"My boat was moored beside an old bathing 'ghat' of the river, almost in ruins. The sun had set,"...https://youtu.be/VAhd2GNf1js. (http://philpapers.org/profile/112741).

This issue of Ethical Perspectives is strongly illuminated by two themes: moral impulse and critical citizenship. Of course, these themes are related – without a critical faculty, the moral impulse is not possible, and impulse, conversely, can be seen as leading toward critique. This is no vicious circle, nor mere tautology – rather, they are both moments of the truly autonomous individual, where the autonomy of the individual is not seen as isolation, but rather as an individual responsibility to and (...) within a society. Hence, a moral impulse fuelled by the individual critic is not enough; criticism must be framed within critical citizenship.Since our schizophrenic age fears for desensitivity, a fear best expressed in our age’s various flavours of political correctness, while it actively or at least tacitly posits this very desensitivity in its canonization of a purely formal ‘freedom to,’ a canonization best exhibited in the extreme examples of reality television, these intertwined themes are of extreme importance, and thus deserve close explication and discussion.I will let the pieces below provide this discussion, but permit me at least to set the table. As Michael Hauskeller so clearly argues in these pages, moral disgust is the moral impulse towards formal ethics, in the sense that it is the initial and immediate moral reaction that normatively colours our comportment with the outside world. I may know or think I know that something is wrong, or right, without giving this impulse a reason. This is not the ethical certitude of Bradley, but it is close in that both Bradley and Hauskeller would argue that the initial feeling need not be explained away, but rather deserves due respect. Moral disgust can clearly be misplaced, and clearly it can fail to withstand ethical scrutiny, but as impulse, it shakes us out of mere consciousness and moves us toward some sort of normativity. In this sense, it is always morally relevant.Lisa Bortolotti joins this discussion by arguing that no moral justification exists for reserving rights to humans. The moral impulse must be widened. At first, her approach comes across as opting for the typical agenda of preference-satisfaction utilitarianism: she wishes to extend the realm of rights in the name of safeguarding the power of reason and autonomy of individuals, who, she argues, are not always human. But then she offers something atypical in this debate: the very safeguarding of the power of reason and autonomy also applies to those who are often seen as marginal humans and thus excluded from in other strands of preference utilitarianism.Co-authors T. Brian Mooney and Samantha Minett apply the question of moral disgust to the question of life-science art, a new form of expression that merges biotechnology with the aesthetic. Like most forms of art that have emerged in recent generations, life-science art sees its task in the questioning of assumptions, which, of course, is a break from past ideas of aesthetics. Mooney and Minett turn their attention to this nascent field and ask: are there good grounds to translate our putative moral disgust at the fanciful and aesthetic use of biotechnology, such as pigs with wings and glowing rabbits? Turning first to utilitarianism and then to Thomastic virtue ethics, they argue clearly: yes, there are.Christian Arnsperger then kicks off our second related theme by posing a simple but profound question: why do English speakers refer to anti-globalism, whereas French speakers refer to alter-mondalism ? This French viewpoint would seem to call for critical global citizens who do not shirk from the increasing interconnectivity of our world, but who also do not take its current form as the inevitable development of immutable laws. Instead, such critical citizenry is called to see the current capitalist framework as an ideology, and as such, as liable to change, a change that citizens themselves can effect.Moving from theory to practice, Andrew Fiala rounds off this issue by giving us an example of critical citizenry, which he sees in just war pacifism. He argues that citizens must not capitulate to political or military authority in judging the justness of war, either regarding ad bellum judgements, or in bello actions. Moreover, seemingly just ad bellum decisions also deserve close scrutiny, largely because once the fog of war descends, in bello actions quickly eclipse justice. For this reason, he argues, a critical citizen should anticipate war crimes and thus be strongly reluctant to authorize war – an authorization that, in democratic societies, ultimately lies in the hands of the citizens themselves through the electoral process.Thus, this number quite clearly furthers the mission of Ethical Perspectives, which is to promote the international dialogue between fundamental and applied ethics. Providing articles written on three separate continents and addressing three of the most characteristic aspects of our age on top of a background well painted by their companion theoretical pieces, our authors once again invite you to take stock of where our world finds itself today. And then, to take action. (shrink)

Should the insane and the mentally ill be held morally responsible for their actions? To answer ‘No’ to this question is to classify the mentally abnormal as not fully human: and indeed legal tradition has generally oscillated between assimilating the insane to brutes and assimilating them to children below the age of discretion, neither of these two categories being accountable in law for what they do. In what respect relevant to moral responsibility were the insane held to resemble brutes (...) and children? In the case of brutes, the answer seems to have been that the doings of the insane appeared to lack whatever it is that marks out human actions as distinctively human . What the insane did could not be thought of as issuing from deliberation, or as capable of having issued from deliberation, but seemed rather to be the result of the unbridled operation of nature — if a diseased nature. The natural comparison with insane killings seemed to be, for example, the killing of birds by cats. This distinction between animal doings and human actions does not depend on Cartesian views about the workings of animals; the operation of nature need not be thought of as mechanical. The thought is simply that where there is no room for deliberation there is no room for moral appraisal. Children, on the other hand, though capable of distinctively human action — i.e. of deliberating about what they do — were held not to be capable of the relevant kind of deliberation: for they were held ‘not to know the difference between right and wrong’. (shrink)

Executive functions (EFs) and impulsivity are dimensions of self-regulation that are both related to psychopathology. However, self-report measures of impulsivity and laboratory EF tasks typically display small correlations, and existing research indicates that impulsivity and EFs may tap separate aspects of self-regulation that independently statistically predict psychopathology in adulthood. However, relationships between EFs, impulsivity, and psychopathology may be different in childhood compared to adulthood. Here, we examine whether these patterns hold in the baseline assessment of the Adolescent Brain and Cognitive (...) Development (ABCD) sample, a national sample of over 11,000 children (including 749 twin pairs) ages 9–10 years. We examine the phenotypic and genetic relationships among latent variables for different components of EFs and multiple facets of impulsivity. Additionally, we assess how EFs and impulsivity relate to composite measures and latent variables of psychopathology derived from parent report. EFs were weakly correlated with impulsivity, and the strength varied by impulsivity facet, emphasizing their separability. We did not identify significant genetic and environmental correlations between EFs and impulsivity. Moreover, controlling for their small relationships with each other, both EFs and some facets of impulsivity statistically predicted an Externalizing factor, attention problems, and social problems, and twin analyses suggested these relationships were genetic in origin. These findings indicate that EFs and impulsivity represent phenotypically and genetically separable aspects of self-regulation that are both transdiagnostic correlates of psychopathology in childhood. (shrink)

A major dopaminergic role for extraversion is compromised by the fact that affiliation and impulsivity tend to be reduced by psychostimulants. Also, the large clinical literature on the treatment of ADHD with drugs that promote dopamine activity provides little or no support for a major role for dopamine in human extraversion. Dopamine facilitation of agency may be more evident for inanimate rather than animate rewards.

After the Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration released in April 2019 the first empirical images of a black hole, an astrophysical object previously thought “unseeable,” much of the public discourse has approached these images as straightforward visual depictions of a black hole. This article challenges this view by showing that the first images of a black hole went beyond merely making an invisible cosmic object visible and that the images published in April 2019 were just the first in a series of (...) black hole images the researchers continue producing. Drawing primarily on Sybille Krämer’s concept of the cartographic impulse, the article demonstrates that the Event Horizon Telescope images are, first and foremost, epistemic tools. These epistemic tools enable researchers to actively explore various physical aspects and dynamic properties of a black hole’s immediate environment and test theoretical predictions about it, thus making this elusive environment empirically knowable. To demonstrate this, the article analyses the mapping operations that combined automated algorithmic procedures with expert human judgment and through which these images were produced, read, and interpreted. It also examines how the different Event Horizon Telescope images relate to one another, which particular epistemic functions they fulfil in the research context, under which conditions, and with which limitations, thus tracing how these images facilitate the production of new scientific knowledge about black holes. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the cause of morally self-defeating acts at the collective level is greed and, at the individual level, an unrestrained impulse for pleasure beyond Innocent Asouzu’s primordial instinct for self-preservation and ignorance. In investigating why humans act in self-defeating ways, Asouzu came up with two possible factors responsible for self-defeating acts: The primordial instinct for selfpreservation and ignorance. Besides Asouzu’s explanation, I here argue that the problem of self-defeating acts goes beyond the primordial instinct for (...) selfpreservation and ignorance to reveal a flaw characteristic of the human condition. At the collective level, the flaw responsible for self-defeating acts is greed and the unrestrained impulse for pleasure at the individual level. I employ the conversational method to interrogate the different views on self-defeating acts from Socrates to Asouzu and show why my explanation offers a better understanding of the problem. (shrink)

The Hebrew Bible provides a rich language and manifold images of describing the beginning of life. It does not determine the status of the embryo in a technical way, but reflects general human experiences with the indeterminacy of prenatal life. Its attitude towards the beginning of life is always multi-dimensional, combining physical, personal, social and transcendental perspectives. The tension between theological explanations and human responsibility is reflected both in the Hebrew Bible and in modern bioethical discussions. Although texts (...) like 1 Sam 1-2 and Ps 139,13-16 were written in a completely different context, their way of speaking about this tension shows parallels with current themes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 35.1 (2005) 8-21MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Klossowski's Reading of Nietzsche Impulses, Phantasms, Simulacra, StereotypesDaniel W. SmithIn his writings on Nietzsche, Pierre Klossowski makes use of various concepts—such as intensities, phantasms, simulacra and stereotypes, resemblance and dissemblance, gregariousness and singularity—that have no place in Nietzsche's own oeuvre. These concepts are Klossowski's own creations, his own contributions to thought. Although Klossowski consistently refused to characterize himself as a philosopher (...) ("Je suis une 'maniaque,'" he once said, "Un point, c'est tout!"),1 his work in its entirety was marked by an extraordinary conceptual creation. From this point of view, his Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle can be read as a work in philosophy—at least in the idiosyncratic sense given to this term by Gilles Deleuze, who defined philosophy as the creation or invention of concepts [Deleuze and Guattari 2]. No doubt, Klossowski remains an almost unclassifiable figure—philosopher, novelist, essayist, translator, artist—and attempting to analyze his work through the prism of philosophy may seem to be a reductive approach that belies the complexity of his exceptional oeuvre. Reading Klossowski as a conceptual innovator, however, at least has the advantage of allowing us to chart a consistent trajectory through his difficult and often labyrinthine text, without denying its other dimensions (affective, perceptive, literary, and so on). In what follows, then, I would like to examine three of Klossowski's most characteristic and important concepts—impulses and their intensities, phantasms, and simulacra and their stereotypes—as well as the precise interrelations he establishes among them. Taken together, these three concepts describe what Klossowski terms the tripartite economy of soul, which constitutes the implicit model through which he interprets Nietzsche's thought.1Impulses as Fluctuating IntensitiesKlossowski describes his books on both Nietzsche and Sade as "essays devoted not to ideologies but to the physiognomies of problematic thinkers who differ greatly from each other" ["Postface" 137, emphasis added]. This emphasis on the "physiognomy" of thinkers reflects Nietzsche's insistence on taking the body rather than the mind as a guide for philosophy since the body is a more accessible phenomenon, less surrounded by myth and superstition. "The body and physiology as the starting point," Nietzsche wrote. "Why?... The phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more tangible [End Page 8] phenomenon.... Belief in the body is more fundamental than belief in the soul" [WP §§492, 489, 491]. Klossowski himself, however, when writing of the intensive status of the impulses, frequently makes use of the term "soul" (âme), owing in part, no doubt, to his interest in the theological literature of the mystics, such as Meister Eckhardt and Teresa of Avila. For the mystics, the depth of the soul is something irreducible and uncreated: it eludes the exercise of the created intellect, and can only be grasped negatively.2 Nonetheless, if one can find a similar apophaticism (or "negative theology") in Klossowski, it is related exclusively to the immanent and chaotic movements of the soul's intensive affects, and not to the transcendence of God. What is incommunicable in the soul (or body) are its "impulses"—their fluctuations of intensity, their rises and falls, their manic elations and depressive descents, which are in constant variation.Nietzsche himself had recourse to a highly varied vocabulary to describe what Klossowski summarizes in the term "impulse": "drive" (Triebe), "desire" (Begierden), "instinct" (Instinke), "power" (Mächte), "force" (Kräfte), "impulse" (Reize, Impulse), "passion" (Leidenschaften), "feeling" (Gefülen), "affect" (Affekte), "pathos" (Pathos), and so on.3 Klossowski frequently employs the musical term tonalité to describe these states of the soul's fluctuating intensities—their diverse tones, timbres, and changing amplitudes—which can take on various forms ("aggressiveness, tolerance, intimidation, anguish, the need for solitude, the forgetting of oneself" [NVC 6]). At bottom, what these impulses express are what Klossowski calls the "obstinate singularity" of the human soul, which is by nature noncommunicable; they constitute "the unexchangeable depth" (le fond inéchangeable) or "the unintelligible depth" (le fond unintelligible) of the soul. What makes every individual... (shrink)

Upon Scheler’ s death in 1928, Martin Heidegger remarked that he was the most important force in philosophy at the time. Jose Ortega y Gasset called Scheler "the first man of the philosophical paradise." The Human Place in the Cosmos, the last of his works Scheler completed, is a pivotal piece in the development of his writing as a whole, marking a peculiar shift in his approach and thought. He had been asked to provide an initial sketch of his (...) much larger works on philosophical anthropology and metaphysics--works he was not able to complete because of his early demise. Frings' new translation of this key work allows us to read and understand Scheler's thought within current philosophical debates and interests. The book addresses two main questions: What is the human being? And what is the place of the human being in the universe? Scheler responds to these questions within contexts of said two projected much larger works but not without reference to scientific research. He covers various levels of being: inorganic reality, organic reality (including plant life and psychological life), all the way up to practical intelligence and the spiritual dimension of human beings, and touching upon the holy. Negotiating two intertwined levels of being, life-energy ("impulsion") and "spirit," this work marks not only a critical moment in the development of his own philosophy but also a significant contribution to the current discussions of continental and analytic philosophers on the nature of the person. (shrink)

The impact of "human enhancement" can manifest itself only overtime. And this is why, the author argues, "human enhancement" is an issue for the youth-oriented policies. As such, the problem of "human enhancement" is a social problem. The author stresses the influence of individual experiments that young people run on themselves and that have to do with human enhancement. He argues that these experiments have the potential of opening new directions for a social construction of reality. (...) He relates this potential to the innovative impulse that young people have. (shrink)

According to the author, psychoanalytic theory and practice – which discloses ‘the interminable falsity of the human subject’s belief in the mastery of its own mental life’ – is in part responsible for the coming of the postmodern era. In this title, originally published in 1993, Barratt examines the role of psychoanalysis in what he sees as the crisis of modernism, shows why the modernist position – what he calls the ‘modern episteme’ – is failing, and proposes that psychoanalysis (...) should redefine itself as a postmodern method. In Barratt’s innovative account of psychoanalysis, which focuses on the significance of the free-associative process, Freud’s discovery of the repressed unconscious leads to a claim that is basic to postmodern ideas: ‘that all thinking and speaking, the production and reproduction of psychic reality, is inherently dynamic, polysemous, and contradictorious.’ He argues that subsequent attempts to ‘normalize and systematize’ psychoanalysis are reactionary and antipsychoanalytic efforts to salvage the modern episteme that psychoanalysis itself calls into question. (shrink)

Although psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism derive from theoretical and philosophical assumptions worlds apart, both experientially-based traditions share at their heart a desire for the understanding, development, and growth of the human experience. Paul Cooper utilizes detailed clinical vignettes to contextualize the implications of Zen Buddhism in the therapeutic setting to demonstrate how its practices and beliefs inform, relate to, and enhance transformative psychoanalytic practice. The basic concepts of Zen, such as the identity of the relative and the absolute and (...) the foundational principles of emptiness and dependent-arising, are given special attention as they relate to the psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious and its processes, transference and countertransference, formulations of self, and more. In addition, through an analysis of apophasis, a unique style of discourse that serves as a basic structure for mystical languages, he provides insight into the structure of the seemingly irrational Zen koan in order to demonstrate its function as a pedagogical and psychological tool. Though mindful of their differences, Cooper’s intent throughout is to illustrate how the practices of both Zen and psychoanalysis become internalized by the individual who engages in them and can, in turn, inform one another in mutually beneficial ways in an effort to comprehend the ramifications of an individual or collective expanding vision. (shrink)

This article provides a contribution to the concept of a peace ethics which understands human peacemaking as a churchly practice accepting and joining in God's reconciling works. From a pacifist stance, the author argues that ecclesial ethics allows a forceful reframing of the just war tradition as it is developed in the largely unknown Reformed confessions of the l61 h century. A theological exploration of the peace church's pathos drives the author towards a rediscovery of the church's central worshiping (...) practices, such as eucharist, as distinctively peacemaking practices. Following John Calvin's and Karl Barth's ethical account, the mode of peacemaking is defined as a hastening that waits. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.3 (1999) 63-80 [Access article in PDF] The Transversality of Michel de Certeau: Foucault's Panoptic Discourse and the Cartographic Impulse Bryan Reynolds and Joseph Fitzpatrick Above all (and this is a corollary, but an important one), the phenomenological and praxiological analysis of cultural trajectories must allow to be grasped at once a composition of places and the innovation that modifies it by dint of moving and cutting across (...) them. --Michel de Certeau, Culture in the PluralThrough his rigorous examinations of the common, the quotidian, the personal, the plural practices that establish and continually transform societies, Michel de Certeau develops a conception of culture born of the perpetual transgression, however subtle or pronounced, of the boundaries imposed by all totalizing systems, whether theoretical or social. This view of culture as a "cutting across" of boundaries, which can be found in many forms throughout his work, achieves a special significance for the study of subjectification in his discussion of "Spatial Practices" that comprises the third section of The Practice of Everyday Life. In an important essay on Certeau's theory of space, Ian Buchanan argues that "our understanding of culture must commence with an understanding of the formation of the subject," and that the latter is addressed by Certeau through his essays on space [129-30]. Following this assertion, we want to argue that Certeau's analyses of spatial practices in Heterologies, "The Gaze: Nicholas of Cusa," and The Practice of Everyday Life [particularly the chapter "Walking in the City" 91-110], outline a theory that describes subjectivity as what amounts to, as Certeau puts it in Culture in the Plural, "a composition of places and the innovation that modifies it by dint of moving and cutting across them" [146]. Furthermore, by articulating the close relationship between Certeau's spatial theory and our own work on "transversal movement," we will attempt to show that the method of analysis Certeau uses in "Walking in the City" (and describes in several other works) is itself marked by the "transversal" tactics that his theory describes. 1 By focusing in particular on Certeau's methodological critique of Foucault in both The Practice of Everyday Life and Heterologies, we will demonstrate the various ways in which he moves beyond what Bryan Reynolds and James Intriligator have labeled the "dissective-cohesive mode" of analysis, an analytical [End Page 63] [Begin Page 65] approach (characteristic of most dialectical argumentation) that breaks its subject matter into constituent parts and examines those parts with the goal of reassembling them into a unified and accountable whole (such as, say, the city or the human subject in "Walking in the City"). 2 Postmodern Space: Certeau and Jameson In his essay "Heterophenomenology, or Certeau's Theory of Space," Ian Buchanan situates Certeau's writings on the production of space within the postmodern debate over the autonomy of the subject, opposing Certeau's view to Fredric Jameson's "assumption that the subject takes his or her psychic bearings from the built environment and only has certain existence so long as he or she can cognitively 'map' this environment" [Buchanan 114]. Citing the example of the Westin Bonaventure hotel in Los Angeles, Jameson argues that "this latest mutation in space--postmodern hyperspace--has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world" [44]. The effect on cultural politics, according to Jameson, is that the subject "submerged" by this postmodern hyperspace is deprived of the "critical distance" that makes possible the "positioning of the cultural act outside of the massive Being of capital" [48]. Buchanan finds in "Walking in the City" the basis for a critique of this view though a conception of space stemming from "heterophe-nomenology," defined as "a phenomenology predicated by a heterogeneously constituted subject which does not take for granted the unity of the body" [112]. Focusing on Certeau's debt to Merleau-Ponty's theories of perception (which can best be seen in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Humanness of Heroes: Studies in the Conclusion of Virgil’s Aeneid by Michael C. J. PutnamAnne RogersonMichael C. J. Putnam. The Humanness of Heroes: Studies in the Conclusion of Virgil’s Aeneid. The Amsterdam Vergil Lectures 1. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011. 183 pp. Paper, $25.Michael Putnam’s latest book on the Aeneid arises from lectures given in 2009 to inaugurate a series of University of Amsterdam Lectures on Vergil. (...) Its central question is how to understand the Aeneid’s end, and in particular what to make of the evolution of Aeneas, the poem’s hero, from “an apparently stoical, self-effacing... victim” at the start of the epic into a “fury-driven, vengeful conqueror” at its close (12). As this opening statement of intent makes clear, Putnam here develops arguments first presented in his 1965 book, The Poetry of the Aeneid (Cambridge, Mass.), and since further extended and refined in numerous articles and chapters and in his 1995 book, Virgil’s Aeneid: Interpretation and Influence (Chapel Hill, N.C.). Putnam’s Aeneid is, broadly speaking, the Aeneid of the so-called Harvard school, the “pessimists” who read its ending as a betrayal of the instruction that Anchises gives Aeneas in the underworld to spare the humbled. But Putnam is not an extremist: his Aeneas rather than being a monster motivated by diabolical rage or inhumane pragmatism, is emotional and human, driven to fury by pietas towards Pallas and Evander. Putnam sees [End Page 675] this impulse, however, although not unjustified, as fundamentally incompatible with the duty enjoined by Anchises. In addition, and in justification of his project to judge the epic’s hero “by the standards that the poem itself sets” (17), Putnam stresses that the Aeneid confronts its readers repeatedly with this incompatibility. This book explores the details and the implications of that confrontation, and in Putnam’s sensitive and careful exploration of those details there is much of value, even for those who may take issue with his interpretation of Anchises’ dictum as an injunction that “the prideful... should be beaten down but spared” (20).The approach Putnam takes to the Aeneid is characteristic of his earlier work: he reads the epic closely, paying meticulous attention to words and images repeated throughout the poem and to echoes of earlier poetry, particularly—since his focus is primarily on Books 10 and 12—the Iliad. Thus in chapters 1 and 2, which treat the rampage of Aeneas in Book 10, Putnam is first concerned to draw out the parallels between Vergil’s hero and the vengeful Achilles. Much of chapter 1 contrasts the Aeneid and the Iliad, but Catullus 64 provides the initial link, a lexical one first discussed by Oliver Lyne in his 1989 Words and the Poet (Oxford): in Catullus’ epyllion Achilles appears as the harvester of men (353–55), while in Aeneid 10.513, the rampaging Aeneas harvests all in his vicinity with his sword. The way Putnam builds on this intertext provides an example of his approach throughout the book, where an understanding of Vergil’s epic is constructed upon a foundation both of allusion and of narrative similarity and difference between events in the later books of the Aeneid and elsewhere. Parallel piles of corpses rapidly amass after the harvesting image both in Catullus 64 and in Aeneid 10. This, Putnam suggests, shows us Vergil’s Aeneas absorbing the brutality of Catullus’ earlier hero, a theme he develops as he goes on to discuss narrative parallels between Vergil’s ferocious Aeneas of Book 10 and Achilles as he is depicted in Iliad 18 and 21. Taking victims for human sacrifice, Putnam argues, links Aeneas to Achilles “at his most savage” (23) and “most vindictive” (24). Worse (for Aeneas), his victims are named, and have families, while Achilles’ twelve captives in the Iliad are anonymous, and less pathetic. Worse still, the Aeneid focuses on the gruesomeness of Aeneas’ unproductive sacrifice of his eight victims, a contrast to the four bulls sacrificed for “productive good” (25) in the Georgics.As Aeneas’ eight and Aristaeus’ four Vergilian victims add up to Homer’s twelve, Putnam argues that the deliberate... (shrink)

PurposeThe aim of this study was to investigate and compare impulsiveness, negative emotion, cognitive function, and P300 components among gamma-hydroxybutyrate -addicted patients, heroin-dependent patients, and methadone maintenance treatment subjects.MethodsA total of 48 men including 17 GHB addicts, 16 heroin addicts, 15 MMT subjects, and 15 male mentally healthy controls were recruited. All subjects were evaluated for symptoms of depression, anxiety, impulsiveness, and cognitive function through the Patient Health Questionnaire, the Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version II, the (...) Beijing version of the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, the behavioral test, and event-related potential P300 detection.Results The mean scores of BIS-II in the GHB addiction group, heroin dependence group, and MMT group were significantly higher than those of the HC group. The total scores of BJ-MOCA in GHB addiction group was the worst among the four groups, followed by heroin addiction, MMT group and HC group. The response time in the GHB addiction group was the longest among the four groups, followed by the heroin addiction, MMT, and HC groups. The amplitude and latency of P300 in GHB addiction subjects were significantly lower and longer than those of the MMT group and the HC group. For the three types of addiction, the P300 amplitudes at Fz, Cz, Pz, T5, and T6 were negatively correlated with the scores of GAD-7, PHQ-9, and BIS-II; the P300 latencies were positively correlated with the response time and negatively correlated with the scores of the BJ-MoCA.ConclusionPeople with an addiction were likely to have increased impulsiveness. The cognitive function of the GHB and heroin-addicted subjects, including the heroin detoxification and the MMT groups, was severely impaired, especially for the GHB-addicted patients. The impairment manifested as abnormalities of BJ-MoCA, response time, and P300 components. (shrink)

Hormonal changes across the menstrual cycle have been shown to influence reward-related motivation and impulsive behaviors. Here, to compare neural mechanisms of cognitive impulse control during the mid-luteal phase (LP) versus during the late follicular phase (FP), we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with an event-related monetary delay discounting (EMDD) behavioral task (study 1) and then employed resting state (RS)-fMRI (study 2). The imaging data were analyzed and related to behavior-associated neural activation. In study 1, women in the late (...) FP showed a preference for sooner rewards while exhibiting enhanced activity in the dorsal striatum (DS), whereas women in the mid-LP showed a preference for delayed, higher-value rewards with enhanced activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Discount rate (transformed k) in the EMDD task correlated with functional connectivity (FC) of the DS-dlPFC circuitry, consistent with the possibility that DS-dlPFC circuitry may regulate impulsivity. In study 2, the right dlPFC was significantly more active in mid-LP than in late FP, and this effect was sensitive to estradiol (E2) and relative E2 levels during mid-LP. The magnitude of DS-dlPFC FC correlated negatively with psychometric impulsivity scores during the late FP. These results replicated findings from study 1 and further indicated that relative E2 levels may play an important role in increasing cognitive control during the mid-LP, which provides new insight into the treatment of conditions characterized by hyper-impulsivity, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, Parkinson disease, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. In conclusion, our results suggest that cyclical gonadal hormones affect cognitive control on impulsive behavior periodically, possibility via DS-dlPFC circuitry. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Religious Pluralism:Buddhist and Christian Perspectives1John D'Arcy MayThe question of how the concept of human rights—so crucially important for the implementation of justice in a rapidly globalizing world—relates to the plurality of cultures and religions has still not been solved. Controversies such as those over land rights in Aboriginal Australia and Asian values in Southeast Asia have shown this repeatedly. In such (...) cases, discussion eventually becomes focused on the universality of human rights, not just the global scope of the idea itself but the universal validity of catalogues of specific rights such as those contained in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948). There is something arbitrary and unsystematic about such charters, as is shown by the rather different emphases in the African and Islamic documents which were meant to correct the UN's lack of universality.2 But if, in attempting to explore this problem seriously, one appears to tamper with the principle of universality, one can easily be accused of diluting the ethical force of human rights by questioning their applicability to every human being without exception. Nothing could be further from my mind, so before explaining what I wish to do in this paper I shall first set out some presuppositions that I take to be axiomatic:1. Our starting point is the dignity of the human, the unique value of each individual human life as a world constituted by consciousness, an originating source of free acts, which is therefore an end in itself and must never be misused as a means to other people's ends.3 This principle is reflected in formulations such as dignitas humana in the social teaching of the Catholic Church, which goes back to the biblical doctrine of the creation of human beings in the image of God, or in the unique status of the human being in the Buddhist scale of existence, on which neither animals nor gods but only humans are in a position to grasp the reality of their situation and strive for definitive release from the chain of becoming; hence the severity of the prohibition on taking human life as the third of the four cardinal offences (pārājika).42. The concept of "human rights" is one way of acknowledging this unique moral status of human dignity, in that rights accrue to the individual person [End Page 51] simply by virtue of his or her being rational, autonomous, and free. To this extent human rights language belongs within the Western tradition of liberal discourse, which lies at the heart of Western democracies and was profoundly influenced by Christianity. Conceptions of what it is that makes the human uniquely valuable, however, are very differently constructed in different cultural and religious traditions.53. What rights language tries to express in the conceptual framework provided by European culture has universal validity, although it is otherwise expressed in other cultures, for example, in terms of "duty," "obedience," "taboo," and so on. Problematic as it is in the context of postmodern discourse, the sameness-in-difference of the human as the criterion for rights everywhere and without exception is a categorical imperative on which the effectiveness of human rights as an instrument of justice depends.4. Conceptions of universality, however, may themselves be culturally determined and usually arise in contexts of domination: what is taken to be universally valid is often somebody's particular version of the truth of things which by virtue of a claim to universality is then imposed on others as "the" truth. Such conceptions are necessarily generalizations, whereas the moral impulse arises in the face-to-face encounter with the alien, unexpected and unwanted "other," as Levinas has shown.5. Universality is thus not available a priori but remains implicit in the intersubjectivity of human interaction until it is realized through shared practice and the negotiation of meanings; this applies all the more to interactions between religions and across cultures.66. Rights language, though a powerful instrument for the implementation of justice, is thus incomplete unless its Western (and Christian) conceptual presuppositions are complemented by the metaphors, stories, and... (shrink)

In this book, contributors who are atheists, believers, and anything in between debate the origins and nature of morality and the human impulse for good.

By using principles from a variety of scientific disciplines, Yale Professor Samuel Wilkinson provides a framework for human evolution that reveals an overarching purpose to our existence. Generations have been taught that evolution implies there is no overarching purpose to our existence, that life has no fundamental meaning. We are merely the accumulation of tens of thousands of intricate molecular accidents. Some scientists take this logic one step further, suggesting that evolution is intrinsically atheistic and goes against the concept (...) of God. But is this true? With respect to our evolution, nature seems to have endowed us with competing dispositions, what Wilkinson calls the dual potential of human nature. We are pulled in different directions: selfishness and altruism, aggression and cooperation, lust and love. When we couple this with the observation that we possess a measure of free will, all this strongly implies there is a universal purpose to our existence. This purpose, at least one of them, is to choose between the good and evil impulses that nature has created within us. Our life is a test. This is a truth, as old as history it seems, that has been espoused by so many of the world's religions. From a certain framework, these aspects of human nature--including how evolution shaped us--are evidence for the existence of a God, not against it. Closely related to this is meaning. What is the meaning of life? Based on the scientific data, it would seem that one such meaning is to develop deep and abiding relationships. At least that is what most people report are the most meaningful aspects of their lives. This is a function of our evolution. It is how we were created"--Dust jacket flap. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the notion and structural components of two concepts: the human condition and human nature. Likewise, it is proposed that both concepts should be included in the basic themes not only in the field of Educational Philosophy, but also in all disciplines where the human being occupies a privileged place. Human condition is understood as a state of subjection to everything with which human beings interact and represents the starting point to ascend (...) to three natures that correspond to human beings. Hegel emphasizes two natures of man. The first is characterized by having a biological structure governed by instincts. The second is culture and to ascend to it requires processes of intellection that can be objectified through consciousness. The third human nature proposed in this paper is rooted in Ernst Bloch’s principle of hope. It is materialized by human actions tending to the construction of the future from the discovery of what is not-yet-conscious that, when identified, is achieved through actions. (shrink)

The surplus of impulses is a key category in Gehlen’s anthropobiology to understand the process of hominisation and humanisation. From the dedifferentiation of human instincts and the primitivisation of man’s anatomy, to the role of experience, institutions, and speech, the surplus of impulses is a source that flows between the inner and the outer, by feeding the action circle that whether translates in activity or is redirected inwards in order to become a movement of volitional constitution. The (...) ambivalence in which Gehlen deals with this function of freedom gives rise to a pessimistic and sacrificial idea of man. However, he posits certain basic elements of a hedonistic theory of speech from which we can better understand the stabilizing task of language as cornerstone of institutions. (shrink)

First published in 1954, _Human Society in Ethics and Politics_ is Bertrand Russell’s last full account of his ethical and political positions relating to both politics and religion. Ethics, he argues, are necessary to man because of the conflict between intelligence and impulse – if one were without the other, there would be no place for ethics. Man’s impulses and desires are equally social and solitary. Politics and ethics are the means by which we as a society and as (...) individuals become socially purposeful and moral codes inculcate our rules of action. (shrink)

What exactly is the human element separating humans from animals and machines? The common answers that immediately come to mind—like art, empathy, or technology—fall apart under close inspection. Dominic Pettman argues that it is a mistake to define such rigid distinctions in the first place, and the most decisive “human error” may be the ingrained impulse to understand ourselves primarily in contrast to our other worldly companions. In _Human Error_, Pettman describes the three sides of the cybernetic triangle— (...) class='Hi'>human, animal, and machine—as a rubric for understanding key figures, texts, and sites where our species-being is either reinforced or challenged by our relationship to our own narcissistic technologies. Consequently, species-being has become a matter of _specious_-being, in which the idea of humanity is not only a case of mistaken identity but indeed the mistake of identity. _Human Error_ boldly insists on the necessity of relinquishing our anthropomorphism but also on the extreme difficulty of doing so, given how deeply this attitude is bound with all our other most cherished beliefs about forms of life. (shrink)

Freedom is Schleiermacher's key ethical concept. Human life in general, however, is causally determined. Freedom is actualized only in the inner life, in feeling and imagination. Inner life, however, is the domain of religion, of consciousness of the infinite, and the source of free human fellowship. Thus freedom is tied to religion. This paper analyzes Schleiermacher's concept of religion and relates it to freedom in its connection with determinism. It attempts to demonstrate that religion is the foundation of (...) the moral life in a way that does not compromise the relative autonomy of morality, but rather makes moral life possible. (shrink)

School anti-violence programs are united in their radical condemnation of aggression, generally equated with violence. The programs advocate its elimination by priming children's emotional and cognitive controls. What goes unrecognized is the embeddedness of aggression in human beings, as well as its positive psychological and moral functions. In attempting to eradicate aggression, schools increase the risk of student disaffection while stifling the goods associated with it: status, power, dominance, agency, mastery, pride, social-affiliation, social-approval, loyalty, self-respect, and self-confidence. It is (...) argued that the distribution of power and authority to students as plausible substitutes for aggression, would enable them to express aggression in a legitimate manner and simultaneously encourage their attachment to school. A vibrant anti-violence program that attracts children will find a way for caring, amiability, sympathy, and kindness to live in tandem with competition, power, assertiveness, and anger tamed by institutional constraints. (shrink)

BackgroundIndividuals who use methamphetamine for a long period of time may experience decreased inhibition and increased impulsivity. In order to reduce impulsivity or improve inhibitory control ability, high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation has attracted much attention of researchers. Recent studies on addiction have shown that rTMS can stimulate different brain regions to produce different therapeutic effects. Recent work also suggests that HF-rTMS over right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex does not affect the impulsivity of patients with alcohol use disorder; while HF-rTMS over (...) left DLPFC could improve the impulsivity of patients with alcohol use disorder and cigarette smokers. However, it should be noted that empirical studies applying HF-rTMS over left DLPFC of patients with MA use disorders are still lacking.MethodsTwenty-nine patients with MAUD underwent five sessions of HF-rTMS on the left DLPFC per week for 4 consecutive weeks. The cue-induced craving and stop-signal and NoGo task were assessed pre-rTMS and post-rTMS. In addition, 29 healthy controls were recruited. There was no rTMS intervention for the controls, the performance of the stop-signal and NoGo task was evaluated on them.ResultsIn total, HF-rTMS of the left DLPFC significantly decreased MA-dependent patients’ cue-induced craving and stop-signal reaction time. For SSRT, the pre-test of experimental group was significantly higher than the score of control group. In the experimental group, the pre-test score was significantly higher than the post-test score. For Go and stop-signal delay, the pre-test scores of the experimental group was significantly lower than the scores of the control group. No significant difference was found between the pre-test and the post-test scores of the experimental group.ConclusionAdd-on HF-rTMS of left DLPFC may be an effective intervention for reducing impulsivity and cue-induced craving of patients with MAUD. Future research with a control group of MAUD that does not undergo the treatment is needed to confirm the effectiveness. (shrink)

Many of the great thinkers and poets in Christianity and Islam led lives marked by personal and religious struggle. Indeed, suffering and struggle are part of the human condition and constant themes in philosophy, sociology and psychology. In this thought-provoking book, acclaimed scholar Mona Siddiqui ponders how humankind finds meaning in life during an age of uncertainty. Here, she explores the theme of human struggle through the writings of iconic figures such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Muhammad Ghazali, Rainer Maria (...) Rilke and Sayyid Qutb - people who searched for meaning in the face of adversity. Considering a wide range of thinkers and literary figures, her book explores how suffering and struggle force the faithful to stretch their imagination in order to bring about powerful and prophetic movements for change. The moral and aesthetic impulse of their writings will also stimulate inter-cultural and interdisciplinary conversations on the search for meaning in an age of uncertainty. (shrink)

For ages there has been a gap between the two cultures of the sciences and religions. According to Roger Sperry, science can now bridge the gap between the cold hard facts of the sciences and humanitarian and religious values. Sperry won the Nobel Prize in 1981 for his work on the differences between the left and right halves of the brain. For the past twenty years he has been campaigning for human consciousness and values to be investigated scientificlly. This (...) book describes Sperry's work and his struggle to guide humanity beyond a world divided. terms such as consciousness, value, love and joy are scientifically meaningful, just like terms referring to brain physiology, such as neural pathways and electrical impulse. The split between mind matter, or religion, and science can be removed, says Sperry, by expanding scientific research. Now, conscious experiences must be taken into account as scientific information about the brain. Our values, beliefs and goals can directly affect our brain states and physiology. (shrink)

In this article I will argue that the feminist theoretical paradigm in approaching the issue of sexual difference should be adjusted. Feminism at present mainly relies on phenomenology of the other and pays much attention to the significant ambiguity of the human body. But I will explain that the phenomenological argument for the sexual asymmetry is invalid. All human beings with gender are bodily conditioned. Gender issues must be integrated into the universal human impulse of liberation which (...) is based on a self-understanding. The gendered self is culturally shaped. An intercultural comparative perspective can allow us to obtain a wider horizon to explore the relationship between a person’s sexually conditioned being and his self-understanding. In my discussion of gender and self, the contrast between China and the West is exemplary. Despite different self-understandings with regard to sex, the pursuit of freedom can be universally noticed. Notwithstanding the sexually embodied existence, human beings in both the West and East have generally theorized and practiced the spiritualization of self in metaphysics and religions. In order to make this point clear I take early Indian Buddhism as an example. My argumentation may seem intercultural and comparative, but fundamentally I am problem-oriented and point to the dimension beyond cultural comparison. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology aims to discover what makes us human, but it has produced accounts that exclude some members of our species. It relies often on a non-naturalistic “philosophy of consciousness” and locates humanity in the cognitive capacity to objectively represent things, to reason teleologically and use tools, to use symbols and language, or to be self-conscious and question existence. This work pursues an alternative, thoroughly naturalistic philosophical anthropology in the tradition of Arnold Gehlen. Combining Gehlen’s theory of our behaviorally-detached (...) and culturally-determined impulses with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s views on intersubjectivity, affect, sexuality, and social institutions, the present work locates the human within the unique structure of human feeling. This produces a truly inclusive account of “the human as the other” or Homo alter. The human is deeply and thoroughly dependent on affective, bodily, communicative bonds, in which others appear as sources of meaning, norms, pleasure, and approbation and disapprobation. This socio-biological account of the human makes institutionality central to our form of life but rejects any political anthropology that attempts to use human nature to prescribe a necessary form to institutions such as the home. Such a social and affective account of the human produces a novel approach to the affect of shame as the feeling of institutional rejection. Ultimately, this work uses philosophical anthropology to combat dehumanization. Our unique form of dependency on others and institutions is present, for example, in infants and the severely disabled who may not possess the forms of consciousness and cognition that traditionally are identified with being human. (shrink)

Many of the great thinkers and poets in Christianity and Islam led lives marked by personal and religious struggle. Indeed, suffering and struggle are part of the human condition and constant themes in philosophy, sociology and psychology. In this thought-provoking book, acclaimed scholar Mona Siddiqui ponders how humankind finds meaning in life during an age of uncertainty. Here, she explores the theme of human struggle through the writings of iconic figures such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Muhammad Ghazali, Rainer Maria (...) Rilke and Sayyid Qutb - people who searched for meaning in the face of adversity. Considering a wide range of thinkers and literary figures, her book explores how suffering and struggle force the faithful to stretch their imagination in order to bring about powerful and prophetic movements for change. The moral and aesthetic impulse of their writings will also stimulate inter-cultural and interdisciplinary conversations on the search for meaning in an age of uncertainty. (shrink)

En la filosofía política latinoamericana predomina una concepción sobre la condición humana,- aunque no siempre se presentase en estos términos-, en lugar de una presunta naturaleza humana, biológicamente determinada o una esencia humana metafísicamente concebida. Los valores por sí mismos, lo mismo éticos que políticos, jurídicos, religiosos, estéticos, etc., no son capaces de realizar absolutamente nada si estos no van acompañados de profundas transformaciones socioeconómico políticas que trascienden su espiritualidad para tratar de convertirse en factor material de impulso al continuo (...) e infinito proceso de enriquecimiento de la condición humana. Este concepto se corresponde mucho mejor con el criterio histórico, holístico, complejo y dialéctico y por tanto contradictorio del perfeccionamiento del hombre en su lucha contra diversas formas de alienación, por lo que resulta más apropiado para concebir el desarrollo progresivo de la democracia y los derechos humanos. Latin American political philosophy is dominated by a conception of the human condition, - though not always he was appearing in these terms-, rather than an alleged human nature, biologically determined or a metaphysically conceived human essence. By themselves, the same ethical values, to political, legal, religious, aesthetic, etc., are not able to do absolutely nothing if they are not accompanied by profound socio-economic political transformations that transcend their spirituality to try to become a material factor of impulse to the infinite and continuous process of enrichment of the human condition. This concept corresponds better with the historical approach, holistic, complex and dialectic and therefore contradictory development of man in their struggle against various forms of alienation, which makes it more appropriate to conceive of the progressive development of democracy and human rights. (shrink)

At first glance, it seems easy to understand the impulse towards numbering people as just another part of modernity's mathematization of the world.1 Seeing humans as interchangeable numbers rather...

This essay explores the conception of the individual in Dewey's democratic writings. Following Dewey's lead, I argue that it is human individuality, including our impulses, habits, and capacities, along with an appropriate environment, that represents the uniqueness and power of every individual. In achieving our individuality, we form habits to live and to grow; we strive toward a fully realized human being, while we perform a unique function in keeping the community growing. Dewey's theory of self-construction provides (...) a theoretical foundation for an active-individual as-a-societal-contributor-always-in-the -making that in turn contributes to the improvement of educational opportunities for all people. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper I will explore the contribution of philosophical anthropology to music education research which, over recent years, has been showing an increasing interest in the human body. In order to do this I will especially be drawing on the ideas of one of its pioneers, Helmuth Plessner. Plessner’s philosophy should be understood as an effort to overcome the Cartesian dualism ‘mind/body’ and to highlight the unity of a human being and her/his relation to her/his environment. With (...) his central theory of “eccentric positionality,” Plessner draws on a human’s relation to her/his body because a human is able to acknowledge that “I am body” and “I have body” while at the same time being able to realize her/his own situation and reflect upon it. Plessner grounds his thinking about music on his phenomenological observation about sound. He remarks that sound, which can be at the same time far and near, has voluminosity, impulsivity, an undeviating relation to human expressivity, is organized in vertical and horizontal arrangement, and tends towards sequentially. Because of all this, sound is compliant with a human body. His philosophy and especially his writings about music and sound could be fruitful for music educational theory and praxis. Some crucial aspects of his theory are embodiment in music, the relation between the meaning of music and body movements, the relation between the conduct of music and conduct of a human and the formation of culture as an open process. In this theoretical terrain concrete proposals and more general suggestions for an efficient and successful music education practice can be located. (shrink)

A new take on our bio-cultural evolution explores how the "inner theatre" of the brain and its "animal-human stages" are reflected in and shaped by the mirror of cinema. Vampire, werewolf, and ape-planet films are perennial favorites—perhaps because they speak to something primal in human nature. This intriguing volume examines such films in light of the latest developments in neuroscience, revealing ways in which animal-human monster movies reflect and affect what we naturally imagine in our minds. Examining (...) specific films as well as early cave images, the book discusses how certain creatures on rock walls and movie screens express animal-to-human evolution and the structures of our brains. The book presents a new model of the human brain with its theatrical, cinematic, and animal elements. It also develops a theory of "rasa-catharsis" as the clarifying of emotions within and between spectators of the stage or screen, drawing on Eastern and Western aesthetics as well as current neuroscience. It focuses on the "inner movie theater" of memories, dreams, and reality representations, involving developmental stages, as well as the "hall of mirrors," ape-egos, and body-swapping identifications between human beings. Finally, the book shows how ironic twists onscreen—especially of contradictory emotions—might evoke a reappraisal of feelings, helping spectators to be more attentive to their own impulses. Through this interdisciplinary study, scholars, artists, and general readers will find a fresh way to understand the potential for interactive mindfulness and yet cathartic backfire between human brains—in cinema, in theater, and in daily life. (shrink)