Hanna Pitkin has made key contributions to the field of political philosophy, pushing forward and clarifying the ways that political theorists think about action as the exercise of political freedom. In so doing, she has offered insightful studies of the problems of modern politics that theorists are called to address, and has addressed them herself in a range of theoretical genres. She is an innovator in bringing conceptual work inspired by ordinary language philosophy to the field of political philosophy, (...) as well as a penetrating and exacting interpreter of texts who draws on the insights of psychoanalysis, gender, and historical study. This collection of her works approaches each of these dimensions of Pitkin's contributions in turn, recognizing that she typically blends these modes of engagement in much of her political theorizing. The Modern Condition and the Impetus to Theorize. At several moments in her career, Pitkin has offered sustained reflection on what aspects of modern political life prompt the impulse to theorize politics. She has also drawn out with great nuance the pitfalls that modern life and philosophy also present for that enterprise, for example, in attempts to naturalize human community or in turning to theoretical abstraction. Her study of Wittgenstein in particular structured her most penetrating study of these questions. Pitkin suggests an agenda for political theorizing to engage the dilemmas of modernity in ways that grasp the importance of paradox as a portal of insight into the modern condition, and eschews attempts at easy resolution. In keeping with this, Pitkin has herself explored a variety of conceptual paradoxes that arise in the work of other theorists (e.g., regarding freedom, interest, and obligation), each as symptomatic of modern dilemmas. In each encounter, Pitkin offers a clearer picture of the problems of political modernity and the outlines of political responses to them. Moral Philosophy, Judgment, Justice: Pitkin has turned at several points in her career to the concept of justice as one that particularly brings together questions of agency and responsibility, the insights of moral philosophy, and judgment. Characteristic of her work, her engagements with justice have drawn upon a variety of methodological resources and theoretical inspirations. Her work engages ordinary language philosophy, pedagogical practice, and textual study, to yield a complex and subtle set of observations, all of which open moral philosophy and matters of judgment to questions of action and responsibility in the exercise of political freedom. Action: Political agency and its obstacles are a key theme in Pitkin's work and a main area of her theoretical innovation. She has approached the question of political agency from several directions. In some works, she has examined the appeal of autonomy as a picture of political agency, probing in particular the gendered dimension of the fantasy of autonomy. In other works - perhaps most famously, in her work on representation - Pitkin has explored the ways that the institutional arrangements of modern liberal societies attempt to link of individual and political agency--and the pitfalls of these approaches. Finally, Pitkin has offered a picture of political freedom as maintaining the tension, between individual "parts" and collective "wholes," that these modern institutional arrangements attempt to resolve. Finally, through her groundbreaking and definitive work on Hannah Arendt, Pitkin has meditated on the political and social conditions that most impede our ability to grasp agency as a practice of political freedom, and gestured to paths that may lead forward. (shrink)

Hanna Pitkin argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action.

Robert Hanna argues for the importance of Kant's theories of the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical foundations of the "exact sciences"--relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy for most of the 20th century. In doing so he makes a valuable contribution to one of the most active and fruitful areas in contemporary scholarship on Kant.

Drug use and drug addiction are severely stigmatised around the world. Marc Lewis does not frame his learning model of addiction as a choice model out of concern that to do so further encourages stigma and blame. Yet the evidence in support of a choice model is increasingly strong as well as consonant with core elements of his learning model. I offer a responsibility without blame framework that derives from reflection on forms of clinical practice that support change and recovery (...) in patients who cause harm to themselves and others. This framework can be used to interrogate our own attitudes and responses, so that we can better see how to acknowledge the truth about choice and agency in addiction, while avoiding stigma and blame, and instead maintaining care and compassion alongside a commitment to working for social justice and good. (shrink)

In Rationality and Logic, Robert Hanna argues that logic is intrinsically psychological and that human psychology is intrinsically logical. He claims that logic is cognitively constructed by rational animals and that rational animals are essentially logical animals. In order to do so, he defends the broadly Kantian thesis that all rational animals possess an innate cognitive "logic faculty." Hanna 's claims challenge the conventional philosophical wisdom that sees logic as a fully formal or "topic-neutral" science irreconcilably separate from (...) the species- or individual-specific focus of empirical psychology.Logic and psychology went their separate ways after attacks by Frege and Husserl on logical psychologism--the explanatory reduction of logic to empirical psychology. Hanna argues, however, that--despite the fact that logical psychologism is false--there is an essential link between logic and psychology. Rational human animals constitute the basic class of cognizers or thinkers studied by cognitive psychology; given the connection between rationality and logic that Hanna claims, it follows that the nature of logic is significantly revealed to us by cognitive psychology. Hanna 's proposed "logical cognitivism" has two important consequences: the recognition by logically oriented philosophers that psychologists are their colleagues in the metadiscipline of cognitive science; and radical changes in cognitive science itself. Cognitive science, Hanna argues, is not at bottom a natural science; it is both an objective or truth-oriented science and a normative human science, as is logic itself. (shrink)

I argue that addiction is not a chronic, relapsing, neurobiological disease characterized by compulsive use of drugs or alcohol. Large-scale national survey data demonstrate that rates of substance dependence peak in adolescence and early adulthood and then decline steeply; addicts tend to “mature out” in their late twenties or early thirties. The exceptions are addicts who suffer from additional psychiatric disorders. I hypothesize that this difference in patterns of use and relapse between the general and psychiatric populations can be explained (...) by the purpose served by drugs and alcohol for patients. Drugs and alcohol alleviate the severe psychological distress typically experienced by patients with comorbid psychiatric disorders and associated problems. On this hypothesis, consumption is a chosen means to ends that are rational to desire: Use is not compulsive. The upshot of this explanation is that the orthodox view of addiction as a chronic, relapsing neurobiological disease is misguided. I delineate five folk psychological factors that together explain addiction as purposive action: strong and habitual desire; willpower; motivation; functional role; and decision and resolve. I conclude by drawing lessons for research and effective treatment. (shrink)

"Fortune is a woman, and if you want to keep her under, you've got to knock her around some."--Niccolò Machiavelli Hanna Pitkin's provocative and enduring study of Machiavelli was the first to systematically place gender at the center of its exploration of his political thought. In this edition, Pitkin adds a new afterword, in which she discusses the book's critical reception and situates the book's arguments in the context of recent interpretations of Machiavelli's thought. "A close and often brilliant (...) exegesis of Machiavelli's writings."-- The American Political Science Review. (shrink)

In a recent New Yorker cartoon, a man is fixing a sink. His partner, standing nearby skeptically asks, “Do you really know what you are doing, or do you only google-​know?” This cartoon perfectly captures the mixed relationship we have with googling, or knowing via digital interface, particularly via search engines. On the one hand, googling is now the dominant source of socially useful knowledge. The use of search engines for this purpose is almost completely integrated into many of our (...) lives. On the other, the point the cartoon is making resonates with nearly all of us: users often recognize that there are risks and trade-​offs associated with gaining certain kinds of information via online search. These facts about googling make it particularly interesting to the applied epistemologist. Our practices involving search engines not only have a distinctive character, that character puts some traditional epistemic questions in a new light. This chapter will examine two of those questions. The first concerns the extent to which googling raises problems similar to familiar quandaries surrounding testimonial knowledge. The second –​and more radical –​concerns whether googling is a type of distributed or extended knowledge. (shrink)

My first experience as a clinician was in a Therapeutic Community for service users with personality disorder. As well as having personality disorder, many of the Community members also suffered from related conditions, such as addiction and eating disorders. Broadly speaking, these conditions are what we might call ‘disorders of agency’. Core diagnostic symptoms or maintaining factors of disorders of agency are actions and omissions: patterns of behaviour central to the nature or maintenance of the condition. For instance, borderline personality (...) disorder is diagnosed in part via deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide, reckless and impulsive behaviour, substance use, violence, and outbursts of anger; addiction is diagnosed via maladaptive patterns of drug consumption; eating disorders involve eating too much or too little. If a service user is to improve let alone recover from these disorders, they must change the diagnostic or maintaining pattern of behaviour (cf. Pearce and Pickard, 2010). For instance, service users with borderline personality disorder must stop self-harming; addicts need to quit using drugs or alcohol; anorexics must eat. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: first to sketch a framework for classifying a wide range of conceptions of scientific objectivity and second to present and defend a conception of scientific objectivity that fills a neglected niche in the resulting hierarchy of viewpoints. Roughly speaking, the proposed ideal of scientific objectivity is effectiveness in the informal but technical sense of an effective method. Science progresses when "higher levels of communicative discourse" are reached by transforming subjective judgments regarding the generation (...) and reduction of data or the testing of theories into objective decision procedures that are automatic or mechanical. (shrink)

The financial sector has seen a transformation towards ‘sustainable’ finance particularly in Europe, driven also by unprecedented regulatory reforms. At the same time, many are sceptical about the real impact of these reforms, fearing that they are triggering a paradoxical financialisation of sustainability. Building on recent research on institutional logics and institutional fields formation, we examine changes in the EU regulatory dynamics as characterised by shifts in framing the relationship between sustainability and finance. Deploying a longitudinal approach, consisting of archival (...) data and semi-structured interviews, we explore the development of EU sustainable finance regulation as an extended, interactive and contested process. Specifically, we suggest that regulatory dynamics depend on the hybrid configuration of the social constituencies supporting sustainable finance reforms and on shifts in the overall prevalence of the financial logic in society. Our paper sheds light on the inherent contradictions and limitations of sustainable finance as a means for transformative sustainability reforms. (shrink)

This book is thus a battle of wits. . . . [A] vivid sketch of the conflict between two basic outlooks."—Library Journal "[O]ne leaves this book feeling enriched and challenged.

The problem of addiction is one of the major challenges and controversies confronting medicine and society. It also poses important and complex philosophical and scientific problems. What is addiction? Why does it occur? And how should we respond to it, as individuals and as a society? The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject. It spans several disciplines and is the first collection of (...) its kind. Organised into three clear parts, forty-five chapters by a team of international contributors examine key areas, including: the meaning of addiction to individuals conceptions of addiction varieties and taxonomies of addiction methods and models of addiction evolution and addiction history, sociology and anthropology population distribution and epidemiology developmental processes vulnerabilities and resilience psychological and neural mechanisms prevention, treatment and spontaneous recovery public health and the ethics of care social justice, law and policy. Essential reading for students and researchers in addiction research and in philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind and psychology and ethics, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction will also be of great interest to those in related fields, such as medicine, mental health, social work, and social policy. (shrink)

Robert Hanna works out a unified contemporary Kantian theory of rational human cognition and knowledge. Along the way, he provides accounts of intentionality and its contents, sense perception and perceptual knowledge, the analytic-synthetic distinction, the nature of logic, and a priori truth and knowledge in mathematics, logic, and philosophy. This book is specifically intended to reach out to two very different audiences: contemporary analytic philosophers of mind and knowledge, and contemporary Kantian philosophers or Kant-scholars. At the same time, it (...) rides the crest of a wave of exciting and revolutionary emerging new trends and new work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology, with a special concentration on the philosophy of perception. What is revolutionary in this new wave are its strong emphases on action, on cognitive phenomenology, on disjunctivist direct realism, on embodiment, and on sense perception as a primitive and proto-rational capacity for cognizing the world. Hanna makes a fundamental contribution to this philosophical revolution by giving it a specifically contemporary Kantian twist, and by pushing these new lines of investigation radically further. (shrink)

Despite being considered the proverbial backbone of our healthcare systems, nursing still seems to struggle to scientifically demonstrate its contribution to care experiences and patient outcomes. This leads to erosive tendencies that threaten the development of the profession and its progress as an academic discipline. With this paper, we want to contribute to the theoretical discourse concerning the nature of nursing and the research into its effectiveness. We begin by outlining a set of prevailing paradoxes and their consequences relating to (...) nursing and nursing research: the issue of demonstrating its unique contribution despite a clear societal mandate; a discrepancy between subjectively experienced effectiveness and objectively ascertainable effectiveness; and a mismatch between theoretical premises of nursing and task‐oriented cultures in practice environments. Using an example of a seemingly simple nursing intervention, we intend to demonstrate the qualities and complexities of nursing. We further illustrate this by drawing on several of our research projects using theory‐based evaluation methodologies. From these illustrative examples, we distil two insights relating to nursing interventions that we consider fundamental: the nurse, as a person, is central to its unique effectiveness; and there is always an interplay between context, intervention and its intended effect. We summarise our considerations and argue the case for conceiving research designs in alignment with theoretical premises of nursing. (shrink)

? We gratefully acknowledge the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, Tucson, which provided a grant for the support of this work. E.T. is also supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. 1 See David Woodruff Smith.

I argue that denial plays a central but insufficiently recognized role in addiction. The puzzle inherent in addiction is why drug use persists despite negative consequences. The orthodox conception of addiction resolves this puzzle by appeal to compulsion; but there is increasing evidence that addicts are not compelled to use but retain choice and control over their consumption in many circumstances. Denial offers an alternative explanation: there is no puzzle as to why drug use persists despite negative consequences if these (...) consequences are not straightforwardly known. I describe the nature of the causal knowledge that one's drug use is causing negative consequences; map the conceptual landscape of denial and explain how it can block such knowledge; and explore some of the processes and mechanisms that have been studied by philosophy and the cognitive sciences and which may underpin denial in addiction, including well-established information-processing biases, motivational influences on belief formation and self-deception, and cognitive deficits with respect to insight and self-awareness. I conclude by suggesting that addiction is as much a disorder of cognition as a disorder of conation. (shrink)

In Neal Stephenson’s fictional novel, Diamond Age (1995), the protagonist Nell acquires a prototype of what we might today recognise as a highly sophisticated e-reader with a voice-assistant. This e-reader, the “Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer”, uses artificial intelli- gence to serve as Nell’s personal teacher. What is key to the Primer is how it is designed to respond to Nell. The Primer has a theory of Nell – her needs, her real-world situation, her abilities – and it tailors its lessons (...) for her. The Primer is a highly personalised artificially intelligent device. For many readers – myself included – the Primer was a utopian vision of the bespoke digital tutors of the future. The appearance of new media and technologies in the early 2000s all pointed to the near-term reality of devices like Primers. The real-life experience of personalised digital media, though, is so far from Stephen- son’s vision that it is hard to imagine we will ever get there. Nell’s time with the Primer develops her intellectually, emotionally, and physically. Our “bespoke” media experience, by contrast, is more likely to turn us in on ourselves rather than guide us to live well in our societies. Personalised media is making us more like Narcissus: our consumption is driven by personal choices and automated algorithms that reflect what we already want to hear, see, and consume, and we are captivated. Central to our understanding of the problems with the personalisation of digital media are filter bubbles and echo chambers. These phenomena are used interchangeably by some, but in distinct ways by others. I take the position that filter bubbles and echo chambers are distinct phenomena, but ones that raise similar epistemic worries. I begin with a general discussion of filter bubbles and echo chambers, and I introduce the concept of “selective exposure” as central to both phenomena. There is minimal uniformity across uses of the terms “filter bubble” and “echo chamber”. Consequently, I divide the later discussion into two more precise topics: homophily and polarisation. I conclude with some future-looking comments about responsibility and the epistemic risks posed by digital personalisation. (shrink)

I argue that legal punishment is morally wrong because it’s too morally risky. I first briefly explain how my argument differs from similar ones in the philosophical literature on legal punishment. Then I explain why legal punishment is morally risky, argue that it’s too morally risky, and discuss objections. In a nutshell, my argument goes as follows. Legal punishment is wrong because we can never sufficiently reduce the risk of doing wrong when we legally punish people. We can never sufficiently (...) reduce this risk because wrongful punishment is much worse than wrongful non-punishment and because punishment’s permissibility depends on the answers to a variety of difficult philosophical questions about which we’re fallible. (shrink)

Background: Today’s healthcare environment is often characterized by an ethically demanding work situation, and nursing students need to prepare to meet ethical challenges in their future role. Moral sensitivity is an important aspect of the ethical decision-making process, but little is known regarding nursing students’ moral sensitivity and its possible development during nursing education. Objectives: The aims of this study were to investigate moral sensitivity among nursing students, differences in moral sensitivity according to sample sub-group, and the relation between demographic (...) characteristics of nursing students and moral sensitivity. Research design: A convenience sample of 299 nursing students from one university completed a questionnaire comprising questions about demographic information and the revised Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire. With the use of SPSS, non-parametric statistics, including logistic regression models, were used to investigate the relationship between demographic characteristics and moral sensitivity. Ethical considerations: The study followed the regulations according to the Swedish Ethical Review Act and was reviewed by the Ethics Committee of South-East Sweden. Findings: The findings showed that mean scores of nursing students’ moral sensitivity were found in the middle to upper segment of the rating scale. Multivariate analysis showed that gender (odds ratio = 3.32), age (odds ratio = 2.09; 1.73), and parental status (odds ratio = 0.31) were of relevance to nursing students’ moral sensitivity. Academic year was found to be unrelated to moral sensitivity. Discussion and conclusion: These demographic aspects should be considered when designing ethics education for nursing students. Future studies should continue to investigate moral sensitivity in nursing students, such as if and how various pedagogical strategies in ethics may contribute to moral sensitivity in nursing students. (shrink)

In this paper we take up the issue of near-term artificial intelligence (AI). "Near-term AI" is used to denote artificial intelligence algorithms that are already in place in a variety of public and private sectors, guiding decision that pertain to advertising, credit ratings, and sentencing in the justice system. Our focus here is to contribute to a critical discussion of the ways that AI is already being widely used in decision-making procedures in these areas. We will argue that developers and (...) deployers of AI systems--in senses to be defined--bear a particular kind of responsibility for the moral consequences of near-term AI. We will present a tool to aid developers and deployers in engaging in the moral reflection we argue is required of them, in order both the help them meet their moral obligations and to help address the material risks posed by what we take to be the status quo of actual near-term AI development. This chapter can be understood as a contribution to the field of technology assessment, but instead of suggesting policy revisions, we will propose a framework for ethical analysis that can be used to facilitate more robust ethical reflection in AI development and implementation. (shrink)

“Libertarian paternalism” aims to harness cognitive biases in order to improve prudential decision-making. Some critics have objected that libertarian paternalism is wrongly manipulative. I argue that this objection is mostly unsuccessful. First, I point out that some strategies endorsed by libertarian paternalists can help people to better appreciate reasons. Second, I develop an account of manipulation according to which an agent manipulates her target by worsening the target’s deliberative position. The means of influence defended by libertarian paternalists—for instance, the judicious (...) use of default rules—are not manipulative in this way. (shrink)

Performance-Kunst ist mehr als ein kulturindustrielles Spektakel, denn sie will auf die Beteiligten existenziell einwirken. Hanna Heinrich entwickelt Analysekategorien, die die Kommunikationsmodi dieser Kunstform ebenso wie ihren gesellschaftstransformativen Anspruch philosophisch ergründen. Dazu bedient sie sich der ästhetischen Positionen G.W.F. Hegels, Friedrich Nietzsches, Martin Heideggers, Alain Badious und Michel Foucaults, die der Kunst große emanzipatorische und soziopolitische Kraft zusprechen sowie politischer Philosophien und Ethiken und zeigt damit auf: »Gelungene« Performances stellen sich als exemplarische Handlungsräume mit utopischem Potenzial der gegenwärtigen Entfremdung (...) entgegen und verweisen auf die (Mit-)Verantwortung und Freiheit jedes Einzelnen. (shrink)

ABSTRACT One of the promises of the internet was its power to unite individual knowers with one another, democratizing knowledge and spurring our collective efforts toward truth. In what sense is our current epistemic life a collective effort? This article examines the idea of the epistemic community. I contrast epistemic community with a collection of individual epistemic agents aiming for truth. I propose that this latter conception of epistemic life permits neglecting our epistemic and moral duties. I argue that healthy (...) epistemic community requires joint commitments to truth and epistemic trust, and where epistemic trust requires conditions of mutual epistemic respect. (shrink)

The question of why bad things happen (to good people) has puzzled individuals over generations and across different cultures. The most popular approach is to turn the issue into a question about God: Why does he allow bad things that lead to the suffering of often innocent bystanders? Some have drawn conclusions that there can be no God. These attempts that seek to find meaning in suffering are called theodicies. Thus, theodicies promise that the torment of the innocent is not (...) in vain. In this article, I argue that theodicy as a viewpoint, independent of its intention, does injustice to the experience of the sufferer. Furthermore, an Adornian approach to suffering avoids the instrumentalization of others’ suffering and that instead of relating to another person’s suffering through theodicy, Adorno’s notion of non-identity opens up an alternative, non-coercive avenue. (shrink)

Intellectual humility is a concept in progress—philosophers and psychologists are in the process of defining and coming to understand what intellectual humility is and what place it has in our theories. Most accounts of intellectual humility build from work in virtue epistemology, the study of knowledge as the state that results when agents are epistemically virtuous (or, perhaps, the view that the proper object of study for epistemology is the intellectually virtuous agent). [...].

Background: Healthcare professionals encounter ethical dilemmas and concerns in their practice. More research is needed to understand these ethical problems and to know how to educate professionals to respond to them. Research objective: To describe ethical dilemmas and concerns at work from the perspectives of Finnish and Dutch healthcare professionals studying at the master’s level. Research design: Exploratory, qualitative study that used the text of student online discussions of ethical dilemmas at work as data. Method: Participants’ online discussions were analyzed (...) using inductive content analysis. Participants: The sample consisted of 49 students at master’s level enrolled in professional ethics courses at universities in Finland and the Netherlands. Ethical considerations: Permission for conducting the study was granted from both universities of applied sciences. All students provided their informed consent for the use of their assignments as research data. Findings: Participants described 51 problematic work situations. Among these, 16 were found to be ethical dilemmas, and the remaining were work issues with an ethical concern and did not meet criteria of a dilemma. The most common problems resulted from concerns about quality care, safety of healthcare professionals, patients’ rights, and working with too few staff and inadequate resources. Discussion: The results indicated that participants were concerned about providing quality of care and raised numerous questions about how to provide it in challenging situations. The results show that it was difficult for students to differentiate ethical dilemmas from other ethical work concerns. Conclusion: Online discussions among healthcare providers give them an opportunity to relate ethical principles to real ethical dilemmas and problems in their work as well as to critically analyze ethical issues. We found that discussions with descriptions of ethical dilemmas and concerns by health professionals provide important information and recommendations not only for education and practice but also for health policy. (shrink)

Presents essays to reflect the influence of Henri Bergson in the fields of philosophy, theology and literature. Also details papers from the Bergson Centennial which took place took place in Paris in 1959.

This paper deals with the nature of trust in science. Understanding what appropriate trust in science is and why it can reasonably break down is important for improving scientists’ trustworthiness. There are two different ways in which philosophers of science think about trust in science: as based on objectivity or as based on shared values. Some authors argue that objectivity actually grounds mere reliance, not genuine trust. They draw on a distinction that philosophers of trust following Annette Baier have made (...) with respect to interpersonal trust, where genuine trust has some normative element to it that is missing in cases of mere reliance. However, I will show that there are plural forms of trust in science: Both objectivity and shared values ground trust in science in a normative sense. I will link the trust in science debate to the literature on interpersonal trust. This is significant in that, beyond references to Baier, there is little connection between both areas of philosophy. In a pluralist reading, different trust accounts help to identify the normative elements involved in different kinds of trust in science. (shrink)

This paper argues that perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ provides one with an awareness of acting, and that this awareness explains a previously overlooked feature of one's knowledge of one's own actions. Actions are events: they occur during periods of time. Knowledge of such events must be sensitive to their course through time. Perception of one's body ‘from the inside’ allows one to monitor one's actions as they unfold, thereby sustaining one's knowledge of what one is doing over (...) the period of time in which one is doing it. (shrink)

Driven by privacy-related fears, users of Online Social Networks may start to reduce their network activities. This trend can have a negative impact on network sustainability and its business value. Nevertheless, very little is understood about the privacy-related concerns of users and the impact of those concerns on identity performance. To close this gap, we take a systematic view of user privacy concerns on such platforms. Based on insights from focus groups and an empirical study with 210 subjects, we find (...) that (i) Organizational Threats and (ii) Social Threats stemming from the user environment constitute two underlying dimensions of the construct Privacy Concerns in Online Social Networks . Using a Structural Equation Model, we examine the impact of the identified dimensions of concern on the Amount, Honesty, and Conscious Control of individual self-disclosure on these sites. We find that users tend to reduce the Amount of information disclosed as a response to their concerns regarding Organizational Threats. Additionally, users become more conscious about the information they reveal as a result of Social Threats. Network providers may want to develop specific mechanisms to alleviate identified user concerns and thereby ensure network sustainability. (shrink)

Most people believe that it is permissible to kill a nonresponsible threat, or someone who threatens one's life without exercising agency. Defenders of this view must show that there is a morally relevant difference between nonresponsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some philosophers, including Jonathan Quong and Helen Frowe, have attempted to do this by arguing that one who kills a bystander takes advantage of another person, while one who kills a threat does not. In this paper, I show that the (...) proposals offered by Quong and Frowe have unacceptable implications. I then argue that those who claim that nonresponsible threats may be killed face a dilemma generated by the possibility of a stationary threat, or someone who endangers another person's life without moving. Unless we arbitrarily distinguish between stationary and moving nonresponsible threats, it is unclear how the permission to kill nonresponsible threats is to be explicated. I conclude that nonresponsible threats are not legitimate targets of self-defence. (shrink)