The topic of this book is a comparison between holism in the philosophy and language and social holism on the one hand and holism about space-time and quantum systems on the other hand. The main claim is that holism in the humanities and holism in fundamental physics come under the same substantial, general conception of holism. That is to say: arguments to the effect that the holism of the mental is unscientific or that (...) the mental is separated from the physical owing to holism are not sound. The holism of the mental fits into a world-view that bases itself on scientific realism. The addressees of this book are all those who care about our view of the world and ourselves in the spirit of an argumentative examination of different positions. No familiarity with physics is presupposed. (shrink)

Traditionally, a scientific model is thought to provide a good scientific explanation to the extent that it satisfies certain scientific goals that are thought to be constitutive of explanation. Problems arise when we realize that individual scientific models cannot simultaneously satisfy all the scientific goals typically associated with explanation. A given model’s ability to satisfy some goals must always come at the expense of satisfying others. This has resulted in philosophical disputes regarding which of these goals are in fact necessary (...) for explanation, and as such which types of models can and cannot provide explanations. Explanatory monists argue that one goal will be explanatory in all contexts, while explanatory pluralists argue that the goal will vary based on pragmatic considerations. In this paper, I argue that such debates are misguided, and that both monists and pluralists are incorrect. Instead of any goal being given explanatory priority over others in a given context, the different goals are all deeply dependent on one another for their explanatory power. Any model that sacrifices some explanatory goals to attain others will always necessarily undermine its own explanatory power in the process. And so when forced to choose between individual scientific models, there can be no explanatory victors. Given that no model can satisfy all the goals typically associated with explanation, no one model in isolation can provide a good scientific explanation. Instead we must appeal to collections of models. Collections of models provide an explanation when they satisfy the web of interconnected goals that justify the explanatory power of one another. (shrink)

This book is a systematic analysis of John R. Searle's philosophy of mind. Searle's view of mind, as a set of subjective and biologically embodied processes, can account for our being part of nature qua mindful beings. This model finds support in neuroscience and offers reliable solutions to the problems of consciousness, mental causation, and the self.

Reprint of an article that initially appeared in _Ethical Theory and Moral Practice_ (2012).

This book presents practical holism as a framework for understanding the ways in which our society and individual lives are affected by moral, legal, political, economic, and other considerations. Only nomadic thought is able to capture the interactions among all those crucial aspects.

One issue of dispute between methodological individualists and methodological holists is whether holist explanations are dispensable in the sense that individualist explanations are able to do their explanatory job. Methodological individualists say they are, whereas methodological holists deny this. In the first part of the paper, I discuss Elder-Vass’ version of an influential argument in support of methodological holism, the argument from emergence. I argue that methodological individualists should reject it: The argument relies on a distinction between individualist and (...) holist explanations that they find unacceptable and Elder-Vass’ reasons in support of his way of drawing this distinction are not good ones. In the second part, I examine what, if anything, would be good reasons in support of a particular way of differentiating between individualist and holist explanations. I propose that a good reason is one which shows, in an acceptable manner, that the distinction, drawn in the same way in all contexts, is useful from the perspective of offering explanations of the social world. I show that if this criterion is adopted, it will result in a fruitful reorientation of the whole debate between methodological individualists and methodological holists. (shrink)

This book raises and examines the philosophical problem of how it is possible that the social world is constituted as a unified totality. A novel theory of social i holism is put forward on the basis of what is specified as formal ontology. The first part of the book discloses the non-extensional constitution of the social world and proposes that the individual is to be understood as a 'Leibnizian entelechial monad' in conceptual communication with the others. it is further (...) established that the categories of social holism must be placed within a transcendental locus. in the second part, this conceptual communication is analysed as the possession and application of social concepts, meaningful linguistic behaviour, and the intentionality of mental acts. Finally, in the last part, the event-structure to the social world is described. Social states of affairs as constituents of an event-dense social world are shown to be complex wholes irreducible to their subjects and instantiating an intensional nexus of relations of social properties. (shrink)

Holistic theories of meaning have, at least since Dummett’s Frege: The Philosophy of language, been assumed to be problematic from the perspective of the incremental nature of natural language learning. In this essay I argue that the general relationship between holism and language learning is in fact the opposite of that claimed by Dummett. It is only given a particular form of language learning, and a particular form of holism, that there is a problem at all; in general, (...) for all forms of holism, and irrespective of how language learning is understood, semantic holism is conducive to language learning. The paper has three main parts. In the first, I demonstrate with the use of a simple formal system, that the form of holism that generates the problem that Dummett draws attention to is really decomposable into three distinct components, each of which is necessary for the problem to arise. In the second part, I demonstrate that even Dummett’s strong form of holism is compatible with one natural way in which to understand the incremental nature of language learning. In the third part, I outline the reasons why all forms of holism are conducive to language learning and offer two ways in which this general fact can be spelled out precisely. I end the paper by addressing some possible objections, and in doing so I draw attention to some affinities between semantic holism and the principle of compositionality, a semantic principle which has long been assumed to be conducive to language learning. (shrink)

SummaryDonald Davidson's account of the interrelation between attitudes, and linguistic and non‐linguistic behaviour is a thoroughly holistic one. The project of radical interpretation itself embodies a holistic approach to the interpretative task. Yet Davidson also accepts a degree of indeterminacy in interpretation. Davidson's commitment to both holism and indeterminacy can give rise to a problem in the Davidsonian position. That problem is explained and a solution proposed. The indeterminacy thesis is thereby clarified, as is the nature of Davidsonian (...) class='Hi'>holism. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the extent to which issues of simulation model validation take on novel characteristics when the models in question become particularly complex. Our central claim is that complex simulation models in general, and global models of climate in particular, face a form of confirmation holism. This holism, moreover, makes analytic understanding of complex models of climate either extremely difficult or even impossible. We argue that this supports a position we call convergence skepticism: the belief (...) that the existence of a plurality of different models making a plurality of different forecasts of future climate is likely to be a persistent feature of global climate science. (shrink)

This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification (...) has rather unwelcome consequences—formally resembling the Sorites paradox—as soon as it is iterated and combined with a natural Bayesian perspective on probabilistic inferences. We conclude that strong versions of foundationalism and infinitism should be abandoned. Positively, we provide a rough sketch for a graded formal coherence notion, according to which infinite regresses of epistemic justification will often have more than a minimal degree of coherence. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to propose a general conception of holism which is applicable to cases as far apart as holism in belief systems and holism in quantum physics. My proposal characterizes a holistic system S in terms of generic ontological dependence among its parts. This dependence relates to some of the properties that make something a part of an S whenever there is a suitable arrangement with other things. My proposal thus also characterizes what (...) it is for something to be a part of a holistic system and enables us to conceive of holistic properties. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to critically assess Errol E. Harris’s process philosophy in the face of contemporary research in the special sciences. Harris devoted his life to grappling with the big questions concerning the relationships between nature, mind, and knowledge. His 70-plus year career was distinguished, his texts on the history of philosophy, philosophy of science, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and consciousness were widely published, and yet his metaphysics has until now remained excluded from mainstream discussions. This (...) book’s contention is that Harris’s work reveals as yet unnoticed connections between theories in numerous scientific disciplines ranging from psychology to cosmology and that an examination of certain theories within these disciplines may serve to strengthen his original arguments. This work maintains that the resulting metaphysics frames a transdisciplinary paradigm shift and provides a viable solution to the hard problem of consciousness. (shrink)

Quantum theory has the property of “local tomography”: the state of any composite system can be reconstructed from the statistics of measurements on the individual components. In this respect the holism of quantum theory is limited. We consider in this paper a class of theories more holistic than quantum theory in that they are constrained only by “bilocal tomography”: the state of any composite system is determined by the statistics of measurements on pairs of components. Under a few auxiliary (...) assumptions, we derive certain general features of such theories. In particular, we show how the number of state parameters can depend on the number of perfectly distinguishable states. We also show that real-vector-space quantum theory, while not locally tomographic, is bilocally tomographic. (shrink)

This paper explores some issues concerning the relation between ontological reduction and conceptual reduction, as construed by the physicalists. More specifically, it aims at highlighting and analyzing certain general methodological and ethical implications of the physicalistic research projects. Against this background, the paper identifies a certain category of concepts as “irreducibly holistic”, that is, those with regard to which ontological and conceptual reduction are inextricably bound together. Further, the paper argues that since irreducibly holistic concepts are conceptually irreducible to the (...) physical, they have to be ontologically irreducible to the physical as well, thus rendering physicalism false. This conclusion is reached by analyzing and then rejecting a variety of programmes aimed at accommodating irreducibly holistic concepts within a physicalist framework (including eliminativism, preservative irrealism and quasi-realism). Lastly, an ontologically pluralistic framework is proposed for the purpose of reconciling apparently conflicting insights from different areas of philosophical and scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Critically reflecting some theses of Fodor & LePore's Holism, it is argued that semantic holism in spite of all their criticism is not defeated. As a consequence of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a first result is that they do not take Traditional Holism, as it originates from Frege and Wittgenstein, serious at all. Whereas a Weak Anatomism, inspired with views of Traditional Holism, might be an interesting alternative to atomism and holism even for (...) Quine and Neo-Fregeans like Dummett. Concerning the Principle of Compositionality an ambiguity between recurrence and functional compositionality is localized that relativizes their critique on Davidson. And finally versions of content- and belief-holism in combination with adequate charity-principles are discussed as a basis for squaring Intentional Realism with Brentano's Thesis. (shrink)

Meaning holism says that the meaning of an expression depends on all of its inferential connections. This dissertation defends this view from the objections that its grounds are infirm and that any theory of meaning holism faces insuperable difficulties. I argue that there are indeed compelling Quinean grounds for holism . I explicate the debate between Quine and Carnap over the status of analyticity, concluding that Quine is right to deny the distinction between inferences that are constitutive (...) of expression meanings and inferences that are merely empirical. The upshot is that all inferences are constitutive of meaning. Coupled with confirmation holism---the claim that all statements in a system of beliefs are holistically inferentially connected---meaning holism follows. I then argue that holism allows for communication even though it entails that communicants do not share the meanings of their expressions . In Chapter 5, I demonstrate how holism is reconcilable with the compositionality of language, thus denying the criticism that their incompatibility presents a prima facie case against holism. After responding to criticisms of holism, I provide a model of the interdependent structure of meaning constituting inferential relations among sentences in terms of conditional subjective probabilities, and I explain how the theory accounts for the normativity of meaning . I then defend a crucial assumption that underlies the entire dissertation, namely, that the meaning of an expression is in fact constituted by the inferences in which it figures . I argue that transparent self-knowledge is an essential feature of meaning, and show how self-knowledge lends itself to inferential role semantics. Chapter 8 takes a critical look at other meaning theories. I argue that denotational views either neglect the significance of behavior explanation in the theory of meaning, or they face the same difficulties that holism encounters, in which case they offer no advantage over holism. Internalist accounts of meaning, on the other hand, unjustifiably invoke ordinary external objects as semantic values. But without this illicit appeal to external objects, they tell us little about the meanings of expressions. (shrink)

In 1978, Carper identified ‘four fundamental patterns of knowing’ that became largely foundational to subsequent epistemological discourse within the nursing discipline. These patterns of empirical, personal, aesthetic, and ethical knowing were presented as conceptually distinct yet related patterns of knowing. In order to provide an alternative conceptualization of aesthetics in nursing, the main tenants of Carper's discussion of aesthetic knowing will be revisited, and the foundations for her arguments will be examined. Specifically, Dewey's Art as Experience will be examined in (...) relation to the ‘holism’ of nursing, and an alternative position on pragmatic aesthetics in nursing will be offered. A preliminary reintegration of the four patterns of knowing will then be presented as will an example of a potential cultivation of aesthetics in nursing, through an example of Rodin's 19th century sculpture, the Burghers of Calais. (shrink)

In Holism: A Shopper's Guide Fodor and LePore contend that there could be punctate minds; minds capable of being in only a single type of representational state. The Kantian idea that the construction of perceptual representations requires the synthesizing activity of the mind is invoked to argue against the possibility of punctate minds. Fodor's commitment to an inferential theory of perception is shown to share crucial assumptions with the Kantian view and hence to lead to the same conclusion. The (...) argument from the need for synthesis is then extended beyond the perceptual case to mental representation in general. (shrink)

Abstract In their book, Holism: A Shopper's Guide, Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore fail to distinguish between two kinds of holism. One of these is holism about meaning, which is indeed problematic. The other is holism about translation, which is not so clearly problematic. Moreover, the problem with the first sort is that it renders communication unintelligible, not that it rules out psychological laws. Further, Fodor and Lepore's criticisms of various contemporary holists are based on serious (...) misreadings. In particular, Quine need not accept the conception of statements that they force on him, and Davidson and Dennett do not argue for the principle of charity in the ways Fodor and Lepore suppose. But Fodor and Lepore's question about the provenance of the principle of charity is a good one and deserves an answer. (shrink)

This paper attempts to build a bridge between the interpretation of quantum theory and the philosophy of mind. In contrast to other such attempts, the bridge which this paper suggests does not consist in extending features of quantum theory to the philosophy of mind. The argument of this paper is that the discussion about a revision of the Cartesian tradition in current philosophy of mind is relevant to the interpretation of quantum theory: taking this discussion into account sharpens up the (...) task for the interpretation of quantum physics as far as the scope of what is known as quantum holism is concerned. In particular, considering this discussion makes out a strong case against the interpretation that considers quantum holism to be universal in the physical realm. (shrink)

This paper argues for confirmational holism about facts and values. This position is similar to one defended by (among others) Hilary Putnam, but the argument is importantly different. Whereas Putnam et al. rely on examples of the putative entanglement of facts and values – a strategy which I suggest is vulnerable to parrying – my argument proceeds at a more general level. I argue that the explanation of action can not be separated from our practical reasoning, and for this (...) reason, the ‘webs’ of value and fact judgments are joined in the same way that Quine holds the judgments of mathematics and natural science to be. (shrink)

An abridged and slightly modified version of an article first published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2012).

In this set of excerpts from an earlier book, I examine some philosophical issues surrounding the whole-part relationship. I present a series of thought experiments and other arguments designed to undermine the view that wholes are "nothing but" their parts.

The reductionist/holist debate seems an impoverished one, with many participants appearing to adopt a position first and constructing rationalisations second. Here I propose an intermediate position of pragmatic holism, that irrespective of whether all natural systems are theoretically reducible, for many systems it is completely impractical to attempt such a reduction, also that regardless if whether irreducible `wholes' exist, it is vain to try and prove this in absolute terms. This position thus illuminates the debate along new pragmatic lines, (...) and refocusses attention on the underlying heuristics of learning about the natural world. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics allegedly supports a holistic metaphysical moral: it is not the case that the intrinsic characters of all entangled wholes supervene on intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal arrangements of proper parts. According to one influential line of reasoning, such holistic supervenience failure follows more or less directly from quantum theory itself. One advertised consequence is the defeat of a natural, broadly reductive worldview commonly linked to Lewis's philosophical doctrine of Humean supervenience. However, the situation is more complicated, in both this (...) and other respects, than it may first appear. This article is an opinionated overview of some especially interesting complications. (shrink)

Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. (...) For example, the meaning of 'chase' might be said by a molecularist to be try to catch. Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to other sentences or beliefs. One major motivation for holism has come from reflections on the natures of confirmation and learning. As Quine (1953) observed, claims about the world are confirmed not individually, but only in conjunction with theories of which they are a part. And typically, one cannot come to understand scientific claims without understanding a significant chunk of the theory of which they are a part. For example, in learning the Newtonian concepts of 'force', 'mass', kinetic energy' and 'momentum', one doesn't learn any definitions of these terms in terms that are understood beforehand, for there are no such definitions. Rather, these theoretical terms were all learned together in conjunction with procedures for solving problems. The major problem with holism is that it threatens to make generalization in psychology virtually impossible. If the content of any state depends on all others, it would be extremely unlikely that any two believers would ever share a state with the same content. Moreover, holism would appear to conflict with our ordinary conception of reasoning. What sentences one accepts influence what one infers. if i accept a sentence and then later reject it, i thereby change the inferential role of that sentence, so the meaning of what i accept wouldn't be the same as what i later reject. but then it would be difficult to understand on this view how one could rationally --or even irrationally!-- change one's mind. and agreement and translation are also problematic for much the same reason. holists have responded (1) by proposing that we should think not in terms of "same/different" meaning but in terms of a gradient of similarity of meaning, (2) by proposing "two factor" theories or (3) by simply accepting the consequence that there is no real difference between changing meanings and changing beliefs. (shrink)

The recent holistic trends in metaphysics are surveyed here and a tentative typology is offered. The non-linear mode of composition is suggested as the key feature of holism, apart from its familiar non-reductionism and emergentism. It is argued that those holistic views are promising that refrain from extreme relationalism based on the denial of there being self-subsistence particulars; also, those refraining from the postulation of an unarticulated all-embracing whole where both relations and terms are denied to be genuine ontological (...) items. The further suggestion is that a trade-off between the holistic perspective and the limits imposed upon it in the form of built-in confinements may help in making this metaphysics go. (shrink)

I critically examine confirmational holism as it pertains to the indispensability arguments for mathematical Platonism. I employ a distinction between pure and applied mathematics that grows out of the often overlooked symbiotic relationship between mathematics and science. I argue that this distinction undercuts the notion that mathematical theories fall under the holistic scope of the confirmation of our scientific theories.Keywords: Confirmational holism; Indispensability argument; Mathematics; Application; Science.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a more balanced judgement than the widespread impression that the changes which are called for in today's philosophy of physics and which centre around the concept of holism amount to a rupture with the framework of Cartesian philosophy of physics. I argue that this framework includes a sort of holism: As a result of the identification of matter with space, any physical property can be instantiated only if there is (...) the whole of matter. Relating this holism to general relativity, I maintain that this holism cannot be directly applied to today's philosophy of physics consequent upon the failure of geometrodynamics. I show in what respect precisely the holism in quantum physics amounts to a revision of the holism within Cartesianism. (shrink)

Holism in metaphysics can be defended because it can solve a dilemma about error: that the object of one’s wrong judgment is either inside or outside one’s mind and that neither alternative can be the case. Among holists the American philosopher Josiah Royce provides the best account of both the dilemma and its holist answer. The latter consists in steering between the hard and fast difference of being inside and outside the mind that sparks the dilemma. Royce does this (...) by identifying a unity in the difference, which then ceases to be a stark division and becomes instead a unity-in-difference. I then show how a related dilemma is susceptible to this sort of holist solution. Yet the holist answer to these dilemmas invites all the stock objections to holism. These include the obliteration of finite selves and the distinction between such selves and their experiences. Answering these objections calls for an alternative that uses Royce’s ploy of synthesizing the extremes of being inside and being outside the mind. This sort of realism gets between the horns of the dilemmas via the real and intentional modes of forms. (shrink)

This paper aims to single out some pathologies of current lexical semantics, which suffers from both the trauma of immanence and the opposite anxiety of rooting all knowledge in the pre-semiotic dimension, or entrusting sense-making entirely to context. To untangle these pitfalls, the dialogue with a phenomenological cognitive semiotics may prove fertile to focus on the lexicon as a type of storage and a type of memory; that is, a type of accumulated and sedimented knowledge based on the dynamical re-pertinentization (...) of invariants. In particular, the perspective developed by Sonesson shows striking coincidences with De Mauro’s semiotic semantics, which already provides a solid foundation for rethinking the notion of lexical field drawing on an “authentic” Humboldtian and Saussurean heritage. Therefore, I will briefly review some principles of lexical structural semantics, with the aim of showing how these notions, once emancipated from the Saussurean vulgata, can not only be compatible with a cognitive phenomenological approach, but also facilitate the rehabilitation of a theoretical apparatus still valuable for both (lexical) semantics and semiotics. Although focused on lexical fields, some of the issues addressed can be extended to language and languages, as well as to other types of semiotic systems, to shed light on controversial themes such as the embodiment of signs and the autonomy of linguistics and semantics. (shrink)

Holistic accounts of meaning normally incorporate a subjective dimension that invites the criticism that they make communication impossible, for speakers are bound to differ in ways the accounts take to be relevant to meaning, and holism generalises any difference over some words to a difference about all, and this seems incompatible with the idea that successful communication requires mutual understanding. I defend holism about meaning from this criticism. I argue that the same combination of properties (subjective origins of (...) value, holism among values, and ultimate publicity of value) is exhibited by monetary value and take the emergence of equilibrium prices as a model for the emergence of public meanings. (shrink)

The holistic view of the Universe is a very promising approach. The necessity of such a view is shown by the teaching of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, a German physicist and philosopher. If we accept Panpsychism as the best alternative to Materialism and Dualism, we should take the holistic view seriously. Panpsychism and Holism combined lead to the Idea of Cosmopsychism. If we consider the Universe as a holistic Quantum System, we should ask, what causes the collapse of its (...) wavefunction? I offer four possible answers and I tend to divine consciousness, which brings the collapse of the wavefunction of our Universe. (shrink)

(1997). Holistic healing as fresh evidence for collective consciousness. World Futures: Vol. 48, The Concept of Collective Consiousness: Research Perspectives, pp. 151-160.