Naturalism as a Philosophical Paradigm

Philo 12 (2):188-199 (2009)
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Abstract

I develop the conjecture that “naturalism” in philosophy names not a thesis but a paradigm in something like Thomas Kuhn’s sense, i.e., a set of commitments, shared by a group of investigators, whose acceptance by the members of the group powerfully influences their day-to-day investigative practice. I take a stab at spelling out the shared commitments that make up naturalism, and the logical and evidential relations among them.

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Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia

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