The aim of this article is to rethink the relation between education and progress, claiming that discourses of progress tend to project specific visions of the future and thereby instrumentalize education to achieve these visions while foreclosing other possible futures. The first part of the paper argues that the historical pact between education and progress has been recently recast in terms of learning. Learning receives at the same time an economic and a political interpretation in this context, turning issues such (...) as unemployment or social justice into learning problems. What both interpretations seem to share, however, is that learning is conceived of as a pathway to futures already known. Drawing on the philosophy of Isabelle Stengers, in whose work the concept of learning acquires a vital position, the article reframes learning in terms of a situated encounter made possible within an artificial environment, whereby the future is not being projected, but becomes thoroughly problematic—a matter of collective concern. Recent calls to ‘learn to live with’ Covid-19, but also the effects of climate change, form the point of departure for reworking the concept of learning from the inside out. (shrink)

In response to its current crisis, scholars call for the revitalisation of democracy through democratic innovations. While they make ample use of life metaphors describing democracy as a living organism, no comprehensive understanding of ‘life’ has been established within democratic theory. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement articulates the urgency of refocusing on life and its meaning through radical democratic practice. This article employs a grounded theory approach, enriched with participatory methods, to develop a radical democratic concept of life in (...) conversation with BLM. It conceptualises life as the existence of a perspective that constantly transforms through its fundamental interconnectedness. Building on this concept, the article outlines four principles of a living democracy that go beyond the revitalisation discourse. A living democracy (1) safeguards the existence of all humans and nonhumans, (2) nurtures a diversity of perspectives, (3) fosters social and planetary connectivity, and (4) enables self- and collective transformation. (shrink)

This book presents an innovative reading of Daoist philosophy that highlights the critical and therapeutic functions of satire and humor. Moeller and D'Ambrosio show how the Zhuangzi expounds the Daoist art of "genuine pretending" the paradoxical skill of enacting social roles without submitting to them or letting them define one's identity.

Introduces contemporary American philosophy of technology through six of its leading figures. The six American philosophers of technology whose work is profiled in this clear and concise introduction to the field—Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner—represent a new, empirical direction in the philosophical study of technology that has developed mainly in North America. In place of the grand philosophical schemes of the classical generation of European philosophers of technology, the contemporary American generation addresses (...) concrete technological practices and the co-evolution of technology and society in modern culture. Six Dutch philosophers associated with Twente University survey and critique the full scope and development of their American colleagues’ work, often illustrating shifts from earlier to more recent interests. Individual chapters focus on Borgmann’s engagement with technology and everyday life; Dreyfus’s work on the limits of artificial intelligence; Feenberg’s perspectives on the cultural and social possibilities opened by technologies; Haraway’s conception of the cyborg and its attendant blurring of boundaries; Ihde’s explorations of the place of technology in the lifeworld; and Winner’s fascination with the moral and political implications of modern technologies. American Philosophy of Technology offers an insightful and readable introduction to this new and distinctly American philosophical turn. Contributors are Hans Achterhuis, Philip Brey, René Munnik, Martijntje Smits, Pieter Tijmes, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. (shrink)

“Marx na Universidade!” Esta palavra de ordem sinalizou as reivindicações do Movimento Estudantil, que agitou as universidades alemãs há mais do que cinco décadas, refletindo sobre a missão político-social da formação universitária. O fato de, naquele tempo, a indicação de uma aula sobre a teoria de Karl Marx ter sido sacrificada pela censura dos órgãos políticos da universidade tornou-se incompreensível em nossos dias.[1] Pelo contrário, depois da preocupação intensa com a teoria marxiana nas décadas passadas, o interesse nela parece ter (...) diminuído rapidamente. Acho que foram sobretudo duas razões que levaram a esse processo. Em primeiro lugar, a crítica da economia política foi aceita como teoria científica, tendo enfraquecido assim seu potencial crítico em relação ao desenvolvimento real das sociedades cunhadas pelo capitalismo tardio. Ela tornou-se apenas uma base entre outras na compreensão científica da realidade social.[2] Além disso, a teoria, ela mesma, contém traços objetivistas ao apresentar a análise das estruturas materiais e econômicas, fazendo desaparecer o sujeito humano — fato este, que levou a teoria a aproximar-se aparentemente aos dogmas positivistas da moderna ciência. A teoria de Marx correria, por isso, o risco de mover-se na vizinhança do positivismo científico sacrificando seu impulso emancipatório. Como pôde essa perversão surgir na recepção dessa teoria? Por que esta teoria tão ambiciosa perdeu seu potencial político, deixando-se incluir no pluralismo das teorias científicas? Achando que a teoria de Marx em si mesma não foi inocente quanto a esse processo ou, ao menos, a esse risco, não quero dizer que tivesse refletido de modo insuficiente sobre a emancipação humana. Muito pelo contrário, provarei que a história de sua recepção, assim como a construção teórica da crítica da economia política dão razões significativas para obrigar seu autor a destematizar os sujeitos humanos e, por isso mesmo, chamar a atenção a esse sujeito desaparecido. Em dois passos, explicarei a seguir as razões fundamentadoras dessa tese à primeira vista paradoxal. Na primeira parte da argumentação examinarei o desenvolvimento da teoria de Marx, que se lê como processo de abandono do discurso sobre o sujeito humano, ao passo que na segunda localizarei o destino dos sujeitos e da perspectiva emancipatória, provocados pelas razões internas dessa teoria. Finalmente, incluirei alguns pontos caraterísticos de uma subjetividade humana não dominada pela alienação vigente nas nossas sociedades capitalistas, extraindo assim uma perspectiva produtiva da argumentação anterior. (shrink)

Current radical democratic politics is characterized by new participatory spaces for citizens’ engagement, which aim at facilitating the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. These spaces are, however, situated in the context of deep societal inequalities. Modes of discrimination are carried over into participatory interaction. The democratic subject is judged by its physically embodied appearance, which replicates external hierarchies and impedes the freedom of self-expression. To tackle this problem, this article seeks to identify ways to increase the freedom of the (...) subject to explore its multiple self. Understanding the self as inherently fugitive, the article investigates participatory, deliberative and agonistic concepts of self-transformation. As all of them appear limited, it introduces a transformative perspective in democratic thought. Enriching the transformative perspective with queer and gender theory, the article generates the concept of a politics of becoming, which, through radical democratic practices of disidentification, advances the freedom of the subject to change. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's Either-Or is a book about the choice between aesthetic, ethical, and religious approaches to life. I show that Either-Or also contains a proposal for philosophy of science, and in particular, about the ideal epistemic state for human beings. Whereas the Cartesian-Hegelian tradition conceived of the ideal state as one of detached deliberation -- i.e. "seeing the world as it is in itself" -- Kierkegaard envisions the ideal state as the achievement of equilibrium between the "spectator" and "actor" aspects of (...) the human being. Kierkegaard's proposal thus sets the stage for Niels Bohr's "epistemological lesson of quantum mechanics". (shrink)

The book also sheds new light on many important allegories by showing how modern translations often conceal the wit and humor of the Chinese original.

This volume presents six lively conversations with Hans-Georg Gadamer, one of the twentieth century’s master philosophers. Looking back over his life and thought, Gadamer takes up key issues in his philosophy, addresses points of controversy, and replies to his critics, including those who accuse him of having been in complicity with the Nazis. A genial and direct conversationalist, Gadamer is here captured at his best and most accessible. The interviews took place between 1989 and 1996, and all but one (...) appear in English for the first time in this volume. The first three conversations, conducted by Heidelberg philosopher Carsten Dutt, deal with hermeneutics, aesthetics, and practical philosophy and the question of ethics. In a fourth conversation, with University of Heidelberg classics professor Glenn W. Most, Gadamer argues for the vital importance of the Greeks for our contemporary thinking. In the next, the philosopher reaffirms his connection with phenomenology and clarifies his relation to Husserl and Heidegger in a conversation with London philosopher Alfons Grieder. In the final interview, with German Nazi expert Dörte von Westernhagen, Gadamer describes his life as a struggling young professor in Germany in the 1930s and refutes accusations of his complicity with the Nazis. These conversations are a lucid introduction for readers new to the philosopher’s thought, and for experts they present an invaluable commentary on Gadamer’s most important themes. (shrink)

In this text, I explore the intertwined relationship between philosophy of science and theology, and the challenges they both encounter in the academic realm. While theology is struggling to maintain its relevance, philosophy of science has gained recognition and offers valuable insights to theologians. I argue that theologians can benefit from engaging with the content and methods of specific sciences, and philosophers of science can help affirm the methodological legitimacy of theology. However, it is important to note that science itself (...) is facing its own set of problems. There is a decline in interest and job satisfaction among scientists, a growing gap between science and the humanities, a crisis of conceptual understanding, and a perceived lack of meaning and purpose. In this context, I propose that theology and philosophy can play a crucial role in addressing these issues. In particular, theology can offer a supportive environment for discussing meaning, values, and the ultimate questions of human existence. Philosophy, on the other hand, can help bridge the gap between science and the humanities, fostering interdisciplinary dialogue and a more holistic understanding of our world. (shrink)

The hole argument purportedly shows that spacetime substantivalism implies a pernicious form of indeterminism. We show that the argument is seductive only because it mistakes a trivial claim (viz. there are isomorphic models) for a significant claim (viz. there are hole isomorphisms). We prove that the latter claim is false -- thereby closing the debate about whether substantivalism implies indeterminism.

Judging works of art is one thing. Loving a work of art is something else. When you visit a museum like the Louvre you make hundreds of judgements in the space of just a couple of hours. But you may grow to love only one or a handful of works over the course of your entire life. Depending on the art form you are most aligned with, this can be a painting, a novel, a poem, a song, a work of (...) architecture, or some other art object or performance. As it happens, however, we have fallen in love with a series of films: Before Sunrise, Before Sunset, and Before Midnight. But what does it mean to love a film? What’s the difference between liking a film, loving a film, and being a film lover? How rational or irrational is it to fall in love with a film? What are the constitutive elements of such a love? These are the questions we seek to address in this paper. -/- . (shrink)

These autobiographical reflections by a major contemporary philosopher offer an enjoyable and enlightening tour not only of his own intellectual development but of the rich and fruitful collaboration of minds during a rich period in German cultural history. Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author of Truth and Method, traces his "philosophical apprenticeships" with some of the most important thinkers of the 20th century. Perhaps more than anyone else, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who is Professor Emeritus at the University of Heidelberg, is the (...) doyen of German philosophy and the recognized chief theorist of hermeneutics. His book Reason in the Age of Science (MIT Press paperback) is an ideal introduction to his thought and to the problems of hermeneutics more generally. Philosophical Apprenticeships is included in the series Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy. (shrink)

The aim of what I propose to call “existential aesthetics” is to investigate the various ways in which art and certain kinds of aesthetic practice or aesthetic experience can be of existential importance to people. Section I provides a definition of existential aesthetics, while Section II delineates this emerging field from cognate areas of research. Sections III and IV explore various subcategories and examples of existential aesthetics. Section V seeks to identify important avenues for future research and Section VI presents (...) some concluding thoughts about the potential of existential aesthetics and why philosophers should be encouraged to fulfill this potential. (shrink)

In Scepticism and Naturalism Strawson characterized his position as a form of naturalism. Not even in that work, however, did he subscribe to any standardly recognized types of naturalism (ontological, epistemological, meta-philosophical). Strawson’s naturalism, as far as it goes, is anthropological instead of scientific, and descriptive rather than revisionary. It insists that central features of our common-sense conceptual scheme are part of our human nature and therefore immune to naturalization by either reduction or elimination. My contribution explores both strengths and (...) weaknesses of this position. It discusses the ‘relativizing move’ that insists on the legitimacy of both the ‘participant’ or ‘involved’ perspective of everyday life vs. the ‘objective’ or ‘detached’ of science as well as Strawson’s ‘relaxed realism’. It ends with a defence of the general idea of anthropological naturalism. In spite of problems concerning details of execution, this approach is more sober, realistic and illuminating than mainstream naturalisms. (shrink)

Today there is a wealth of fascinating studies of connexive logical systems. But sometimes it looks as if connexive logic is still in search of a convincing interpretation that explains in intuitive terms _why_ the connexive principles should be valid. In this paper I argue that difference-making conditionals as presented in Rott (_Review of Symbolic Logic_ 15, 2022) offer one principled way of interpreting connexive principles. From a philosophical point of view, the idea of difference-making demands full, unrestricted connexivity, because (...) neither logical truths nor contradictions or other absurdities can ever ‘make a difference’ (i.e., be relevantly connected) to anything. However, difference-making conditionals have so far been only partially connexive. I show how the existing analysis of difference-making conditionals can be reshaped to obtain full connexivity. The classical AGM belief revision model is replaced by a conceivability-limited revision model that serves as the semantic base for the analysis. The key point of the latter is that the agent should never accept any absurdities. (shrink)

The idea of moral certainties is venerable, highly contentious, and nevertheless alive. What I call “hinge ethics” (in analogy to hinge epistemology) combines three currents – meta-ethical concerns about the scope and limits of moral knowledge and objectivity, the idea of limits of doubt as articulated in On Certainty, and sympathies for Wittgensteinian ideas about ethics. This essay critically assesses hinge ethics, focusing on Nigel Pleasants’ work. My main objection is not that Wittgensteinian ideas about certainty cannot be transferred from (...) the domain of physical phenomena to the moral domain. Nor shall I nail my colours to the mast of moral relativism. Instead my main tack will be as follows: Several of the views hinge ethicists detect in or derive from On Certainty are intriguing and ingenious, yet either unwarranted and/or not echt Wittgensteinian. Purported moral certainties like the wrongness of killing are neither ineffable, nor non-propositional, nor quasi-transcendental preconditions of moral thought and action. In so far as morality has scaffolding foundations, it is not certainties but capacities. At least some of these capacities are cognitive, a matter of social cognition. (shrink)

The prior issue of Krisis (42:1) published Critical Naturalism: A Manifesto, with the aim to instigate a debate of the issues raised in this manifesto – the necessary re-thinking of the role (and the concept) of nature in critical theory in relation to questions of ecology, health, and inequality. Since Krisis considers itself a place for philosophical debates that take contemporary struggles as starting point, it issued an open call and solicited responses to the manifesto. This is one of the (...) sixteen selected responses, which augment, specify, or question the assumptions and arguments of the manifesto. (shrink)

With reference to Plato and Aristotle, Gadamer discusses the question of what is left of friendship and solidarity in an age of `anonymous responsibility.'.

In 1514 at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Leipzig, a quodlibetical disputation took place. About 60 persons participated in the disputation. A handwritten record of this event has been preserved. A thorough analysis of these texts gives us a wealth of information with regard to the themes, positions, and tendencies of thinking during that period of time. The scholars at Leipzig University made an attempt at reconciling their philosophical interests with the claim to spiritual hegemony on the (...) part of theology and the church. This aspect is remarkable if one thinks of the famous papal bull Apostolici Regiminis, promulgated in the year 1513. The attached appendix lists the topics and the names of the participants of the disputation according to the record. (shrink)

Für die zeitgenössische Philosophie ist das Vererben ein Vermögenstransfer, der unter Gesichtspunkten sozialer Gerechtigkeit zu behandeln ist. Diese Untersuchungsperspektive ist angesichts der massiven Verteilungseffekte, die das Vererben zeitigt, ohne Frage sehr wichtig. Allerdings lässt sie einen Punkt unberücksichtigt: Das testamentarische Vererben kann wichtige Beiträge dazu leisten, dass wir Verstorbene, denen wir zu Lebzeiten nahestanden, in Erinnerung behalten und wertschätzen. Hierbei ist der monetäre Wert der vererbten Güter nicht entscheidend. Wie ich in meinem Aufsatz darlege, lässt sich mit diesem Befund erklären, (...) warum die (von einer wachsenden Zahl von Gerechtigkeitstheoretikerinnen und -theoretikern geforderte) Abschaffung des Rechts zu vererben nicht nur von Vorteil sein würde, sondern auch mit ethischen Kosten verbunden wäre. Ein adäquater philosophischer Diskurs hätte diesen Befund (mit dem sich neoliberale oder rechtslibertaristische erbrechtliche Positionen nicht rechtfertigen lassen) angemessen zu berücksichtigen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos: The Philosophical Arguments by Simon TruwantHans-Jörg RheinbergerTRUWANT, Simon. Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos: The Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022. 288 pp. Cloth, $99.99The legendary debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger in Davos, where the two philosophers met and exchanged views on the occasion of the second Davoser Hochschultage in 1929, has been investigated and commented upon many times. The general (...) tenor of these assessments was, as Simon Truwant states, to conclude either that the young Heidegger won out over his elder contemporary Cassirer, or that in fact they talked past each other, that is, that there was no real debate at all. Truwant sets out to contest both of these conclusions, and he fully succeeds in doing so. What may appear as an unnecessary rehearsal at the beginning reveals itself as a balanced and in-depth assessment of the two philosophical projects of the mature Cassirer and the early Heidegger from within and, more broadly speaking, as the expression of a "parting of the ways" (Michael Friedman) in early twentieth-century Western philosophy.Truwant identifies three core topics in the dispute between the two thinkers: first, their assessment of the core of Kant's transcendental philosophy; second, their stance on the human condition; and third, their position toward the proper task of philosophy. Accordingly, the book with its altogether ten chapters is meaningfully divided into three parts. In each part devoted to each of the three topics, a meticulous and close reading of Cassirer's philosophy of human culture qua philosophy of symbolic forms and Heidegger's existential ontology toward being and time is carried out. As the debate advances from an assessment of Kant's critical project, as exposed in his Critique of Pure Reason, to their takes on the essence of the human condition, and finally to the proper task of philosophy, their respective positions more and more appear to become incompatible. This is to be expected, Truwant argues, since each one's stance toward the task of philosophy determines his view on the human condition and, in turn, his interpretation of Kant's transcendental philosophy.This short review is not the place to enter into the carefully exposed argumentative details of Cassirer and Heidegger's views. Suffice it to say that Truwant successfully demonstrates that neither of the above-mentioned standard accounts of the Davos debate can be substantiated. Heidegger did not outmatch Cassirer. Both philosophers argued from an internally consistent position. Cassirer saw the task of his philosophy of symbolic forms as a cosmopolitan one that ultimately strives toward a self-understanding of human culture in all of its facets. He looked at the [End Page 562] human condition from the perspective of mankind as a species of living beings capable of creating a multiplicity of symbolic forms, from myth to language to science, from religion to economy to politics, and he saw the essence of human culture in precisely this irreducible multiplicity that offered the human being a route to transcend its finiteness. At the same time, he shared with Kant the idea that the sciences offer a privileged perspective for the assessment of man's proliferating symbolic capacities, and he held with Kant that our takes on the world are never immediate but always, and necessarily so, mediated by the means with which we approach it. Heidegger, on the other hand, saw the task of his existential ontology to recuperate the fundamental meaning of the being of beings (das Sein des Seienden) that tended to be forgotten (Seinsvergessenheit) both in the course of the history of philosophy and in the busyness of everyday life. He looked at the human condition as being fundamentally finite, and he articulated the necessity to come to terms with its finitude. Finally, he approached Kant's transcendental philosophy as an attempt to have glimpsed, although it was ultimately eschewed, the unavoidability of such a fundamental ontology.In one respect, however, both philosophers shared a common ground, and it is this common ground that lets their controversy appear as a real dispute in an originary sense. In the introduction to his book, Truwant formulates... (shrink)

Barzykowski and Moulin link déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories to the process of retrieval. They make no reference to Tulving's SPI-model. In this, it is proposed that information is acquired serially (S), stored in parallel (P), and retrieved independently (I). This model offers an alternative, elegant, view of involuntary autobiographical memory retrieval, as well as of déjà vus.

Despite the simplicity from a linguistic perspective, the formula וַיִּקְבֹּר אֹתוֹ in Deuteronomy 34:6 has been at the origins of a vivid discussion amongst its interpreters. Most of the time, this formula, in which an explicit subject is missing, is interpreted as having YHWH, who is mentioned in the final part of the foregoing verse, as its subject. As such, it is YHWH who is considered as the one who buried Moses. Nevertheless, other interpretations are equally possible. In Hebrew, a (...) third person singular verbal form can also be used in order to refer to an unidentified subject (‘one’). A comparison of the Masoretic Text of Deuteronomy 34:6 to the Versiones makes clear that the latter apparently has been the interpretation of the Septuagint translator, even if one cannot be sure whether its plural verbal form ἔθαψαν is because of the interpretation of the Greek translator or to a different Hebrew Vorlage. Moreover, the comparison of the different textual witnesses of Deuteronomy 34:6 makes clear that a conclusive answer to the question whether the singular (וַיִּקְבֹּר) or the plural form (וַיּקְבְּרוּ) is the ‘more original’ seems to be impossible. Contribution: Refraining from historical-critical or theological prejudices, the present article evaluates the possibilities as to the issue who buried Moses, according to Deuteronomy 34:8. It demonstrates that on the basis of textual evidences as witnessed by the Versiones, a univocal interpretation should not be imposed to the text. Interpreting difficult Bible passages is one of the core focusses of HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies. (shrink)

The Greek philosopher Aristotle continued the tradition of his predecessors, Socrates, the Sophists, and Plato, who for the first time had made man the centre of philosophical reflection. However, Aristotle did not limit his thought to man alone; man, situated at the top of the Great Chain of Being, is an integral part of the encompassing nature. In his Treatise on the Soul (De Anima) Aristotle’s argument concerning the soul’s knowledge-generating faculties, in particular the dialogue with his predecessors, resembles in (...) many respects the philosophical debate on the pramāṇas, ‘the valid ways of cognition’, which informed the classical Indian schools of thought. In Aristotle’s De Anima we possess a unique, coherent treatise that deals exhaustively with ‘valid ways of cognition’, a treatise that kept its prominent position until the Scientific Revolution of the 16/17th century. This book focuses on the concept of the hylomorphic soul and the process by which it actuates cognition, that means it is concerned with Aristotle’s epistemology. From his conception of the soul or psychẽ as the entelexeia of the body arises the ‘noetic problem’. The idea of a human mind, nous, that takes part in a supra-individual, semi-divine world of knowledge (epistẽmẽ) is apparently at odds with the basic principles of Aristotle’s philosophy. When the Philosopher avows that the mind is ‘separable’ in its true realization, the question is how it can still be part of the human soul. It is argued that the so-called ‘susceptible mind’ (νοῦς παθητικός) and its actual operation are two aspects of one and the same nous: the potency of the human mind to accommodate forms or ideas distinguishes it fundamentally from the divine ‘thinking of thinking’, the eternal, immutable state of the celestial mind. (shrink)

Die Beihefte der Historische Zeitschrift werden in Neuer Folge von Andreas Fahrmeir und Hartmut Leppin herausgegeben. Die Beihefte enthalten Essays und Monographien zu Themen der deutschen und europäischen Geschichte sowie Sammelbände zu herausragenden Themenbereichen. In ihnen äußern sich die ausgewiesenen Sachkenner ihres Fachgebiets.

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The Tractatus revolves around the connection between two central topics – the preconditions of symbolic representation and the nature of logic-cum-philosophy. Proper philosophy is an activity, namely of revealing the hidden structures that allow language to represent reality by way of logical analysis. At the same time the main purpose of such logical analysis consists in revealing metaphysical statements to be nonsensical. In the subsequent development of analytic philosophy, these two ideas parted company. The positive aim of revealing the logical (...) form of sentences resulted in a program closely associated with Davidson, namely a theory of meaning for natural languages that yields metaphysical corollaries. The negative aim of overcoming metaphysics ushered in the activity of dissolving conceptual confusions through conceptual rather than logical analysis, propelled by the later Wittgenstein. My presentation pursues these historical lines of influence. But the ultimate aim is a substantive one, namely to establish whether the two projects can be kept apart. With the later Wittgenstein, I criticize the claim that formal calculi constitute the hidden structure of natural languages. But I also contend that the hope of engaging in anti-metaphysical dialectic without relying on logico-conceptual analysis of some kind falls prey to a “myth of mere method”. (shrink)

Ausgehend von einer Gegenüberstellung der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundpositionen des Empirismus und der Transzendentalphilosophie (Apriorismus) will der Autor am Beispiel der Probleme «Begriffsbildung» und «Kausalität» zeigen, wie sich klassische philosophische Kontroversen (Hume-Kant) unter Zuhilfenahme erkenntnistheoretisch relevanter biologisch-psychologischer Forschungsergebnisse (J. Piaget, K. Lorenz) lösen lassen.

Reprint of the ed. published in Vienna by J. Springer in 1930 and 1928, respectively. "Unrecht und Unrechtsfolge im V'olkerrecht" is reprinted from Zeitschrift f'ur 'offentliches Recht, Bd. 12, 1932.