W obliczu katastrofalnych skutków antropopresji widoczna staje się konieczność współpracy pomiędzy humanistyką a przyrodoznawstwem. Te dwie sztucznie rozłączone dziedziny nauki, zdążyły w toku historii zbudować swoje metodologie i swoje języki. Obie jednak badają to samo: świat, w którym żyje człowiek. W kontekście narastającej potrzeby troskliwych działań w kierunku przyrody, potrzebne są zintegrowane podejścia. Jest to tym bardziej zasadne, że przecież człowiek jest elementem biologicznego środowiska. Koncepcje posthumanistyczne znoszą podział między kulturą a naturą, proponują zrezygnować z antropocentryzmu i lokują człowieka na (...) powrót w świecie przyrody. Tym bardziej więc powrotne połączenie humanistyki i przyrodoznawstwa jest zasadne. Co więcej, jest ono też konieczne dla efektywnej refleksji na rzecz ochrony środowiska przyrodniczego. (shrink)

Hanna Pitkin has made key contributions to the field of political philosophy, pushing forward and clarifying the ways that political theorists think about action as the exercise of political freedom. In so doing, she has offered insightful studies of the problems of modern politics that theorists are called to address, and has addressed them herself in a range of theoretical genres. She is an innovator in bringing conceptual work inspired by ordinary language philosophy to the field of political philosophy, (...) as well as a penetrating and exacting interpreter of texts who draws on the insights of psychoanalysis, gender, and historical study. This collection of her works approaches each of these dimensions of Pitkin's contributions in turn, recognizing that she typically blends these modes of engagement in much of her political theorizing. The Modern Condition and the Impetus to Theorize. At several moments in her career, Pitkin has offered sustained reflection on what aspects of modern political life prompt the impulse to theorize politics. She has also drawn out with great nuance the pitfalls that modern life and philosophy also present for that enterprise, for example, in attempts to naturalize human community or in turning to theoretical abstraction. Her study of Wittgenstein in particular structured her most penetrating study of these questions. Pitkin suggests an agenda for political theorizing to engage the dilemmas of modernity in ways that grasp the importance of paradox as a portal of insight into the modern condition, and eschews attempts at easy resolution. In keeping with this, Pitkin has herself explored a variety of conceptual paradoxes that arise in the work of other theorists (e.g., regarding freedom, interest, and obligation), each as symptomatic of modern dilemmas. In each encounter, Pitkin offers a clearer picture of the problems of political modernity and the outlines of political responses to them. Moral Philosophy, Judgment, Justice: Pitkin has turned at several points in her career to the concept of justice as one that particularly brings together questions of agency and responsibility, the insights of moral philosophy, and judgment. Characteristic of her work, her engagements with justice have drawn upon a variety of methodological resources and theoretical inspirations. Her work engages ordinary language philosophy, pedagogical practice, and textual study, to yield a complex and subtle set of observations, all of which open moral philosophy and matters of judgment to questions of action and responsibility in the exercise of political freedom. Action: Political agency and its obstacles are a key theme in Pitkin's work and a main area of her theoretical innovation. She has approached the question of political agency from several directions. In some works, she has examined the appeal of autonomy as a picture of political agency, probing in particular the gendered dimension of the fantasy of autonomy. In other works - perhaps most famously, in her work on representation - Pitkin has explored the ways that the institutional arrangements of modern liberal societies attempt to link of individual and political agency--and the pitfalls of these approaches. Finally, Pitkin has offered a picture of political freedom as maintaining the tension, between individual "parts" and collective "wholes," that these modern institutional arrangements attempt to resolve. Finally, through her groundbreaking and definitive work on Hannah Arendt, Pitkin has meditated on the political and social conditions that most impede our ability to grasp agency as a practice of political freedom, and gestured to paths that may lead forward. (shrink)

Drug use and drug addiction are severely stigmatised around the world. Marc Lewis does not frame his learning model of addiction as a choice model out of concern that to do so further encourages stigma and blame. Yet the evidence in support of a choice model is increasingly strong as well as consonant with core elements of his learning model. I offer a responsibility without blame framework that derives from reflection on forms of clinical practice that support change and recovery (...) in patients who cause harm to themselves and others. This framework can be used to interrogate our own attitudes and responses, so that we can better see how to acknowledge the truth about choice and agency in addiction, while avoiding stigma and blame, and instead maintaining care and compassion alongside a commitment to working for social justice and good. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the context of translational research, researchers have increasingly been using biological samples and data in fundamental research phases. To explore informed consent practices, we conducted a retrospective study on informed consent documents that were used for CARPEM’s translational research programs. This review focused on detailing their form, their informational content, and the adequacy of these documents with the international ethical principles and participants’ rights.MethodsInformed consent forms (ICFs) were collected from CARPEM investigators. A content analysis focused on information related to (...) biological samples and data treatment (context of sampling and collect, aims, reuse, consent renewal), including the type of consent. An automatic assessment of the readability of the ICFs were performed with the IT program “Flesch Score”.Results29 ICFs from 25 of 49 studies were analyzed after selection criteria were applied. Three types of consent were identified: 11 broad consents, six specific consents, and two opt-out consents. The Flesch Scores showed that most of the documents were too complex to be fully understood by most of the potential research participants. Most of the biological samples were collected during the healthcare routine, but the information content about secondary use of biological samples varied between ICFs. All documents mentioned personal data treatment but information about their reuse was not standardized in the ICFs.ConclusionsOur review of current IC procedures of CARPEM showed that practices could be improved considering new translational research methods. “Old fashion written ICFs” should be adapted to the translational research approach, to better respect individual rights and international research ethics principles. In this context, theoretically, a digital tool allowing dynamic information and consent of participants, through an electronic interactive platform may be a good way to promote more active participation in research. Nevertheless, its feasibility in the complex environment of biological samples and data research remains to prove. The way of a combination of a broad consent followed by dynamic information may be alternatively tested. (shrink)

Author: Mamzer Henryk Title: TRANSFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS INTO THE CULTURAL STUDIES ONES AS THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE PROCESS OF WORLD’S HUMANIZATION (Przekształcanie się problemów filozoficznych w kulturoznawcze jako wyraz procesu humanizacji świata) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 263-278 Keywords: NOTION OF CULTURE, CULTURAL STUDIES, PROCESS OF WORLD’S HUMANIZATION Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:This text is inspired by main research problem undertaken by Jerzy Kmita in (...) his book Konieczne serio ironisty. O przekształcaniu się problemów filozoficznych w kulturoznawcze (Poznań 2007). The mentioned problem is related to this area of culture to which „The human being had invaded and thanks to this started to construct both the world and himself”. Beginning from this moment the way followed by humans equals the process of the world’s humanization. This is not a continuous process. Each epoch, each culture, has its own vision of own functioning and the way which surrounding world functions, the world in which the social actor participates and creates. The practice proves that usually ethnocentric human attitudes influence the way in which original assumptions are introduced into the life. Reaction to this fact is giving up practicing philosophical practices related with the notion of “absolute” and, as consequences, moving into the field of cultural studies. This process is the demonstration of the world’s humanization. The notion of culture is the superior one. In a way – a priori – of all types of human activities. The science and philosophy are produced by the culture as well, and they are shaped by the values and expectations present in given culture. Because of this cultural studies (knowledge on the culture) appears to be “broad meaning type of knowledge”, exceeding the borders of the philosophy. (shrink)

Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the connections between them. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defense of (...) Kant's theory of analytic and synthetic necessary truth, making this compelling reading for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues. (shrink)

? We gratefully acknowledge the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, Tucson, which provided a grant for the support of this work. E.T. is also supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. 1 See David Woodruff Smith.

Robert Hanna argues for the importance of Kant's theories of the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical foundations of the "exact sciences"--relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy for most of the 20th century. In doing so he makes a valuable contribution to one of the most active and fruitful areas in contemporary scholarship on Kant.

I argue that denial plays a central but insufficiently recognized role in addiction. The puzzle inherent in addiction is why drug use persists despite negative consequences. The orthodox conception of addiction resolves this puzzle by appeal to compulsion; but there is increasing evidence that addicts are not compelled to use but retain choice and control over their consumption in many circumstances. Denial offers an alternative explanation: there is no puzzle as to why drug use persists despite negative consequences if these (...) consequences are not straightforwardly known. I describe the nature of the causal knowledge that one's drug use is causing negative consequences; map the conceptual landscape of denial and explain how it can block such knowledge; and explore some of the processes and mechanisms that have been studied by philosophy and the cognitive sciences and which may underpin denial in addiction, including well-established information-processing biases, motivational influences on belief formation and self-deception, and cognitive deficits with respect to insight and self-awareness. I conclude by suggesting that addiction is as much a disorder of cognition as a disorder of conation. (shrink)

Addiction is standardly characterized as a neurobiological disease of compulsion. Against this characterization, I argue that many cases of addiction cannot be explained without recognizing the value of drugs to those who are addicted; and I explore in detail an insufficiently recognized source of value, namely, a sense of self and social identity as an addict. For people who lack a genuine alternative sense of self and social identity, recovery represents an existential threat. Given that an addict identification carries expectations (...) of continued consumption despite negative consequences, there is therefore a parsimonious explanation of why people who identify as addicts continue to use drugs despite these consequences: they self‐identify as addicts and that is what addicts are supposed to do. I conclude by considering how it is nonetheless possible to overcome addiction despite this identity, in part by imagining and enacting a new one. Importantly, this possibility requires the availability of social support and material resources that are all too frequently absent in the lives of those who struggle with addiction. (shrink)

Effective treatment of disorders of agency presents a clinical conundrum. Many of the core symptoms or maintaining factors are actions and omissions that cause harm to self and others. Encouraging service users to take responsibility for this behavior is central to treatment. Blame, in contrast, is detrimental. How is it possible to hold service users responsible for actions and omissions that cause harm without blaming them? A solution to this problem is part conceptual, part practical. This chapter offers a conceptual (...) framework that clearly distinguishes between ideas of responsibility, blameworthiness, and "detached" and "affective" blame. It argues that affective blame is detrimental to effective treatment. And it suggests that affective blame can be avoided by attention to service users' past history, which directly evokes compassion and empathy. Finally, the chapter briefly considers whether the clinical stance of responsibility without blame should be adopted in non-clinical interpersonal and social contexts. (shrink)

In Our Best Interest argues that it is permissible to intervene in a person's affairs whenever doing so serves her best interest without wronging others. Jason Hanna makes the case for paternalism, responding to common objections that paternalism is disrespectful or that it violates rights, and arguing that popular anti-paternalist views confront serious problems.

In Rationality and Logic, Robert Hanna argues that logic is intrinsically psychological and that human psychology is intrinsically logical. He claims that logic is cognitively constructed by rational animals and that rational animals are essentially logical animals. In order to do so, he defends the broadly Kantian thesis that all rational animals possess an innate cognitive "logic faculty." Hanna 's claims challenge the conventional philosophical wisdom that sees logic as a fully formal or "topic-neutral" science irreconcilably separate from (...) the species- or individual-specific focus of empirical psychology.Logic and psychology went their separate ways after attacks by Frege and Husserl on logical psychologism--the explanatory reduction of logic to empirical psychology. Hanna argues, however, that--despite the fact that logical psychologism is false--there is an essential link between logic and psychology. Rational human animals constitute the basic class of cognizers or thinkers studied by cognitive psychology; given the connection between rationality and logic that Hanna claims, it follows that the nature of logic is significantly revealed to us by cognitive psychology. Hanna 's proposed "logical cognitivism" has two important consequences: the recognition by logically oriented philosophers that psychologists are their colleagues in the metadiscipline of cognitive science; and radical changes in cognitive science itself. Cognitive science, Hanna argues, is not at bottom a natural science; it is both an objective or truth-oriented science and a normative human science, as is logic itself. (shrink)

Robert Hanna works out a unified contemporary Kantian theory of rational human cognition and knowledge. Along the way, he provides accounts of intentionality and its contents, sense perception and perceptual knowledge, the analytic-synthetic distinction, the nature of logic, and a priori truth and knowledge in mathematics, logic, and philosophy. This book is specifically intended to reach out to two very different audiences: contemporary analytic philosophers of mind and knowledge, and contemporary Kantian philosophers or Kant-scholars. At the same time, it (...) rides the crest of a wave of exciting and revolutionary emerging new trends and new work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology, with a special concentration on the philosophy of perception. What is revolutionary in this new wave are its strong emphases on action, on cognitive phenomenology, on disjunctivist direct realism, on embodiment, and on sense perception as a primitive and proto-rational capacity for cognizing the world. Hanna makes a fundamental contribution to this philosophical revolution by giving it a specifically contemporary Kantian twist, and by pushing these new lines of investigation radically further. (shrink)

Ethics is an unconventional field of research for a surgeon, as ethics in surgery owns several specificities and surgery is considered an aggressive specialty. Therefore, the interest of research in medical ethics is sometimes unclear.In this short essay, we discussed the interest of research in medical ethics using a comparison to thermodynamics and mainly, entropy. During the transformation of a figure from one state to another, some energy is released or absorbed; yet, a part of this energy is wasted because (...) of “unordered” reactions: it is Entropy.This “wasted energy” exists in Medical practice and justifies research in Medical ethics. (shrink)

Artykuł ma charakter polemiczny – wyraża wątpliwość wobec potocznego przekonania, że materialne pozostałości po społeczeństwach minionych, skoro są jedynym o nich źródłem informacji, mówią „same za siebie”. Przekonanie to znajduje wsparcie w upowszechniającym się ostatnio w humanistyce światowej i europejskiej ukierunkowaniu badań nad kulturą materialną. Istotą owego ukierunkowania - jak twierdzą jego zwolennicy posługujący się hasłem „powrotu do materialności” lub „powrotu do rzeczy” - jest osłabienie czy wręcz wyeliminowanie nieuzasadnionej asymetrii między ludzkimi działaniami intencjonalnymi a nie-ludzkim, materialnym światem relacji przyczynowych. (...) Jednakże odczytywanie pradziejów z uporządkowanych przez archeologa materialnych wytworów jest ich odczytywaniem w języku wspólnotowym, a więc takim, w którym nadana została owemu zbiorowi wytworów treść dziejowa. Treść dziejowa uporządkowanego na muzealnej wystawie zbioru wytworów to rezultat uzgodnień wspólnotowych, literalne odniesienie przedmiotowe, „widziany społecznie” fragment rzeczywistości minionej, jej ujęcie z punktu widzenia akceptowanego kulturowo wcześniejszego zespołu stwierdzeń. Bez uzgodnień w języku wspólnotowym nie jest możliwe nadanie treści dziejowej porządkującej materialne wytwory, tak jak nie jest możliwe jej odczytanie bez znajomości języka wspólnotowego. Beduini czy australijscy aborygeni - przykładowo - nie uczestniczą w „umeblowaniu” świata kultury zachodniej, a więc bez znajomości jego języka wspólnotowego nie są w stanie odczytać treści dziejowej ze zbioru wytworów przedstawiającego ową treść. Język wspólnotowy ma charakter przedustawny; w sensie logicznym wyprzedza zarówno nadawanie materialnym wytworom treści dziejowej, jak i jej odczytanie przez odbiorcę. Materialne przedmioty, podobnie jak i miniona rzeczywistość, w której funkcjonowały, łączą się nierozerwalnie z kontekstem myślowym badacza, z jego kontekstem kulturowym. W związku z tym oddzielenie ich obiektywnego charakteru od kontekstu kulturowego, za pośrednictwem którego są one postrzegane, okazuje się niemożliwe. Nie jest więc możliwe oddzielenie rzeczy od naszego sposobu myślenia o nich. Przedmioty materialne w sensie przyrodoznawczym same w sobie nic nam nie mówią. „Tylko my to robimy” - by użyć sformułowania R. Rorty’ego. Główna teza artykułu ugruntowana jest więc w dokonaniach takich myślicieli jak: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Jerzy Kmita, Hilary Putnam czy Willard Van Orman Quine. Upowszechniające się dziś urzeczowienie badań nad kulturą jest wyrazem mityzacji sposobu myślenia najbardziej czytelnego w kulturze popularnej, a polegającego z jednej strony na antropomorfizowaniu świata natury, z drugiej zaś na równoczesnej reifikacji kulturowego obrazu świata. (shrink)

Hanna Pitkin argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action.

In Embodied Minds in Action, Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese work out a unified treatment of three fundamental philosophical problems: the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, and the problem of action. This unified treatment rests on two basic claims. The first is that conscious, intentional minds like ours are essentially embodied. This entails that our minds are necessarily spread throughout our living, organismic bodies and belong to their complete neurobiological constitution. So minds like ours are necessarily alive. (...) The second claim is that essentially embodied minds are self-organizing thermodynamic systems. This entails that our mental lives consist in the possibility and actuality of moving our own living organismic bodies through space and time, by means of our conscious desires. The upshot is that we are essentially minded animals who help to create the natural world through our own agency. This doctrine--the Essential Embodiment Theory--is a truly radical idea which subverts the traditionally opposed and seemingly exhaustive categories of Dualism and Materialism, and offers a new paradigm for contemporary mainstream research in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

This paper deals with the nature of trust in science. Understanding what appropriate trust in science is and why it can reasonably break down is important for improving scientists’ trustworthiness. There are two different ways in which philosophers of science think about trust in science: as based on objectivity or as based on shared values. Some authors argue that objectivity actually grounds mere reliance, not genuine trust. They draw on a distinction that philosophers of trust following Annette Baier have made (...) with respect to interpersonal trust, where genuine trust has some normative element to it that is missing in cases of mere reliance. However, I will show that there are plural forms of trust in science: Both objectivity and shared values ground trust in science in a normative sense. I will link the trust in science debate to the literature on interpersonal trust. This is significant in that, beyond references to Baier, there is little connection between both areas of philosophy. In a pluralist reading, different trust accounts help to identify the normative elements involved in different kinds of trust in science. (shrink)

Rebound effects on the consumer level occur when consumers’ realized greenhouse gas emission savings caused by behaviors that might be beneficial to the environment are lower than their potential greenhouse gas emission savings because the savings are offset by behavioral adjustments. While previous literature mainly studied the economic mechanisms of such rebound effects, research has largely neglected the moral-psychological mechanisms. A comprehensive conceptualization of rebound effects on the consumer level can help fill this void and stimulate more empirical research in (...) this relevant area. To this end, the paper introduces three focal dimensions of rebound effects on the consumer level: mechanism of rebound effects, product category, and consumption context. Based on this conceptualization, and integrating assumptions from the theory of moral licensing, the theory of categorization, and the construal level theory, this paper further refines the conceptualization of the moral component as an explanatory factor for rebound effects and highlights that the moral-psychological mechanisms of indirect rebound effects are more complex and diverse than the economic mechanisms. The paper outlines promising directions for future studies considering the different quantification and characteristics of economic and moral currencies that explain rebound effects on the consumer level and the strategic categorization of products and consumption contexts. (shrink)

Fließende Identität ist zum Wunschtraum einer ‚androgyn-multiplen‘ Kultur geworden. Utopien im Sinne des totalen Selbstentwurfs verwischen bisherigen Grenzen zwischen Fleisch und Plastik, Körper und Computer. Im postmodernen Plural gilt das Subjekt nur als Momentaufnahme im Fluss weiterer Verwandlungen. Es bedarf mehr denn je eines sinnvollen Durchdenkens: Was ist der Mensch? Edith Steins Denken legt frei, dass es eine Entfaltung gibt vom Unbelebten zum Belebten, über Pflanze und Tier bis zu jenem Wesen, das über Freiheit und Selbstbewusstsein verfügt: dem Menschen. Und (...) zugleich gelangt er aus sich selbst in einem Überstieg, ja, in eine lösende Beziehung: ‚In der Vereinigung mit der Göttlichen Liebe umfasst der geschaffene Geist auch erkennend, selig und frei bejahend sich selbst.‘ Das ist die Identität, um die es dem Menschen in seiner Sinnsuche geht. (shrink)

The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is overall harmful for someone if and only if it makes her worse off than she otherwise would have been. I defend this account from two common objections.

An observation of Hume’s has received a lot of attention over the last decade and a half: Although we can standardly imagine the most implausible scenarios, we encounter resistance when imagining propositions at odds with established moral (or perhaps more generally evaluative) convictions. The literature is ripe with ‘solutions’ to this so-called ‘Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. Few, however, question the plausibility of the empirical assumption at the heart of the puzzle. In this paper, we explore empirically whether the difficulty we (...) witness in imagining certain propositions is indeed due to claim type (evaluative v. non-evaluative) or whether it is much rather driven by mundane features of content. Our findings suggest that claim type plays but a marginal role, and that there might hence not be much of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved. (shrink)

This paper argues that perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ provides one with an awareness of acting, and that this awareness explains a previously overlooked feature of one's knowledge of one's own actions. Actions are events: they occur during periods of time. Knowledge of such events must be sensitive to their course through time. Perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ allows one to monitor one's actions as they unfold, thereby sustaining one's knowledge of what one is doing over (...) the period of time in which one is doing it. (shrink)

The landscape of addiction is dominated by two rival models: a moral model and a model that characterizes addiction as a neurobiological disease of compulsion. Against both, I offer a scientifically and clinically informed alternative. Addiction is a highly heterogenous condition that is ill‐characterized as involving compulsive use. On the whole, drug consumption in addiction remains goal directed: people take drugs because drugs have tremendous value. This view has potential implications for the claim that addiction is, in all cases, a (...) brain disease. But more importantly, it has implications for clinical and policy interventions. To help someone overcome addiction, you need to understand and address why they persist in using drugs despite negative consequences. If they are not compelled, then the explanation must advert to the value of drugs for them as an individual. What blocks us from acknowledging this reality is not science but fear: that it will ignite moralism about drugs and condemnation of drug users. The solution is not to cleave to the concept of compulsion but to fight moralism directly. (shrink)

cognitive psychology; given the connection between rationality and logic that Hanna claims, it follows that the nature of logic is significantly revealed to us by cognitive psychology. Hanna's proposed "logical cognitivism" has two important consequences: the recognition by logically oriented philosophers that psychologists are their colleagues in the metadiscipline of cognitive science; and radical changes in cognitive science itself. Cognitive science, Hanna argues, is not at bottom a natural science; it is both an objective or truth-oriented science (...) and a normative human science, as is logic itself. (shrink)

Building on contemporary research in embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind, this book explores how social institutions in contemporary neoliberal nation-states systematically affect our thoughts, feelings, and agency. Human beings are, necessarily, social animals who create and belong to social institutions. But social institutions take on a life of their own, and literally shape the minds of all those who belong to them, for better or worse, usually without their being self-consciously aware of it. Indeed, in contemporary neoliberal societies, (...) it is generally for the worse. In The Mind-Body Politic, Michelle Maiese and Robert Hanna work out a new critique of contemporary social institutions by deploying the special standpoint of the philosophy of mind—in particular, the special standpoint of the philosophy of what they call essentially embodied minds—and make a set of concrete, positive proposals for radically changing both these social institutions and also our essentially embodied lives for the better. (shrink)

BackgroundSince 2006, the genetic testing company 23andMe has collected biological samples, self-reported information, and consent documents for biobanking and research from more than 1,000,000 individuals, through a direct-to-consumer online genetic-testing service providing a genetic ancestry report and a genetic health report. However, on November 22, 2013, the Food and Drug Administration halted the sale of genetic health testing, on the grounds that 23andMe was not acting in accordance with federal law, by selling tests of undemonstrated reliability as predictive tests for (...) medical risk factors. Consumers could still obtain the genetic ancestry report, but they no longer had access to the genetic health report in the United States. However, this did not prevent the company from continuing its health research, with previously obtained and future samples, provided that consent had been obtained from the consumers concerned, or with health reports for individuals from other countries. Furthermore, 23andMe was granted FDA authorization on February 19, 2015, first to provide reports about Bloom syndrome carrier status, and, more recently, to provide consumers with “carrier status” information for 35 genes known to cause disease.DiscussionIn this Debate, we highlight the likelihood that the primary objective of the company was probably two-fold: promoting itself within the market for predictive testing for human genetic diseases and ancestry at a low cost to consumers, and establishing a high-value database/biobank for research and personal information).SummaryBy dint of this marketing approach, a two-sided market has been established between the consumer and the research laboratories, involving the establishment of a database/DNA biobank for scientific and financial gain. We describe here the profound ethical issues raised by this setup. (shrink)

Meeting the net zero emission targets set by many states after the Paris Agreement to help keep global warming well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels will require carbon dioxide removal technologies (CDRs). Several moral concerns arise if the contribution of CDRs to achieving net zero is not specified, but such concerns can be met by defining a permissible target for CDRs. This paper proposes a framework for defining the permissible contribution of CDRs to the net zero targets of individual states. (...) The framework identifies three categories of emissions for which the permissibility of CDRs varies depending on the ethical costs of both emission abatement and CDRs. We argue that a) luxury emissions should be reduced without using CDRs; b) emissions for full membership in society should be abated by structural efforts, although using CDRs is permissible, given certain conditions; and c) CDRs are permissible for residual emissions because otherwise net zero targets cannot be reached. (shrink)

There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or (...) subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance. (shrink)

Narrow views of systemic sustainability risks can result in ecological concerns being neglected, as well as giving rise to unequal distribution and exploitation of natural resources, creating injustice. Given recent advancements in integrating justice with the safe space environmentally, as defined by the planetary boundaries, now is a critical moment for business ethics researchers to deepen the conversation on managing systemic sustainability risks to create a safe and just operating space. We argue that the social-ecological systems approach, that views humans (...) as embedded in and dependent on the natural environment, provides a foundation for business ethics scholars to deepen the conversation. We build on two key dimensions from the social-ecological systems approach, social-ecological connectivity and cross-scale dynamics to develop a framework that illustrates four ways for business ethics scholars to research systemic sustainability risks. We demonstrate the relevance of these dimensions for understanding systemic sustainability risks, discuss their ethical implications, and outline opportunities for future research. (shrink)

This study examines the situated use of rules and the social practices people deploy to correct projectable rule violations in pétanque playing activities. Drawing on Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis, and using naturally occurring video recordings, this article investigates socially organized occasions of rule use, and more particularly how rules for turn-taking at play are reflexively established in and through interaction. The alternation of players in pétanque is dependent on and consequential for the progressivity of the game and it is a (...) practical problem for the players when a participant projects to break a rule of “who plays next”. The empirical analysis shows that formulating rules is a practice for indicating and correcting incipient violations of who plays next, which retrospectively invoke and establish the situated expectations that constitute the game as that particular game. Focusing on the anticipative corrections of projectable violations of turn-taking rules, this study revisits the concept of rules, as they are played into being, from a social and interactional perspective. We argue and demonstrate that rules are not prescriptions of game conduct, but resources that reflexively render the players’ conducts intelligible as playing the game they are engaging in. (shrink)

In order to investigate whether addressees can make immediate use of speaker‐based constraints during reference resolution, participant addressees' eye movements were monitored as they helped a confederate cook follow a recipe. Objects were located in the helper's area, which the cook could not reach, and the cook's area, which both could reach. Critical referring expressions matched one object (helper's area) or two objects (helper's and cook's areas), and were produced when the cook's hands were empty or full, which defined the (...) cook's reaching ability constraints. Helper's first and total fixations showed that they restricted their domain of interpretation to their own objects when the cook's hands were empty, and widened it to include the cook's objects only when the cook's hands were full. These results demonstrate that addressees can quickly take into account task‐relevant constraints to restrict their referential domain to referents that are plausible given the speaker's goals and constraints. (shrink)