Evolutionary accounts of the origin of human morality may be speculative to some extent, but they contain some very plausible claims, such as the claim that ethics evolved as a response to the demands of group living. Regarding the phenomenon of moral progress, it has been argued both that it is ruled out by an evolutionary approach, and that it can be explained by it. It has even been claimed that an evolutionary account has the potential to advance progress in (...) the moral domain. This paper explores the complex relationship between evolutionary explanations of morality and the possibility of moral progress. It seeks to answer the question as to what these explanations are able to tell us about the possibility of moral progress and the ways in which such progress can be achieved. It is argued that evolutionary explanations can inform moral education and other forms of moral enhancement, and that increased evolutionary knowledge figures among the changes in the circumstances of morality that can lead to moral progress. Evolutionary explanations can show us certain limits to the possibility for humans of progressing morally as well as certain enabling conditions. It is argued that both aspects – enhancement and changes in the circumstances – are equally important for the achievement of moral progress. This is illustrated by means of two examples of areas in which moral progress seems possible: our relationship towards the distant poor and our relationship towards non-human animals. (shrink)

We explore the meaning and implications of Bourdieu’s construct of the field of power and integrate it into a wider conception of the formation and functioning of elites at the highest level in society. Corporate leaders active within the field of power hold prominent roles in numerous organizations, constituting an ‘elite of elites’, whose networks integrate powerful participants from different fields. As ‘bridging actors’, they form coalitions to determine institutional settlements and societal resource flows. We ask how some corporate actors (...) (minority) become hyper-agents, those actors who ‘make things happen’, while others (majority) remain ‘ordinary’ members of the elite. Three hypotheses are developed and tested using extensive data on the French business elite. Social class emerges as persistently important, challenging the myth of meritocratic inclusion. Our primary contribution to Bourdieusian scholarship lies in our analysis of hyper-agents, revealing the debts these dominants owe to elite schools and privileged classes. (shrink)

1. Ursprünge und Entfaltungen.--II. Abenteuer der Seele.--v. 3. Wandel der Reiche.

Hommage à Wolf gang Preisendanz zum 80. Geburtstag.

1. Bd. Der Leib. Die Seele. Das Leben -- 2. Bd. Der Mensch. Der Geist. Der Welt Lauf -- 3. Bd. Die Geschichte. Der Fortschritt. Der Zusammenhang der Dinge.

The following article by Grete Hermann arguably occupies an important place in the history of the philosophical interpretation of of quantum mechanics. The purpose of Hermann's writing on natural philosophy is to examine the revision of the law of causality which quantum mechanics seems to require at a fundamental level of theoretical description in physics. It is Hermann's declared intention to show that quantum mechanics does not disprove the concept of causality, "yet has clarified [it] and has (...) removed from it other principles which are not necessarily connected to it." She attempts to show that this most "obvious" counter-example to the aprioricity of causality, quantum theory, is in fact not a counter-example at all. (shrink)

Court D. Lewis, author of Repentance and the Right to Forgiveness, presents a rights-based theory of ethics grounded in eirenéism, a needs-based theory of rights (inspired by Nicholas Wolterstorff) that seeks peaceful flourishing for all moral agents. This approach creates a moral relationship between victims and wrongdoers such that wrongdoers owe victims compensatory obligations. However, one further result is that wrongdoers may be owed forgiveness by victims. This leads to the “repugnant implication” that victims may be wrongdoers who do not (...) forgive. Author Lewis addresses the “repugnant implication” by showing that victims are obligated to work toward forgiveness, if not forgiveness itself. Critic Gregory L. Bock argues that victims are not the only ones who can forgive, that the personal dimensions of forgiveness are overlooked, and that the force of the “repugnancy implication” may be questioned. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock supports a virtue ethics framework. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock encourages virtue ethics. Critic David Boersema raises questions about the binding nature of relationships, the dependency of flourishing upon forgiveness, and the nature of needs or rights. Boersema also questions the wisdom of a rights-based approach to forgiveness. Critic Jennifer Kling asks whether a rights-based approach is necessary to ground obligations to meet the needs of others: why not an ethics of care? If a rights-based approach is taken, perhaps a wrongdoer is obligated to not make forgiveness a life good. By disengaging this obligation, we avoid constraining a victim’s work toward forgiveness, especially when the wrongdoing is oppressive. Author Lewis responds to these objections. (shrink)

die Behandlungsweise kann jedoch sehr verschieden sein. Diese letztere charakterisiert nicht nur eine bestimmte Auffassung von Philosophie, sondern ebenso den Philosophen, der sie anwendet. In dem Sinne ist jede Erörterung eines philosophischen Gedankens zugleich eine bio graphische Notiz. Der erfahrungswissenschaftliche Charakter der in diesem Band ge sammelten philosophische Gedankengänge entstammt zu einem er heblichen Teil der Kenntnisnahme der (ursprünglich amerikanischen) Kulturanthropologie. Ihr Schöpfen aus den Initiativen der alther kömmlichen Ethnologie wie auch aus der vergleichenden Völkerkunde hat, zusammen mit dem fruchtbaren (...) «:field-work», auf einer anthropo logischen Basis neue und neuartige Erfahrungen über den Menschen hervorgehoben. Dadurch ist mehr als ein bloßes Kooperieren von Philosophie und Wissenschaft gewachsen: hier hat sich der Charakter des Philosophischen selbst gewandelt. Diese Kooperation, ja vielmehr tiefgreifende Verschränkung ist ein Merkmal moderner Philosophie. Besonders im Denken von Hermann Wein ist dieses Charakteristikum zu einem fruchtbaren philosophischen Ausgangspunkt geworden. Das wäre sowohl für seine philosophisch-anthropologischen wie auch für seine sprachphilosophischen Erörterungen nachzuweisen. Eben in der Abschätzung und Durchdenkung jener Bereiche bekommt die Idee der Erfahrung ihre Gestaltungskraft. Als Grundmotiv wäre diese Idee zu betrachten - nicht als ein regelmässig wiederkehrender Hinweis oder die Formulierung irgendeiner Wünschbarkeit in philosophicis. Betrachtet man unsere Philosophie der Gegenwart, so ergibt sich, dass ein solcher Ausgangspunkt außer in anthropologischen und be stimmten sprachphilosophischen Erwägungen auch in ethischen Frage stellungen fruchtbar geworden ist - wir weisen auf die amerikanischen und anderen. (shrink)

Neural algorithms are conserved during evolution. Neurons with different shapes and using different molecular mechanisms can perform the same computation. However, evolutionary conservation of neural algorithms is not sufficient for claiming the realization of an algorithm for a specific computational problem. A plausible scheme for ontogenetic emergence of the structure of the algorithm must also be provided.