Digital data is an increasing and continual presence across the sites, activities and relationships of everyday life. In this article we explore what data presence means for the ways that the everyday is organised, sensed, and anticipated. While digital data studies have demonstrated how data is deeply entangled with the way in which everyday life is lived out and valued, at the same time our relationships with data are riddled with anxieties or small niggles or tricky trade-offs and their use (...) is often chaotic and muddled, part of the inevitable uncertainty about what will happen next. If the presence of data is part of the environments we inhabit, this raises the question of how and why data is valuable to us and what forms of hope and trust enable this value to further develop. (shrink)

This paper deals with Thomas Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature. Deviating from its interpretation as a logically indispensable hypothesis for the purpose of the individualist-contractualist legitimation of the state, the article directs the discussion away from the question of the state of nature’s status within Hobbes’ anthropological or legal framework and towards the issue of where and what kind of evidence for this narrative is supposed to be found. If one interrogates this narrative in epistemological terms, an interpretative (...) perspective is opened up in which ordinary forms of competitive and exploitative behaviour as well as of unmediated rule are of central importance, and the consideration of the state of nature as both a situational-relational and gradual concept is made possible as well as necessary. This contribution not only shows how such interpretative possibility is substantiated by the primary sources, but also asks how it relates to Hobbes’ own reflections on knowledge and scientific method. It is shown that what is crucial here is not the distinction between empirical and idealist approach, but the one between two kinds of experience, the second of which corresponds to a nominalist view of knowledge about politics. (shrink)

In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.

Horst Bredekamp’s subject is the astute deployment and perennial resonance of the startling image of the body politic that dominates the frontispiece to Leviathan: a treatise on the psychology of the individual and the dynamic of the multitude, published in 1651 by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Affirming the centrality of such a figural device for this pioneering theorist of the state, Bredekamp goes on to address the art-historical dimension of the mesmerising etched title-page. In his central chapters he (...) explores the extraordinary range of sources – from socio-cultural tradition to scientific advances – on which the author and his artist-collaborator may have drawn. In conclusion, he reveals Hobbes to be no less passionate than shrewd in his belief that the constraints and amenities of a tolerable life in common attest to the potency of the visual. As appendices, two essays and catalogues explore the portraits made of Hobbes as well as illustrations that appeared in his other works, thus systematically completing the exploration of the images connected with this exceptional philosopher. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from philosophers (...) has been the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). CTM was first articulated by Hilary Putnam (1960, 1961), but finds perhaps its most consistent and enduring advocate in Jerry Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994). It is this theory, and not any broader interpretations of what it would be for the mind to be a computer, that I wish to address in this paper. What I shall argue here is that the notion of symbolic representation employed by CTM is fundamentally unsuited to providing an explanation of the intentionality of mental states (a major goal of CTM), and that this result undercuts a second major goal of CTM, sometimes refered to as the vindication of intentional psychology. This line of argument is related to the discussions of derived intentionality by Searle (1980, 1983, 1984) and Sayre (1986, 1987). But whereas those discussions seem to be concerned with the causal dependence of familiar sorts of symbolic representation upon meaning-bestowing acts, my claim is rather that there is not one but several notions of meaning to be had, and that the notions that are applicable to symbols are conceptually dependent upon the notion that is applicable to mental states in the fashion that Aristotle refered to as paronymy. That is, an analysis of the notions of meaning applicable to symbols reveals that they contain presuppositions about meaningful mental states, much as Aristotle's analysis of the sense of healthy that is applied to foods reveals that it means conducive to having a healthy body, and hence any attempt to explain mental semantics in terms of the semantics of symbols is doomed to circularity and regress. I shall argue, however, that this does not have the consequence that computationalism is bankrupt as a paradigm for cognitive science, as it is possible to reconstruct CTM in a fashion that avoids these difficulties and makes it a viable research framework for psychology, albeit at the cost of losing its claims to explain intentionality and to vindicate intentional psychology. I have argued elsewhere (Horst, 1996) that local special sciences such as psychology do not require vindication in the form of demonstrating their reducibility to more fundamental theories, and hence failure to make good on these philosophical promises need not compromise the broad range of work in empirical cognitive science motivated by the computer paradigm in ways that do not depend on these problematic treatments of symbols. (shrink)

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)

This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive (...) illusions and explores implications for epistemology, semantics, and disunity of science. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. (...) I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what’s special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons. (shrink)

In this panel six IS researchers from varying backgrounds will discuss whether epistemological anarchy, as proposed by the controversial philosopher Paul Feyerabend, has the potential to foster research progress and can help to create new insights in the IS field. Feyerabend is well known for his notion that "anything goes" in terms of methodology, and many scholars are concerned that this seemingly anarchistic sentiment can undermine efforts to systematically build and structure an epistemological and methodological foundation for an academic discipline. (...) This panel, which will be moderated by Horst Treiblmaier, includes as panelists Andrew Burton-Jones, Shirley Gregor, Rudy Hirschheim, Michael Myers, and Tom Stafford. The outcome of this discussion will be incorporated into a paper published in the DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems. (shrink)

Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or (...) archery, creditworthy moral success is a matter of getting things right by way of manifesting a relevant skill. My main aim in this paper is to bring out an important structural difference between moral creditworthiness and creditworthiness in sports, arts, and craft, undermining attempts to use examples of the latter as a model for understanding the former. As an alternative, I propose an account of morally creditworthy action, according to which such action is a matter of manifesting virtue, not skill—a claim that's based on an important, but underappreciated, difference between the sorts of excellences constituting virtues and skills. The paper thus contributes to a more nuanced picture of normative achievements across different domains of human agency, highlighting largely overlooked structural dissimilarities among them. (shrink)

Die Pluralität theologischer Denkansätze wurde in jüngster Zeit mit einem Exklusivitätsanspruch von Teilen Analytischer Theologie konfrontiert. Vertreter*innen 'kontinentaler' Theologie sehen sich dadurch zu einem Metadiskurs über die Frage herausgefordert, wie Theologie heute grundsätzlich zu formatieren ist. In diesem Band treten Positionen zum ersten Mal in einen direkten argumentativen Austausch.

Over the past thirty years, it is been common to hear the mind likened to a digital computer. This essay is concerned with a particular philosophical view that holds that the mind literally is a digital computer (in a specific sense of “computer” to be developed), and that thought literally is a kind of computation. This view—which will be called the “Computational Theory of Mind” (CTM)—is thus to be distinguished from other and broader attempts to connect the mind with computation, (...) including (a) various enterprises at modeling features of the mind using computational modeling techniques, and (b) employing some feature or features of production-model computers (such as the stored program concept, or the distinction between hardware and software) merely as a guiding metaphor for understanding some feature of the mind. This entry is therefore concerned solely with the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) proposed by Hilary Putnam [1961] and developed most notably for philosophers by Jerry Fodor [1975, 1980, 1987, 1993]. The senses of ‘computer’ and ‘computation’ employed here are technical; the main tasks of this entry will therefore be to elucidate: (a) the technical sense of ‘computation’ that is at issue, (b) the ways in which it is claimed to be applicable to the mind, (c) the philosophical problems this understanding of the mind is claimed to solve, and (d) the major criticisms that have accrued to this view. (shrink)

This article presents a reading of Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, in recourse to lesser known works of his such as Dictatorship and On the Three Types of Juristic Thought and in light of a hypothesis developed while examining his comment to Concept, going back to the German re-edition of the latter in 1963. There, Schmitt offers an interpretative scheme he has himself named “Hobbes-Crystal”, encapsulating not only a suggestion of how to decipher Hobbes, but also Schmitt’s own approach (...) to politics as Political Theology. As I argue below, the relevant comment also hints at Schmitt’s opposing stance to Natural Law as a legal paradigm and philosophical tradition. I show how this is supported by the Concept’s main text and other works mentioned above, proceeding to claim the former functions on a double-level: Schmitt‘s nominalist inquiry in the concept, circular in itself (although favourably supported by a sup-posedly mere description of what is “the case”) sits on premises which not only have not been articulated openly, but also contradict the nominalist proceeding. Bringing both insights to-gether and fleshing them out by close reading, I show that Schmitt’s nominalism presupposes his adversary stance towards Natural Law. Examining the arguments for this position of his and endorsing Oliver Marchart’s work in history of political theory, I read the nominalist façade of the Concept as a case of postfundamentalist criticism of Natural Law, which Schmitt’s Hobbes studies were formative to. (shrink)

This new volume of the SAGE Social Thinkers series, The Social Thought of Georg Simmel provides a concise introduction to the work, life, and influences of Georg Simmel. Horst J. Helle closely examines the writings and ideas of Simmel that introduced a new way of looking at culture and society and helped establish sociology’s place among the academic fields. The book focuses on the key intellectual concerns of Simmel, including the process of individualization, religion, private and family life, cities, (...) and modernization. It is ideal for use as a self-contained volume or in conjunction with other sociological theory books. (shrink)

Seit dem byzantinischen Bilderstreit und dem Bildersturm der Reformation ist nicht mehr in solcher Intensität über Bilder nachgedacht worden wie in den letzten Jahrzehnten. Neben der Archäologie und der Kunstgeschichte haben sich zahlreiche weitere Fächer an Fragestellungen rund um das Bild geradezu festgebissen. Angesichts dessen geht einer der bedeutendsten Kunsthistoriker der Gegenwart der Frage nach, warum Begriff und Geltung sowie Macht und Ohnmacht von Bildern so hartnäckig verfolgte Themen unserer Tage geworden sind.

Belonging uncertainty, defined as the general concern about the quality of one’s social relationships in an academic setting, has been found to be an important determinant of academic achievement and persistence. However, to date, only little research investigated the sources of belonging uncertainty. To address this research gap, we examined three potential sources of belonging uncertainty in a sample of undergraduate computer science students in Germany (N= 449) and focused on (a) perceived affective and academic exclusion by fellow students, (b) (...) domain-specific academic self-efficacy beliefs, and (c) perception of one’s individual performance potential compared to that of fellow students in the field. Perceived affective and academic exclusion by fellow students and domain-specific academic self-efficacy beliefs were significant predictors of female students’ uncertainty about belonging in computer science. The perception of one’s individual performance potential in comparison to that of fellow students, however, was a relevant predictor of both male and female students’ belonging uncertainty in computer science. Our findings imply an expanded view of the theoretical concept of belonging uncertainty that goes beyond mere concerns of social connectedness. (shrink)

This article examines the notions of “intuitive” and “counterintuitive” beliefs and concepts in cognitive science of religion. “Intuitive” states are contrasted with those that are products of explicit, conscious reasoning. In many cases the intuitions are grounded in the implicit rules of mental models, frames, or schemas. I argue that the pathway from intuitive to high theological concepts and beliefs may be distinct from that from intuitions to “folk religion,” and discuss how Christian theology might best interpret the results of (...) studies in cognitive psychology of religion. (shrink)

Segundo o presente artigo, a crise ecológica tornou dramaticamente claw que a evolução social não deve ser apenas entendida como uma emancipação das limitações derivadas da natureza e das amarras da sociabilidade humana e ainda menos deve ser aferida pela capacidade de transformar a natureza num mew repositório de recursos naturais capazes de garantir a sobrevivência do género humano. O artigo pretende assim mostrar até que ponto o progresso social está intimamente associado com a capacidade de se manter o metabolismo (...) social com a natureza a um nível regenerativo. Precisamente neste contexto é que deve ser entendida a exigência de se associar intimamente os sistemas funcionais da economia e da técnica na rede natural que os suporta e dessa forma condicionar a direcção estàvel da evolugdo social á capacidade de resistencia, sempre em mudança, dos sistemas ecológicos. Nesse sentido, o autor define a tarefa de uma "ética social ecológica" como sendo a de contribuir para a clarificação da necessária e, diante da razão prática, responsdvel articulagdo mutua dos factores económicos, sócio-culturais e ecológicos. Essa "ética social ecólogica", diz ainda o autor, parte da constatação de que com a modernidade se alcançou um estádio da história da cultura em que a dependência do ser humano em relação a natureza está ligada com uma dependência de muitos ecosistemas, até então deixados em seu estado natural, em relação ao ser humano, de cuja integridade, por sua vez, também o ser humano depende. Porfim, o artigo interroga-se sobre até que ponto numa natureza de tal maneira "socializada" ainda se podem encontrar pressupostos para uma praxis social capaz de apontar um caminho racionalmente induzido em que se garanta ofuturo dos sistemas sociais, e mostra como esta questão conduz ao problema ético-ecológico fundamental relativo á existência de aspectos normativos no relacionamento com a natureza nas sociedades modernas. /// In the view of the present article, the ecological crisis has dramatically demonstrated that social evolution ought not be understood merely in terms of an emancipation of natural and social limitations. Even less, ought it be thought that such an emancipation implies the transformation of nature into just a reserve of natural resources for the survival of humankind. The article hopes to show the degree to which social progress is intimately associated with the capacity of maintaining the social metabolism with nature at the level at which regeneration is possible. One must come to understand the exigency of bringing functional systems of economy and technology within the natural network nature that supports them such that an equilibrium in social evolution may be established in relation to the ecological systems. In this sense, the author sees the task of an "ecological social ethics" as contributing to the clarification of the necessary articulation between economic, socio-cultural, and ecological factors. Such an ethics is conceived against the background of a modernity that reflects a stage in the history of culture in which human beings were seen as depending on many ecosystems left in their natural state. Finally, the question is raised concerning the degree to which it is still possible to find principles for a social praxis capable of opening a rational path for the social systems of the future and how this question raises a further one about the normative aspects of the relationship with nature in modern societies. (shrink)

This book challenges the standard view that modern hermeneutics begins with Friedrich Ast and Friedrich Schleiermacher, arguing instead that it is the dialectic of reflective and teleological reason in Kant’s Critique of Judgment that provides the actual proto-hermeneutic foundation. It is revolutionary in doing so by replacing interpretive truth claims by the more appropriate claim of rendering opaque contexts intelligible. Taking Gadamer’s comprehensive analysis of hermeneutics in Truth and Method (1960) as its point of departure, the book turns to Kant’s (...) Critiques, reviewing his major concepts as a coherent system in relation to his sensus communis. At the heart of the book is the interaction between reflective, bottom-up search and teleological, top-down interpretative projection as provided in Part II of the third Critique. This text contends that Kant’s broad definition of nature invites the liberation of the reflective-teleological judgment from its biological exemplifications and so permits us to establish its generalised status as a path-breaking, methodological tool. Kant’s dialectic of reflective search and meaning bestowing, stipulated teleology is asserted to anticipate a series of motifs commonly associated with hermeneutics. Figures covered include Dilthey, Husserl, Ingarden, Heidegger, Gadamer, Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, Vattimo, Nancy and Caputo. Their collective contributions to interpretation allow for a review of the evolution of hermeneutics from the perspective of the Kantian critique of the limitations of human cognition. The book is written for the informed, general reader, but will likewise appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students as well as researchers in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of U.S. farmland owners, operators, and workers by race, ethnicity, and gender. We first review the intersection between racialized and gendered capitalism and farmland ownership and farming in the United States. Then we analyze data from the 2014 Tenure and Ownership Agricultural Land survey, the 2012 Census of Agriculture, and the 2013–2014 National Agricultural Worker Survey to demonstrate that significant nation-wide disparities in farming by race, ethnicity and gender persist in the U.S. In 2012–2014, White (...) people owned 98% and operated 94% of all farmland. They generated 98% of all farm-related income from land ownership and 97% of income from farm owner-operatorship. Meanwhile, People of Color farmers were more likely to be tenants rather than owners, owned less land, and generated less farm-related wealth per person than their White counterparts. Hispanic farmers were also disproportionately farm laborers. In addition to racial and ethnic disparities, there were disparities by gender. About 63% of non-operating landowners, 86% of farm operators, and 87% of tenant farmers were male, and female farmers tended to generate less income per farmer than men. This data provides evidence of ongoing racial, ethnic and gender disparities in agriculture in the United States. We conclude with a call to address the structural drivers of the disparities and with recommendations for better data collection. (shrink)

At the beginning of the year, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) was published. The text is the result of the work of a broad range of private law scholars from the Member States of the European Union, and it presents itself as an ‘academic’ document, committed to the precepts of scholarship rather than politics. Notwithstanding its unwieldy name, the text is nothing less than the draft of the central components of a European Civil Code. The following article aims (...) to inform the reader about this potentially important document and to initiate further academic debate about it. Following an overview of the genesis and content of the DCFR (Part 1), the discussion focuses on whether, and to what extent, it is based upon consistent and convincing core aims and values (Part 2). The article then proceeds to address, more specifically, the significance of private autonomy, and it examines the extent to which the proposed rules satisfy the requirements of legal certainty and legal clarity (Part 3). Thereafter, the DCFR is measured against the criteria of internal consistency and systematic integrity (Part 4). Also (Part 5) the question is asked whether the Draft critically reflects and convincingly integrates the sources on which it is based (that is the Lando Commission's Principles of European Contract Law and the Acquis Principles, as well as the private law traditions of the Member States). Also deserving of attention is the inclusion of more than 120 definitions of central concepts of private law, which are not to be found in this form or level of detail in either the Lando Principles or the national private laws (Part 6). (shrink)

It makes sense to review these two books together since they both address the concept of semiotranslation, Dinda L. Gorlée extending her previous writings on the subject by adding intermedial intertextuality argued as 'transduction', and Douglas Robinson subjecting semiotranslation to a sustained critique before offering his own icotic position.In agreement with her previous publications, Gorlée rejects any notion of translation as a simple substitution of linguistic expressions. Instead, the translation process and its results are seen as non-symmetrical, forever changing over (...) time and between cultures. 'Translation' now encompasses a broad spectrum of transformations from intralingual paraphrase to intermedial... (shrink)

The constructionism is an epistemology that is discussed in several social and educational disciplines. The key thesis is that the human world is based on perception and is a construction of a reality that lies outside of the knowing subject. Everything that can be known of this external reality is created by the observer. The following article describes the tradition of this epistemological position of skepticism and the different perspectives and,,schools" of this constructionist paradigm. Some unsolved questions are discussed, and (...) it is asked whether this paradigm is really new and innovative. The last section concerns the reception of these ideas within the educational sciences and pedagogical practice. (shrink)

V. 1 is a detailed analysis of a previously unknown proof copy of the first edition of Galileo's Sidereus nuncius, in which watercolor drawings appear in place of the etchings of the published edition, consigned in 2005 to the antiquarian bookselling firm of Martayan Lan. V. 2 is an account of the composition and production of the edition, based on analysis of extant copies as well as the New York proof copy. V. 3 was written in response to the discovery, (...) soon after the publication of v. 2, that the proof copy was in fact an elaborate forgery produced between 2003 and 2005 under the direction of Marino Massimo de Caro, as first reported in the article "A very rare book," by Nicholas Schmidle, in The New Yorker issue of 16 December 2013. V. 4, in German, is a heavily revised edition of Horst Bredekamp's Galilei der Künstler, which had included a chapter on the then unrecognized forgery. (shrink)

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that (...) is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. (shrink)