This book offers a roadmap for determining when and how to regulate risky reproductive technologies on behalf of future children. It starts by explaining our intuitive, but paradoxical, belief that reproductive choices can be both life-giving and harmful. Next, it recommends a case-by-case method for reconciling the interests of future children with the reproductive liberty of prospective parents. Finally, it applies this framework to four past and future medical interventions, including cloning and genetic engineering. Drawing lessons from these case studies, (...) it criticizes the current lack of regulatory oversight. (shrink)

In this article, I identify the peculiar challenges of current regulation in the UK to assess the safety of new medical devices. Not only is there a limited role for the regulatory authority in assessing their safety, but also no clinical investigation might be needed before many new devices can be marketed for use in populations across the European Union. As a lay member of a committee flagged to review research involving medical devices, I describe some of the difficulties we (...) face in this regard as well as recent developments designed to raise regulatory standards. (shrink)

The question is why it is that objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. Answering this question requires an analysis of the nature of fear in the public sphere since feeling safe means to feel that one avoids the frightening, i.e. the threats or dangers that one perceives in the world. Döring argues that the fact-resistance fear might display in the public sphere is due to the characteristic function that fear fulfills in this sphere. In (...) the public sphere, fear is typically embodied by “fear narratives,” i.e. by real-life structuring stories of local groups which thereby respond to feelings of powerless fear and insecurity. By specifying what the threat is and how to deal with it in the right way, fear narratives reduce felt insecurity. Because of this and by thus enabling a feeling of superiority which may even turn the fear narrative into a narrative of enthusiastic heroism, fear in the public sphere does itself satisfy subjective preferences. This is why objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. The question is how we could and should handle this. (shrink)

Self-driving cars promise solutions to some of the hazards of human driving but there are important questions about the safety of these new technologies. This paper takes a qualitative social science approach to the question ‘how safe is safe enough?’ Drawing on 50 interviews with people developing and researching self-driving cars, I describe two dominant narratives of safety. The first, safety-in-numbers, sees safety as a self-evident property of the technology and offers metrics in an attempt to reassure the (...) public. The second approach, safety-by-design, starts with the challenge of safety assurance and sees the technology as intrinsically problematic. The first approach is concerned only with performance—what a self-driving system does. The second is also concerned with why systems do what they do and how they should be tested. Using insights from workshops with members of the public, I introduce a further concern that will define trustworthy self-driving cars: the intended and perceived purposes of a system. Engineers’ safety assurances will have their credibility tested in public. ‘How safe is safe enough?’ prompts further questions: ‘safe enough for what?’ and ‘safe enough for whom?’. (shrink)

The rule ‘Keep your promises’ is often presented as a challenge to consequentialism, because the ground of your moral obligation not to break a promise seems to lie in the past fact that you made the promise, which is not a consequence of the act. A different picture emerges, however, when we move beyond the question of whether you have any moral obligation at all to the related question of how strong that obligation is.If I promise to meet you and (...) some other mutual friends for a casual lunch, then my moral obligation to meet you is not as strong as when I promise to drive you to the airport to catch an important flight. Why not? The natural answer is that, if I break the lunch promise, not much bad will happen. You will still have a pleasant lunch with our other friends, and you and I can still have lunch some other time. I have some moral obligation to meet you, but not a very strong one. In contrast, if I break my driving promise, then my failure will cause much more harm, assuming that you will not find another way to get to the airport in time for your flight. These harmful consequences to you seem to be what give strength to my moral obligation to keep this promise.The relevant kind of strength is measured by how much is needed to override the obligation. I would need much stronger reasons to justify breaking my promise to drive you to the airport than to justify breaking my promise to meet you for lunch. The fact that my teenage child is sick at home might be enough to justify missing the lunch, even if the teenager would be safe at …. (shrink)

Some screening tests for donor blood that are used by blood services to prevent transfusion-transmission of infectious diseases offer relatively few health benefits for the resources spent on them. Can good ethical arguments be provided for employing these tests nonetheless? This paper discusses—and ultimately rejects—three such arguments. According to the ‘rule of rescue’ argument, general standards for cost-effectiveness in healthcare may be ignored when rescuing identifiable individuals. The argument fails in this context, however, because we cannot identify beforehand who will (...) benefit from additional blood screening tests. On the ‘imposed risk’ argument, general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply when healthcare interventions impose risks on patients. This argument ignores the fact that imposing risks on patients is inevitable in healthcare and that these risks can be countered only within reasonable limits. Finally, the ‘manufacturing standard’ argument premises that general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply to procedures preventing the contamination of manufactured medical products. We contend that while this argument seems reasonable insofar as commercially manufactured medical products are concerned, publicly funded blood screening tests should respect the standards for general healthcare. We conclude that these particular arguments are unpersuasive, and we offer directions to advance the debate. (shrink)

A recently enacted law permits patients to see their electronic medical record (EMR) immediately after their careprovider writes in it. In this article I discuss a proposal that authors make in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics, that ethics consultants (ECs) keep their notes in a separate section of the EMR that patients cannot access when their ethics notes may be troubling to patients, to avoid unduly harming them.I discuss this concern and three more widely applicable clinical goals: (...) to help patients feel safe; to gain patients’ trust; and to provide hope to patients, when possible. These goals apply to careproviders and ECs who seek to help patients and families resolve ethical conflicts. I explain why these goals are singularly important and how careproviders may pursue them, using as an example informing patients about temporal framing to help them find hope. (shrink)

In this short response to Gray’s article Capacity and Decision Making we double down on our argument that risk-relativity is a nonsense. Risk relativity is the claim that we should set a higher standard of competence for a person to make a risky choice than to make a safe choice. Gray’s response largely involves calling attention to the complexities, ramifications and multiple value implications of decision-making, but we do not deny any of this. Using the notion of quality of (...) care mentioned by Gray, we construct an argument that might be used to support risk relativity. But it is no more persuasive than the arguments put forward by risk-relativists. (shrink)

According to the safety principle, if one knows that p, one's belief that p could not easily have been false. One problem besetting this principle is the lottery problem – that of explaining why one does not seem to know that one will lose the lottery purely based on probabilistic considerations, prior to the announcement of the lottery result. As Greco points out, it is difficult for a safety theorist to solve this problem, without paying a heavy price. In this (...) paper, I first reject three existing safety-based solutions to the lottery problem, due to Pritchard, Sosa, and Broncano-Berrocal. Failure of these accounts reveals that there is something crucial missing in the safety principle. By way of remedying this, I propose to integrate a safety principle with a condition regarding one's own awareness of (nearby) error-possibilities. The resulting account, as I argue, enjoys a number of theoretical advantages, including its capacity to handle the lottery problem. (shrink)

According to the extended mind thesis, cognitive processes are not confined to the nervous system but can extend beyond skin and skull to notebooks, iPhones, computers and such. The extended mind thesis is a metaphysical thesis about the material basis of our cognition. As such, whether the thesis is true can have implications for epistemological issues. Carter has recently argued that safety-based theories of knowledge are in tension with the extended mind hypothesis, since the safety condition implies that there is (...) an epistemic difference between subjects who form their beliefs via their biological capacities and between subjects who have extended their cognition. Kelp, on the other hand, has argued that a safety-based theory of knowledge can be correct only if the extended mind thesis is true. While these claims are not logically inconsistent, they do leave the safety theorist in an uncomfortable position. I will argue that safety-based theories of knowledge are not hostage to the truth of the extended mind thesis, and that once the safety condition is properly understood it is not in tension with the extended mind thesis. (shrink)

Safe-by-design aims at addressing safety issues already during the R&D and design phases of new technologies. SbD has increasingly become popular in the last few years for addressing the risks of emerging technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic biology. We ask to what extent SbD approaches can deal with uncertainty, in particular with indeterminacy, i.e., the fact that the actual safety of a technology depends on the behavior of actors in the value chain like users and operators. We argue that (...) while indeterminacy may be approached by designing out users as much as possible in attaining safety, this is often not a good strategy. It will not only make it more difficult to deal with unexpected risks; it also misses out on the resources that users can bring for achieving safety, and it is undemocratic. We argue that rather than directly designing for safety, it is better to design for the responsibility for safety, i.e., designers should think where the responsibility for safety is best situated and design technologies accordingly. We propose some heuristics that can be used in deciding how to share and distribute responsibility for safety through design. (shrink)

Education has always occupied a contradictory position in society, expected to ensure compliance and continuity and yet to encourage critique and renewal. Since the early 1980s, however, successive UK governments have directly mobilised education, and higher education in particular, as an ideological tool in the task of embedding neo-liberalism as ‘common sense’. Modularisation has been in the vanguard, first in the universities, more latterly at secondary level. The effect has been disastrous: here as elsewhere, choice has become depressingly fetishised; knowledge, (...) and with it learning, have been fragmented and commodified; academics, like others, have been de-professionalised; and students, like the rest of us, have been transformed into clients or customers. The details of the history and impact of all this are too close to readers’ experience to require elaboration here: its significance, however, has been too little considered. In particular, the question of how we allowed it to come about is one worth asking – if only so that we can learn from our complicity. Since, however, that judgement depends on the negative view of modularisation just outlined, I start by giving a summary argument for such an evaluation (section 1). I then offer some remarks about the specifically ideological character of modularisation (section 2) as an introduction to some initial reflections on our complicity in this aspect of the neo-liberals’ efforts to make universities safe in their attempt to ensure that the future belongs to them (section 3). Finally I offer a brief suggestion about what we might yet do to overcome the disaster (section 4). (shrink)

There is a growing concern that the voices of athletes, and in particular, athletes from equity-deserving groups, are unaccounted for in the development and advancement of Safe Sport initiatives. The lack of consideration of the needs and experiences of diverse groups is concerning, given the existing literature outside the context of sport indicating that equity-deserving individuals experience more violence. As such, the following study sought to understand how equity-deserving athletes interpret and experience Safe Sport. Grounded within an interpretive (...) phenomenological analysis, semi-structured interviews were used to understand how athletes with marginalised identities conceptualise and experience Safe Sport. Seven participants, including two Black male athletes, two White, gay male athletes, one Middle Eastern female athlete, one White, female athlete with a physical disability and one White, non-binary, queer, athlete with a physical disability, were asked to conceptualise and describe their experiences of Safe Sport. The findings revealed these athletes perceived Safe Sport as an unrealistic and unattainable ideal that cannot fully be experienced by those from equity-deserving groups. This interpretation was reinforced by reported experiences of discriminatory comments, discriminatory behaviours and systemic barriers, perpetrated by coaches, teammates, and resulting from structural aspects of sport. The findings draw on the human rights literature to suggest integrating principles of equity, diversity and inclusion are fundamental to safeguarding equity-deserving athletes. (shrink)

Safe-by-design aims at addressing safety issues already during the R&D and design phases of new technologies. SbD has increasingly become popular in the last few years for addressing the risks of emerging technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic biology. We ask to what extent SbD approaches can deal with uncertainty, in particular with indeterminacy, i.e., the fact that the actual safety of a technology depends on the behavior of actors in the value chain like users and operators. We argue that (...) while indeterminacy may be approached by designing out users as much as possible in attaining safety, this is often not a good strategy. It will not only make it more difficult to deal with unexpected risks; it also misses out on the resources that users can bring for achieving safety, and it is undemocratic. We argue that rather than directly designing for safety, it is better to design for the responsibility for safety, i.e., designers should think where the responsibility for safety is best situated and design technologies accordingly. We propose some heuristics that can be used in deciding how to share and distribute responsibility for safety through design. (shrink)

What is possible, according to the empiricist conception, is what our evidence positively allows; and what is necessary is what it compels. These notions, along with logical possibility, are the only defensible notions of possibility and necessity. In so far as nomic and metaphysical possibilities are defensible, they fall within empirical possibility. These empirical conceptions are incompatible with traditional possible world semantics. Empirically necessary propositions cannot be defined as those true in all possible worlds. There can be empirical possibilities without (...) empirical necessities. The duality of possibility and necessity can be degenerate and can even be falsified. (shrink)

When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...) presenting them with a dilemma. They can either opt for a construal of their view that permits epistemic access to non-structural features of unobservables but then face the daunting task of substantiating a claim that seems to have little hope of being true or they can drop the requirement of epistemic access to non-structural features but then face a collapse to epistemic structural realism. There is thus only one well supported way to be a realist. No wonder then that many traditional scientific realists have over the years expressed views that are strikingly similar to epistemic structural realism. It is high time to let these epistemic structural realists out of the closet. (shrink)

Naturalism is often considered to be antithetical to theology and genuine religion. However, in a series of recent books and articles, Willem Drees has proposed a scientifically informed naturalistic account of religion, which, he contends, is not only compatible with supernaturalistic religion and theology but provides a better account of both than either purely naturalistic or purely supernaturalistic accounts. While rejecting both epistemological and methodological naturalism, Drees maintains that ontological naturalism offers the best philosophical account of the natural world and (...) that, in addition, it provides the opening for a supernaturalistic understanding of religion and theology, one that best fits the condition of epistemic and moral distance from the transcendent characteristic of religious wonderers and wanderers. In this paper I examine Drees's claim and argue that it is seriously flawed. I show that Drees's naturalism is, in fact, both methodologically and epistemologically naturalistic. I also show that his attempts to limit naturalism to the sphere of the natural world by means of the phenomena of limit questions and underdetermination fail. Arguing for a more optimistic, but also, I contend, more empirically accurate account of human epistemic and moral capacities, I propose a full‐fledged scientifically based naturalistic account of theology. (shrink)

__Creating Safe, Equitable, Engaging Schools_ brings together the collective wisdom of more than thirty experts from a variety of fields to show how school leaders can create communities that support the social, emotional, and academic needs of all students._ It offers an essential guide for making sense of the myriad evidence‐based frameworks, resources, and tools available to create a continuous improvement system. Chapters illustrate how leaders can leverage the power of school-based teams to assess the needs of students in (...) their school and select appropriate interventions across a wide variety of domains, including social and emotional learning, trauma, restorative practices, cultural responsiveness, and student and family engagement. Filled with recommendations gleaned from research and ongoing work in every US state and territory, _Creating Safe, Equitable, Engaging Schools_ is a critical resource for understanding and adopting evidence-based practices and making programmatic decisions to ensure the ideal conditions for learning, growth, and development. (shrink)

This article contributes to debates concerning the sexualization of culture in the European context by analysing shifts in contemporary forms of British women’s sexual sexual subjectivities in relation to consumer culture. The article employs a ‘heterotopological’ analysis of how space is materialized through history, power and discourse. A two-part analysis is employed that, first, maps the history of British sex shops in relation to two discourses of sexuality and consumption, namely ‘safe’ and ‘seedy’; and second, analyses how these discourses (...) can be taken up and negotiated by young women today, as evidenced in a focus group discussion on ‘Ann Summers’. It concludes that new directions and interesting insights into the intersections of space, power, gender and sexuality within neoliberal postfeminist shifts in feminine identity can be made by considering female-oriented sex shops as ‘postfeminist heterotopias’. (shrink)

Although there is evidence that supports the safety of planned home birth for healthy women, less than 1 percent of women in the United States choose to have their baby at home. An ethnographic study of the experience of planned home birth provided rich descriptions of women’s experiences planning, preparing for, and having a home birth. This article describes findings related to how women make the decision to have a planned home birth. For these women, being safe emerged as (...) central in making the decision. For them, being safe included four factors: avoiding technological birth interventions, knowing the midwife and the midwife knowing them, feeling comfortable and protected at home, and knowing that backup hospital medical care was accessible if needed. (shrink)

New genomic techniques (NGTs) are powerful technologies with the potential to change how we relate to our food, food producers, and natural environment. Their use may affect the practices and values our societies are built on. Like many countries, the EU is currently revisiting its GMO legislation to accommodate the emergence of NGTs. We argue that assessing such technologies according to whether they are ‘safe enough’ will not create the public trust necessary for societal acceptance. To avoid past mistakes (...) of under- or miscommunication about possible impacts, we need open, transparent, and inclusive societal debate on the nature of the science of gene (editing) technologies, on how to use them, and whether they contribute to sustainable solutions to societal and environmental challenges. To be trustworthy, GMO regulation must demonstrate the authorities’ ability to manage the scientific, socio-economic, environmental, and ethical complexities and uncertainties associated with NGTs. Regulators and authorities should give equal attention to the reflexive and the emotional aspects of trust and make room for honest public and stakeholder inclusion processes. The European Group of Ethics in Science and Technology’s recent report on the Ethics of Genome Editing (2021) is important in calling attention to a series of fundamental issues that ought to be included in debates on the regulation and use of NGTs to ensure public trust in these technologies and in regulating authorities. With the great power of NGTs comes great responsibility, and the way forward must be grounded in responsible research, innovation, and regulation. (shrink)

The War on Cops is a collection of previously-published essays by Heather Mac Donald, a public intellectual in the United States who belongs to the ‘small faction’ of secular conservatives (Mark Oppenheimer, “A Place on the Right for a Few Godless Conservatives”, New York Times, February 18, 2011). The essays are journalistic rather than academic, having appeared in the City Journal, National Review, New York Daily News, InsideSources, Wall Street Journal, and Weekly Standard, but the volume is nonetheless significant to (...) contemporary philosophers due to both its form and content. First, Mac Donald presents a logical argument for her position and makes explicit use of philosophical devices such as thought experiments. Second, this argument concerns the controversy surrounding the killing of African American males by police officers in the last three years and she provides the first sustained criticism of the rationale for the Black Lives Matter movement. (shrink)

For human germline gene editing to be a viable technique for preventing disease, it must meet a baseline level of safety. This commentary unpacks Sahotra Sarkar’s concept of specificity outlined in Cut and Paste Genetics, which he proposes as a guide for when human germline gene editing can be performed safely. The commentary raises conceptual questions to how specificity is intended to work and raises further epistemic questions for how evidenceEvidence meets the demands of specificity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Finding Safe Harbor:Buddhist Sexual Ethics in AmericaStephanie KazaWhen the Buddha left home in search of spiritual understanding, he left behind his wife and presumably the pleasures of sex. After his enlightenment, he encouraged others to do the same: renounce the world of the senses to seek liberation from suffering. The monks and nuns that followed the Buddha's teachings formed a kind of sexless society, a society that did (...) not reproduce itself biologically.1 By abstaining from sexual relations, Buddhist monastics intended to reduce attachment and model an alternative to lay life. Buddhist society would continue via transmission of the teachings, a spiritual form of continuity not dependent on sex.But of course, the Buddha was teaching ordinary people with ordinary appetites for sexual contact. And these appetites could really get in the way of spiritual progress; thus we find no shortage of Buddhist commentary on sexuality and its ramifications. And despite 2,500 years of wisdom on this subject, Buddhist teachers and students are still blundering into sexual contacts that undermine their own progress and often the progress of others. Clearly this is not a human fallibility that can be corrected by setting up some simple rules. In fact, sexuality is one of the most deeply hard-wired neurological drives of the human organism, not easily uprooted even for lofty spiritual ideals.From a Buddhist perspective, working with sexuality is working with attachment. How can we understand that attachment in its biological origins? In A Natural History of Sex, Adrian Forsyth describes in vivid detail the ecology and evolution of mating behavior in the animal kingdom.2 In sixteen chapters that cover every biological strategy you can imagine—from incest to role reversal, infanticide to sex change—the author shows how costly sex can be to individual organisms. Though sex is not the only means of reproduction, it certainly involves the most complex behaviors, anatomical variations, social choices, and in a few cases, the risk of death. What can possibly merit such a great investment in momentary pleasure (if indeed it is pleasurable for some animals)? The evolutionary answer is, genetically variable offspring. Variation is the key to surviving calamity as a species. If all animals of a species were genetically identical, they would be terribly vulnerable to single events that exploited their weaknesses. But with variation, there is always a chance that some will make it [End Page 23] through and go on to survive the new conditions (post-earthquake, fire, icestorm, plague, etc.).Seen from the long view of evolution, sexuality is the key to survival of the species. So it is not surprising that sexual conditioning affects the entire human brain, a fact well known to human adolescents. To see how much conditioning must be addressed by Buddhist practice, we can look briefly at the neural map of the human brain. The part of the cortex that responds to touch is wrapped around the cerebrum, with specific areas registering touch in the different parts of the body. The area taken up by the genitals is about as large as the rest of the chest, abdomen, and back put together. It is equivalent to the area used for the hands or the lips, two parts of the body where touch is crucial for finding and managing food. Rita Carter, in Mapping the Mind, points out that "connections from the sex-sniffing, sex-seeking and sex-reactive areas of the limbic systems radiate to almost every corner of every cortical lobe, feeding the urge to our conscious minds."3 Sexual activity involves not only touch and high-level visual recognition but also emotion, thought, and, in the frontal lobes, morality—some of our most sophisticated and abstract thought processes.It is clear that sexuality presents no small challenge to religious practice. How has Buddhism attempted to work with this deep biological conditioning? The central guidelines for Buddhist ethics can be found in the five foundational precepts. Practicing the precepts is seen as a way to reduce suffering and to deepen one's capacity for achieving enlightenment. The first two precepts deal with not killing and not stealing, the third precept deals with not engaging in... (shrink)

In “How to Be an Infallibilist,” Julien Dutant (2016, 149) presents a simple and seemingly plausible argument that knowledge requires infallible belief—roughly, belief that could not be mistaken. As Dutant recognizes, infallibilism is almost universally dismissed, in large part because it seems to rule out any knowledge of the physical world. He seeks to show how we can be an Infallibilist without being a skeptic, based on the assumption that knowledge has a safety condition. I critically examine each line of (...) Dutant’s argument, showing that the argument is unsound on any plausible interpretation. I also question the idea that knowledge cannot be the conjunction of true belief and a nonfactive condition, that any belief about the physical world could not be false, and that any nonskeptical alternative to infallibilism would have to allow knowledge of chancy outcomes. I briefly suggest that a fallibilist account can be strict enough to satisfy the Infallibilist’s quest for certainty. (shrink)

The focus of this chapter will be on the epistemic and normative questions at issue in debates about cancer screening, with a special focus on mammography as a case study. Such questions include: How do we know who needs to be screened? What are the benefits and harms of cancer screening, and what is the quality of evidence for each? How ought we to measure and compare these benefits and harms? What are the sources of uncertainty about our estimates of (...) benefit and harm? Why are such issues so contested? What are the major drivers of dissent and consensus on the data and their interpretation? How, if at all, do values play a role in debates surrounding mammography screening? In sum: In what ways does inductive risk, broadly conceived, 1 come into play in the science behind cancer screening, and mammography screening in particular? (shrink)

Many of us assume that all the free editing and sorting of online content we ordinarily rely on is carried out by AI algorithms — not human persons. Yet in fact, that is often not the case. This is because human workers remain cheaper, quicker, and more reliable than AI for performing myriad tasks where the right answer turns on ineffable contextual criteria too subtle for algorithms to yet decode. The output of this work is then used for machine learning (...) purposes to generate algorithms constructed from large data sets containing thousands of correctly coded observations. The fact that ghost workers are treated as consumers distorts the basic logic of the employment relationship, effectively placing the worker-as-consumer in the worst of both worlds, in which they hold the legal rights of neither group. This puts them in a regulatory limbo position in which they have little or no protection, control, or guarantee of return on investment. This is because the platforms that facilitate ghost work have orchestrated a three-way virtual relationship that absolves all parties of responsibility, while placing nearly all the risks and opportunity costs squarely on the shoulders of the workers. As a result, we believe such a work arrangement as it stands, does not uphold basic standards of Rawlsian justice as fairness. (shrink)

While research shows that there are familiar forms of doing masculinity involving distancing from femininity/women or from subordinated/marginalized masculinities/men, there is less emphasis on the fact that the content of these masculine performances varies depending on the specific cultural norms and ideologies present in an organization. The author relies on a comparative case study using in-depth interviews and participant observation in the accounting departments at a heterosexual men’s pornographic magazine and at a feminist magazine to examine how organizational culture shapes (...) the ways that men do masculinity at work. Both accounting departments support a general pattern of doing masculinity referred to as the business professional attitude, but men also utilize unique strategies of doing masculinity depending on the degree to which masculinity is “safe” or “embattled” at their workplace. The author concludes by discussing the consequences of these strategies for men’s and women’s work relationships. (shrink)

The purpose of the present thesis is to apply philosophical methods to the ongoing debate of the precautionary principle, in order to illuminate this debate. The thesis consists of an Introduction and five papers. Paper I con-cerns an objection to the method of conceptual analysis, the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I argue that the Charge from Psychology is misdirected. In Paper II, the method of conceptual analysis is applied to the concept of precaution which (...) is ana-lysed in terms of precautionary actions. The purpose is explicatory. A definition involving three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is proposed, and the implications of this analysis for the debate on the pre-cautionary principle are discussed. Paper III attempts to provide an ana-lytical apparatus which may be used for finding improved formulations of the precautionary principle. The approach is lexicographical. Several exist-ing and possible formulations of the precautionary principle are examined, and four common elements and a common structure of the precautionary principle are identified. It is suggested that the analytical apparatus pre-sented can be used in negotiations of the precautionary principle. Paper IV questions the soundness of some arguments against the precautionary prin-ciple. Five common arguments are discussed and rejected. In Paper V, two of these arguments are further discussed. I argue that an attempt at rejec-tion of the precautionary principle delivered by John Harris and Søren Holm is unwarranted, because their arguments against it are based on in-terpretations of the precautionary principle that ignore context. Paper VI deals with the idea of de minimis risk. After a discussion of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, I examine one way of deter-mining how small a risk ought to be in order to be disregarded, namely the use of natural risk levels as benchmarks. I argue that this approach fails, even if the distinction between what is natural and what is not natural can be upheld. (shrink)

The paper is thematically divided into two parts. In the first part, we will address the arguments raised against the anti-intellectualist thesis that ability is a necessary condition for knowledge-how, present Katherine Hawley’s proposed generic solution based on counterfactual success in order to overcome these arguments, followed by an analysis of Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument to Hawley’s counterfactual success thesis [CST]. We will conclude that Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument misses its target, so that, as far as we are concerned, Katherine (...) Hawley’s proposal, namely CST, is safe. In the second part of the paper, we will provide a statistical interpretation of one of Hawley’s more specific proposals, counterfactual success with occasional failure [CSTF], and assess a couple of philosophically challenging consequences that follow from such an interpretation. (shrink)

The Safe-by-Design approach in synthetic biology holds the promise of designing the building blocks of life in an organism guided by the value of safety. This paves a new way for using biotechnologies safely. However, the Safe-by-Design approach moves the bulk of the responsibility for safety to the actors in the research and development phase. Also, it assumes that safety can be defined and understood by all stakeholders in the same way. These assumptions are problematic and might actually (...) undermine safety. This research explores these assumptions through the use of a Group Decision Room. In this set up, anonymous and non-anonymous deliberation methods are used for different stakeholders to exchange views. During the session, a potential synthetic biology application is used as a case for investigation: the Food Warden, a biosensor contained in meat packaging for indicating the freshness of meat. Participants discuss what potential issues might arise, how responsibilities should be distributed in a forward-looking way, who is to blame if something would go wrong. They are also asked what safety and responsibility mean at different phases, and for different stakeholders. The results of the session are not generalizable, but provide valuable insights. Issues of safety cannot all be taken care of in the R&D phase. Also, when things go wrong, there are proximal and distal causes to consider. In addition, capacities of actors play an important role in defining their responsibilities. Last but not least, this research provides a new perspective on the role of instruction manuals in achieving safety. (shrink)

Teaching ethics is crucial to health sciences education. Doing it well requires a willingness to engage contentious social issues. Those issues introduce conflict and risk, but avoiding them ignores moral diversity and renders the work of ethics education irrelevant. Therefore, when (not if) contentious issues and moral differences arise, they must be acknowledged and can be addressed with humility, collegiality, and openness to support learning. Faculty must risk moments when not everyone will “feel safe,” so the candor implied in (...) psychological safety can emerge. The deliberative and social work of ethics education involves generous listening, wading into difference, and wondering together if our beliefs and arguments are as sound as we once thought. By forecasting the need for candid engagement with contentious issues and moral difference, establishing ground rules, and bolstering due process structures for faculty and students, a riskier and more relevant ethics pedagogy can emerge. Doing so will prepare everyone for the moral diversity they can expect in our common life and in practice. (shrink)

This research project aims to accomplish two primary objectives: (1) propose an argument that a posthuman ethics in the design of technologies is sound and thus warranted and, (2) how can existent SBD approaches begin to envision principled and methodological ways of incorporating nonhuman values into design. In order to do this this MRP will provide a rudimentary outline of what constitutes SBD approaches. A particular design approach - Value Sensitive Design (VSD) - is taken up as an illustrative example (...) given that it, among the other SBD frameworks, most clearly illustrates a principled approach to the integration of values in design. -/- This explication will be followed by the strongest arguments for a posthumanist ethic, primarily drawing from the works of the Italian philosophers Leonardo Caffo and Roberto Marchesini and Francesa Ferrando. In doing so I will show how the human imperative to account for nonhuman values is a duty and as such must be continually ready-to-hand when making value-critical decision. (shrink)

This book offers an innovative approach to moral enhancement. We, as humans, have a moral duty to be as good as we can be. Hence, moral bio-enhancement, if effective and safe, is our moral duty. However, it has to be voluntary because if it is made compulsory, human freedom would be curtailed. As freedom is an essential component of humanness, compulsory MBE would infringe upon our humanness. An essential question is; what will motivate humans to subject themselves voluntarily to (...) MBE?The book argues - and supports by using empirical/experimental evidence - that morality and happiness operate in a circularly supportive relationship that applies to most humans most of the time: the better they are, the happier they will be; the happier they are, the better they will be. Hence, the grounding rationale for MBE ought not to be the prevention of “ultimate harm” based on compulsory MBE, but human happiness based on voluntary MBE. The primary objective of the book is to provide the readers with an original view on moral enhancement, whilst proposing a novel conception of moral enhancement that is informed by new biotechnological developments. (shrink)

Zhongdaology is the core of Chinese traditional Confucian philosophy. The zhongdaological way of thinking represents the Chinese philosophical thinking mode, with Confucianism as the main body, and has deeply influenced many aspects of Chinese culture. It is different from the traditional ontological thinking in the West. However, for a long time, due to the influence of the dominant position of Western ontological thinking in the field of philosophical research, the characteristics of zhongdaological thinking have not been fully elaborated and promoted. (...) This essay briefly exposes the historical origin of the doctrine of zhongdaology and its significance in Confucianism. Like the situation of traditional Chinese philosophy, African philosophy also has long been overshadowed and ignored by western philosophy to some extent. To this end, it can be safely stated that the dominance of western tradition is why the interaction between Chinese philosophy and African philosophy and otherunderrepresented philosophical traditions in the south have not taken firm roots. This essay makes some preliminary comparisons betweenChinese Confucian zhongdaology with some African philosophical ideas such as Ezumezu and Ubuntu, to show, first, the significance of broader dialogue and exchange among different philosophical traditions in the south, second how zhongdaology itself could serve as a veritable framework for doing philosophy across borders. (shrink)

There is currently a stalemate over the correct approach to legal liability. To take a prominent example, it remains a point of contention whether land owners should be held liable for injuries to trespassers. Many of those who insist that land owners should be held liable for injuries to trespassers maintain this for purely economic or pragmatic reasons. In contrast, those on the other side frequently defend their view on the grounds that, in such trespass cases, owners are not morally (...) responsible for the injuries. We maintain that the best way forward for all parties in this debate is to recognize the existence of “morally responsible liability ”—of cases where owners qua owners are morally responsible for damages caused by their property. Once this is recognized, the debate can be framed in terms of whether there are economic or pragmatic reasons for legal liability to diverge from morally responsible liability. Unfortunately, there is no good account of morally responsible liability in the literature. Taking lessons from the failings of the few extant accounts, we draw on the work of A. M. Honoré and Jeremy Waldron to develop an account of our own. We argue that owners are morally responsible for damages caused by their property when and because their taking ownership of something leads to increased risk to others. We explain how and why such increases in risk come about, and how our account captures our intuitions concerning various cases, including those concerning injuries to trespassers. (shrink)

Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that -- according to Buddhaghosa -- should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega -- what it is and how it works -- based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two" systems" : the experiential, automatic system (...) 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight in suffering produce moral motivation. (shrink)

This article recounts how Neo-Scholastic international lawyers navigated the complex political landscape of the 1920s and 30s, combining universalism, nationalism and religious belief. Participating in the contemporary re-engagement of Catholics with modern politics, they re-imagined the international legal order in Catholic terms. They argued that a universal morality, overruling the extremes of state sovereignty, was the only solid basis for just and stable global legal relations. While the contribution of Catholics to the establishment of the post-war world order and the (...) rise of human rights is widely acknowledged, the interwar genealogy of these developments is not. Reading these thinkers’ universalist legal tenets in conjunction with their political trajectories provides a relevant frame to understand the moral charge characterizing international law in the early years of the Cold War. (shrink)

Haack's topic here is the terms "pragmatism" and "pragmaticism," why Peirce felt the need for the new term, which was "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers," and why he thought its ugliness was actually a good thing. What was the origin of pragmatism as a philosophical movement? When, where, and how did the word "pragmatism" get into philosophical circulation? Why does Peirce conclude, only a few years after he had taken his bows as the founder of the movement, (...) that he needed a new word for the original idea? Who were the kidnappers he worried about? Why did he think the ugliness of this new word a good thing? How does this relate to his distaste for "studying in a literary spirit"? And, as always, what can we learn from all this?—a good deal, Haack discovers, about the state of philosophy today. (shrink)

Pregnancy and childbirth have become a dangerous journey for Black women as harrowing stories of death and near‐death experiences resonate within Black communities. While the causes of pregnancy‐related morbidity and mortality are well documented, little is known about how Black Canadian women feel protected from undesirable maternal health outcomes when accessing and receiving pregnancy and intrapartum care. This critical qualitative inquiry sheds light on Black women's perceived sense of safety in accessing pregnancy and intrapartum care. Twenty‐four in‐depth interviews were conducted (...) with Black women who were pregnant or had given birth. Five interconnected themes were generated through thematic analysis: (1) There is a lot of prejudice towards us, (2) We are treated as sick bodies, (3) There is a lot of stereotypes towards us, (4) Our care is lacking in quality, and (5) We feel unsafe in the healthcare system. These themes highlight the perils faced by Black women accessing pregnancy and intrapartum care. The right to safe motherhood and equitable care for Black women should be a national priority in Canada to avert a looming crisis. (shrink)

Philosophers provide excellent resources for developing a science of virtues, and an interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophers and psychologists seems ideal. This suggestion is not new, but there has been little guidance for psychologists about how philosophical work can be useful in developing a science of virtue. This article provides some guidance by dividing the contributions of philosophers into three categories. First, many philosophers provide theories of virtue’s nature or value, but these are generally not useful for psychological scientists and can (...) be safely ignored. Second, awareness of the range of philosophic positions can enable scientists to recognize contentious theoretical assumptions that they are making. Psychologists need not try to resolve these debates; they can choose to only identify which position(s) they are taking. Third, awareness of the range of philosophic positions and the competing conceptual analyses of various virtue concepts and traits can help psychologists to identify and test new empirical hypotheses. (shrink)

The Safe-by-Design approach in synthetic biology holds the promise of designing the building blocks of life in an organism guided by the value of safety. This paves a new way for using biotechnologies safely. However, the Safe-by-Design approach moves the bulk of the responsibility for safety to the actors in the research and development phase. Also, it assumes that safety can be defined and understood by all stakeholders in the same way. These assumptions are problematic and might actually (...) undermine safety. This research explores these assumptions through the use of a Group Decision Room. In this set up, anonymous and non-anonymous deliberation methods are used for different stakeholders to exchange views. During the session, a potential synthetic biology application is used as a case for investigation: the Food Warden, a biosensor contained in meat packaging for indicating the freshness of meat. Participants discuss what potential issues might arise, how responsibilities should be distributed in a forward-looking way, who is to blame if something would go wrong. They are also asked what safety and responsibility mean at different phases, and for different stakeholders. The results of the session are not generalizable, but provide valuable insights. Issues of safety cannot all be taken care of in the R&D phase. Also, when things go wrong, there are proximal and distal causes to consider. In addition, capacities of actors play an important role in defining their responsibilities. Last but not least, this research provides a new perspective on the role of instruction manuals in achieving safety. (shrink)

The creative thinking and ability of top management team members is important in coping with rapid changes in the external environment and improving the competitive advantage of an organization. This research focuses on the CEO–TMT interface to explain how CEOs influence TMT characteristics, which in turn affects TMT outcomes. Based on social learning theory, this study examines the associations among CEO ethical leadership, TMT cohesion and TMT creativity in a Chinese context using a total of 91 top management teams. To (...) verify the reliability and validity of the constructs, a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were run. The results showed that the hypothesized model captured distinct constructs and fits the data well. Multistep regression method was used to test hypotheses. The results indicated that (a) CEO ethical leadership has a positive effect on TMT creativity; (b) TMT cohesion plays a mediating role in the relationship between CEO ethical leadership and TMT creativity; and (c) power distance plays a moderating role in the relationship between CEO ethical leadership and TMT creativity. The greater the power distance, the weaker the positive relationship between CEO ethical leadership and TMT creativity. This study demonstrates the value of CEO ethical leadership and advocates the importance of establishing team cohesion and building a psychologically safe environment to motivate top managers within an organization to share information and knowledge to improve creativity. (shrink)

Research related to indigenous peoples in Sweden and elsewhere has a history marked by discriminatory practice and unequal research processes. Sweden has still not been very visible in terms of openly debating, developing and implementing ethical strategies specifically suited for indigenous research. The present study explores how research ethics is discussed among scholars within the Sami research field in contemporary Sweden. Fifty-six research proposals deriving from eight different research institutions and 160 individual researchers are analyzed, discovering how scholars relate to (...) research ethics when planning for new research projects related to the indigenous Sami. The results demonstrate that ethical guidelines for research are often referred to, but that a common view on what guidelines to use is lacking, leading to a notable variety between different researchers. Ethical discussions are present in the vast majority of the proposals, however there are notable differences between the theories around how to proceed in a culturally safe, ethical manner, and the proposed methods that are to be used to implement theory in practice. In conclusion, there exists a great uncertainty among scholars on where to seek ethical guidance, how to relate to current legislation around research ethics and at the same time act ethically in a culturally appropriate manner. This uncertainty leads to questioning whether discussions of ethics are relevant in the first place, what they are supposed to include, how they are meant to be undertaken and what consequences can be expected from the presence or absence of ethics in indigenous research. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAn estimated 1.5 million people died in 2007 from waterborne illness. While this number is unacceptably high, it represents a 16 percent improvement over the previous three years. This paper discusses the challenges and solutions to delivering clean water in the developing world. It then discusses safe water projects for a children's dormitory in Mae Nam Khun, Thailand, and for a community in Chirundu, Zambia. Both projects were designed and implemented by the Seattle University student chapter of Engineers Without (...) Borders . These projects had technical challenges that are relatively easy to resolve in the developed world, but were particularly challenging in their contexts. This paper examines how these challenges were met through collaboration with several organizations, including the Centers for Disease Control in the United States and small businesses within the host countries. (shrink)

We expect schools to be a safe haven, but after more than a decade of targeted school violence prevention laws and safety plans, students are still marginalized and bullied to the point of despondence, retaliation, and even suicide. This thoughtful exploration of what makes a school a safe place is based on the understanding that violence is a continuum of acts and attitudes–subtle to overt–that have a negative effect on how students feel and learn.

In this paper, I explore a number of issues related to a life lived with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Primarily, I am interested in discussing how one unwillingly changes their personal identity by forced medicating—demanded by others implicitly and explicitly. My motivation is something deep and invasive in me. I want to know, I have always wanted to know, why others want me to not be Me so badly. I have thought about this question for years, and though others may (...) simply chalk it up to just one of the standard paranoid or narcissistic traits of borderline personality disorder, there is something more to this question that many of us agonize over most of our lives. There is a deeply normative component to this question that extends beyond the mere fear of abandonment; it is tied to a desire by others to erase—literally—who we are for their own comfort. In this sense, then, I invite you to travel along a path of what it can mean to be a BPDer, from a narrative, phenomenological, and cognitive lived, embodied perspective. My purpose is to show that the treatments for us that others desire cannot avoid (and usually do not want to avoid) the unraveling of who we really are. Whether we want to or not, we give up our self to keep other people with us. And for many, this is too much to ask, and can be one, though not the only, reason suicide and self‐harm seem to be necessary recourses. One in 10 people with BPD commit suicide. So this is a serious matter, indeed. (shrink)