이 글은 찰스 테일러가 말하고자 하는 인정이 어떠한 것인지를 밝히기 위한 목적으로 쓰여졌다. 테일러는 근대 세계의 문제들을 진단하고, 근대적 인간 주체가 의미가 거세된 얄팍한 삶을 살고 있음을 비판하며, 그 지점을 극복하기 위해서 “본래성의 윤리”가 필요함을 역설한다. 본래성의 윤리에 따르면, 인간 주체는 의미 있는 것, 중요한 것, 소중한 것, 가치 있는 것, 그러니까 선을 선택하고 지평으로 삼아서, 그 지평으로부터 삶의 의미를 부여해나가며 자신의 정체성을 획득해나간다. 그렇지만 이러한 선택의 범위는 제한되는데, 왜냐하면 인간의 삶이 이미 주어진 지평, 맥락에서 펼쳐지기 때문이다. 그런 점에서 인간의 (...) 삶 그리고 인간의 주체성 혹은 정체성은 타자들, 혹은 공동체와 무관하지 않다. 그리하여 인정의 중요성이 대두된다. 인정 없이 주체의 정체성은 형성될 수 없다. 다만 이러한 인정은 현대 사회가 한편으로는 평등을 추구한다는 점에서 다른 한편으로는 개성과 차이를 부각한다는 점에서 문제에 부딪친다. 인정은 평등한 인정과 차이의 인정 사이에서 어느 한쪽으로 기울어질 수 없고 그 사이에서 균형을 잡아야 한다. 그러한 균형을 생각해보려면, 테일러가 인정을 사유하며 어떻게 인간들 사이의 차이 혹은 비대칭성을 생각하고 있는지를 살펴볼 필요가 제기된다. 그러기 위해서 이 글은 리쾨르가 『인정의 여정』에서 제안한 “비대칭성의 망각의 발견”을 참조하려고 한다. “비대칭성의 망각의 발견”을 통해서, 테일러가 어떻게 차이와 비대칭적 관계에 대한 사유를 인정에 녹여내는지를 보여주려고 한다. (shrink)

It has been not atypical for commentators to argue that Aristotelian friendship features disinterested concern for others, that is, concern for others that is completely independent of one's own happiness. Often, the relevant commentators point to some normative features of Aristotelian friendship, wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the other for herself, where these are assumed to be disinterested. While the disinterested interpretations may be correct overall, I argue that wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the (...) other for herself constitute a dubious foundation for disinterested interpretations. For wishing goods for the other's sake does not involve a reason for action on the other's behalf, and the primary point of loving the other for herself is the role of the other in facilitating one's own happiness, specifically conceived of by Aristotle in terms of one's own virtuous activity. (shrink)

In the explanations of logical laws and inference rules of the mature version of Begriffsschrift in Grundgesetze, Frege uses the predicate “… is the True.” Scholars like Greimann maintain that this predicate is a metalinguistic truth-predicate for Frege. This paper examines an argument for this claim that is based on the “nominal reading” of Frege’s conception of sentences—the claim that for Frege a sentence “p” is equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that p.” In particular, (...) this paper attempts to establish two points concerning this argument based on the nominal reading. First, the argument implies a claim about the nature of assertion which Frege repeatedly denies in his mature works. Secondly, the nominal reading on which the argument depends is false. A sentence “p” is not equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that p” for Frege. Our discussion will lead to an important lesson about Frege’s conception of sentences and of assertion. (shrink)

Based on the observation that ancient Chinese thinkers formulated their conception of logic and agency mainly around the concept of biàn 辯 (discrimination), Chris Fraser argues that (1) ancient Chinese thinkers had no concept of sentence or proposition, (2) they did not engage in logical argumentation in its proper sense, and (3) reason or rationality was not highly valued in ancient China for normative evaluation of actions. However, the text of the Mòzǐ 墨子 contains strong pieces of evidence against these (...) claims, and I argue that the opposite is clearly the case in Mòzǐ. Then, I move on to apply the metaethical idea of judgment internalism—the idea that there is an “internal” or conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation—to some passages from the Mòzǐ and argue that Mòzǐ is best interpreted as a flexible internalist who is willing to incorporate an externalist idea into his system of thought. (shrink)

This paper evaluates and criticises the developmental systems conception of evolution and develops instead an extension of the gene's eye conception of evolution. We argue (i) Dawkin's attempt to segregate developmental and evolutionary issues about genes is unsatisfactory. On plausible views of development it is arbitrary to single out genes as the units of selection. (ii) The genotype does not carry information about the phenotype in any way that distinguishes the role of the genes in development from that other factors. (...) (iii) There is no simple and general causal criterion which distinguishes the role of genes in development and evolution. (iv) There is, however, an important sense in which genes but not every other developmental factor represent the phenotype. (v) The idea that genes represent features of the phenotype forces us to recognise that genes are not the only, or almost the only, replicators. Many mechanisms of replication are involved in both development and evolution. (vi) A conception of evolutionary history which recognises both genetic and non-genetic replicators, lineages of replicators and interactors has advantages over both the radical rejection of the replicator/interactor distinction and the conservative restriction of replication to genetic replication. (shrink)

This study investigates whether and how the corporate social responsibility (CSR) profile of a company transfers to another company when an executive leaves a firm. We integrate upper echelon and institutional theories, and develop a novel measure of CSR profiles to explore this issue with a longitudinal data set of executive migrations over a 14-year period. We find that migrated executives assimilate elements of their old firms’ CSR profiles into their new firms (i.e., narrowing the distance between the two firms’ (...) CSR profiles), and this is true for both CSR and corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). This relationship is stronger when the migrating executive comes from a bigger firm with better social and financial performance than that of the new firm. We also find that the potential for improvement in CSR profiles in migration holds true for CSiR, but not CSR. Our findings have import for upper echelon theory and the managerial discretion afforded to executives regarding CSR decisions. (shrink)

This chapter connects the major transitions to evolvability and its evolution. It reviews a three-pulse model of the conditions that make the evolution of complexity possible. It specifically outlines the life up to the evolution of fully equipped prokaryote cells, the phase of microbial evolution, and the third phase that sees the evolution of complex development. It compares the prokaryote and multicellular evolvability. The deeply obscure problem of precellular evolution is also evaluated. This chapter shows that individual properties of developmental (...) mechanisms are significant to evolvability, but they are not all that is important. (shrink)

The present paper attempts to provide an exact truthmaker semantical analysis of modalized propositions. According to the present proposal, an exact truthmaker for “Necessarily _P_” is a state that bans every exact truthmaker for “Not _P_”, and an exact truthmaker for “Possibly _P_” is a state that allows an exact truthmaker for _P_. Based on this proposal, a formal semantics will be developed; and the soundness and completeness results for a well-known family of the systems of normal modal propositional logic (...) will be established. It shall be seen that the present analysis offers an exactification of the standard Kripke semantics in the sense that it analyzes the accessibility relation between possible worlds in terms of the banning and allowing relations between the constituent states, and thereby gives an account of “truth at a possible world” in terms of exact truthmaking. (shrink)

Although many accept the Rawlsian distinction between ‘end-state’ and ‘transitional’ principles, theorists disagree strongly over which feasibility constraint to use when selecting the former. While ‘minimalists’ favor a scientific-laws-only constraint, ‘non-minimalists’ believe that end-state principles should also be constrained by what people could (empirically) accept after reasoned discussion. I argue that a theorist who follows ‘non-minimalism’ will devise end-state principles that cannot be realized (as end-state principles), or cannot be stabilized (as end-state principles), or are indistinguishable in content from those (...) she would have selected had she followed ‘minimalism.’ The paper ends by outlining the implications of my analysis for the broader methodological map of political philosophy. (shrink)

In his profound discussion, Sterelny draws out common themes in the contributions to this topic: selective drivers in the coevolution of cognition and culture, the role of language in it, characteristics of cumulative cultural evolution, and issues of testability. He highlights the growing body of evidence for positive feedback mechanisms in cultural evolution, but also notes that progress is piecemeal, calling for more cross‐border work between cognitive science and research on cultural evolution.

Measuring Chinese character recognition ability is essential in research on character learning among learners of Chinese as a second language. Three methods are typically used to evaluate character recognition competence by investigating the following properties of a given character: pronunciation, meaning, and pronunciation and meaning. However, no study has explored the similar or dissimilar outcomes that these three measurements might yield. The current study examined this issue by testing 162 CSL learners with various L1 backgrounds and Chinese proficiency levels. Participants' (...) performance in character recognition measured using a phonological method, a semantic method, and a PS method was compared, which led to two major findings. In terms of similarity, participants' performance in character recognition and the influence of L1 background and Chinese proficiency level on character recognition was similar across the three methods. As for differences, the semantic method could yield a character recognition test with better quality than the other two methods, and the three methods yielded different best fitting models and showed different predictions for Chinese proficiency across different L1 groups. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are proposed. (shrink)

In the U.S. there has been considerable interest in connecting low-income households to alternative food networks like Community Supported Agriculture. To learn more about this possibility we conducted a statewide survey of CSA members in California. A total of 1149 members from 41 CSAs responded. Here we answer the research question: How do CSA members’ socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds, household conditions potentially interfering with membership, and CSA membership experiences vary between lower-income households and higher-income households? We divided members into LIHHs (...) and HIHHs. We present comparisons of LIHHs’ and HIHHs’ employment, race/ethnicity, household composition and education, use of food support, and enjoyment of food-related activities; conditions interfering with membership and major life events; and sources of information influencing decision to join, reasons for joining, ratings of importance of and satisfaction with various CSA attributes, gaps between importance of and satisfaction with various CSA attributes, valuing of the share and willingness to pay more, and impacts of membership. We find that LIHHs are committed CSA members, often more so than HIHHs, and that CSA members in California are disproportionately white, but that racial disproportionality decreases as incomes increase. We conclude by considering: the economic risks that LIHHs face in CSA membership, the intersection of economic risks with race/ethnicity and cultural coding in CSA; and the possibilities of increasing participation of LIHH in CSA. (shrink)

Suppose one accepts the argument that past infinity is not acceptable. This does not eliminate the possibility that the beginning of time is not equivalent across objects. Along with breakdown of absolute simultaneity of events in relativity, there may even be no agreement on whether an event existed. There may be no consistent way to totally order events. In such a case, despite every object, conscious or not, having finite lifetime, there may be no single point called “the beginning,” and (...) the universe stays as it is without requiring a cause of existence. (shrink)

There is a very striking difference between even the simplest ethnographically known human societies and those of the chimps and bonobos. Chimp and bonobo societies are closed societies: with the exception of adolescent females who disperse from their natal group and join a nearby group (never to return to their group of origin), a pan residential group is the whole social world of the agents who make it up. That is not true of forager bands, which have fluid memberships, and (...) regular associations with neighbouring bands. They are components of a larger social world. The open and fluid character of forager bands brings with it many advantages, so the stability of this more vertically complex form of social life is not difficult to explain, once it establishes. But how did it establish, if, as is likely, earlier hominin social worlds resemble those of our close pan relatives in the suspicion (even hostility) of one band to another? How did hominin social organisation transition from life in closed bands, each distrustful of its neighbours, to the much more open social lives of foragers? I will discuss and synthesise two approaches to this problem, one ecological, based on the work of Robert Layton and his colleagues, and another that is organised around an expansion of kin recognition, an idea primarily driven by Bernard Chapais. The paper closes by discussing potential archaeological signatures both of more open social worlds, and of the supposed causal drivers of such worlds. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the view that scientific change is the result of a selection process which has the same structure as that which drives natural selection. I argue that there are important differences between organic evolution and scientific growth. First, natural selection is much more constrained than scientific change; for example it is hard to populations of organisms to escape local maxima. Science progresses; it may not even make sense to say that biological evolution is progressive. Second, natural (...) selection depends for its power on the specifics of its domain, so I doubt that there is much point in seeing a selective regime in science as an instance of a more general family of selective regimes. Third, the replicator/interactor distinction fits scientific change much less well than biological evolution. But a family of selective theories of science can be identified ranging from the very ambitious to the very modest. Though the very ambitious programs of evolutionary epistemology are in trouble, there is space for one which is not a trivial redescription of what everyone already knows, but which is sensitive to the peculiarities of its domain. That selective theory explains important aspects of the community organization of science, an organization which is central to scientific progress. (shrink)

One central debate in cognitive science is over imagery. Do images constitute, or constitute evidence for, a distinctive, depictive form of mental representation? The most sophisticated advocacy of this view has been developed by Kosslyn and his coworkers. This paper focuses on his position and argues (i) that though Kosslyn has not developed a satisfactory account of depiction, there is nothing in principle unintelligible about the idea of depictive neural representation, but (ii) Kosslyn's model of imagery rescues the intelligibility of (...) pictorialism at the cost of its explanatory power. (shrink)

Group contingency (GC) is an effective and cost-efficient strategy that can be successfully applied to technology-based interventions. This study examined the relative effectiveness and cost efficiency of three types of technology-based group contingencies on walking among adults. Seventy two students were divided into teams of three. Each team was randomly assigned to one of three GC conditions (independent, interdependent, or dependent) and underwent 66 days of technology-based group contingency intervention. Sixty five participants completed the intervention and 61 completed the follow-up (...) assessment 2 months later. Step counts and self-reported walking activity increased after the intervention under all three conditions. The proportion of participants that met the target step counts was significantly higher under the dependent group contingency condition. However, 2 months later, intervention effects were not maintained under any condition. For cost efficiency, the increase in step count per point was significantly higher under the interdependent group contingency condition. Group cohesion and social validity (point satisfaction and point utility) were significantly higher under the dependent group contingency condition. Finally, the clinical implications and limitations of this study are discussed. (shrink)

Spinoza expounds the doctrine of self-preservation (conatus) in such a profound way that suicide seems incomprehensible. However, this affirmation contrasts with the frequent references to suicidal acts in his works. To address this contrast and thus support the compatibility between suicide and conatus, I refer to a new reading of Proposition 5 of Ethics III on contrariety. I reveal the complexity of every individual, the existence of conflictuality between their parts and the conatus of each part, which, depending on relationships (...) with external things, enjoys a degree of independence from the conatus of the individual as a whole. (shrink)

This paper explores Mencius' political theory of international relations and the morality of war from the perspective of Confucian moralpolitik. It argues that while acknowledging the possibility of international justice among the feudal, yet de facto, independent states during the Warring States period, Mencius subscribed to the idea that international morality (and justice) can be best maintained under what I call 'Confucian international moral hierarchy' among the states. By upholding international moral hierarchy, Mencius attempted to achieve an international community in (...) which big/strong and small/weak states are mutually connected to each other for the common welfare of the people. The paper then turns to Mencius' ideas on just war and investigates how Mencius rationalized the punitive expedition in the virtual absence of a symbolic institutional authority representing the Mandate of Heaven, the metaphysical ground for the morality of war, by presenting its visible alternatives. It closes by critically revisiting Daniel Bell's interpretation of Mencius's ideas of a just war. (shrink)

A Darwinian theory of the evolution of language must be incremental: to explain the transition from a hominin baseline with great ape grade communicative capacities to language-equipped hominins as a series of small steps. This paper takes up that project for the special case of words, giving an incremental model of the call to word transition. The model is embedded in a general conception of human social evolution with independent empirical support, but it also depends on some more specific assumptions (...) about language and about the earlier forms of hominin communication. Given these assumptions, the paper can be no more than a working draft of a more complete theory. (shrink)

1. Chŏngch'i ch'ŏrhak kwa chŏngsin punsŏkhak ŭi mannam -- 2. Han'gugin ŭi chamjae ŭisik kwa chŏngch'i pyŏngni.