The Explanatory Role of Propositions

Analysis 77 (2):370-379 (2017)
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Abstract

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] of the best arguments in Trenton Merricks’s book Propositions – and there are many excellent arguments to choose from – occurs near the end, where he argues that if it is primitive that propositions represent things as being various ways then we should reject the view that propositions are structured and have constituents. As Merricks shows, combining these views leads to an inexplicable coincidence between what a proposition represents and its constituents. Suppose that it is a primitive and unanalysable fact that the proposition that p represents Russell as being a philosopher. Suppose also that p has Russell and the property of being a philosopher as constituents. What is the relationship between these two facts? The latter cannot explain the...

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Peter Hanks
University of Minnesota

Citations of this work

Act‐type theories of propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11).

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References found in this work

Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The things we mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mind and Meaning.Brian Loar - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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