed conflict prevents the coerced extraction of information from Prisoners of War (PoWs). We claim, however, that the letter of that law involves too broad a concept of coercion. On a natural reading, there is a sense in which any extraction of information—by any method—is coercive. We respect the notion that PoWs ought not be treated poorly, but we argue “coercion” should not be understood so broadly. With respect to its use in international law, we (...) favor a moralized notion of “coercion,” as opposed to a non-moralized one. We explain what this means, and argue why this is a better reading of the law. We think a moralized notion of coercion is more intuitive, is more in line with both actual practice and the intent of the framers of international law, and has practical benefits as well. (shrink)

The current proliferation of restitutive claims in response to expropriation in armed conflicts occurs at the interstices of humanitarianism and transitional justice. Restitution indicates the expansion of the humanitarian mandate from providing immediate relief to those who have suffered loss, to engaging in remedial, redressive and restorative practices. That intersection between the humanitarian goals and post-conflict justice is one of the signs of ‘new’ forms and ethos of humanitarianism. This article offers a critical reading of the ‘restitutive (...) desire’ underpinning the humanitarian restitutive politics, which it relates to political fantasies of reversibility and undoing. It locates the genealogy of restitution in Émile Durkheim’s work on the division of labour, individualization and the distinction between repressive and restitutive law. It argues that in the Durkheimian socio-legal tradition restitution figures as a return of ‘matters to their former status’ and of ‘disturbed relationships to their normal form’. It then turns to Sigmund Freud’s essay on Daniel Schreber, which defines restitution not as procedure of undoing, but as a reparative practice that nevertheless affirms the subject’s ‘catastrophic loss of the world’. The Freudian perspective uncouples restitution and undoing and asks about the possibility of restitutive politics haunted by unrectifiable loss. (shrink)