The article reveals the essential features and conditions of the long-term process of development of competitive innovation economy - knowledge economy on the example of Ukraine, where the dialogue of late postmodernism and early post-industrialism create special regional conditions. The article characterizes education as not just a form of social consciousness and practice, but as a social and cultural engine and simultaneously marker of civilization development level; considers higher education system from the point of view of society request to form (...) specialists of high qualification level and as a result powerful factor of regional economic growth; offers the directions of Ukraine higher education reforming, which still has signs of late postmodernism. The authors of this article have proved that the synergy of the economic and educational-scientific spheres is capable of changing the global laws of society's existence and returning the course of history to a truly humanistic, technological and divinely attentive course. The development of innovative activities, the introduction of new technologies, which in the long term to overcome the negative trends, primarily related to the need for structural reform of the educational sector in Ukraine and other regions, which are attractors of world change. In particular, cardinal changes require higher education as the most important resource potential that determines the direction of sustainable economic development. (shrink)

A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue (...) in detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence against physicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in a brisk, candid and exceptionally clear style, this 2003 book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new (...) formulations of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising. (shrink)

I argue that a certain version of physicalism, which is viewed by both its admirers and its detractors as non-reductionist, in fact entails two claims which, though not reductionist in the currently most popular sense of 'reductionist', conform to the spirit of reductionism sufficiently closely to compromise its claim to be a comprehensively non-reductionist version of physicalism. Putatively non-reductionist versions of physicalism in general, I suggest, are likely to be non-reductionist only in some senses, but not in others, and hence (...) to disappoint those who wish to be physicalists but still to remain soft and cuddly non-reductionists. (shrink)

Grounding is all the rage in analytical metaphysics. But here I give three reasons for not appealing to a primitive relation of grounding in formulating physicalism. (1) It probably can't do the key job it would need to do. (2) We don't need it, since we already have realization. (3) It is probably not even consistent with physicalism.

The present paper discusses the problem of quantum-mechanical properties of a subject’s consciousness. The model of generalized economic measurements is used for the analysis. Two types of such measurements are analyzed – transactions and technologies. Algebraic ratios between the technology-type measurements allow making their analogy with slit experiments in physics. It has been shown that the description of results of such measurements is possible both in classical and in quantum formalism of calculation of probabilities. Thus, the quantum-mechanical formalism of the (...) description of states appears as a result of idealization of the selection mechanism in the proprietor's consciousness. (shrink)

This paper argues against both conceptual and linguistic analysis as sources of a priori knowledge. Whether such knowledge is possible turns on the nature of concepts. The paper's chief contention is that none of the main views about what concepts are can underwrite the possibility of such knowledge.

This paper attempts to bring the work of Gilbert Simondon into conversation with contemporary discourse on climate change and the Anthropocene. Though his work pre-dates the coining of the term, Simondon, with his non-anthropomorphic view of technology, is in many ways a philosopher of the Anthropocene. In this paper I contrast Simondon’s philosophy to the popular idea that technology is something we can use to adapt to the practical problems of the Anthropocene. I will begin by looking briefly at the (...) narrative of adaptation in the Anthropocene. I will then discuss Simondon’s philosophy of individuation in order to understand why he rejects these narratives of adaptation. Next, I will look at his own ideas on the role that can be played by technology. Ultimately, I hope to describe why, for Simondon, a view of technology that centres on relation rather than on a particular view of the human subject is crucial to human life. The significance of a non-anthropomorphic approach to technology extends beyond the current ecological crisis to all manner of injustice, violence, and misunderstanding between human groups as well as the environment. (shrink)

У статті розглянуто сутність концепції сталого розвитку. Визначено ознаки та ідеї сталого розвитку. Виділено рівні реалізації концепції сталого розвитку й обґрунтовано вплив підприємства як господарюючого суб'єкта на практичну реалізацію цієї концепції. Запропоновано трактувати сталий розвиток підприємства з позиції системно інтегрованого підходу.

The subject of this thesis is physicalism, understood not as some particular doctrine pertaining narrowly to the philosophy of mind, but rather as a quite general metaphysical claim to the effect that everything is, or is fundamentally, physical. Thus physicalism explicates the thought that in some sense physics is the basic science. The aim of the thesis is to defend a particular brand of physicalism, which I call eliminative type physicalism. It claims, roughly, that every property is a physical property, (...) a property mentioned in the laws of physics, and hence that any putative property not identifiable with a physical property must be eliminated from our ontology. Eliminative type physicalism is apt to face three objections, and so my thesis, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts. In the first, I argue against the idea that there are tenable positions, both physicalist and non-physicalist, alternative to eliminative type physicalism. I argue that each of these positions token physicalism (Fodor, middle Putnam), supervenience physicalism (Lewis, Horgan) and and a non-physicalist view I call pluralism (Goodman, late Putnam) is defective. In the second part, responding to the objection that there is just no reason to be a physicalist, I develop a positive argument for eliminative type physicalism, an argument resting upon a strong version of the explanatory test for reality according to which only explanatorily indispensable properties can justifiably be said to exist. In the third and final part, I argue, against the charge that eliminative type physicalism cannot accommodate what I call phenomenal properties (qualia, raw feels etc.), that there is no good reason to deny, and one good reason to affirm, that phenomenal properties just are physical properties. (shrink)

Supervenience physicalism holds that all facts, of whatever type, globally supervene upon the physical facts, even though neither type-type nor token-token nonphysical-physical identities hold. I argue that, invoked like this, supervenience is metaphysically mysterious, needing explanation. I reject two explanations (Lewis and Forrest). I argue that the best explanation of the appearance of supervenience is an error-theoretic, projectivist one: there are no nonphysical properties, but we erroneously project such onto the physical world in a systematic way, yielding the appearance of (...) supervenience. (shrink)

In earlier work, I proposed and defended a formulation of physicalism that was distinctive in appealing to a carefully-defined relation of physical realization. Various philosophers (Robert Francescotti, Daniel Stoljar, Carl Gillett, and Susan Schneider) have since presented challenges to this formulation. In the present paper, I aim to show that these challenges can be overcome.

This paper introduces the term "Hempel's Dilemma" to refer to the following challenge to any formulation of physicalism that appeals to the content of physics: if physical properties are those mentioned as such in current physics, then physicalism is probably false; but if they are those mentioned as such in a completed physics, then, since we have no idea what completed physics will look like, the resulting formulation of physicalism will lack content that is determinable by us now. It shows (...) how the first horn of Hempel's Dilemma can be avoided. The key is an account of what is required for the acceptance of physicalism according to which to accept physicalism does not require assigning to physicalism a high probability, merely a higher probability than is assigned to any of its relevant rivals. This account of acceptance is shown to satisfy all the intuitive demands of the scientific realist, so that to be a physicalist is simply to be a scientific realist regarding physicalism. (shrink)

This paper makes an elementary case, aimed at introductory students, for a physicalist (or materialist) view of the mind.

Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest an alternative (...) account which, however, cannot play a role in a Searle-type argument, and argue that Searle gives no good reason for favoring his account, which allows the abstract argument to work, over the alternative, which doesn't. This response to Searle's abstract argument also, incidentally, enables the Robot Reply to the Chinese Room to defend itself against objections Searle makes to it. (shrink)

_Purpose._ To substantiate the definition of technics as the attributive characteristics of a human being and the necessity of its orientation towards human flourishing in the context of new anthropological models of the 21st century. _Theoretical basis._ Correlation between technics, technology and the human essence is examined. The role of technics is traced at different historical stages of human development. Negative and positive effects of digital technology development upon a contemporary human being is analysed in the light of new anthropological (...) models: homo technologicus, homo digitalis and homo eudaimonicus. The content of a new worldview-value paradigm of defining goals of technology is outlined. _Originality._ Transformation of the role of technics correlates with value and worldview shifts in person’s understanding of his/her purpose in both natural and social worlds. Nowadays, philosophical analysis of anthropological dimension of technics and technology opens a horizon for seeking effective solutions in the face of the contemporary challenges and anti-utopian threats by means of focusing on the fact that, indeed, technological development is subordinate to the humanist goal that is flourishing, wellbeing and comprehensive development of a human being. _Conclusions._ The essence of technology reveals not through its functional but anthropogenic definitions in a sense of a source of institutionalization and in a sense of a source of realization of a human way of self-identification and self-objectification of human subjectivity. Technics/technology is the attributive characteristics of human essence and being: a human being is as much human as much he/she is a creator of technics. The purpose of technics is not to master the nature and to transform the world; technics is, above all, a tool of human self-improvement and self-creation through broadening the horizon of human capacities. The analysis of new modern anthropological models shows that it is the orientation of technology/technology towards human flourishing that is, on the one hand, a response to the existential demands of modern man, and on the other hand, a way of preventing future threats related to technological development. (shrink)

Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.

This is a critical, but sympathetic, examination of the manifesto for naturalized metaphysics that forms the first chapter of James Ladyman and Don Ross's 2006 book, Every Thing Must Go, but it has wider implications than this description suggests.

The relevance of the study of this problem is that the concept of information-digital management contributes to the development of digital society, based on a new wave of technological progress. The purpose of the study is to show how the information revolution of the XXI century contributes to the reduction of manpower as a result of progressive robotization. There are different technologies that are used today to replace people; the need for human resources is reduced thanks to robots, computers and (...) other high-tech gadgets. Methods of theoretical analysis - deduction and induction, historical and logical, comparative and structural-genetic analysis, informatiological method, which contribute to the penetration into the essence of the phenomenon under study as a complex phenomenon and dynamic process. Results: It has been proven that, due to the various well-known developments in information-computer technologies and robotics, many experts believe that the society is at an early stage of the new industrial revolution, which in the future can change the way people live and work just like 200 years ago a steam engine did. Technological unemployment is one of the main reasons for the increase in the overall unemployment rate in Western countries over the past 30 years. Although to some extent this is connected with the demographic revolution and the changing structure of the economy in many countries, the development of information and computer technologies, as well as other types of automation and Internet have played a significant role, especially since 2000. Findings. We have shown that many jobs of cheap labor can disappear, because the digital society focuses on the development of human resources. The world is turning into a digital society and the world is ruled by a digit, world that is based on intelligence, mind, algorithms, digitalization. The digital society consists of a set of algorithms that are controlled by information and computer technologies that penetrate into digital management, which is based on intellectual right-minded force represented by human resources. It is human resources that develop robotics, artificial intelligence, computerization, mechanization, robotization, which are based on robotics, artificial intelligence. These varieties of digital society will accelerate the potential of the long-term productivity increase through intellectualization. Practical recommendations - to develop a small business that rests on the network of intelligent platforms and helps to create jobs on the Internet and create new types of employment. (shrink)

Against the common supposition that Adorno’s thinking remains caught in a distressing form of pessimism rendering it impotent in the face of modern capitalism and the fungibility of subjects, the article argues that the operation of negative dialectics inherently contains a productive moment that suggests the promise of a qualitatively different philosophy. Through an analysis that employs the multivalent senses of play at work in Adornian thinking — and particularly the notions of gamble, risk and chance — as its primary (...) interpretive key, the article shows that this promise for a philosophy ‘to come’ is at work in the use of parataxis and the practice of constellating concepts; in the invocation of metaphysical experience and affective language; and in the descriptions of critical philosophy as engaged in a practice of ‘critique and rescue’ or ‘wounded healing’. (shrink)

The third of three contributions to an e-book in which I debated Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro on the question whether the human mind is material. I said that it is, and they said that it isn't. The article is meant to be intelligible to an educated general audience. In this third contribution, I reply to the claim of Goetz and Taliaferro that naturalism (i.e., anti-supernaturalism) cannot accommodate free choices and conscious experience.

Changing values may give rise to intergenerational conflicts, like in the ongoing climate change and energy transition debate. This essay focuses on the interpretative question of how this value change can best be understood. To elucidate the interpretation of value change, two philosophical perspectives on value are introduced: Berlin’s value pluralism and Dworkin’s interpretivism. While both authors do not explicitly discuss value change, I argue that their perspectives can be used for interpreting value change in the case of climate change (...) and the energy transition. I claim that Berlin’s pluralistic account of value would understand the value change as an intergenerational conflict and therefore provide a too narrow and static ground for understanding ongoing value change. Instead, by exploring Dworkin’s standpoint in moral epistemology, this essay distills a more encompassing perspective on how values may relate, converge, overlap, and change, fulfilling their functions in the course of climate change and energy transition. This perspective is further detailed by taking inspiration from Shue’s work on the interpretation of equity in the climate change debate. I argue that the resulting perspective allows us to see value change as a gradual process rather than as a clash between generations and their values. (shrink)

Обсуждается широкий круг проблем взаимоотношения сознания и материи. Особое внимание уделено анализу структуры и свойств сознания в рамках информационной эволюции. А также – анализу роли специфических (невычислительных) свойств сознания в процедуре классических и квантовых измерений. В частности, подробно обсуждается вопрос о «клонировании» сознания (возможности копирования его свойств его на новый материальный носитель). Мы надеемся, что сформулированный нами обобщенный принцип дополнительности откроет новые пути для исследования проблем сознания в рамках фундаментальной физической картины мира.

The first of three contributions to an e-book in which I debated Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro on the question whether the human mind is material. I said that it is, and they said that it isn't. The article is meant to be intelligible to an educated general audience. In this first contribution, I present a simplified version of the argument for physicalism based on the neural dependence of mental phenomena.

Materialism is nearly universally assumed by cognitive scientists. Intuitively, materialism says that a person’s mental states are nothing over and above his or her material states, while dualism denies this. Philosophers have introduced concepts (e.g., realization, supervenience) to assist in formulating the theses of materialism and dualism with more precision, and distinguished among importantly different versions of each view (e.g., eliminative materialism, substance dualism, emergentism). They have also clarified the logic of arguments that use empirical findings to support materialism. Finally, (...) they have devised various objections to materialism, objections that therefore serve also as arguments for dualism. These objections typically center around two features of mental states that materialism has had trouble in accommodating. The first feature is intentionality, the property of representing, or being about, objects, properties, and states of affairs external to the mental states. The second feature is phenomenal consciousness, the property possessed by many mental states of there being something it is like for the subject of the mental state to be in that mental state. (shrink)

This paper argues in unprecedented empirical and philosophical detail that, given only what science has discovered about pain, we should prefer the materialist hypothesis that pains are purely material over the dualist hypothesis that they are immaterial. The empirical findings cited provide strong evidence for the thesis of empirical supervenience: that to every sort of introspectible change over time in pains, or variation among pains at a time, there corresponds in fact a certain sort of simultaneous neural change over time, (...) or variation at a time. The empirical supervenience of pain on the neural is shown in turn to favor the hypothesis that pains are, in a sense that is made precise, purely material. (shrink)

Two ways are considered of formulating a version of retentive physicalism, the view that in some important sense everything is physical, even though there do exist properties, e.g. higher-level scientific ones, which cannot be type-identified with physical properties. The first way makes use of disjunction, but is rejected on the grounds that the results yield claims that are either false or insufficiently materialist. The second way, realisation physicalism, appeals to the correlative notions of a functional property and its realisation, and (...) states, roughly, that any actual property whatsoever is either itself a physical property or else is, ultimately, realised by instances of physical properties. Realisation physicalism is distinctive since it makes no claims of identity whatsoever, and involves no appeal to the dubious concept of supervenience. After an attempt to formulate realisation physicalism more precisely, I explore a way in which, in principle, we could obtain evidence of its truth. (shrink)

This paper concerns Sydney Shoemaker's view, presented in his book, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007), of how mental properties are realized by physical properties. That view aims to avoid the "too many minds" problem to which he seems to be led by his further view that human persons are not token-identical with their bodies. The paper interprets and criticizes Shoemaker's view.

The paper argues that a broadly functionalist picture of psychological phenomena is quite consistent with at least one interesting thesis of psychological reductionism.

I develop the conjecture that “naturalism” in philosophy names not a thesis but a paradigm in something like Thomas Kuhn’s sense, i.e., a set of commitments, shared by a group of investigators, whose acceptance by the members of the group powerfully influences their day-to-day investigative practice. I take a stab at spelling out the shared commitments that make up naturalism, and the logical and evidential relations among them.

A standard objection to any version of physicalism, an objection which may be encountered both in conversation and in the literature, is that there is just no reason to be a physicalist; even if there are no good arguments against physicalism, there are none for it either. My main aim in this paper is to defeat this objection by supplying a trio of positive reasons for adopting a particular brand of physicalism, which I call realization physicalism. The arguments I shall (...) give are addressed not to the supporters of rival brands of physicalism but to the comprehensive anti-physicalist - the objector who wishes not to accept any brand of physicalism at all - and their general thrust is that it is much harder to be a comprehensive anti-physicalist than might at first appear. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom has recently elaborated a formulation of non-reductive physicalism in which supervenience does not play the central role and realization plays no role at all; he calls his formulation “robust non-reductive physicalism”. This paper argues that for several reasons robust non-reductive physicalism is inadequate as a formulation of physicalism: it can only rule out fundamental laws of physical-to-mental emergence by stipulating that there are no such laws; it fails to entail the supervenience of the mental on the physical; it (...) appeals to two relations that are physicalistically unacceptable; and it rules out certain epistemically possible ways that the world might turn out to be according to current physics. This paper further argues that the difficulties faced by Pereboom’s robust non-reductive physicalism can all be avoided if physicalism is instead formulated by appeal to a carefully-defined relation of realization. (shrink)

Robert Pargetter has argued that we know other minds through an inference to the best explanation. My aim is to show, by criticising Pargetter's account, that this approach to the problem of other minds cannot, as it stands, deliver the goods; it might be part of the right response to the problem, but it cannot be the whole story. More precisely, I will claim that Pargetter does not successfully reconstruct how ordinary people in everyday life come reasonably to believe in (...) other minds, given only the gross behavioural evidence actually available to them. I will suggest, contrary to both Pargetter in particular and this approach in general, that reference to one's own case does, after all, play an indispensable evidential role in the justification of belief in other minds, something which obviously marks an important disanalogy between the case of other minds and that of such theoretical entities as electrons. (shrink)

The relevance of the topic of research of information management as a modern direction of the development of society is that in the 21st century the development of modern civilization has accelerated in the direction of globalization - economic, political, and cultural. The central problem for the development of informational civilization is information as one of the most important attributes and resources of human activity, which grows into knowledge. The problem of research is information management as a science that is (...) not yet sufficiently developed in modern scientific literature; therefore, it is very important to study all new approaches to its development. The purpose of the research is the conceptualization of information management as a science, based on information and communication technologies and informatization mechanisms that help to identify the information and innovation potential of our country, develop information standards and implement intellectual human capital based on information.The article substantiates the essence, tasks and main directions of the development of the concept of information management, determined by informationalism. The transition to a new information civilization has the character of a "technocratic project", based on the innovative development of society, which is based on the information infrastructure. The development of information management is promoted by the "knowledge society", which cultivates a creative person, the formation of which is based on information and knowledge. The research tasks are the conceptualization of information management, its essence, content and main directions of development, which are introduced into the practice of the educational process of high school. The methodological basis for the formation and development of the concept of the information society is informationalism, studied by M. Castells, as well as Autopoese methodology of Maturana and Varela. The results of the research are the formation of the concept of information management as one of the most modern trends in the development of the 21st century society, which is quite innovative, requiring the development of an informative and innovative society and an informative and innovative personality. Conclusions - the concept of information management should be introduced in all areas of the development of society, including high school, which requires the formation of a creative personality as a subject of an informative and innovative society. (shrink)

Актуальність дослідження пошуку стратегій розвитку менеджменту стійкого розвитку в умовах «глобалізації 4.0» має велике теоретичне і практичне значення і є інноваційною концепцією сучасності, тому що без збалансованого розвитку цивілізація існувати не зможе. В умовах «глобалізації 4.0» починають переосмислюватися проблеми, які виникли в часи розвитку технологій, що змінили світ. Мета дослідження - концептуалізація пошуку стратегій менеджменту збалансованого розвитку в умовах четвертої хвилі глобалізації. Мета статті : виявити проблеми сучасного соціально-економічного розвитку, які відрізняють винятковий динамізм та непередбачуваність процесів; здійснити аналіз терміну «стратегічний (...) менеджмент стійкого розвитку»; розкрити стратегії менеджменту стійкого розвитку в умовах четвертої хвилі глобалізації як національного, так і регіонального масштабів; сформувати концепцію менеджменту стійкого розвитку в умовах «глобалізації 4.0». Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій, з яких започатковано розв’язання даної проблеми. Ми спираємося на роботу Донелли Медоуз, Денніса Медоуз і Йоргена Рандерса «Межі зростання. 30 років потому» - поновлене дослідження, що базується на нових даних про тенденції розвитку людської цивілізації. Методологія дослідження. В основі моделі - методологія системної динаміки та сучасних комп’ютерних можливостей. Наукова новизна - у виявленні проблем «глобалізації 4.0» та формуванні концепції збалансованого розвитку цивілізації. Результати дослідження - виявлено проблеми соціально-економічного розвитку, в основі яких знаходиться винятковий динамізм та непередбачуваність економічних процесів, поразка «четвертої промислової революції»; здійснено аналіз терміну «стратегічний менеджмент стійкого розвитку»; розглянуто стратегії менеджменту стійкого розвитку в умовах четвертої хвилі глобалізації як національного, так і регіонального рівня масштабів; сформовані перші підходи до вироблення концепції менеджменту стійкого розвитку в умовах четвертої хвилі глобалізації. Висновок - нами сформовано перші підходи до пошуку стратегій, що лягли в основу концепції менеджменту стійкого розвитку в умовах четвертої хвилі глобалізації. (shrink)

A wide range of problems of the relationship between consciousness and matter are discussed. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the structure and properties of consciousness in the framework of information evolution. The role of specific (non-computational) properties of consciousness in the procedure of classical and quantum measurements is analyzed. In particular, the issue of "cloning" of consciousness (the possibility of copying its properties onto a new material carrier) is discussed in detail. We hope that the generalized principle (...) of complementarity formulated by us will open up new ways for studying the problems of consciousness within the framework of the fundamental physical picture of the world. (shrink)

The paper deals withy the analysis and highlighting the concepts of First and third Rome under the context of the «Russian world» ideology and modern Vatican verification. The imperian segment of First and third Rome, interconnection between the ideologeme «Moscow – the Third Rome» and geopolitical in the essence concept of Kyryll patriarch. The process of historial fails of «Moscow the Third Rome» created for all the Christian world. It has been pinted out that the «Russian world» abd the ROC (...) were designated only for Eastern Slavonic countries of Europe. (shrink)

Purpose. The paper considers the fear of social alienation of love. It is within the limits of psychoanalytic epistemology, the analysis of which will be presented in the article, the tendencies to monotony and universal solutions with an emphasis on ensuring the objectivity of the problem of gender alienation, to be more exact, the fear of love, which causes the gender process, are viewed most reliably. In view of the above the purpose of the paper is to investigate the conceptual (...) contradictions associated with the reconstruction of basic measurements of the fear of alienation of love within different ideological approaches; to reveal the most significant contradictions that manifest themselves in the differences between secular and religious frames; to determine a philosophical and fundamental foundation for the types of fear: metaphysical, transcendental and social, which to some extent have influenced the development of a gender tradition. The paper investigates the fear of alienation of love, not as an instinct or psychological experience, or as a social factor, but as a correlation between the functional types of fear and the peculiarities of social and cultural processes, and it acts as a dependence of the European societies on the various functional forms of fear of love that influence the processes of social transformations. Theoretical basis. The authors determine that in the gender approach the subject, who is cognized, has specific desires and interests. The process of cognation is local, contextual, in which physiologically and spiritually the fear of alienation of love is closely linked to the conditions of existence of people, with the arrangement of social and individual life. In modern civilization, true love with some exceptions, is fleeting. It is now hindered by the burdens of life, and ideological settings, which go only from the "I", and not from the common "I and You", contributing to frustration and alienation. Originality. The emphasis is placed on the fact that the fear of alienation of love, as a way of identifying the essential characteristics of "I", acts as an existential, which concentrates on the sense-life range of problems. The range of problem in a single topic is in the "point I", surrounded by gender boundaries, it contains as a condition for its manifestation the personality distancing – free or forced consolidation and assertion of the autonomy of the individual. Alienation of love as an existential admits in the register of the intimate, intentional for self-perception, internal state to organize and identify with the "authentic I". Conclusions. The article establishes that gender identity under the conditions of modern socio-psychological crisis is associated with forming a special "picture of fear, anxiety, loneliness" as a part of that internal and external world, generated by alienation from society. The fear of alienated love acts as the essential existential of human being, which is a necessary existential condition of the existential tension that occurs as an antipode and a characteristic of courage, asceticism, and the "beginning of wisdom". The considered phenomenon of the fear of alienation of love is interpreted as the result of the ontological and gender alienation of a person who has lost a sense of security and plunged into a continuous interindividual rivalry. (shrink)

We experience the intuition of distinctness when, for example, we attend introspectively to the phenomenal redness of a current visual sensation and it seems to us that that very property could not literally be a physical property of neural activity in a certain tiny region of our brain. The book begins by arguing that the intuition of distinctness underlies certain otherwise puzzling attitudes manifested in debates both inside and outside philosophy about whether physicalism (or materialism) can accommodate phenomenal properties (or (...) qualia). It then argues systematically against the dualist suggestion that the intuition of distinctness gives us reason to reject the physicalist view that phenomenal properties are physical, and to adopt property dualism instead. In the course of the argument, it defends an unorthodox version of representationalism and offers positive accounts of what makes our introspective knowledge of phenomenal properties special, how introspection could tell us that an introspected property is physical, and what the subjectivity of phenomenal properties could be. Finally, after critically surveying previous attempts to account for the intuition of distinctness consistently with physicalism, it elaborates a novel explanation of the intuition of distinctness. The intuition arises because introspection is, in a certain way, conceptually encapsulated, as a result of which we are unable to do something that we can do in the case of every other kind of identity claim that we believe or entertain, and therefore unable to believe, or even to imagine believing, that an introspected phenomenal property is physical. (shrink)

Using the notion of strict implication, Robert Kirk claims to have formulated a version of physicalism which is nonreductive. I argue that, depending on how his notion of strict implication is interpreted, Kirk's formulation either fails to be physicalist or else commits him to reductionism. Either way we do not have nonreductive physicalism. I also suggest that the reductionism to which Kirk is committed, though unfashionable, is unobjectionable.

Written with a student audience in mind, this article surveys the issues raises by the attempt to formulate, argue for, and explore the implications of a comprehensively physicalist view of the world.

Late twentieth-century physicalism—here understood, broadly, as a comprehensive view about the nature of contingent reality, rather than, narrowly, as a view about the relation of the mental to the physical—is widely regarded as the descendant of the materialist hypotheses familiar from the history of philosophy both ancient and modern. This chapter contends that contemporary physicalism differs significantly from historical hypotheses of materialism, significantly enough that the prospects for physicalism cannot be inferred from those for materialism. The chapter brings out these (...) differences by identifying the two main challenges faced by philosophers who want to revive the materialist hypotheses of earlier centuries, and then indicating the author’s possibly idiosyncratic view of how these challenges are best overcome. The first challenge is to formulate physicalism adequately, so that it is interesting but neither obviously true nor obviously false; the second challenge is to specify what would count as empirical evidence for an adequately-formulated hypothesis of physicalism. The chapter’s survey of responses to these two challenges constitutes an opinionated history of central aspects of the past fifty (or so) years of philosophical reflection on physicalism. (shrink)

This paper presents an irreducibly inductive argument for physicalism based on the causal closure of the physical (for which it argues), and defends it against various detractors.

The algebra of transactions as fundamental measurements is constructed on the basis of the analysis of their properties and represents an expansion of the Boolean algebra. The notion of the generalized economic measurements of the economic “quantity” and “quality” of objects of transactions is introduced. It has been shown that the vector space of economic states constructed on the basis of these measurements is relativistic. The laws of kinematics of economic objects in this space have been analyzed and the stages (...) of constructing the dynamics have been formulated. In particular, the “principle of maximum benefit”, which represents an economic analog of the principle of least action in the classical mechanics, and the principle of relativity as the principle of equality of all possible consumer preferences have been formulated. The notion of economic interval between two economic objects invariant to the selection of the vector of consumer preferences has been introduced. Methods of experimental verification of the principle of relativity in the space of economic states have been proposed. (shrink)

Critical comments on David Papineau's idea that people find physicalism about phenomenal consciousness unbelievable because they commit what he calls the 'antipathetic fallacy'.

My goal in this paper is to provide critical discussion of Michael Rea’s case for three of the controversial theses defended in his World Without Design (Oxford University Press, 2002): (1) that naturalism must be viewed as what he calls a “research program”; (2) that naturalism “cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence,” as he puts it; and (3) that naturalists cannot be justified in accepting realism about material objects.