Positive emotions are linked to numerous benefits, but not everyone appreciates the same kinds of positive emotional experiences. We examine how distinct positive emotions are perceived and whether individuals’ perceptions are linked to how societies evaluate those emotions. Participants from Hong Kong and Netherlands rated 23 positive emotions based on their individual perceptions and societal evaluations. We found that there were cultural differences in judgments about all six aspects of positive emotions; positivity, arousal, and social engagement predicted emotions being positively (...) regarded at the societal level in both cultures; and that positivity mattered more for the Dutch participants, although arousal and social engagement mattered more in Hong Kong for societal evaluations. These findings provide a granular map of the perception and evaluation of distinct positive emotions in two cultures and highlight the role of cultures in the understanding how positive emotions are perceived and evaluated. (shrink)

Alterations in the expression of certain genes or in their products can render benign tumor cells metastatic. Experimentally this has been quickly performed by transferring dominantly acting oncogenes such as c‐H‐rasEJ into susceptible cells, but in vivo such a rapid qualitative change in a dominantly acting oncogene occurs only rarely, and progression to highly metastatic phenotypes is thought to occur through a slow stepwise process. Such slow changes can be reversible and need not involve known dominantly acting oncogenes, consistent with (...) clinical observations. An important element of the natural progression of tumors to malignancy may be their ability to circumvent microenvironmental controls that regulate growth and cellular diversity and to evolve into heterogeneous phenotypes, a process that appears to involve mainly quantitative changes in gene expression but which can be rapidly stimulated in cell culture by the introduction of a dominantly acting oncogene. It is proposed that the highly malignant cells that have slowly evolved in vivo with only a few qualitative gene changes have undergone extensive cycles of diversification and accumulation of quantitative changes in the expression of genes that encode products that are related to malignancy and metastasis. Thus, highly malignant cellular phenotypes can arise quickly through specific qualitative changes in critical controlling genes or more slowly by less critical qualitative genetic changes, coupled with cellular diversification and accumulation of quantitative changes in gene expression. (shrink)

An expanded version has now appeared: HOW BRAINS THINK: Evolving Intelligence, Then and Now in the Science Masters series (BasicBooks 1996 in the USA and Weidenfeld & Nicolson in the UK, various translation editions elsewhere, including China). My Darwin Machines model for cerebral cortical circuitry has now appeared as THE CEREBRAL CODE: Thinking a Thought in the Mosaics of the Mind (MIT Press 1996).

Until 1969, there was only one book in English on Georg Lukács, Victor Zitta's Georg Lukács' Marxism: Alienation, Dialectics, Revolution. A Study in Utopia and Ideology, published in 1964 by Martinus Nijhoff. In early 1970, Georg Lukács: The Man, His Work, and His Ideas, edited by G. H. R. Parkinson, was published in London by Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Now, we have Lichtheim's addition to what promises to be a growing body of literature in English on this many-sided and controversial (...) philosopher. Although Lichtheim expresses some reservations about Zitta's treatment of Lukács, his own work belongs to the same genre in two essential respects: first, it is fundamentally hostile to Lukács, and second, it lapses into many ad hominem arguments which reflect this hostility. Thus, also, the book is sparing in its acknowledgment of Lukács' originality and unsparing in its criticism of his acceptance of any aspect of Leninism as distinct from Marxism. The stated aim of the book is a critical examination of Lukács' theory of aesthetics. In Lukács' case, this requires coming to grips with his views on history, politics, society, and epistemology. Over half of the book is devoted to the latter subjects. The picture of Lukács which emerges is that of an academician, physically divorced from, and without roots in the working class whose cause he espouses. His historical importance is attributed to his recapture of the Hegelian dimension of Marx and his error is his over-extension of the Hegelian aspect to the point where authentic Marxism is submerged in a Hegelianized version of it. Aside from the historical inaccuracy of presenting Lukács as an academician, isolated from the practical sides of daily life, Lichtheim misses the revolutionary essence of Lukács' thought which led him to abandon the comfortable and secure life of a dissident banker's son for the uncertainties and hardships of the life of the revolutionary. The influences of Plato and Dilthey are given undue emphasis in Lukács' thought and a disproportionate part of the book is given over to expounding on this subject. This is a small book about a big philosopher. Most of such books do not satisfy and the present one is no exception.--H. B. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL AND G. H. HARDY: A STUDY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP I. GRATTAN-GUINNESS Faculty of Science, Engineering and Mathematics Middlesex Polytechnic Enfield, Middlesex EN3 45F, England I. INTRODUCTION Prom time to time the name of Hardy turns up in Russell's career: a common interest in set theory and the philosophy of mathematics, similar political and religious sentiments, and certain matters of mutual concern arising at Trinity College Cambridge and in (...) the university in general. However, there is no connected account of their contacts. The purpose of this article is to fill a gap in the literature on both men. After enduring private instruction at home, Bertrand Russell gained a minor scholarship in mathematics at Trinity College in 1890; he took Part I of the Mathematical Tripos until 1893 and then Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos in the following year. In 1895 he gained a Prize Fellowship, which he held until 1901; in 19IO.he was awarded a college lectureship which he lost six years later under circumstances noted in section IV below. Much of the intervening time was spent in Oxford or London; however, he spent part of each year in Cambridge.1 The later years are brieHy recorded in section IV. Born into an intellectual family ofmodest means in 1877 (five years younger than Russell, therefore), Godfrey Harold Hardy won a scholarship to Winchester College and then went to Trinity College in I Standard biographical information on Russell is easily available; see, for example, R. W. Clark, The Life ofBertrand Russel~ specific phases and events are dealt with in succeeding footnotes. The Autobiography ofBertrand Russell is of lower quality than one might imagine; for example, Hardy is not mentioned at all! rus.ell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMasrer Unive~ity Library Press noS. 11 (wimer 1991-92): 165-79 ISSN 0036-01631 166 I. GRATTAN-GUINNESS 1896, just after Russell had gained his fellowship. He was elected to the Apostles (the "Society") in 1898, the year after Russell "took wings" after five years' active membership; he seems to have been less active than Russell as a speaker during his own three years there.2 At some stage he also joined the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club, which Russell had joined in. 1891; a surprising contribution will be described in section IV.3 Graduating as fourth wrangler in Part I of the Mathematical Tripos in 1898 and gaining a high place in Part II in 1900, Hardy received at once a Prize Fellowship (like Russell). Upon its termination six years later, he obtained a colleg~ lectureship, which he held until 1919. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London in 1910 (two years after Russell),4 and in the following year he began his life-long collaboration with his younger colleague ]. E. Littlewood (1885-1977), also a Trinity College graduate and then Fellow, and also a friend of Russell.5 The next stages of Hardy's career will be described in section IV: his personality is assessed in a concluding section v. 1 On Russell'~ and Hardy's roles in the Apostles, see passim in P. Levy, Moore: G. E Moore and the Cambridge Apostles (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979). 3 The chief obituary of Hardy is by E. C. Titchmarsh, published in slightly different forms in Obituary Notices ofthe Royal Society ofLondon, 6 (1949); 447-61, and Journal ofthe London Mathematical Society, 25 (1950): 81-101 (followed by more technical surveys of his mathematics by Titchmarsh and eight other authors on pp. 102-38). The first version is reprinted with a few changes in Hardy's Collected Papers, 7 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1966-79), I: 1-12. No major study has been written on him since. 4 Hardy was n~minated for a Royal Sociery fellowship in 1907 by A. R. Forsyth, seconded by J. W L. Glaisher, and supported "on personal knowledge" by W Burnside, E. W Hobson, P. A. MacMahon, A. N. Whitehead, A. E. H. Love, E. B. Elliott and T.]. d'A. Bromwich; the proposal was "suspended" (put up for voring) in 1908, 1909 and 1910 (Royal Sociery Cettificates, 12: foJ. 311). Although Russell was... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.1 (2000) 153-156 [Access article in PDF] JHI 2000 Donald R. Kelley It was just sixty years ago that this Journal first made its appearance. Two hundred thirty-nine issues later it continues in a world transformed by war, overpopulation, cultural shocks, scientific and technological transformations, globalization, the avalanche of information produced by electronic exchange, and "the acceleration of just about everything." Yet despite (...) these factors and the strains of postmodernism and cultural alterity, 1 it has not entirely lost touch with its intellectual innocence, faith in humanistic learning, and reliance on enlightened reason. This continuity itself may seem something of a novelty in an age of distrust of history and "rage against reason," but for some of us it reflects the critical spirit and intellectual context out of which such ostensibly subversive attitudes emerge, and reemerge. To some extent, moreover, the diversity of opinions about intellectual traditions is the result of specializations, and special interests, which have changed the climate of opinion since the time of Arthur O. Lovejoy, principal founder of the JHI. Lovejoy's vision was super- as well as inter-disciplinary; that is, he intended to include in the agenda of "history of ideas" particular areas of history of philosophy, literature, art, science, social science, etc., as well as the larger intellectual and cultural areas into which these disciplinary histories extend. 2 These days, however, all these disciplinary traditions have their own more specialized journals and do not need to seek a vehicle in publications of more general interest. What remains then, for the most part, is the interdisciplinary arena in which larger questions of human experience should be posed--and for Lovejoy, as for so many epigones and critics, the main "larger question" is not only one of value but also of specifically historical inquiry. 3 [End Page 153]The first issue of the JHI appeared under the editorship of Lovejoy (with Philip Wiener, who did most of the editorial work, as "managing editor"), assisted by a committee that included two historians, three philosophers, four literary scholars, and one political theorist; namely, Crane Brinton, Gilbert Chinard, Morris Cohen, Francis Coker, Richard McKeon, Perry Miller, Marjory Nicolson, J. H. Randall, J. Salwyn Schapiro, and Louis Wright. The first volume featured contributions from each of these, including Wiener, except for Miller (vol. 2), Shapiro (vol. 3), McKeon (vol. 8), and Coker. 4 During the first five years there were also reviews of books by Dilthey (by Horace L. Friess), Croce (Schapiro), Mannheim (Randall), Perry Miller (Herbert W. Schneider), Van Wyck Brooks (Miller) and Alfred Kazin (F. O. Matthiessen). In this period the disciplinary distribution of articles was not markedly different from that of the past five years, nor was the ranking of fields by number of submissions. 5 Most important, the original interdisciplinary thrust of Lovejoy's agenda, if not his attachment to the spiritualist currency of "unit-ideas," has survived growing specialization.At first the history of ideas was pursued largely in the shadow of the history of philosophy; for in this field, according to Lovejoy, "is to be found the common seed-plot, the locus of initial manifestation in writing, of the greater number of the more fundamental and pervasive ideas, and especially of the ruling preconceptions, which manifest themselves in other regions of intellectual history." 6 Lovejoy's concern was always with concepts, especially "-isms," and yet in some ways he anticipated the "linguistic turn" of the later years of this century, pointing out in particular "the role of semantic shifts, ambiguities, and confusions, in the history of thought and taste," for "nearly all of the great catchwords have been equivocal--or rather, multivocal." 7 If ideas could be given stable definitions, they were nonetheless often, in the context of language, in conflict, even in the mind of a single thinker; for such was the "anomaly of knowledge." 8 So Lovejoy was at pains to distinguish the various meanings of [End Page 154] catch-words like "nature," "perfectibility," "romanticism," "progress," and "pragmatism," not to mention more inflammatory terms of wartime ideological debate.But... (shrink)

This paper presents four different understandings of the family and their concomitant views of the authority of the family in pediatric medical decision making. These different views are grounded in robustly developed, and conflicting, worldviews supported by disparate basic premises about the nature of morality. The traditional worldviews are often found within religious communities that embrace foundational metaphysical premises at odds with the commitments of the liberal account of the family dominant in the secular culture of the West. These disputes (...) are substantial and ultimately irresolvable by sound rational argument because of the failure to share common foundational premises and rules of evidence. It is in light of these fundamental disagreements that there is a need to evaluate critically the claims and agenda advanced by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. (shrink)

On Islamic philosophy in the light of Koran.

SUFFERING HUMAN AND DIVINE INTRODUCTION I KNEW when I asked Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson to write this volume on Suffering that I was giving him the most difficult ...

Guidelines for a model bride in Islam based on Islamic teachings; includes stories of six exemplary Muslim wives during Prophet Muhammad's time.

We are dealing with the Dirac Hamiltonian H = H0 + V with no magnetic field and radially symmetric electrostatic potential V = V(r), preferably the Coulomb potential. While the observable H is precisely predictable, its components H0 (relativistic mass) and V (potential energy) are not. However they both possess precisely predictable approximations H0 ∼ and V∼ which approximate accurately if the particle is not near its nucleus. On the other hand, near 0, H0 and V are practically unpredictable, perhaps (...) in agreement with the fact, that a neutrino also should be in the game. [We have not yet studied the corresponding observables for the (≥ 12-dimensional) problem of electro-weak interaction.] Mathematically we are focusing on the spectral theory of the unbounded self-adjoint operators H0 ∼ and V ∼. We can prove that V ∼ is unitarily equivalent to V(r) again, by a unitary map given as Wiener-Hopf-type singular integral operator in the standard separation of variables for radially symmetric Dirac Hamiltonians. [This is, as far as the continuous spectrum is concerned.] Very similar unitary equivalence holds for H 0 ∼ and H 0. We are tempted to regard this as a form of “renormalization”. (shrink)

Die drei Bücher "Vom rechten Handeln" beschäftigen sich mit dem Verhältnis zwischem dem "Sittlichen" und dem "Nützlichen". Cicero vertritt die These, dass beide Begriffe "von Natur aus" identisch sind. Einen Konflikt zwischen dem Sittlichen, d.h. den aus den Tugenden folgenden Pflichten, und dem Nützlichen kann es daher im Grunde nicht geben. Was immer auf den ersten Blick sich als Konfliktfall darstellen mag - und Cicero geht zahlreiche Beispiele durch -, erweist sich bei genauer Betrachtung stets als scheinbarer Konflikt, der Nutzen (...) als scheinbarer Nutzen. Cicero verfasste "De officiis" als Vermächtnis an seinen Sohn in den Monaten nach der Ermordung Caesars. Von allen Werken Ciceros hat es am stärksten auf die Nachwelt gewirkt, von der Antika an, über Mittelalter, Renaissance bis hin zur Neuzeit; es wurde 1465 in Mainz als erstes gedruckt und am häufigsten übersetzt und kommentiert. Voltaire und Friedrich der Große hielten "De officiis" für das beste Buch über Moral. Die Übersetzung Karl Büchners sucht so wörtlich wie möglich die kunstvolle Sprache Ciceros nachzubilden. Der lateinische Text folgt der maßgeblichen Ausgabe von C. Atzert, die zahlreichen Abweichungen werden ausführlich kommentiert. Mit Einführung, Verzeichnis der Eigennamen und Literaturhinweisen. (shrink)

First published in 1962, Freedom and History expresses a deep concern about freedom and the way it is imperilled by misunderstandings. Professor Lewis examines works of T.H. Green and compares Green with Locke and Rousseau.

The demand for liver transplants continues to far exceed the number of available viable donor organs; hence, it is of utmost importance to determine those individuals who are best able to care for these valuable, limited resources as potential recipients. At the same time, psychiatric comorbidity is common in the course of end-stage liver disease and can be mutually complicating. This article focuses on liver transplant candidacy from a psychiatric perspective, using illustrative cases to underscore the foundational facets of medical (...) ethics that serve as the guide to these complex medical and ethical decisions. (shrink)

Festschrift volume in honour of Mohd. Sabir Hussain, b. 1935.

It is argued that dispositional explanations are radically incomplete causal explanations that are employed when (1) a description of the stimuli is insufficient to account for the object's response and (2) not enough is known about the object to specify what its specific causal contribution is. ryle's failure to refer to the causal contribution of the organism in his account of dispositions is regarded as a serious weakness.