An EXACT reproduction from the original book BODY AND WILL: BEING AN ESSAY CONCERNING WILL IN ITS METAPHYSICAL, PHYSIOLOGICAL and PATHOLOGICAL ASPECTS by Henry Maudsley first published in 1884. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print (...) as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

The Philosophy of the Infinite, With Special Reference to the Theories of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin by Henry Calderwood. This book is a reproduction of the original book published in 1854 and may have some imperfections such as marks or hand-written notes.

A collection of essays and lectures from Henry Steele Commager, one of America's eminent historians. The focus is on the age of enlightenment, with particular attention to Thomas Jefferson, and how enlightenment philosophy shaped the birth of the United States.

And at the other extreme and in a somewhat different sense, a realistic metaphysician in, say, the Aristotelian tradition would be equally insistent that he must be able to consider and talk about beings or things or entities just as such, about being qua being, in other words. And he too would mean to employ such terms in a way that would be all-inclusive and all-embracing. For he would say that there is literally nothing--unless it be just nothing--which could not (...) be said to be in some sense or other, or to be something or other. That is to say, outside being there is nothing. And this, as everyone knows, is simply the basis for Aristotle's celebrated denial that being can be a genus. (shrink)

Reproduction of the original: Theology and the Social Consciousness by Henry Churchill King.

Decisions concerning proof of facts in criminal law must be rational because of what is at stake, but the decision‐making process must also be cognitively feasible because of cognitive limitations, and it must obey the relevant legal–procedural constraints. In this topic three approaches to rational reasoning about evidence in criminal law are compared in light of these demands: arguments, probabilities, and scenarios. This is done in six case studies in which different authors analyze a manslaughter case from different theoretical perspectives, (...) plus four commentaries on these case studies. The aim of this topic is to obtain more insight into how the different approaches can be applied in a legal context. This will advance the discussion on rational reasoning about evidence in law and will contribute more widely to cognitive science on a number of topics, including the value of probabilistic accounts of cognition and the problem of dealing with cognitive biases in reasoning under uncertainty in practical contexts. (shrink)

This paper attempts to nudge the reader in the direction of an enlightened account of democratic choice, a sense of reflective choice which undermines our present support of discriminatory sectarian doctrine. I use Gutmann’s and Altman’s views as prologues to my own, though they might well reject my conclusions about discriminatory religion. I contrast my view with Macedo’s, Gray’s, Larmore’s, Rosenblum’s, and Galston’s.My argument utilizes common sense and relatively uncontroversial metaphysical principles to make it more difficult to dismiss as being (...) on an ontic par with the discriminatory doctrines which it challenges. I argue that discriminatory religion might be allowed to continue to be practiced and expressed by those who would pay their own way, much as with hate groups generally, but I view our continued public subsidization of it as a failure to recognize it for what it is. (shrink)

Confederate service, Confederate propaganda. Although not born in the South, Henry Hotze's devotion to the cause of the Confederacy was as ardent as that of any native secessionist. As a member of the Mobile Cadets, an elite volunteer company of the Gulf City, Hotze was ordered to Virginia at the start of war as part of the Third Alabama Regiment. He distinguished himself in many ways, primarily off the battlefield as a clerk and European go-between. In November of 1861, (...) he was appointed to the position of Commercial Agent at London by C.S.A. Secretary of State R.M.T. Hunter, who instructed him to take the pulse of the English public on Confederate sentiment and to publish articles there that would cast the Confederacy in a favorable light. These articles appeared first in The Index, the newspaper that Hotze established in London, and reveal Hotze's skill as both a reporter and a propagandist for the Confederacy. (shrink)

And so the matter might be allowed to rest. But unfortunately, despite the prevailing consensus that there really isn't any issue any longer between the two types of logic, we should like in this paper to reopen the whole issue. Our justification for so doing is that, so far as we know, in most of the discussions of the nature of the difference between Aristotelian logic and mathematical logic there has not been too much attention paid to the metaphysical question (...) as to what precisely so-called logical "forms" may be said to be. Thus everyone --both Aristotelians and mathematical logicians--quite glibly use the term "formal logic." But we wonder if either the one party or the other has ever stopped long enough seriously to consider the fact that the actual ontological status that is ascribed to such forms is very different for the one tradition from what it is for the other. Indeed, we cannot help feeling that as soon as such metaphysical differences are clearly recognized, philosophers may well come to see that Aristotelian logic and mathematical logic are not "both 'logic' in the strictest sense of the word," nor do they "both have, vaguely speaking, the same subject matter.". (shrink)

The author wishes to discover a way in which the philosophy of w v quine can be described relative to its place in the history of metaphysics. In order to facilitate such a classification, The author distinguishes between the aristotelian notion of metaphysics, As the study of being qua being or ultimate reality, And kant's transcendental approach in which it is admitted that only appearances can ever be described and that things can never be known as they are in themselves. (...) It is the author's contention that quine's metaphysics can most appropriately be understood as following in the tradition of kant's transcendentalism. The argument for this claim is based on quine's repeated assertion that the methods and procedures of metaphysics are continuous with those of the natural sciences. The logic of discovery in the sciences, However, Quine would consider to be not so much inductive as hypothetico-Deductive; and since hypotheses would appear to be neither verifiable nor falsifiable in any strict sense, The only alternative is to consider that such hypotheses are subject only to a transcendental justification. (edited). (shrink)

The thesis is two-fold: to show that to be human is to have a nature disposed to inalienable conflict of interests, and to show that creativity is the best principle by which to organize interests.