Damon Tweedy is a psychiatrist, lawyer, and writer. He's also Black. While in his first year as a medical student at Duke University, one of his professors approached him in the classroom and asked why the light bulb in the room hadn't been changed, as requested. Tweedy realized that his professor assumed he was a maintenance worker, not a student. Tweedy never took up this incident with the professor, nor did the professor ever apologize. Tweedy recounts that his best "revenge" (...) would be to excel in the class, which he ultimately did. At the end of the semester, upon learning that Tweedy received the second highest grade of over one hundred students, this professor invited him to work as a research assistant in his... (shrink)

Over the past decade, feminist philosophers have gone a long way toward identifying and explaining the phenomenon that has come to be known as epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice is injustice occurring within the domain of knowledge (e.g., knowledge production and transmission), which typically impacts structurally marginalized social groups. In this paper, we argue that, as they currently work, algorithms on social media exacerbate the problem of epistemic injustice and related problems of social distrust. In other words, we argue that algorithms (...) on social media recreate and reify the conditions that lead to some groups being systematically denied the full status of knowers, thereby corrupting the epistemic terrain and, with it, systems of social trust and cooperation. We argue that algorithms do this in two ways—namely, via what we are calling algorithmic targeting and algorithmic sorting. (shrink)

The presumption of innocence has often been understood as a doctrine that can be explained primarily by instrumental concerns relating to accurate fact-finding in the criminal trial and that has few if any implications outside the trial itself. In this paper, I argue, in contrast, that in a liberal legal order everyone has a right to be presumed innocent simply in virtue of being a person. Every person has a right not to be subjected to criminal punishment unless and until (...) he or she has done something that is criminally wrong. Since disagreements about allegations of criminal wrongdoing are inevitable, the liberal legal order requires a process for determining whether wrongdoing has occurred. In order to preserve the right not to be punished without wrongdoing, the accused person must be presumed innocent throughout this process. The presumption of innocence is therefore as much a basic human right as, for example, the right to bodily integrity or the right to freedom of expression. Specifications of and limitations on the right should therefore be justified not primarily in terms of their instrumental effectiveness in fact-finding or crime control but in terms of the role of the criminal process in a liberal legal order. I consider some implications of this view of the presumption of innocence for the pre-trial process and for substantive criminal law. I argue that the presumption of innocence, understood as a basic human right, should condition the entire pre-trial process; it has, however, minimal implications for the definition of offences. (shrink)

The harm principle, understood as the normative requirement that conduct should be criminalized only if it is harmful, has difficulty in dealing with those core cases of criminal wrongdoing that can occur without causing any direct harm. Advocates of the harm principle typically find it implausible to hold that these core cases should not be crimes and so usually seek out some indirect harm that can justify criminalizing the seemingly harmless conduct. But this strategy justifies criminalization of a wide range (...) of conduct on the basis of the fear, worry, and anxiety it generates among those who are not the direct victims of the conduct, and thereby undermines the limiting role of the harm principle by permitting the very move it was meant to prevent: the criminalization of harmless conduct on the ground of others’ feelings about it. The best way to avoid this dilemma is to recognize that people have rights, operating independently of the harm principle, to be treated in certain ways just because they are persons. The existence of such rights provides a ground for both criminalizing conduct and limiting the scope of criminalization because these rights point both to conduct that people must be permitted to engage in and conduct that might well be criminalized. A complete account of criminal law will therefore require the harm principle to work together with an independent account of rights. (shrink)

There are, broadly speaking, two ways to think about rationality, as defined in the following passage: ‘Reason’ for a long time meant the activity of understanding and assimilating the eternal ideas which were to function as goals for men. Today, on the contrary, it is not only the business but the essential work of reason to find means for the goals one adopts at any given time. To use what Horkheimer called objective reason, and what others have called expressive or (...) non–instrumental reason, is to reflect on one's goals, to attempt to determine what preferences one ought to hold. On the other hand, to use what Horkheimer called subjective reason is to ‘be concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted’, that is, to be instrumentally rational. This contrast between non-instrumental and instrumental reason is at the heart of many contemporary social and philosophical disputes. 1. (shrink)

The increase in incarceration of offenders in the United States over the last 40 years has created a system of mass incarceration or mass punishment. While consequentialist theories of punishment may generate considerable doubts about the value of this system, it seems that retributive theories of punishment lack the resources to criticize mass punishment. Because of their focus on individual desert, it seems that they can say nothing about punishment in the aggregate. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for a certain (...) kind of retributivism to question the justice of mass punishment. When retributive punishment is considered as one of the functions of a state whose task is to create and maintain a system of equal freedom for all, then punishment must be justified not only at the individual level but also at the level of the system of punishment as a whole. If the criminal justice system inflicts excessive amounts of punishment in the aggregate, it becomes unjust, not because individual offenders are treated unjustly, but because a policy of relentless prosecution and punishment is not appropriate for a free society. (shrink)

RésuméCet article met en évidence trois pratiques épistémiques qui, prises ensemble, créent des conditions qui aggravent le problème de « l'effacement de la bisexualité ». Bien que les personnes bisexuelles constituent une portion significative de la communauté LGBTQ+, leurs identités et leurs expériences sont régulièrement effacées, autant au sein des communautés queer que dans la société au sens large. Cet article soutient que nous avons une obligation à la fois épistémique et morale de nous préoccuper des conditions épistémiques créées pour (...) les personnes bisexuelles, et de travailler pour rendre ces conditions plus justes. Plus précisément, je souligne l'influence néfaste de l'injustice testimoniale, de l’étouffement testimonial et des micro-agressions épistémiques sur la capacité des personnes bisexuelles à défier et à résister à leur propre effacement. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPeople have procedural rights because states are under a duty of political morality to provide them with fair procedures for settling disputes about the application of the laws. This obligation flows from the state's duty to treat each person as a free and equal member of the legal order. Yet adherence to procedural rights can impede accuracy in fact-finding, which in turn can result in poor protection for substantive rights. So the state also has a duty to provide a reasonable (...) degree of accuracy in fact-finding. The legal order should therefore strive to improve the accuracy of fact-finding, within the constraints imposed by procedural rights people have. Nevertheless, the duty to provide reasonably accurate procedures is subordinate to the duty to provide procedural rights because the settlement of disputes among free persons must be conducted in a manner that respects their status as free persons. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that purely quantitative understandings of Aristotle's concept of "the mean" are oversimplified, and I make this argument by analyzing the particular emotion of anger. Anger, I contend, helps to complicate the purely quantitative understanding of the mean, insofar as, I argue, the amount of anger experienced is not the morally salient feature in determining whether or not the anger is virtuous. Rather, anger is one example of an emotion or trait for which other, non-quantitative parameters (...) of the mean are more salient, giving us a more nuanced understanding of what the mean is. Anger is virtuous not when it is in the right measurable degree, but rather when it is directed at the proper target. In this way, the virtue-making property of anger is distinctly qualitative. Examining anger provides insight into the concept of the mean and its role in Aristotle's ethics, and also helps to shed light on contemporary debates about political anger. (shrink)

Kant’s essay ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’ claims that everyone has an unconditional duty of right not to lie under any circumstances. This claim creates a conflict within the doctrine of right because Kant also claims that each of us is under an unconditional duty of right to obey the positive law in force in the civil condition in all circumstances. In Kant’s specific example, truthfulness would violate the positive law because it would make the speaker an (...) accomplice to a crime. Since both duties flow from the requirement that we not act inconsistently with the possibility of rightful relations among humans, a juridical solution to the conflict must be possible. That solution is to recognize that lying in appropriate circumstances is akin to the use of force in self-defence or defence of a third party. (shrink)

Most people think of law as an instrument that can help us achieve human purposes that can themselves be adequately specified without reference to law or legal ideas. But a number of scholars, asso...

Microaggressions in Medicine demonstrates that the harms of microaggressions are anything but micro. Guided by diverse patient testimonies and case studies, the book focuses on harms experienced by patients who are marginalized on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, body size, and disability. It amplifies their voices, stories, and experiences, which have too often been excluded from mainstream bioethical, medical, and popular discussions. The novel account advanced in Microaggressions in Medicine illustrates that microaggressions in medicine are not rare, but (...) frequent in the healthcare experiences of marginalized patients. Our hope is that the book helps patients better understand and make sense of... Read More. (shrink)

Some version of the will theory and the interest theory of rights attempt to provide a precise and normatively neutral definition of a right that would be useful in substantive normative debates and that corresponds reasonably well with usage in our political and legal culture. But there is an irresolvable tension in this project. Consistent application of a definition of a right cannot plausible track ordinary usage without invoking underlying normative propositions about the justifications for granting rights. Thus, definitional approaches (...) to rights are too demanding to serve either the descriptive purpose of providing a neutral vocabulary or the normative purpose of usefully discussing the rights we ought to have. For descriptive purposes, it would be better to retreat, if necessary, to the Hohfeldian idea that a right is nothing more than the correlate of a duty; for normative purposes, it would be better to address directly the political justification for characterizing a particular legal as creating a right. (shrink)

In “Principle, Policy, Procedure,” Ronald Dworkin poses the following conundrum: In every substantive legal dispute, one party has, as a matter of political morality, a right to win. Yet in procedural law, it looks as though courts routinely strike a utilitarian balance between the benefits and the costs of accurate fact-finding. If so, the court as a forum of principle is threatened by the utilitarian justification of its procedures; moreover, procedural entitlements do not create rights in Dworkin’s sense. Dworkin’s solution (...) is to apply the principle of equal concern and respect so that procedural rules fairly distribute the risk of the “moral harm” of incorrect outcomes. But this solution has a consequentialist spirit that may not succeed in dispelling the conundrum. Some procedural rules are better understood as requiring people to be treated in certain ways directly as a matter of principle, rather than indirectly as calibrating moral harm. (shrink)

We are grateful and humbled that this esteemed group of scholars and healthcare practitioners have dedicated the time to read and engage with our book. Their thoughtful, critical comments have given us new ways of reflecting on our own work, compelled us to develop and expand some of our claims, and have also nudged us to move in new directions that we hope to explore in future research. In what follows, we reply to each of the commentaries, focusing on what (...) we take to be the most central insights, critiques, and areas for further exploration from each contribution.Catherine Sherron (2024) offers an expansive commentary on chapter 4, "Epistemic Microaggressions," focusing on the nature of epistemic agency... Read More. (shrink)

We argue that modern approaches to teaching Corporate Social Responsibility rely heavily on abstract descriptions of poorly framed problems. Such problems often point to a reality that does not favour the development of CSR. Instead it creates a level of abstraction between “business” and “social responsibility” because there is no real experience of the challenges of integrating CSR into business practice. The number one challenge of making CSR work is integrating it into culture and business practices. To assist in helping (...) the future leaders of tomorrow understand their studies, we propose that a deeper integration between theory and practice is important. In this paper it is argued that this deeper integration can be achieved using small simulations in which students attempt to integrate CSR into real world situations and reflect on this experience. The reflection enables them to capture insights that are often absent from abstractions such as case studies. We offer an action research study to demonstrate how this reflective cycle works in two separate courses where this approach was applied. From this, these lessons are developed into a discussion where future directions are discussed. (shrink)

BOETHIUS. CHAPTER I. A GLANCE AT THE CONTROVERSY ON BOETHIUS. Authorities. — The volumes of Nitzsch and Hildebrand mentioned in this chapter have been of ...

Taking seriously the notion that diversifying our philosophical pedagogy is of both intrinsic and instrumental importance, this paper offers a defense of, and model for, a pedagogical approach aimed at making canonical philosophical texts more appealing—and more useful—for diverse students. Specifically, taking Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as a case study, this paper considers how we might make this text more engaging for students from traditionally underrepresented backgrounds. It does so by offering a five-step model, which involves: situating the text in its (...) historical context; acknowledging and addressing problematic content in the text; drawing out novel or underexplored themes and questions from the text; bringing the text into dialogue with diverse and contemporary philosophical approaches and issues (e.g., feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, and non-Western philosophies); and applying issues, themes, and concepts from the text to contemporary matters or current events as much as possible. Specific examples are offered regarding how to achieve each of these steps when teaching the Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

As the other entries in this section have surely made clear, Carolyn McLeod's outstanding monograph, Conscience in Reproductive Health Care: Prioritizing Patient Interests, is fertile ground for fruitful philosophical analyses of issues pertaining to conscience, trust, autonomy, and more, all of which are sure to be of great interest and benefit to scholars in areas such as bioethics, health policy, and feminist ethics. Conscience in Reproductive Health Care provides a compelling response to a timely bioethical dilemma: What do we do (...) when healthcare providers refuse certain health services to patients on grounds of conscience? McLeod contends that healthcare providers, in light of their fiduciary... (shrink)

Originally published in 1942, this book constitutes the companion volume to The Heart of Pascal ; both volumes were formed using selections from Pascal's Pensées. The text gathers together a series of selections, presented in French, which illustrate Pascal's Christian faith and thoughts on the relationship between man and God. An appendix and preface by the editor are also provided. This is a highly informative book that will be of value to anyone with an interest in Pascal and his late (...) thought. (shrink)