In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status of the pregnant woman. (...) It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, ‘more than one’. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality. (shrink)

The most comprehensive compilation of the works of Abelard and Heloise ever presented in a single volume in English, _The Letters and Other Writings_ features an accurate and stylistically faithful new translation of both _The Calamities of Peter Abelard_ and the remarkable letters it sparked between the ill-fated twelfth-century philosopher and his brilliant former student and lover—an exchange whose intellectual passion, formal virtuosity, and psychological drama distinguish it as one of the most extraordinary correspondences in European history. Thanks to this (...) edition, Latin-less readers will be better placed than ever to see why this undisputed milestone in the intellectual life of medieval France is also a masterpiece of Western literature. In addition to the _The Calamities_ and the letters--the first complete English translation of all seven in more than eighty years--this volume includes an Introduction, a map, and a chronology, Abelard's _Confession of Faith_, letters between Heloise and Peter the Venerable, the Introduction to _The Questions of Heloise_, and selected songs and poems by Abelard, among them a previously untranslated shaped poem, Open Wide Your Eyes. Extracts of lost letters sometimes ascribed to Abelard and Heloise are given in appendixes. (shrink)

Can platforms close the governance gap in the sharing economy, and if so, how? Through an in-depth qualitative case study, we analyze the process by which new regulation and self-regulation emerge in one sector of the sharing economy, crowdfunding, through the actions of a meta-organization. We focus on the principal French sectoral meta-organization, Financement Participatif France. We show that this multi-stakeholder meta-organization not only closed the governance gap through collective legal, ethical, and utilitarian work but also preceded and shaped the (...) new market. We present a hybrid governance approach combining soft multi-agency regulation, self-regulation through a process of “partial meta-organizing”, and direct civil society participation. We expand the literature by highlighting features of platforms’ partial meta-organizing and by identifying conditions for successful joint regulation and self-regulation of the sector. (shrink)

In his article entitled ‘Moral parenthood: not gestational’, Benjamin Lange makes the following central and narrow claim: that moral parenthood cannot be defended fully based on an ‘emotional relationship’ facilitated by gestation.1 By ‘moral parenthood’, Lange appears to mean a moral right to parent the child. The ‘emotional relationship’ under scrutiny seems to be a form of intimate relationship during pregnancy involving an emotional attachment between the pregnant woman (or, in Lange’s terminology, the ‘gestational procreator’) and the newborn. In other (...) words, Lange critiques the view that a moral right to parent a child can be grounded in an emotional relationship, as developed during pregnancy, between the mother and child. Lange discusses the possible emotions of both of them, during pregnancy, and at the time of birth. He notes some problems in seeing this relationship as one that has sufficiently weighty moral importance: it is asymmetrical, for example, and the relationship is not obviously reciprocal. The central claim here is in fact quite easily convincing. It is quite right that emotions alone should not ground a moral right to parent a child. Lange accepts for example that ‘gestational procreators are usually highly emotionally invested in their pregnancy’ (p3),1 and this ‘usually’ …. (shrink)

Au cours du XIXe siècle les compositeurs d'opéra prennent conscience que le théâtre peut être pensé en tant qu'espace expressif susceptible de s'intégrer à l'écriture musicale afin de véhiculer du sens. Au XXe siècle, cette idée se développe aussi à l'aide de croisements avec les expériences des avant-gardes théâtrales, et contribue à transformer la conception même de la scène du théâtre musical (qui devient aussi multimédia). L'idée d'espace "sensible" ouvre ainsi une perspective originale pour aborder l'étude des processus qui porte (...) vers les formes de théâtre musical d'aujourd'hui."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Understanding the relations between mind, brain and behavior is an enduring challenge for science and philosophy. The present article focuses on the concept of internal states, of which emotions are the most studied subtype, in the recent neuroscientific literature. Internal states are conceived by neuroscientists as functional states implemented in neural circuits that drive behavior. To begin, we discuss current definitions of internal states, that emphasize both their intrinsic and relational properties. We stress the difference between preliminary characterizations of these (...) states (that allow researchers to track them) and findings related to their intrinsic nature. We analyze three experimental studies interpreted within this framework, and outline the role of innovative methods in the process of discovery. We interpret the families of states under investigation as homeostatic property clusters, and suggest that the work of Anderson and Adolphs offers a solution to the problem of what constitutes a natural kind in neuroscience. Concerning the relationship between physical states of the brain and mental states, we make explicit the discrepancy between an eliminativist and a reductive project within the literature, and underline the importance of a choice between them. Finally, we suggest that studies of internal states have three interrelated objectives: a better grasp of brain-behavior relationships, a more principled attribution of mental states to nonhuman animals, and better animal models of our own internal states in clinical contexts. With this plurality of objectives comes a plurality of possible outcomes of ongoing research. (shrink)

In my feature article, ‘Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood’,1 I argue that there are reasons to recognise that pregnant women have a superior moral status. This is a new argument on personhood in philosophy, and I am not surprised that it has generated some discussion. While I am grateful that many authors have engaged with my ideas, I have not identified from the six commentaries any aspect in my approach that would need to (...) be revised. I will do my best here, in the space available, to address the main points raised. Gibson starts off by correctly noting that my proposal rests on a starting assumption (which I do not defend) that we follow a first threshold of personhood, but then seems to leave this aside in the rest of his critique.2 He says I have not justified why humanity’s survival is important, and that I have assumed that the existence of human persons matters. My response is that yes, I have, and that the first threshold already recognises the high moral value of human persons. If alternatively babies are harms themselves, or are harmed from being born, then perhaps we will see pregnant women as pest-making or victim-making entities. I …. (shrink)

De la drosophile à la souris, en passant par le poisson-zèbre, les organismes modèles façonnent le paysage de la biologie contemporaine. Au sein des pratiques de modélisation en sciences, ces modèles sont non seulement très particuliers, mais font aussi l’objet d’utilisations très variées. Dans ce contexte, cet article vise deux objectifs : d’une part, proposer une description suffisamment générale pour englober tous les usages qui en sont faits, tout en essayant de caractériser la spécificité de ces modèles. D’autre part, il (...) s’agit de dégager les rôles épistémiques généraux que l’on peut attribuer à ces modèles. Au-delà de leur fonction représentationnelle, nous en proposons deux : celui d’instruments de mesure, et celui de supports pour la découverte d’explications de phénomènes biologiques. (shrink)

This article will review reasons why it is argued that the law on abortion on the grounds of disability is discriminatory, as well as recent unsuccessful attempts to address this discrimination in the law. These attempts include ones which would have moderately restricted access to abortion in certain limited cases, and another that might have opened to door to a number of different possibilities, including both to options that could have restricted access to abortion, and to other options that might (...) have increased access. Finally, this article will also examine reasons why some of the most important challenges surrounding disability equality cannot be sufficiently addressed through legal change alone. While there are strong reasons to support some form of change in the law, a more foundational change in values is necessary if we want to live in a more ethical society that is truly capable of welcoming disabled children. (shrink)

Théodule Ribot est l’un des premiers à penser les rapports entre mémoire et émotions. Au sein de ce qu’il appelle la « mémoire affective », il décèle une mémoire spécifique des émotions. Il s’ensuit un débat sur l’existence, la définition et le contenu de cette mémoire. Après les propositions initiales de Ribot, on observe l’émergence progressive d’un consensus : même s’il est possible de distinguer la mémoire affective de la mémoire intellectuelle, tout souvenir présente à des degrés variables des éléments (...) intellectuels et des éléments affectifs. Si, dans le cadre académique, ces débats sont tombés dans l’oubli, on peut établir une continuité conceptuelle avec la recherche scientifique actuelle, qui gagnerait à relire cette littérature centenaire. (shrink)

Despite growing awareness around human impacts on marine ecosystems, little action is taken to reduce the negative effects of organizations on the ocean, thus increasing risks of global collapse. In this paper, I argue that organizations act as systems of ocean destruction, and I explore how to operate a shift to organizations as systems of ocean conservation and thriving, enabling human–ocean socio‐ecological coviability. To do so, I analyze the organizational affordances of the ocean: incommensurability, open access and complex property regimes, (...) structural domination by humans and land, perceived inexhaustibility, and cognitive distance. Then, based on the transdisciplinary analysis of mechanisms of ocean destruction, I discuss the constitution of ocean negative commons and the ruining of the ocean. Lastly, based on four drivers (technology and innovation, consumption, marginalization and social orders), I suggest alternative organizing principles that might allow to manage these commons and to transform organizations to achieve socio‐ecological coviability with the ocean: degrowth, total responsibility, full cost allocation, ocean equity, and adaptive, place‐based co‐management. (shrink)

This article explores the effects of naming and describing disability in law and medicine. Instead of focusing on substantive issues like medical treatment or legal rights, it will address questions which arise in relation to the use of language itself. When a label which is attached to a disability is associated with a negative meaning, this can have a profound effect on the individual concerned and can create stigma. Overly negative descriptions of disabilities can be misleading, not only for the (...) individual, but also more broadly in society, if there are inaccurate perceptions about disability in the social context. This article will examine some relevant examples of terminology, where these issues arise. It will also suggest that the role of medicine and the law in naming and describing disability is particularly important because in these areas there is, perhaps more than anywhere else, a recognized source of authority for the choice of terminology. Labels and descriptions used in the medical and legal contexts can not only perpetuate existing stigmatization of disabled people, but can also contribute to creating stigma at its source, given that the words used in these contexts can constitute an exercise of power. (shrink)

For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for (...) grounding epistemic normativity. (shrink)

According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After (...) clarifying both EI and the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, I examine three major instrumentalist replies and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I end by briefly sketching a fourth possible response, which is, I suggest, more promising than the other three. (shrink)

This special issue of The New Bioethics follows on from a conference that took place at St Stephen's House, University of Oxford, in March 2022, on ‘Prenatal Testing, Disability, and the Ethical So...

There has been a significant growth in the literature on nudging and behavioural economics, since Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published their well-known book Nudge: Improving Decisions about H...

What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is always good to believe in accordance with epistemic norms, including in cases (...) where the matter at hand is completely trivial. Therefore, if epistemology is normative, its normativity won't come from value. (shrink)

This paper presents some impossibility results for certain views about what you should do when you are uncertain about which moral theory is true. I show that under reasonable and extremely minimal ways of defining what a moral theory is, it follows that the concept of expected moral choiceworthiness is undefined, and more generally that any theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty must generate pathological results.

According to moral error theorists, moral claims necessarily represent categorically or robustly normative facts. But since there are no such facts, moral thought and discourse are systematically mistaken. One widely discussed objection to the moral error theory is that it cannot be true because it leads to an epistemic error theory. We argue that this objection is mistaken. Objectors may be right that the epistemic error theory is untenable. We also agree with epistemic realists that our epistemological claims are not (...) systematically in error. However, this is not because there are robustly normative facts, but rather because the truth of our epistemic claims doesn’t turn on whether there are such facts. Epistemic facts, we argue, are not robustly or categorically normative. Moral error theorists should therefore respond to the objection that their view does not commit them to the epistemic error theory. (shrink)

Epistemic instrumentalism views epistemic norms and epistemic normativity as essentially involving the instrumental relation between means and ends. It construes notions like epistemic normativity, norms, and rationality, as forms of instrumental or means-end normativity, norms, and rationality. I do two main things in this paper. In part 1, I argue that there is an under-appreciated distinction between two independent types of epistemic instrumentalism. These are instrumentalism about epistemic norms and instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. In part 2, I argue that this (...) under-appreciated distinction matters for the debate surrounding the plausibility of EI. Specifically, whether we interpret EI as norm-EI or as source-EI matters for the widely discussed universality or categoricity objection to EI, and for two important motivations for adopting EI, namely naturalism and the practical utility of epistemic norms. I will then conclude by drawing some lessons for epistemic instrumentalism going forward. (shrink)

When should you believe testimony that you receive from your social media feeds? One natural answer is suggested by non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. Avoid accepting social media testimony if you have an undefeated defeater for it. Otherwise, you may accept it. I argue that this is too permissive to be an adequate epistemic policy because social media have some characteristics that tend to facilitate the efficacy of misinformation on those platforms. I formulate and defend an alternative epistemic policy (...) for belief on social media, which is inspired by reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. (shrink)

This article concerns the ways in which authors from various fields conceptualise the ethical issues arising in the conduct of research. We reviewed critically and systematically the literature concerning the ethics of conducting research in order to engage in a reflection about the vocabulary and conceptual categories used in the publications reviewed. To understand better how the ethical issues involved in conducting research are conceptualised in the publications reviewed, we 1) established an inventory of the conceptualisations reviewed, and 2) we (...) critically assessed them. We found that the publications reviewed mostly showed examples of descriptive ethics, in that most authors describe ethical issues without reflecting much on them, which could be explained both by 1) a lack of ethical education in research contexts, and 2) by the fact that we do not know what researchers know (or do not) about ethical issues. Additionally, the definitions identified in the publications are scarce and at times imprecise, but this seems more to point out the ethical vocabulary’s difficulties in certain contexts. Further, very few authors offer proper conceptualisations of the ethical issues arising in conducting research. When dealing with vast arrays of ethical issues to conceptualise, perhaps one ought to remember that some typologies already exist that could guide further reflection and help understand other realities for which the current ethical vocabulary may be lacking. We believe that combining the reviewed typologies, both with other well-developed typologies and critical reflection, could help support better ethical practice in conducting research. (shrink)

This article argues for a novel approach to the measurement of freedom of choice, on which the availability of an option is a matter of degree, rather than a bivalent matter of being either available or not. This approach is motivated by case studies involving weakness of will, where deficiencies in willpower seem to impair individual freedom by making certain alternatives much harder to pursue. This approach is perfectly general, however: its graded analysis of option availability can be extended to (...) cases where weakness of will is not involved and can be used to generalize numerous existing measures of freedom. (shrink)

French translation by G. B. Côté and Roger Lapalme of "A Geneticist's Roadmap to Sanity" (G. B. Côté, 2019) with added bibliography. -/- À voir le monde d’aujourd’hui, on pourrait croire que nous avons perdu la raison. Je veux explorer ici les fondements mêmes de notre existence. Je discuterai brièvement du libre arbitre, de l’éthique, de la religion, de la souffrance, du dualisme cartésien et de l’état de conscience, avec un arrière-plan promulguant l’importance de la physique quantique d’aujourd’hui (...) et de l’intemporel. Pour ce faire, je devrai d’abord établir que le platonisme mathématique est une prémisse essentielle pour qu’un univers (ou même un multivers) prenne forme, et j’introduirai les trois modes d’existence abstrait, virtuel et concret (en philosophie) correspondant respectivement aux concepts d’information, d’énergie et de masse (en physique). Cet article constitue un bref exposé de ma théorie du tout. (shrink)

The short anonymous work known as the Constitution of the Athenians has long since fascinated scholars. Written sometime in the 5th century, during or just before the Peloponnesian War, it offers a scathing attack on Athenian democratic institutions. Its author is unknown but has traditionally been called the "Old Oligarch" in reference to his obvious political convictions. But the pamphlet's interest lies not so much in its critique of Athenian democracy as in the connection the author sees between these institutions (...) and Athens' imperialist policies in the Aegean. (shrink)

In contrast to the well-developed analysis of British feminism's implication in the late 19th-and early 20th-century reconstruction of the British national and imperial project, research into comparable areas of Dutch history are only just emerging. Taking as its starting point several conclusions drawn from postcolonial writing in the eld of British imperialism, this article investigates an important moment in the history of Dutch feminism, the Nationale Tentoonstelling van Vrouwenarbeid, to examine Dutch feminism's complicity in the Dutch imperial project. Simultaneously, it (...) examines the appropriation by colonial reformists of a `maternalist politics' to redene that project. In so doing, the article aims to focus attention on the interaction between metropolitan and colonial discourse and the place of maternalist politics in each. Further, the article briey reects on the signicance for Indonesian women of the operation of such discourses in the colonial context. (shrink)

This paper examines Claude Tresmontant's attempt to provide a philosophical argument in favour of God's existence using the results of modern science. Like many contemporary theists, Tresmontant believes that discoveries in the field of astrophysics, rightly interpreted, lead to the postulation of a deity. This paper challenges the philosophical presuppositions of Tresmontant's argument and the thesis that current cosmological theories can be used to construct a valid proof of the existence of God.

The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure is (...) his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that “everything that is moved is moved by another”. James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. (shrink)

Republican and so-called independence conceptions of freedom stand out from other conceptions by embedding strong modal conditions on what it takes for a person to count as being free to do something. For this reason, the extent of one’s freedom, conceived under republican/independentist lights, cannot be measured by any of the measures of freedom that have been developed so far in the literature on freedom, since these do not register the requisite modal constraints. In this paper I propose a measure (...) of freedom that does capture the requisite modal concerns. I do so by relying on work in the semantics of counterfactuals to define a measure of how modally robustly available an option is to an individual. (shrink)

An analysis of the counter-intuitive properties of infinity as understood differently in mathematics, classical physics and quantum physics allows the consideration of various paradoxes under a new light (e.g. Zeno’s dichotomy, Torricelli’s trumpet, and the weirdness of quantum physics). It provides strong support for the reality of abstractness and mathematical Platonism, and a plausible reason why there is something rather than nothing in the concrete universe. The conclusions are far reaching for science and philosophy.

Giving Voice To Values (GVV) serves as a framework to teach individuals methods to speak up when they witness actions that are contrary to their professional and personal values. This essay illustrates how GVV serves as a catalyst to advance both research and teaching activities.

World news can be discouraging these days. In order to counteract the effects of fake news and corruption, scientists have a duty to present the truth and propose ethical solutions acceptable to the world at large. -/- By starting from scratch, we can lay down the scientific principles underlying our very existence, and reach reasonable conclusions on all major topics including quantum physics, infinity, timelessness, free will, mathematical Platonism, happiness, ethics and religion, all the way to creation and a special (...) type of multiverse. -/- This article amounts to a summary of my personal Theory of Everything. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.36046.31049. (shrink)

This contribution consists of an edition, and an introductory study, of the questio “Utrum sit necesse ponere intellectum agentem”, dated to 1315-1320, by the Italian Averroist Maino of Milan. The study shows that while Maino defended the existence of the agent intellect in the face of the criticisms of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, he also subscribed to central features of Durand’s noetics, which he struggled to reconcile with his Aristotelian and Averroist convictions.