Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content, according to which the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. He explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.

The study aims at the systematic presentation of basic systems of scholastic epistemic logic (regardless of its original distribution into different contexts and genres). Scholastic epistemic logic can be (re)interpreted as a conservative extension of a certain non-modal base, which can be viewed as the model of epistemic agents. Its fundamental principles are: [O] if φ implies ψ and an agent knows that φ, then the agent knows that ψ; [T] if an agent knows that φ, then φ; [K] if (...) an agent knows that φ implies ψ and that φ, then the agent knows that ψ; [4] an agent who knows φ knows to know φ; [5] an agent who fails to know φ knows to fail to know φ; (or their modifications). From this point of view, scholastic epistemic logic can be construed as a confrontation of logical systems with unequal strength, ranging between that of John Wyclif, Peter of Mantua and Paul of Venice, William Heytesbury, and finally (a different theory of) Paul of Venice. These systems represent the hierarchy of epistemic agents by extending the set of their basic properties, including veridicality, inferential extendability, and introspectibility of knowledge. (shrink)

We argue that Chow's defense of hypothesis-testing procedures attempts to restore an aura of objectivity to the core procedures, allowing these to take on the role of judgment that should be reserved for the researcher. We provide a brief overview of what we call the historical case against hypothesis testing and argue that the latter has led to a constrained and simplified conception of what passes for theory in psychology.

This paper focuses on the early sixteenth-century epistemic logic developed by John Mair’s circle and discusses iterated epistemic modalities, epistemic closure and Bradwardinian semantics related to the logic of epistemic statements. These topics are addressed as part of setting up and solving epistemic sophisms based on traditional scenarios which can be traced back to fourteenth-century British epistemic logic. While the ultimate source for the debate appears to be the second chapter of William Heytesbury’s Regule solvendi sophismata, the immediate source is (...) the Italian editorial, commentarial and philosophical tradition, notably Paul of Venice and Cajetan of Thiene. (shrink)

The conference where this article was originally presented solicited recommendations for the “right questions” to ask regarding education and technology. The author of this article suggests that we already know what the right questions are for illuminating technology and its social meaning. What the author wants to know is why those questions in fact are not being asked more widely—why is widespread disinclination to enter explicit deliberation on the proper place of technology so resilient? Langdon Winner uses the term “technological (...) somnambulism” to describe the predominant stance toward technology in our culture, that “we so willingly sleepwalk through the process of reconstituting the conditions of human existence” via the adoption of new technologies. The basic institutional and ideological forces shaping the development and use of technology are not mysterious. But, scrutiny of those forces remains limited to a relative handful of academics and activists. How can technological somnambulism be countered? (shrink)

There is a noticeable gap between results of cognitive neuroscientific research into basic mathematical abilities and philosophical and empirical investigations of mathematics as a distinct intellectual activity. The paper explores the relevance of a Wittgensteinian framework for dealing with this discrepancy.

This article provides somephilosophical ``groundwork'' for contemporary debatesabout the status of the idea(l) of critical thinking.The major part of the article consists of a discussionof three conceptions of ``criticality,'' viz., criticaldogmatism, transcendental critique (Karl-Otto Apel),and deconstruction (Jacques Derrida). It is shown thatthese conceptions not only differ in their answer tothe question what it is ``to be critical.'' They alsoprovide different justifications for critique andhence different answers to the question what giveseach of them the ``right'' to be critical. It is arguedthat (...) while transcendental critique is able to solvesome of the problems of the dogmatic approach tocriticality, deconstruction provides the most coherentand self-reflexive conception of critique. A crucialcharacteristic of the deconstructive style of critiqueis that this style is not motivated by the truth ofthe criterion (as in critical dogmatism) or by acertain conception of rationality (as intranscendental critique), but rather by a concern forjustice. It is suggested that this concern should becentral to any redescription of the idea(l) ofcritical thinking. (shrink)

This book is a lively and provoking introduction to film theory.

In Hanks I defend a theory of propositions that locates the source of propositional unity in acts of predication that people perform in thought and speech. On my account, these acts of predication are judgmental or assertoric in character, and they commit the speaker to things being the way they are represented to be in the act of predication. This leads to a problem about negations, disjunctions, conditionals, and other kinds of embeddings. When you assert that a is F or (...) b is G you do not assert that a is F, nor do you commit yourself to a’s being F. According to my theory, however, in uttering the disjunction you predicate F of a. What is going on? I account for these cases using the concept of cancellation. In uttering the disjunction, the act of predicating F of a is cancelled, and when an act of predication is cancelled it does not count as an assertion and does not commit the speaker to anything. But what is it for an act of predication to be cancelled? One immediate concern is that cancelled predication won’t provide a unified proposition to be the input to disjunction. In this paper I answer this and related objections by explaining and defending my concept of cancellation. (shrink)

Patient advocacy is an important aspect of nursing care, yet there are few instruments to measure this essential function. This study was conducted to develop, determine the psychometric properties, and support validity of the Protective Nursing Advocacy Scale (PNAS), which measures nursing advocacy beliefs and actions from a protective perspective. The study used a descriptive correlational design with a systematically selected sample of 419 medical-surgical registered nurses. Analysis of the 43-item instrument was conducted using principal components analysis with promax rotation, (...) which resulted in the items loading onto four components. The four subscales have sufficient internal consistency, as did the overall PNAS. Satisfactory evidence of construct, content, and convergent validity were determined. Implications for nursing practice include using the PNAS in conjunction with an educational program to enhance advocacy skills, which may help to improve patient outcomes. (shrink)

O texto parte das considerações que Schopenhauer faz acerca do princípio de razão suficiente do agir na sua dissertação Sobre a quadrúplice raiz do princípio de razão suficiente e da negação da Vontade de vida nos §68-70 de O mundo como vontade e como representação; e como a conduta relacionada a este conceito pode ser observada ao longo da história, seja no cristianismo ou nas religiões indianas, mostrando como é possível chegar à tal conhecimento. Em seguida, aliado ao texto kantiano (...) sobre as grandezas negativas, mostro a inversão que Schopenhauer faz dos sinais do que é considerado positivo ou negativo, ou seja, ser e nada, devido a uma troca de perspectiva em consequência da chamada “viragem da vontade”. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an account of the nature of propositional content according to which the proposition expressed by a declarative sentence is a certain type of action a speaker performs in uttering that sentence. On this view, the semantic contents of proper names turn out to be types of reference acts. By carefully individuating these types, it is possible to provide new solutions to Frege’s puzzles about names in identity- and belief-sentences.

The problem of logical omniscience breaks down to the problems of the closure of knowledge under implication and of the distribution of knowledge over implication. In late medieval scholasticism these two related issues were engaged in various genres, in particular in general analysis of validity, games of obligationes, solution to self-referential antinomies and semantics of terms. The present study analyses the corpus of fourteenth-century texts with some overreaches to the subsequent two centuries, attempting to cover representatives of both the “British” (...) and the “Continental” tradition. With some degree of simplification, this results in a range of four basic positions: 1. knowledge is closed under “analytic entailment” (Buridan), 2. knowledge distributes over implication (Heytesbury), 3. knowledge distributes over implication provided that its consequent’s truth is being taken into consideration (Peter of Mantua), 4. knowledge does not distribute overimplication (Wyclif). (shrink)

Among the important conceptual innovations introduced in the second scholasticism era and motivated by theological debates following the Council of Trent were the theories of moral necessity and moral implication. As they were centred upon a view of moral necessity as a form of necessity weaker than physical necessity, and moral implication as weaker than physical implication, some interpretations of moral necessity encouraged the logic of statistical hypotheses and probability. Three branches of this debate are studied in this paper: the (...) explanation of moral necessity in terms of suppositio, the confrontation over the interpretation of moral necessity, and the theory of statistical quantification. (shrink)

v. 1. The origins of a theoretical psychology -- v. 2. Theory and method -- v. 3. Major theoretical positions in twentieth century psychology -- v. 4. The human dilemma : social, developmental, and abnormal psychology.

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comOne of the best arguments in Trenton Merricks’s book Propositions – and there are many excellent arguments to choose from – occurs near the end, where he argues that if it is primitive that propositions represent things as being various ways then we should reject the view that propositions are structured and have constituents. As Merricks shows, combining these (...) views leads to an inexplicable coincidence between what a proposition represents and its constituents. Suppose that it is a primitive and unanalysable fact that the proposition that p represents Russell as being a philosopher. Suppose also that p has Russell and the property of being a philosopher as constituents. What is the relationship between these two facts? The latter cannot explain the... (shrink)

Active at the time when the social sciences were founded, Max Weber's social theory contributed significantly to a wide range of fields and disciplines. Considering his prominence, it makes sense to take stock of the Weberian heritage and to explore the ways in which Weber's work and ideas have contributed to our understanding of the modern world. Using his work as a point of departure, The Oxford Handbook of Max Weber investigates the Weberian legacy today, identifying the enduring problems and (...) themes associated with his thought that have contemporary significance: the nature of modern capitalism, neo-liberal global economic policy, nationalism, religion and secularization, threats to legality, the culture of modernity, bureaucratic rule and leadership, politics and ethics, the value of science, power and inequality. These problems are global in scope, and the Weberian approach has been used to address them in very different societies. Thus, the Handbook also features chapters on Europe, Turkey, Islam, Judaism, China, India, and international politics. The Handbook emphasizes the use and application of Weber's ideas. It offers a journey through the intellectual terrain that scholars continue to explore using the tools and perspectives of Weberian analysis. The essays explore how Weber's concepts, hypotheses, and perspectives have been applied in practice, and how they can be applied in the future in social inquiry, not only in Europe and North America, but globally. The volume is divided into six parts exploring, in turn: Capitalism in a Globalized World, Society and Social Structure, Politics and the State, Religion, Culture, and Science and Knowledge. (shrink)

Introduction -- The road to imperfection -- Cataloguing irrationality -- Some real life examples -- Science to the rescue -- A deeper look at what's wrong -- Assigning the blame -- Can it be fixed.

Geary suggests that implicit mathematical principles exist across human cultures and transcend sex differences. Is such knowledge present in animals as well, and is it sufficient to account for performance in all species, including our own? I attempt to trace the implications of Gearys target article for comparative psychology, questioning the exclusion of “subitizing” in describing human mathematical performance, and asking whether human researchers function as cultural agents with animals, elevating their implicit knowledge to secondary domains of numerical performance.

To date, a wide range of interdisciplinary scholarship has done little to clarify either the why or the how of empathy. Preston & de Waal attempt to remedy this, although it remains unclear whether empathy consists of two discrete processes, or whether a perceptual and motor component are joined in some sort of behavioral inevitability. Although it is appealing to offer a neuroanatomy of empathy, the present level of neuropsychology may not support such reductionism.