David Hume was one of the most important British philosophers of the eighteenth century. The first part of his _Treatise on Human Nature_ is a seminal work in philosophy. _Hume on Knowledge_ introduces and assesses: * Humes life and the background of the _Treatise_ * The ideas and text in the _Treatise_ * Humes continuing importance to philosophy.

The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) mechanisms that are horizontal —between cause and effect— and mechanisms that are vertical —they realize in lower-level terms causal properties—: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of causal claims. The paper (...) shows that mechanisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context, using the now standard graphical causal structure framework. These conclusions also support the larger philosophy of science moral that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empirical, not a priori and universal. (shrink)

Aesthetic internalism claims a link between judgement and motivation: aesthetic judgements bring with them motivations to act in characteristic ways. Critics object that there is a difference between merely liking something and judging it to be aesthetically good, and that it is our likings, not our aesthetic judgements, that motivate us. This paper develops a version of aesthetic internalism that can respond to this criticism. Wholehearted aesthetic judgements are characterized by stability, attention, and motivation. Making such judgements is an important (...) part of a good life, and so at least some aesthetic judgements are motivating. So we have reason to think that this version of aesthetic internalism is true. This paper defends wholehearted aesthetic internalism against objections, and assesses an argument from aesthetic internalism to aesthetic non-cognitivism. While wholehearted aesthetic internalism can only offer qualified support to non-cognitivism, it nonetheless offers a number of fruitful avenues for further work. (shrink)

This paper argues that when used judiciously Bayes's law has a role to play in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. Several examples are presented in which a rational response to evidence requires a judgement whether to apply Bayes's law or whether, for example, to redistribute prior probabilities. The paper concludes that reflection on Bayes's law illustrates how an adequate account of the rational evaluation of hypotheses requires an account of judgement--a point which several philosophers have noted despite few attempts to (...) develop an adequate theory of judgement. (shrink)

It is generally not recognized that Whewell's conception of necessary truth evolved only gradually; his early statements are misleading. For this reason, and because of certain peculiarities in his expository style over his publishing history, he is commonly thought to have used the term "necessary" in the sense of "absolutely necessary". I argue that, on the contrary, the term is essentially relational in his mature view. This conclusion leads, in turn, to a re-interpretation of his doctrine of "fundamental ideas". Here (...) I argue that the crux of his position is that cognitive principles which are initially regulative become, through invention, repeated employment, and stipulative definition, constitutive ones. (shrink)

L’article commence par mettre en évidence une tendance chez les Platoniciens de l’antiquité tardive à prêter attention aux mots du maître pour savoir s’il prend en compte des niveaux métaphysiques ou s’il s’agit de conséquences métaphysiques. L’auteur réfléchit ensuite sur les passages mathématiques et ésotériques des Lettres, qui présentent, comme on le croit, des doctrines secrètes, et sur la Lettre II en particulier, dont l’influence lui permet de discuter deux triades d’Amélius. La triade première est bien connue grâce aux quelques (...) témoignages de Proclus, la deuxième, à peine reconnue comme triade, correspond aux trois hypothèses du Parménide de Platon, et présente donc, pour les interprètes néoplatoniciens, des significations métaphysiques. Pour toutes les deux, il s’agit d’interpréter les fragments et de se demander si l’une peut avoir un rapport avec l’autre, et quel serait ce rapport. (shrink)

El presente artículo planteó como problema de investigación la disputa, dispersión y disgregación de distintas nociones de paz a la hora de abordar la fundación y puesta en marcha del naciente proceso de construcción de paz en Colombia y, a posteriori, instó a desafiar esa disgregación e incomunicación desde la representación de una categoría alternativa capaz de integrar, poner en simbiosis e hibridación las perspectivas para ganar corpulencia. Bajo un enfoque metodológico cualitativo de tipo exploratoriodescriptivo, se procuró buscar, reconocer, describir (...) y ampliar los contenidos, fundamentos y perspectivas que pueden ser el contenido y el cuerpo amplio de la construcción de paz; reto perceptivo que exigió asociar los métodos complejo/sistémico para abrir un campo de discusión con el fin de re-imaginar una categoría alternativa: un sistema de paz complejo y conscientemente humanizador. Como resultado se obtuvo una taxonomía tentativa de las posturas conceptuales actuales y antiguas, la descripción tanto de sus atributos, dimensiones y funciones, como de sus incomunicaciones, restricciones, limitaciones, a manera de un torbellino creativo de lo diverso que condujo a la posibilidad de toparse con una emergente concepción de paz capaz de integrar, poner en diálogo y relacionamiento algunos avances investigativos en materia del cultivo de la paz. (shrink)

In the last two decades, there has been a great deal of interest in providing an intentional criterion of the psychological. Of the various ones proferred, it seems to me that the best was the earliest, which was Chisholm’s initial criterion in his 1955 essay “Sentences about Believing.” In this present paper I first single out a basic misconception pervading the recent literature on intentionality and suggest that a consequence of this misconception has been the futile attempt to use the (...) notion of intentionality to provide a kind of definition of “mind”; that is, to use intentionality to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the psychological. Secondly, I point out how intentionality as captured by my own criterion is indispensable in that it is an essential property of certain particulars which are basic to our conceptual scheme and apparently basic to any conceptual scheme whatsoever. (shrink)