Heinrich Rickert fut, avec Windelband et Lask, l’un des principaux représentants de l’école néokantienne de Heidelberg, qui se différencie essentiellement de l’école de Marbourg par la façon dont elle redéfinit l’idéalisme transcendantal à partir de la problématique de la validité, héritée notamment de la philosophie de Lotze.Les six articles réunis ici, publiés par Rickert dans la revue Logos entre 1911 et 1932, dessinent les grandes lignes d’une philosophie systématique des valeurs qui ne se veut pas seulement une théorie (...) transcendantale du valoir dans son opposition à l’être, mais aussi, en tant que doctrine des visions du monde, l’élaboration d’une réponse philosophique à la question du sens de la vie. À côté de recherches architectoniques portant sur la détermination et l’articulation des différents domaines axiologiques, mais aussi sur les problèmes généraux liés à la définition de la philosophie comme doctrine des valeurs, ces articles entretiennent une constante polémique à l’endroit de tout intuitionnisme et de toute « philosophie de la vie ». Contre le biologisme qui fait du vivant la valeur absolue et contre la dénonciation intuitionniste de la science comme intellectualisme, l’affirmation de la transcendance des valeurs garantit pour Rickert le droit d’une philosophie scientifique et critique de la culture, qui en appréhende la vie propre en rendant compte de l’articulation des valeurs et de l’effectivité empirique au sein d’un système des valeurs qui reste ouvert sur l’infinie nouveauté et l’inépuisable richesse du monde historique. (shrink)

Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) fut, avec Windelband et Lask, l'un des principaux representants de l'ecole neokantienne de Heidelberg, qui se differencie essentiellement de l'ecole de Marbourg par la facon dont elle redefinit l'idealisme transcendantal a partir de la problematique de la validite, heritee notamment de la philosophie de Lotze. Les six articles reunis ici, publies par Rickert dans la revue Logos entre 1911 et 1932, dessinent les grandes lignes d'une philosophie systematique des valeurs qui ne se veut pas seulement (...) une theorie transcendantale du valoir dans son opposition a l'etre, mais aussi, en tant que doctrine des visions du monde, l'elaboration d'une reponse philosophique a la question du sens de la vie. A cote de recherches architectoniques portant sur la determination et l'articulation des differents domaines axiologiques, mais aussi sur les problemes generaux lies a la definition de la philosophie comme doctrine des valeurs, ces articles entretiennent une constante polemique a l'endroit de tout intuitionnisme et de toute philosophie de la vie. Contre le biologisme qui fait du vivant la valeur absolue et contre la denonciation intuitionniste de la science comme intellectualisme, l'affirmation de la transcendance des valeurs garantit pour Rickert le droit d'une philosophie scientifique et critique de la culture, qui en apprehende la vie propre en rendant compte de l'articulation des valeurs et de l'effectivite empirique au sein d'un systeme des valeurs qui reste ouvert sur l'infinie nouveaute et l'inepuisable richesse du monde historique. (shrink)

What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments?Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of (...) human nature; or, are they modulated by economic, social and cultural environments? Until now, experimental research could not address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. A vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by economic, social, and cultural environments, yet such methods can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. Combining ethnographic and experimental approaches to fill this gap, this book breaks new ground in reporting the results of a large cross-cultural study aimed at determining the sources of social preferences that underlie the diversity of human sociality. The same experiments which provided evidence for social preferences among university students were performed in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of social, economic and cultural conditions by experienced field researchers who had also done long-term ethnographic field work in these societies. The findings of these experiments demonstrated that no society in which experimental behaviour is consistent with the canonical model of self-interest. Indeed, results showed that the variation in behaviour is far greater than previously thought, and that the differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of this variation, which individual-level economic and demographic variables could not. Finally, the extent to which experimental play mirrors patterns of interaction found in everyday life is traced.The book starts with a succinct but substantive introduction to the use of game theory as an analytical tool and its use in the social sciences for the rigorous testing of hypotheses about fundamental aspects of social behaviour outside artificially constructed laboratories. The results of the fifteen case studies are summarized in a suggestive chapter about the scope of the project. (shrink)

In this collection comprising four of his most influential essays, Henrich proves himself unique in the conjunction of philosophical acumen, insight, and originality that he brings to Kant interpretation.

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is (...) substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obviousa priorigrounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions ofhumannature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges. (shrink)

After introducing the new field of cultural evolution, we review a growing body of empirical evidence suggesting that culture shapes what people attend to, perceive and remember as well as how they think, feel and reason. Focusing on perception, spatial navigation, mentalizing, thinking styles, reasoning (epistemic norms) and language, we discuss not only important variation in these domains, but emphasize that most researchers (including philosophers) and research participants are psychologically peculiar within a global and historical context. This rising tide of (...) evidence recommends caution in relying on one’s intuitions or even in generalizing from reliable psychological findings to the species, Homo sapiens. Our evolutionary approach suggests that humans have evolved a suite of reliably developing cognitive abilities that adapt our minds, information-processing abilities and emotions ontogenetically to the diverse culturally-constructed worlds we confront. (shrink)

Einleitung.--Die begriffliche Erkenntniss der Körperwelt.--Natur und Geist.--Natur und Geschichte.--Die historische Begriffsbildung.--Naturphilosophie und Geschichts-Philosophie.

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...) small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life. Key Words: altruism; cooperation; cross-cultural research; experimental economics; game theory; ultimatum game; public goods game; self-interest. (shrink)

This is a collection of four essays on aesthetic, ethical, and political issues by the pre-eminent Kant scholar in Germany today, perhaps best known for rekindling interest in the great classical German tradition from Kant to Fichte.

Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) war einer der bedeutendsten deutschen Philosophen vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und gilt neben Wilhelm Windelband als einer der Hauptvertreter der südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus. Seine auch heute noch anregende Philosophie hatte großen, interdisziplinären wie internationalen Einfluss. Die philologisch-kritische Ausgabe macht die Schriften endlich wieder verfügbar.

Hence, there is still controversy over which of the two versions of the deduction deserves priority and whether indeed any distinction between them can be maintained that would go beyond questions of presentation and involve the structure of the proof itself. Schopenhauer and Heidegger held that the first edition alone fully expresses Kant's unique philosophy, while Kant himself, as well as many other Kantians, have only seen a difference in the method of presentation.

Auf den ersten Blick scheint Selbstbewusstsein zu dem zu gehören, was sich nahezu von selbst versteht. In anhaltendem Nachdenken stellt sich aber heraus, dass mit ihm der Philosophie eines ihrer schwierigsten und folgenreichsten Probleme aufgegeben ist. Vor über fünfzig Jahren erschien Dieter Henrichs Abhandlung Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht, welche dieses Problem ausarbeitete. Sie zeigte, dass es Fichte war, der als erster das Problem sicher erfasste und zum Leitthema seines Denkens werden liess. Dem unveränderten Abdruck dieses Textes folgt nun -- als um (...) ein Vielfaches umfangreicherer Haupttext -- eine neue Folge von Überlegungen. Sie betreffen Selbstbewusstsein im Zusammenhang einer philosophischen Grundlegung und die Probleme, die Fichtes Systembildung unter dem Leitgedanken seiner ursprünglichen Einsicht in eine Bewegung ohne definitive Lösung versetzten. Henrichs Buch lässt sich als eine Erneuerung von Kants Denkart betrachten - in der Beziehung auf ein Thema, dessen Bedeutung für die Philosophie kaum noch bestritten wird, in einer der Erfahrungsart der Gegenwart gemässen Perspektive und in der Folge von Klärungen, die zu gewinnen sind, wenn man der Dynamik in Fichtes Systembildungen nachdenkt."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Paru en 1909 dans les Kant-Studien, « Les deux voies de la théorie de la connaissance » constitue une pièce maîtresse du débat qui opposa le néokantisme à la phénoménologie naissante. Heinrich Rickert, qui fut avec Windelband et Lask l’un des principaux représentants de l’école néokantienne de Heidelberg, y expose de façon claire et synthétique les principes méthodiques qui fondent sa philosophie critique. À travers un dialogue constant avec les Recherches logiques de Husserl, Rickert distingue deux « voies (...) » ou deux méthodes que peut suivre la théorie de la connaissance : la méthode psychologico-transcendantale , correspondant à l’analyse de l’acte de juger, et la méthode logico-transcendantale , correspondant à l’analyse du sens propositionnel. Comment ces deux méthodes s’articulent-elles? Quelle est leur contribution propre au programme critique? Et quelles sont leurs limites respectives? Sur ces questions, la position de Rickert se révèle aussi riche et innovante que celle de Husserl, dont elle diffère sensiblement. L’aspect à la fois polémique et concis de ce texte en fait un document essentiel pour la connaissance de l’école de Heidelberg et, plus généralement, pour l’étude du néokantisme dans son ensemble. (shrink)

Die im Band vereinigten drei Schriften behandeln zentrale Themender Philosophie Rickerts: die Umgestaltung der traditionellenDefinitions- und Begriffslehre; das Verhältnis von Logik undMathematik, zu dem Rickert mit Bezug auf das alogische Wesender Zahl eine Theorie jenseits von Empirismus und Rationalismusvertritt; und das Zentralwort der Ontologie: Sein, zu dem eineGegentheorie zu Heidegger gegeben wird.

Electrifying when first delivered in 1973, legendary in the years since, Dieter Henrich's lectures on German Idealism were the first contact a major German philosopher had made with an American audience since the onset of World War II. They remain one of the most eloquent explanations and interpretations of classical German philosophy and of the way it relates to the concerns of contemporary philosophy. Thanks to the editorial work of David Pacini, the lectures appear here with annotations linking them (...) to editions of the masterworks of German philosophy as they are now available. Henrich describes the movement that led from Kant to Hegel, beginning with an interpretation of the structure and tensions of Kant's system. He locates the Kantian movement and revival of Spinoza, as sketched by F. H. Jacobi, in the intellectual conditions of the time and in the philosophical motivations of modern thought. Providing extensive analysis of the various versions of Fichte's Science of Knowledge, Henrich brings into view a constellation of problems that illuminate the accomplishments of the founders of Romanticism, Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, and of the poet Hölderlin's original philosophy. He concludes with an interpretation of the basic design of Hegel's system. (shrink)

In a series of studies over the last 30 years, Henrich has shown that Hölderlin played a decisive role in the development of philosophy from Kant to Hegel. This book includes six of Henrich's most important essays on Hölderlin.

Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) was One of the leading neo-Kantian philosophers in Germany and a crucial figure in the discussions of the foundations of the social sciences in the first quarter of the twentieth century. His views were extremely influential, most significantly on Max Weber. The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science is Rickert's most important work, and it is here translated into English for the first time. It presents his systematic theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, (...) and deals particularly with historical knowledge and the problem of demarcating the natural from the human sciences. The theory Rickert develops is carefully argued and of great intrinsic interest. It departs from both positivism and neo-Hegelian idealism and is worked out by contrast to the views of others, particularly Dilthey and the early phenomenologists. (shrink)

This paper presents a simple mathematical model that shows how economic inequality between social groups can arise and be maintained even when the only adaptive learning process driving cultural evolution increases individuals’ economic gains. The key assumptions are that human populations are structured into groups and that cultural learning is more likely to occur within than between groups. Then, if groups are sufficiently isolated and there are potential gains from specialization and exchange, stable stratification can sometimes result. This model predicts (...) that stratification is favored, ceteris paribus, by (1) greater surplus production, (2) more equitable divisions of the surplus among specialists, (3) greater cultural isolation among subpopulations within a society, and (4) more weight given to economic success by cultural learners. (shrink)

ResumoNo presente texto (“O Eu de Fichte”), no qual identifica duas épocas distintas na história da filosofia concernente ao desenvolvimento da teoria da consciência, D. Henrich volta-se, após caracterizar os componentes de cada período, à teoria da consciência do primeiro Fichte, o da Doutrina da Ciência de 1794, pondo ênfase sobre algumas aporiaspresentes nessa sua primeira formulação, na medida em que Fichte foi o primeiro a encarar o problema da consciência em sua perspectiva, no fundo, mais agônica, deixado sem (...) tratamento pela tradição da filosofia pré-kantiana e kantiana. AbstractIn the present text (Fichte’s Self), in which he identifies two distinct epochs in the history of philosophy concerning the development of the theory of consciousness, D. Henrich turns, after characterizing the components of each period, to the theory of consciousness of the first Fichte, that of the Doctrine of Science of 1794, placing emphasis on some of the aporias present in his first formulation, insofar as Fichte was the first to face the problem of consciousness in its essentially more agonistic perspective, left untreated by the tradition of pre-Kantian and Kantianphilosophy. (shrink)