Martin Heidegger und Hans Jantzen gehören zu den wichtigsten Vertretern der Philosophie und Kunstgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Seit den 1920er bis Ende der 1960er Jahre kritisierten sie vorherrschende, naturwissenschaftlich geprägte Auffassungen des Raums und entwickelten einen neuartigen Begriff. Dieser sogenannte künstlerische Raum sei ein freies Zusammenspiel von materiellen und immateriellen Bestandteilen, das als solches erst in der Wahrnehmung real wird. Die Autorin arbeitet dieses Verständnis heraus und stellt es in einen geistes- und zeitgeschichtlichen Kontext. Neben der Bedeutung der (...) Bestandteile und der Grenze für die Gestalt und die Wirkung des Raums kommt der des Lichts sowie Jantzens Diaphanie-Begriff besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu. Für die erörterte Raumbeschaffenheit werden Anhaltspunkte in der gotischen Kathedrale und in Werken der Bronzezeit, Dorik, Ottonik und Moderne sowie von Kindern und Laien festgestellt. Im Anschluss an zeitgenössische Theorien ergeben sich Übereinstimmungen mit dem Konzept des geopolitischen Groß-raums und einer erdbezogenen Ästhetik. Vor dem Hintergrund des Kunst- und Sprachbegriffs der Epoche wird abschließend Heideggers und Jantzens Ansicht untersucht, alle Kunst sei sprachlich, sowie inwiefern sich diese Sprachlichkeit räumlich manifestiert. Die Zusammenführung von Jantzens Analyse ottonischer Wortbilder mit Heideggers Auslegung moderner Dichtung und Bildkunst zeigt, dass deren Raumbegriff unabhängig von politischen Bezügen bestehen kann. „Bei diesem Buch handelt es sich fraglos um eine kunsthistorisch und philosophisch bedeutsame Untersuchung.“. (shrink)

Introduces contemporary American philosophy of technology through six of its leading figures. The six American philosophers of technology whose work is profiled in this clear and concise introduction to the field—Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner—represent a new, empirical direction in the philosophical study of technology that has developed mainly in North America. In place of the grand philosophical schemes of the classical generation of European philosophers of technology, the contemporary American generation addresses (...) concrete technological practices and the co-evolution of technology and society in modern culture. Six Dutch philosophers associated with Twente University survey and critique the full scope and development of their American colleagues’ work, often illustrating shifts from earlier to more recent interests. Individual chapters focus on Borgmann’s engagement with technology and everyday life; Dreyfus’s work on the limits of artificial intelligence; Feenberg’s perspectives on the cultural and social possibilities opened by technologies; Haraway’s conception of the cyborg and its attendant blurring of boundaries; Ihde’s explorations of the place of technology in the lifeworld; and Winner’s fascination with the moral and political implications of modern technologies. American Philosophy of Technology offers an insightful and readable introduction to this new and distinctly American philosophical turn. Contributors are Hans Achterhuis, Philip Brey, René Munnik, Martijntje Smits, Pieter Tijmes, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. (shrink)

The problem of joint measurement of incompatible observables is investigated. Measurements are represented by positive operator-valued measures. A quantitative notion of inaccuracy is defined. It is shown that within this framework joint inaccurate measurements are possible for arbitrary maximal projection-valued measures on finite-dimensional spaces. The accuracy of such measurements is limited, as is shown by an inaccuracy inequality we derive. This new type of uncertainty relation can be unambiguously interpreted as referring to measurement precision rather than preparative quality. Several recent (...) experiments are seen to be realizations of such joint measurements. (shrink)

Technik bestimmt auf die mannigfaltigste Weise unser Leben und Zusammenleben. Obgleich sie von Platon und Aristoteles bis in das zwanzigste Jahrhundert in Einzelaspekten betrachtet worden ist, wurde sie erst in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu einem eigenständigen Gegenstand der Philosophie. Dennoch werden ihre philosophischen Probleme immer noch eher beiläufig behandelt. So geht es um die Klärung ganz zentraler und herausfordernder Aufgaben – von der menschlichen Schöpferkraft über eine Klärung, was ein technisches Artefakt ist, zum technischen Wissen, in all diesen Elementen verknüpft (...) mit dem Verantwortungsproblem. Das Ziel ist eine Darstellung dieser faszinierenden philosophischen Fragen vor dem Hintergrund der Tradition. (shrink)

The development of science does not proceed as a monotonous addition of information. A superior successor theory often contradicts its predecessor. The question as to what the logical relationship is between such theories, insofar as the transition from one to the other embodies continuity and progress, is the subject of this book. Proceeding from a discussion of intertheory reductions, the author proves that theories revision models from philosophical logic are fruitful for questions of scientific theory. Formal analyses of conditionals, autoepistemic (...) inferences, intertheoretical explanations and idealizations are carried out, as well as applications to the Kepler-Newton case and the case of the ideal gas law and van der Waals's law. (shrink)

This volume answers the question: Why do we believe what we believe? It examines current research on the concept of beliefs, and the development in our understanding of the process of believing. It takes into account empirical findings in the field of neuroscience regarding the processes that underlie beliefs, and discusses the notion that beyond the interactive exploratory analysis of sensory information from the complex outside world, humans engage in an evaluative analysis by which they attribute personal meaning and relevance (...) to the probabilistic representations of objects and events. Beliefs exert a strong influence on behaviour, decision-making, and identifying and solving problems. Despite their importance, beliefs have until recently not been at the centre of scientific interest. In fact, "belief" is an ill-defined phenomenon. From a transdisciplinary perspective the actual approaches to understanding belief seem incompatible as they attempt to highlight such different topics as "belief - religion", "belief - spirituality", "belief - faith", "belief - knowledge", "belief - attitude", "belief - disbelief", "belief - illusion", and "believing - brain function". This situation contradicts the idea that belief is close to pathological phenomena and that it should be eliminated from scientific discussions. Rather, believing is fundamental for understanding the many problems of every-day life. In fact, the book shows that beliefs are relevant for politics, international affairs, economy, law, or religions also in modern societies. This book presents the increasing scientific interest in beliefs and believing, and reflects the change in focus from the content aspect of belief towards the fluid nature of believing. (shrink)

In his choice of texts, the Editor has been faced with the difficult task of selecting, from among the author's more than 600 publications, those of the greatest philosophical interest. It is chiefly the topics of value-rela tivism and the logic of norms that have been kept in view. The selection has also been guided by the endeavour to reprint, so far as possible, texts which have not hitherto appeared in English. At times, however, this aim has had to be (...) discarded, in order to include works of key im portance and also the latest expressions of Kelsen's view. In addition to the two topics already mentioned, the Editor has con sidered Kelsen's discussions of the causal principle to be so far worthy of philosophical attention, that some writings on causality and account ability have been included in this collection of philosophical studies. OTA WEINBERGER Hans Kelsen died on April 19th, 1973. Only his work now lives, for the inspiration of future generations of jurists and philosophers. Graz, 25th April, 1973 OT A WEINBERGER TRANSLATOR'S NOTE I am obliged to the Editor for his careful scrutiny of the translation, which has led to a number of corrections and improvements in the text. (shrink)

The centerpiece of Jeffrey Bub's book Interpreting the Quantum World is a theorem (Bub and Clifton 1996) which correlates each member of a large class of no-collapse interpretations with some 'privileged observable'. In particular, the Bub-Clifton theorem determines the unique maximal sublattice L(R,e) of propositions such that (a) elements of L(R,e) can be simultaneously determinate in state e, (b) L(R,e) contains the spectral projections of the privileged observable R, and (c) L(R,e) is picked out by R and e alone. In (...) this paper, we explore the issue of maximal determinate sets of observables using the tools provided by the algebraic approach to quantum theory; and we call the resulting algebras of determinate observables, "maximal *beable* subalgebras". The capstone of our exploration is a generalized version of Bub and Clifton's theorem that applies to arbitrary (i.e., both mixed and pure) quantum states, to Hilbert spaces of arbitrary (i.e., both finite and infinite) dimension, and to arbitrary observables (including those with a continuous spectrum). Moreover, in the special case covered by the original Bub-Clifton theorem, our theorem reproduces their result under strictly weaker assumptions. This added level of generality permits us to treat several topics that were beyond the reach of the original Bub-Clifton result. In particular: (a) We show explicitly that a (non-dynamical) version of the Bohm theory can be obtained by granting privileged status to the position observable. (b) We show that Clifton's (1995) characterization of the Kochen-Dieks modal interpretation is a corollary of our theorem in the special case when the density operator is taken as the privileged observable. (c) We show that the 'uniqueness' demonstrated by Bub and Clifton is only guaranteed in certain special cases -- viz., when the quantum state is pure, or if the privileged observable is compatible with the density operator. We also use our results to articulate a solid mathematical foundation for certain tenets of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. For example, the uncertainty principle asserts that there are strict limits on the precision with which we can know, simultaneously, the position and momentum of a quantum-mechanical particle. However, the Copenhagen interpretation of this fact is not simply that a precision momentum measurement necessarily and uncontrollably disturbs the value of position, and vice-versa; but that position and momentum can never in reality be thought of as simultaneously determinate. We provide warrant for this stronger 'indeterminacy principle' by showing that there is no quantum state that assigns a sharp value to both position and momentum; and, a fortiori, that it is mathematically impossible to construct a beable algebra that contains both the position observable and the momentum observable. We also prove a generalized version of the Bub-Clifton theorem that applies to "singular" states (i.e., states that arise from non-countably-additive probability measures, such as Dirac delta functions). This result allows us to provide a mathematically rigorous reconstruction of Bohr's response to the original EPR argument -- which makes use of a singular state. In particular, we show that if the position of the first particle is privileged (e.g., as Bohr would do in a position measuring context), the position of the second particle acquires a definite value by virtue of lying in the corresponding maximal beable subalgebra. But then (by the indeterminacy principle) the momentum of the second particle is not a beable; and EPR's argument for the simultaneous reality of both position and momentum is undercut. (shrink)

En écho à la crainte de voir la "politique disparaître complètement du monde", selon l'inquiétude formulée par Hannah Arendt, notamment dans sa Crise de la culture, les trois essais qui composent ce recueil tentent d'apporter quelques éléments de réponse à des questions contemporaines de philosophie politique. Aussi cette menace d'une disparition éventuelle de la politique semble-t-elle suivre de nos jours trois tendances interdépendantes : sa dissolution privative dans les mécanismes du marché ; l'évincement de ses catégories usuelles (nation, souveraineté...) au (...) profit des notions religieuses (croisade, axe du mal...) ; enfin, l'occultation tendancieuse du débat démocratique au nom d'une expertise garante d'une objectivité "non partisane". Si crise de la politique et crise de la culture paraissent ainsi s'interpeller, sans doute est-ce parce qu'elles révèlent un même enjeu : la reconquête, à rebours de cette privatisation processuelle de l'espace public, d'un monde commun – ce que souligne d'ailleurs avec force la question écologique. A l'inverse d'une philosophie politique abstraite sise sur des principes immuables, l'idée est plutôt la suivante : comment articuler concrètement et stratégiquement, dans le sillage de Daniel Bensaïd, philosophie et politique? (shrink)

Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740–1821) zählte zu den prägenden Philosophen und Publizisten der europäischen Aufklärung zwischen 1770 und 1800, und zwar sowohl innerhalb weiter Teilbereiche der Fach- und Schulphilosophie als auch im Zusammenhang literarischer und popularphilosophischer Diskurse der sich entwickelnden Öffentlichkeit. Feder nahm entscheidenden Einfluss auf wichtige Debatten, Kontroversen und Forschungsentwicklungen seiner Zeit.

The term theodicy was coined by the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and is inherent in the question of how evil can exist if an intrinsically good God guides everything. The publication of this oeuvre initiated intense philosophical and theological discourse in the subsequent centuries, during which many issues that bare upon human well-being were articulated. Also, Leibniz’s rational approach to the relationship between God and evil raised a number of issues related to the topic of belief. This topic has (...) entangled discourses on theodicy with a long-lasting debate on beliefs, which goes back to Antiquity. Recently, a paradigm-shift shed new light on the understanding of belief. Science has begun to address the neurophysiological mechanisms of the processes that underpin belief formation, modulation, and change. The term credition was coined in order to capture and reflect this new and innovative understanding of the fluidity of beliefs and believing. This paper presents various features of a pattern of interrelationships between well-being, theodicy, and credition. (shrink)

SummaryThe philosophical core of a psychological theory of cognitive processes is developped and commented, focussing on the problem of intentionality, this term being taken in the normal and in the phenomenological sense. Actions, perceived processes, their states and results, operations and concepts are seen as related insofar as they all establish relations between elements, are generated by construction and can be objectivated. These acts and/or the objectives that control them, are intentional insofar as their structure is activated. Such activation is (...) characteristic of living systems. Intentionality sensu Brentano/Husserl is limited to acts of presentation, a contemplative conception which lacks the constructivity and the dynamism of our pragmatistic concept of action and thought. (shrink)