The main goal of our study was to investigate the role of insight into one’s own biases in the process of hypothesis validation in accordance to the two fundamental social perception domains on the example of confirmation bias. The study was conducted on a group of 593 participants with the use of a confirmation bias procedure, a free recall procedure and the Metacognitive Self scale. We manipulated with the domain and the value of information given to the respondents. We suspected (...) that individuals with a high metacognitive self, in opposition to low metacognitive self ones, would not process the given information according to the two fundamental social perception domains. The results verified the existence of an interaction effect of the metacognitive self and the domain of the information given about a perceived person on the susceptibility to follow the confirmation bias. Contrary to the low metacognitive self individuals, who show a higher tendency for the confirmation bias within the competence than the community domain, persons with a high insight into their own biases express the same level of confirmation bias in no respect to the domain of the information. The value of the information has no significant influence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT One of the promises of the internet was its power to unite individual knowers with one another, democratizing knowledge and spurring our collective efforts toward truth. In what sense is our current epistemic life a collective effort? This article examines the idea of the epistemic community. I contrast epistemic community with a collection of individual epistemic agents aiming for truth. I propose that this latter conception of epistemic life permits neglecting our epistemic and moral duties. I argue that healthy (...) epistemic community requires joint commitments to truth and epistemic trust, and where epistemic trust requires conditions of mutual epistemic respect. (shrink)

? We gratefully acknowledge the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, Tucson, which provided a grant for the support of this work. E.T. is also supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. 1 See David Woodruff Smith.

Rising health insurance costs and the cost of living crisis are likely leading to an increase in unpaid health insurance bills in many countries. In Switzerland, a particularly drastic measure to sanction defaulting insurance payers is employed. Since 2012, Swiss cantons – who have to cover most of the bills of defaulting payers - are allowed by federal law to blacklist them and to restrict their access to medical care to emergencies.In our paper, we briefly describe blacklisting in the context (...) of the Swiss healthcare system before we examine the ethical issues involved in light of what is known about its social and health impacts. We found no evidence that blacklisting serves as an effective way of recovering unpaid health insurance contributions or of strengthening solidarity within the health insurance system. Furthermore, the ambiguous definitions of what constitutes an emergency treatment and the incompatibility of the denial of medical care with the obligation to provide professional assistance complicate the implementation of blacklists and expose care providers to enormous pressure.Therefore, we conclude that blacklists and the (partial) denial of medical care not only pose profound ethical problems but are also unsuitable for fulfilling the purpose for which they were introduced. (shrink)

In the 1970s, Peter Hacker and Bernard Williams argued that Wittgenstein was a Kantian transcendental idealist. In the 1980s, Hacker officially rescinded this interpretation and Williams in any case regarded Wittgenstein's transcendental idealism as a philosophical mistake. And ever since, there has been a lively debate about Wittgenstein's Kantianism, anti‐Kantianism, or non‐Kantianism. No one doubts that throughout his philosophical writings, Wittgenstein saw a fundamental connection between language and human life. Jonathan Lear's critical judgment on the later Wittgenstein's transcendental anthropology is (...) that it is ultimately a failure, due to an incoherence between the prima‐facie‐opposed 'transcendental' and 'anthropological' levels of reflection. According to Kant, a mental representation is transcendental when it is either part of, or derived from, our nonempirical innately specified spontaneous cognitive capacities. Then Kant's transcendental idealism (TI) can be formulated as a two‐part philosophical equation: representational transcendentalism, cognitive idealism. (shrink)

This important book proposes a new account of the nature of language, founded upon an original interpretation of Wittgenstein. The authors deny the existence of a direct referential relationship between words and things. Rather, the link between language and world is a two-stage one, in which meaning is used and in which a natural language should be understood as fundamentally a collection of socially devised and maintained practices. Arguing against the philosophical mainstream descending from Frege and Russell to Quine, Davidson, (...) Dummett, McDowell, Evans, Putnam, Kripke and others, the authors demonstrate that discarding the notion of reference does not entail relativism or semantic nihilism. A provocative re-examination of the interrelations of language and social practice, this book will interest not only philosophers of language but also linguists, psycholinguists, students of communication and all those concerned with the nature and acquisition of human linguistic capacities. (shrink)

We take a fresh look at the concerns about credit card pricing and empirically investigate whether the Credit CARD Act of 2009 has been successful in addressing those concerns. The rational choice theory of credit card pricing, which posits that issuers use back-end fees to adjust the price of credit to reflect new information about borrowers’ credit risk, predicts that issuers will respond to the Act by using alternative ways to price risk. In contrast, the behavioral economics theory, which posits (...) that issuers use back-end fees because they are not salient to consumers, predicts that issuers will respond by increasing unregulated non-salient prices. If the market is competitive, we argue that the CARD Act should also result in increases in some salient, up-front prices. But we show that if issuers have market power, reductions in non-salient fees may not result in concomitant increases in salient charges. We test these predictions using two datasets on credit card contract terms before and after the CARD Act rules went into effect. We find that the rules have substantially reduced the back-end fees directly regulated by the Act, including late fees and over-the-limit fees. However, unregulated contract terms, such as annual fees and purchase interest rates, have changed little. Post-CARD Act, consumers continue to face high long-term prices and low short-term prices, and imperfectly rational consumers still find it difficult to understand the cost of credit card borrowing. We thus consider potential improvements to the regulatory framework. We argue that improved disclosures that present to consumers the aggregate cost of credit under the contract, based on information about the borrower’s likely use of credit, would improve consumer outcomes. Furthermore, we suggest that regulators, rather than focusing on prices that are “too high,” should consider limiting the ability of issuers to charge introductory teaser interest rates that are in a sense “too low. (shrink)

Polycomb group proteins are evolutionary conserved chromatin‐modifying complexes, essential for the regulation of developmental and cell‐identity genes. Polycomb‐mediated transcriptional regulation is provided by two multi‐protein complexes known as Polycomb repressive complex 1 (PRC1) and 2 (PRC2). Recent studies positioned PRC1 as a foremost executer of Polycomb‐mediated transcriptional control. Mammalian PRC1 complexes can form multiple sub‐complexes that vary in their core and accessory subunit composition, leading to fascinating and diverse transcriptional regulatory mechanisms employed by PRC1 complexes. These mechanisms include PRC1‐catalytic activity (...) toward monoubiquitination of histone H2AK119, a well‐established hallmark of PRC1 complexes, whose importance has been long debated. In this review, the central roles that PRC1‐catalytic activity plays in transcriptional repression are emphasized and the recent evidence supporting a role for PRC1 complexes in gene activation is discussed. (shrink)

In this essay, I apply the Kantian interpretation of enlightenment as radical enlightenment to the enterprise of philosophy within the context of our contemporary world-situation, and try to answer this very hard quest ion: “As radically enlightened Kantian philosophers confronted by the double-whammy consisting of what I call The Hyper-State, together with the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, what should we dare to think and do?” The very hard problem posed by this very har d question is what I’ll call The New (...) Conflict of the Faculties. By way of a direct answer to this very hard question and by way of an effective solution to this very hard problem, I provide seven recommendations. (shrink)

That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which analyticity is couched in terms of "truth in virtue of meanings", Frege's notions of analytic and a priori concern justification, respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists. Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which is (...) not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched. (shrink)

It is now conventional wisdom that conscious experience — or in Nagel’s canonical characterization, “what it is like to be” for an organism — is what makes the mind-body problem so intractable. By the same token, our current conceptions of the mind-body relation are inadequate and some conceptual development is urgently needed. Our overall aim in this paper is to make some progress towards that conceptual development. We first examine a currently neglected, yet fundamental aspect of consciousness. This aspect is (...) the spontaneity of consciousness, by which we mean its inner plasticity and inner purposiveness. We then sketch a “neurophenomenological” framework for thinking about the relationship between the spontaneity of consciousness and dynamic patterns of brain activity as studied in cognitive neuroscience. We conclude by proposing that the conscious mentality of sentient organisms or animals is active and dynamic, and that this “enactive” conception of consciousness can help us to move beyond the classical dichotomy between materialism and dualism. (shrink)

BARNOY S, OFRA L and BAR‐TAL Y. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 128–133 [Epub ahead of print]What makes patients perceive their health care worker as an epistemic authority?Health care workers’ (HCW) perceived epistemic authority (EA) may have an effect on patient decision‐making and compliance. The present study investigated the hypotheses that higher EA is attributed to staff perceived to be experts; to physicians rather than nurses; to HCWs who recommend taking a test more than to the ones who make no recommendation. (...) The study was based on a factorial 2 × 2 × 2 within‐between subjects design. The questionnaire presented four scenarios, each illustrating a HCW presenting information on a devastating genetic disease. The three variables manipulated were: HCW expertise, HCW role, and making a recommendation or not. After each scenario participants were asked questions about the EA they attributed to the HCW in the scenario. The results show main effects for perceived expertise and recommendation/no recommendation on the level of EA attributed. Expert nurses were judged to have the same high EA as expert physicians. But expert physicians who recommended taking a test were judged as having significantly higher EA than expert physicians who made no recommendation. Among nurses who made no recommendation, expert nurses were evaluated as having significantly higher EA than novices. Since expert nurses were perceived to have equal expertise as expert physicians, it follows that information given by both nurses and physicians can reduce patient uncertainty. (shrink)

Volume 34, Issue 8, December 2020, Page 1690-1703.

Remarks on Sandra Lee Bartky's Femininity and Domination.

It is now conventional wisdom that conscious experience — or in Nagel’s canonical characterization, “what it is like to be” for an organism — is what makes the mind-body problem so intractable. By the same token, our current conceptions of the mind-body relation are inadequate and some conceptual development is urgently needed. Our overall aim in this paper is to make some progress towards that conceptual development. We first examine a currently neglected, yet fundamental aspect of consciousness. This aspect is (...) the spontaneity of consciousness, by which we mean its inner plasticity and inner purposiveness. We then sketch a “neurophenomenological” framework for thinking about the relationship between the spontaneity of consciousness and dynamic patterns of brain activity as studied in cognitive neuroscience. We conclude by proposing that the conscious mentality of sentient organisms or animals is active and dynamic, and that this “enactive” conception of consciousness can help us to move beyond the classical dichotomy between materialism and dualism. (shrink)

This ambitious work reclassifies and restructures the history of ideas and the philosophy of culture through a wide-ranging and novel use of the idea of the organon. It does so by radically revising standard interpretations and theories of all branches of philosophy, and by providing an intellectual and philosophical foundation for the new organon of the cultural sciences. Furthermore, the seeded idea that saw its growth in the form of this book is the unshakable conviction that the only way by (...) which a new apparatus of philosophy, an organon, could be created is by harking back to the vast sources of imagination, inspiration and mimÄ"sis. This entire study is based on the notion that metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the world in its entirety and with human beingâ (TM)s existence and thought, should provide the foundation for the organon of cultural sciences, based on symbolic forms. Given that the colossal amount of information and knowledge of philosophy, arts, humanities, logic, mathematics, social sciences and natural sciences cannot be comprised, analyzed and comprehended per se, it is the organonâ (TM)s objective to extract the main principles, ideas, postulates, theorems and theories of the cultural sciences, and, subsequently, to shape and restructure them as symbolic forms. Since all these principles are grounded on Becomingâ "which is not a stable or fixed entity such as Being, substance or thingâ "the symbolic forms preserve and change, elevate and further the organon of the cultural sciences, via a critical-dialectical process. (shrink)

This book introduces feminist voices into the study of Platonic and Aristotelian texts that modern Western philosophy has treated as foundational. The book concerns the extent to which Platonic and Aristotelian texts are redeemably sexist, masculinist, or phallocentric.

We show that it is possible to generalize the Ursell–Mayer cluster formalism so that it may cover also the statistics of Internet websites. Our starting point is the introduction of an extra variable that is assumed to take account, as will be explained, of the nature of the Internet statistics. We then show, following the arguments in Mayer, that one may obtain a phase transition-like phenomena.

A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame (...) provides the allocation at hand. Obviously, each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shapley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions, especially in professional academic philosophy, all-too-often are, or anyhow quickly devolve into, nothing but essentially humanly irrelevant, esoteric, logic-chopping, t...

there be an objective modal distinction between the observable and the unobservable.’ My intent is to counter Ladyman's claim that the irreducibly modal character of empirical adequacy is something that is ‘really wrong with constructive empiricism’. I argue that disposition concepts refer to non-modal properties of types rather than to modal properties of tokens of those types. Solubility, for example, is an ‘occurrent’, though unobservable, property of a type of substance (involving the structure of associated atoms); and observability is, similarly, (...) an ‘occurrent’, though unobservable, property of a type of event (involving the structure of associated physical systems). Empirical adequacy, like truth, is an objective, semantic notion; the empirical adequacy of a theory depends upon all actual tokens of the relevant observable type, not just upon the tokens that have actually been observed. Introduction The typical character of disposition concepts Confirmational versus semantic empirical adequacy Conclusion. (shrink)

At least Kant thinks it's a part of the concept that gold is to be a yellow metal. He thinks that we know this a priori, and that we could not discover it to be empirically false … Is Kant right about this? Gold [is] … a yellow malleable ductile high density metallic element resistant to chemical reaction. Nature considered materially is the totality of all objects of experience. Kant's joke. Kant wanted to prove in a way that would dumbfound (...) the common man that the common man was right: that was the secret joke of this soul. (shrink)

That a good person cannot be harmed is a basic truth of traditional ethics, especially as conceived by Plato and Kant: human goodness is the approximation to perfect, rational self-sufficiency. Martha Nussbaum's project in The Fragility of Goodness is precisely to raise serious doubts about such a view; more positively, her task is to demonstrate the essential role of "luck" in moral life. Moral luck is what is external, contingent, and beyond human control in moral experience. Nussbaum wants to say (...) not only that moral goodness is affected at its very core by luck, but more radically that human goodness is in some sense impossible without the dimension of luck. (shrink)

Hanna Pitkin has made key contributions to the field of political philosophy, pushing forward and clarifying the ways that political theorists think about action as the exercise of political freedom. In so doing, she has offered insightful studies of the problems of modern politics that theorists are called to address, and has addressed them herself in a range of theoretical genres. She is an innovator in bringing conceptual work inspired by ordinary language philosophy to the field of political philosophy, (...) as well as a penetrating and exacting interpreter of texts who draws on the insights of psychoanalysis, gender, and historical study. This collection of her works approaches each of these dimensions of Pitkin's contributions in turn, recognizing that she typically blends these modes of engagement in much of her political theorizing. The Modern Condition and the Impetus to Theorize. At several moments in her career, Pitkin has offered sustained reflection on what aspects of modern political life prompt the impulse to theorize politics. She has also drawn out with great nuance the pitfalls that modern life and philosophy also present for that enterprise, for example, in attempts to naturalize human community or in turning to theoretical abstraction. Her study of Wittgenstein in particular structured her most penetrating study of these questions. Pitkin suggests an agenda for political theorizing to engage the dilemmas of modernity in ways that grasp the importance of paradox as a portal of insight into the modern condition, and eschews attempts at easy resolution. In keeping with this, Pitkin has herself explored a variety of conceptual paradoxes that arise in the work of other theorists (e.g., regarding freedom, interest, and obligation), each as symptomatic of modern dilemmas. In each encounter, Pitkin offers a clearer picture of the problems of political modernity and the outlines of political responses to them. Moral Philosophy, Judgment, Justice: Pitkin has turned at several points in her career to the concept of justice as one that particularly brings together questions of agency and responsibility, the insights of moral philosophy, and judgment. Characteristic of her work, her engagements with justice have drawn upon a variety of methodological resources and theoretical inspirations. Her work engages ordinary language philosophy, pedagogical practice, and textual study, to yield a complex and subtle set of observations, all of which open moral philosophy and matters of judgment to questions of action and responsibility in the exercise of political freedom. Action: Political agency and its obstacles are a key theme in Pitkin's work and a main area of her theoretical innovation. She has approached the question of political agency from several directions. In some works, she has examined the appeal of autonomy as a picture of political agency, probing in particular the gendered dimension of the fantasy of autonomy. In other works - perhaps most famously, in her work on representation - Pitkin has explored the ways that the institutional arrangements of modern liberal societies attempt to link of individual and political agency--and the pitfalls of these approaches. Finally, Pitkin has offered a picture of political freedom as maintaining the tension, between individual "parts" and collective "wholes," that these modern institutional arrangements attempt to resolve. Finally, through her groundbreaking and definitive work on Hannah Arendt, Pitkin has meditated on the political and social conditions that most impede our ability to grasp agency as a practice of political freedom, and gestured to paths that may lead forward. (shrink)