Introductory essay / Peter Jones -- The usefulness of the arts and the humanities : the case of Descartes / Gábor Boros -- Roads of remembrance : the treatment of imagination and memory in Gerard's Essay on genius / Zsolt Komáromy -- Diderot's untimeliness / László Kisbali ; transl. Márton Dornbach -- Melody vs. harmony : Rousseau, or, The aesthetics of vowels / Mária Ludassy ; transl. Zsolt Komáromy -- Judgement and taste : from Shakespeare to Shaftesbury / Ferenc (...) Hörcher -- Lord Shaftesbury's "aesthetic freedom" / Endre Szécsényi -- Why one should imitate the Greeks : on Winckelmann / Sándor Radnóti ; transl. Márton Dornbach -- Beauty or beast, or, Monstrous regiments? : Robertson and Burke on women and the public scene / László Kontler -- The concept of nature and the theodicy problem in the Malebranche-Arnauld-Leibniz debate / Dániel Schmal -- Lessing's anti-candide : between reason and revelation / Krisztina Utasi ; transl. Márton Dornbach. (shrink)

This book presents the psychological basis, methodology, and application of Marton's phenomenographic approach to the theory of learning.

_Freedom of the Will_ provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The original analysis can be amended so (...) that the revised conditional account is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives. (shrink)

This book provides a critical survey of measurement theories and a clear exposition of the concerning philosophical questions. The author offers a new, constructive interpretation for measurement in both physics and the social sciences, arguing for a constructivist approach.

Diese Studie führt einen Dialog mit dem französischen Philosophen Gilles Deleuze, um anhand seines Denkens die Erscheinungsweisen von Ereignis zeit- und sprachphilosophisch zu beschreiben. Ereignis, dieses Begriffswort, das sich jeder Definition naturgemäß entzieht, wird in der jüngeren Praktischen Theologie und in der Systematischen Theologie seit Karl Barth häufig gebraucht und selten bestimmt. In dieser Studie geht Ferenc Herzig dem Ereignis nach, ohne es mit einer „Was-ist“-Frage einzuzäunen. Die Konsequenzen für liturgische und homiletische Grundfragen werden daraufhin ebenso dargestellt wie der (...) Versuch unternommen, die Frage nach Gott unter poststrukturalistischen Vorzeichen zu stellen. (shrink)

Jonathan Dancy has argued that agents’ reasons for their actions are facts or features of the situations rather than their psychological states. The purpose of the paper is to show that even if we grant that this is so in most of the cases, there is a class of mental states that can be reasons. Although beliefs and desires are not reasons for actions, some emotional states—like loving, liking or disliking someone—can generate reasons. The distinctive feature of these states is (...) that their content is a particular, and not a proposition. Hence in certain situations their love or admiration can provide agents with reasons to do one particular thing rather than another. (shrink)

(1990). Redefining the boundaries of the possible: New perspectives on European unification. World Futures: Vol. 29, Transition in Eastern Europe, pp. 3-17.

Is this the crisis of culture we experience today, or should we consider it a victory, a glorious deconstruction of metaphysical culture? McLuhan’s prophetic vision about the historical phases of orality–literate culture–secondary orality can be interpreted as events of a Hegelian triad. The process should be about the alienation and withdrawal of the Mind: in literate culture the Mind took an objectified, outer and estranged form, that of metaphysical culture. Today, in the open, interactive media of Web 2 we can (...) take possession of the Mind again and free it from the rigid hierarchies. One should be eager to take part in such a universal reform, but somehow, it seems, there is a fly in the ointment. (shrink)

In this new book, Fr. Damian Ference proposes a more precise lens for decoding Flannery O'Connor's narrative art, one that originates in O'Connor's own words about herself: Hillbilly Thomism. The author examines the various ways in which St. Thomas Aquinas and the philosophical tradition of Thomism shaped not only O'Connor's view of reality but also the stories she told to help us see and know it."--from inside front flap.

I offer an analysis of Reid's notion of the will. Naturalism in the philosophy of action is defined as the attempt to eliminate the capacity of will and to reduce volition to some class of appetite or desire. Reid's arguments show, however, that volition plays a particular role in deliberation which cannot be reduced to some form of motivation present at the time of action. Deliberation is understood as an action over which the agent has control. Will is a higher-order (...) mental capacity enabling us to control our own attitudes, decisions and actions. Reid investigates several distinct forms of this control. I conclude with some remarks about the relation between Reid's arguments about the function of the will and his moral rationalism. (shrink)

First we prove that the set of countable linear orders of the form I + I form a complete analytic set. As a consequence of this we improve a result of Humke and Laczkovich, who showed in [HL] that the set of functions of the form f ⚬ f form a true analytic set in C[0, 1]. We show that these functions form a complete analytic set, solving a problem mentioned on p. 215 of [K1] and on p. 4 of (...) [B]. (shrink)

Argument for fatalism attempts to prove that free choice is a logical or conceptual impossibility. The paper argues that the first two premises of the argument are sound: propositions are either true or false and they have their truth-value eternally. But the claim that from the fatalistic premises with the introduction of some innocent further premise dire consequences follow as regards to the possibility of free choice is false. The introduced premise, which establishes the connection between the first two premises (...) (which are about the nature of propositions) and the concept of free choice is not innocent. It creates the impression that the truth of certain propositions can somehow determine the occurrence of certain events. But no proposition can have such an effect since the counterfactuals If proposition P were true, event E would happen does not say anything about determination. The argument for fatalism is, however, not a boring sophism. It does reveal something about the nature of propositional representation. It shows that each proposition represents necessarily the fact what it represents, i.e. it shows that propositions have their truth conditions non-contingently. But from this nothing follows as regards to the contingent nature of the facts represented. On the bases of the first two premises of the argument for fatalism we cannot infer to the impossibility of free choice. The argument for fatalism should not be interpreted as an attempt to prove on purely logical or conceptual grounds that we do not have the ability to influence future events by our choices. But it could be used to show something about the nature of propositional representation. (shrink)

The paper addresses the problem whether arts, sciences and humanities can be regarded as useful. First it examines the means-ends relation and argues that some means are not causally but rather constitutively connected to ends. Second, it specifies two dimensions along which the problem of values will be addressed. One is the issue about the relation between values and desirability, the other is the active and affective conceptions of valuation. Third the paper offers a concise reconstruction of the answers to (...) the question of usefulness formulated during the enlightenment. It will be argued that traditionally usefulness was understood causally and not on the individual, but rather on the social level. In the final section the paper contends that values should be understood in terms of activities rather than in terms ofdesire satisfaction and that this interpretation can bring us closer to answering the question whether and why arts and sciences are useful. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explain the sense in which laws of physics are contingent. It argues, first, that contemporary Humean accounts cannot adequately explain the contingency of physical laws; and second, that Hume’s own arguments against the metaphysical necessity of causal connections are not applicable in this context. The paper concludes by arguing that contingency is an essentially emergent, macroscopic phenomenon: we can understand the contingency of fundamental physical laws only through their relation to the distribution of (...) macroscopic modal properties in the manifest world. (shrink)

This paper aims to defend the common-sense view that we exempt compulsive agents from responsibility to the extent that they are unable to choose what they do and hence they cannot control their actions by their choices. This view has been challenged in a seminal paper by Gary Watson, who claimed that akratic agents lack control in the same sense but they are responsible nonetheless. In the first part of the paper, I critically examine the arguments Watson advances for this (...) claim first in his original paper and then in some more recent works. I conclude that his account is based on the widely held assumption that both compulsive behavior and weakness of the will must be understood as a direct result of some inner motivational conflict. In the second part, I argue for an alternative understanding of the difference between weakness and compulsion. My claim is that compulsion is a cognitive rather than a motivational deficiency, since the compulsive, unlike the weak-willed, does not desire to perform the action which she actually performs. Furthermore, I argue that compulsive agents cannot control their actions by their choices because they have a distorted view of their own actional abilities. In the final part of the paper, I discuss a consequence of this account to the conditional analysis of free will as a condition of responsibility. (shrink)

A stereospecific binding site is not the only determinant governing the selectivity of transport proteins. An understanding of transport across cellular membranes requires a description of the different compartments within a transmembrane channel; evidence for the existence of these compartments comes from the selectivity properties of genetically modified maltoporin. Such compartments may also be of significance in determining the specificity of other transport proteins.

This paper wants to address the Aristotelian analysis of the concept of mimesis from a social and cultural angle. It is going to show that mimesis is crucial if we want to understand why the institution of the theatre played such a crucial role in the civic educational programme of classical Athens. The paper’s argument is that the magic spell of theatrical imitation, its aesthetic machinery was exploited by the city for civic educational function. Dramas, and in particular tragedies helped (...) to articulate the city’s political expectations from the citizens, and they achieved it with far better efficiency than any other medium of propaganda which was available in those days. It will first reconstruct the duality within the internal structure of the Aristotelian account of mimesis in Poetics: it will show both 1.) the aesthetic and 2.) the socio-cultural dimensions of his theory of civic initiation through dramatic imitation. In the second part it will compare this Greek cultural context with a similar context in Rome in the activity and writings of Cicero. Finally, the paper presents the Renaissance republican context of early modern Europe, which also connected politico-moral education with the idea of mimesis. (shrink)

This paper provides a short overview of how Oakeshott identifies the functions and limits of government, with reliance primarily on two texts. The first one from “Lectures on the History of Political” thought distinguishes nomocratic and teleocratic ways of governing. Oakeshott describes the two forms in a detached fashion, and indirectly hints at his preference for nomocratic rule. The second text is Oakeshott’s essay “On Being Conservative”, where Oakeshott gives a sceptical and critical description of human nature. The paper argues (...) that this account of human nature should be seen as the basis, on which a nomocratic rule can be defended. It will be argued, that the two texts should be read together, if we want to get a reasoned overview of Oakeshott’s criticism of contemporary forms of government, and of his reasons to choose nomocratic rule instead of the teleocratic one. It will be argued that a complex political philosophy based on these two pillars will be provided by Oakeshott’s late book On Human Conduct. (shrink)

This essay – although aware of the contradiction in terms of the concept of conservative theory – tries to pick out some key notions within the conservative political mindset, and offers an analysis of them by relating them to one another. Beside Aristotelian phronesis or practical wisdom, it focuses on kairos, or the right moment for action. It points out that due to the time constraint inherent in the realm of political action, agents need to acquire a kind of tacit, (...) practical knowledge of how to deal with pressing issues, and phronesis is a term which covers this sort of practical ability. The paper then tries to show that individual action is closely connected to communal interests, differentiates between formal and informal forms of communal knowledge and ends up by referring to Oakeshott’s, MacIntyre’s and Tocqueville’s ideas of communal wisdom and practice. (shrink)

At the end of his life György Lukács described his intellectual career as ‘my way to Marx’ [mein Weg zu Marx]. By this he meant that his professional life can be interpreted as an attempt to get to the real Marx. In this paper I use this expression in a narrower and more direct meaning: I attempt to present the road at the end of which the young Lukács arrived at a Marxist standpoint.

Die zweite bedeutende Schaffensperiode Fichtes entfaltet sich in Berlin, der Hauptstadt Preußens, und ist ständig stärker verknüpft mit dem aufgeklärt-absolutistischen preußischen Staat. Selbstverständlich ist dies in vielerlei Hinsicht ein Anzeichen für eine markante Wende im Wirken Fichtes, bei der es sich aber keineswegs um einen unerklärlichen und irrationalen Gesinnungswandel handelt: die Berliner Epoche ist im Vergleich zur Jenaer Periode gleichermaßen gekennzeichnet durch Kontinuität und Diskontinuität. Bezüglich der theoretischen Philosophie bleibt immer die wesentliche Identifikation von Allgemeinem Ich und Gott aufrechterhalten. Doch (...) während in der Jenaer Periode eher Gott sich im Allgemeinen Ich auflöste, löst sich jetzt immer mehr das Allgemeine Ich in Gott auf. Dies steht im Zusammenhang damit, dass zwar auch in Betracht auf seine praktische Philosophie ständig der theoretischen Philosophie gegenüber deren Priorität bestand - doch während in der Jenaer Periode allgemein-abstrakte Prinzipien von Freiheit und Moral im Mittelpunkt standen, wurden diese jetzt konkretisiert und nehmen damit gesellschafts- und geschichtsphilosophische bzw. religionsphilosophische sowie eschatologische Dimensionen an: Gott erscheint in der Geschichte und handelt, dazu noch mit bestimmten Zielen. Das Ziel der Geschichte ist das Reich Gottes auf Erden. All diese Fragen werden immer enger verknüpft mit dem Problem der Zukunft Deutschlands und innerhalb dessen Preußens - so wie auch das Schaffen jeder großen Gestalt der deutschen klassischen Philosophie, unabhängig von der Herkunft, auf diese oder jene Weise mit dem Schicksal Preußens in Verbindung stand. Königsberg und Berlin waren für Kant, Fichte, Hegel und Schelling gleichermaßen wichtige Beziehungspunkte. Schon der spezifischen gesellschaftlichen und historischen Rolle Preußens, der großen ostdeutschen protestantischen Monarchie, wegen müssen wir also bezüglich der Jenaer und Berliner Periode Fichtes nicht nur Diskontinuität sondern auch Kontinuität anerkennen. (shrink)

Various approaches have been taken recently to a reinterpretation of the European reception of China and the sinophilia-sinophobia dichotomy (Hung 2003, Millar 2010, Jacobsen 2013). In the present article, a nineteenth-century approach to China is examined using Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) as examples. It will be argued that this approach differs from earlier attitudes. First, the central currents will be surveyed in the European reception of China between the Jesuit missionaries and early nineteenth-century philosophies of (...) history, introducing an interpretational framework that differentiates between various approaches to China, namely a _universalistic_ and a _progression-based approach_. Then, first Tocqueville's and then Mill's depictions of China in comparison with the concepts of preceding centuries will be analyzed. It will be argued that Tocqueville and Mill's understanding of China represents a third view that I will call _relation-based_. (shrink)