Combining theological and medical perspectives is indispensable for the historical study of the interconnections between mind, body, and soul. This article explores these relations through the history of Finnish psychosomatic medicine, and uses published and archival materials to examine the intellectual biography of the Finland-Swedish theologian turned psychiatrist Asser Stenbäck (1913–2006). Stenbäck's career, which evolved from priesthood to psychiatry and politics, reveals a great deal about the tensions between religion and medicine, the spiritual and scientific groups that impinged upon (...) psychosomatic medicine, and ideas on how health and Christian morality were interconnected. The biographical approach is adopted to unearth the values encoded in medical concepts, and through this, to point towards another, underexplored dimension of the health–religion relationship. In addition to their emotional aspect, religious doctrines are intended to organise life and give it meaning. Stenbäck's ideas tied these experiential and normative spheres together by defending an irrationalist substratum of the world in the secular age of medicine. His work illustrates how the inner experience of faith can become both medically and politically purposive. It is worth combining these perspectives in historical research as well in order to better understand how the theological, medical, and political worlds are in dialogue when it comes to human problems. (shrink)

Recently, G. ASSER has obtained two interesting characterizations of the class of unary primitive recursive string-functions over a fixed alphabet as Robinson algebras. Both characterizations use a somewhat artificial string-function, namely the string-function lexicographically associated with the number-theoretical excess-over-a-square function. Our aim is to offer two new and natural Robinson algebras which are equivalent to ASSER’S algebras.

Materialism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental. Anti-materialists asser t that, on the contrary, mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena. Among the weapons in the arsenal of anti-materialists, one of the most potent has been the conceivability argument. When I conceive of the mental, it seems utterly unlike the physical. Anti-materialists insist that (...) from this intuitive difference we can infer a genuine meta-physical difference. Materialists retor t that the nature of reality, including the ultimate natures of its constituents, is a matter for discovery; an objective fact that cannot be discerned a priori. In this paper I under take to provide an explicit analysis of the dialectic that surrounds the conceivability argument. My principal conclusion is that the materialist is right in resisting the reasoning that star ts from considerations of what is conceivable and ends with genuine metaphysical conclusions. However my approach is much more sympathetic to the anti-materialist position than is the standard materialist line, and I will provide a limited defense of some crucial aspects of the anti-materialist position. Materialism will emerge from this fight intact, but shaken. (shrink)

Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences, such as (1) It’s raining and I don’t think it’s raining. which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making an asser- tion with them.1 But Mark Crimmins has given us a case of a sentence that is syntactically just like (1) but is nonetheless assertible. Suppose I know somebody, and know or have excellent reason to believe that I know that very person under some other guise. I do not know what (...) that other guise is, though I do know that I believe that the person I know under that other guise is an idiot. (shrink)

In 1952, Heinrich Scholz published a question in The Journal of Symbolic Logic asking for a characterization of spectra, i.e., sets of natural numbers that are the cardinalities of finite models of first order sentences. Günter Asser in turn asked whether the complement of a spectrum is always a spectrum. These innocent questions turned out to be seminal for the development of finite model theory and descriptive complexity. In this paper we survey developments over the last 50-odd years pertaining (...) to the spectrum problem. Our presentation follows conceptual developments rather than the chronological order. Originally a number theoretic problem, it has been approached by means of recursion theory, resource bounded complexity theory, classification by complexity of the defining sentences, and finally by means of structural graph theory. Although Scholz' question was answered in various ways, Asser's question remains open. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to Prof. Dr. Günter Asser, whose work in founding this journal and maintaining it over many difficult years has been a major contribution to the activities of the mathematical logic community.At first sight it appears highly unlikely that Urysohn's Lemma has any significant constructive content. However, working in the context of an apartness space and using functions whose values are a generalisation of the reals, rather than real numbers, enables us to produce a significant constructive (...) version of that lemma. (shrink)

LetL 3 c be the smallest set of propositional formulas, which containsCpCqpCCCpqCrqCCqpCrpCCCpqCCqrqCCCpqppand is closed with respect to substitution and detachment. Let $\mathfrak{M}_3^c $ be Łukasiewicz’s three-valued implicational matrix defined as follows:cxy=min (1,1−x+y), where $x,y \in \{ 0,\tfrac{1}{2},1\}$ . In this paper the following theorem is proved: $$L_3^c = E( \mathfrak{M}_3^c )$$ The idea used in the proof is derived from Asser’s proof of completeness of the two-valued propositional calculus. The proof given here is based on the Pogorzelski’s deduction theorem (...) fork-valued propositional calculi and on Lindenbaum’s theorem. (shrink)

The chronicle of John of Worcester is one of the most important sources of earlier English history. The chronicle, which was written at Worcester by 1140, is of considerable interest to historians of both the Anglo-Saxon period and of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. Its backbone is a translation of an Anglo-Saxon chronicle with varied connections, and this edition makes possible the detailed examination of these allegiances. Its annals for the second half of the ninth century provide one of (...) the earliest surviving witnesses to the text of Asser's Life of Alfred. The author had access to otherwise unrecorded sources of events in the eleventh century, and the chronicle's value as a contemporary source for the reign of Stephen has long been acknowledged. Dr McGurk has completed the edition of the work left unfinished by R. R. Darlington on his death in 1977. The chronicle will be published in three volumes. Volume II covers the annals for 450 to 1066, and volume III the annals from 1067 to 1140. Volume I will be published last, and will contain a general introduction and supplementary material. (shrink)