How does cultural knowledge shape the development of human minds and, conversely, what kind of species-specific social-cognitive mechanisms have evolved to support the intergenerational reproduction of cultural knowledge? We critically examine current theories proposing a human-specific drive to identify with and imitate conspecifics as the evolutionary mechanism underlying cultural learning. We summarize new data demonstrating the selective interpretive nature of imitative learning in 14-month-olds and argue that the predictive scope of existing imitative learning models is either too broad or too (...) narrow to account for these findings. We outline our alternative theory of a human-specific adaptation for ‘pedagogy’, a communicative system of mutual design specialized for the fast and efficient transfer of new and relevant cultural knowledge from knowledgeable to ignorant conspecifics. We show the central role that innately specified ostensive-communicative triggering cues and learner-directed manner of knowledge manifestations play in constraining and guiding selective imitation of relevant cultural knowledge that is both new and cognitively opaque to the naive learner. (shrink)

The book addresses the constitution of the high culture of modernity as an uneasy unity of the sciences, including philosophy, and the arts. Their internal dynamism and strain is established through, on the one hand, the relationship of the author - work - recipient, and, on the other, the respective roles of experts and the market.

György Lukács first published the original Hungarian language version of Soul and Form in 1910. It included eight of the ten essays later to be published in subsequent German, Italian, and English editions. This current centennial edition adds to the mix one additional Lukács essay, "On Poverty of Spirit", written at roughly the same time as the others and bearing a vital relationship to them. Finally, in this edition we have added to the Lukács material an important introductory essay by (...) Judith Butler, as well as a concluding essay, by Katie Terezakis, which draws out connections between the Lukácsian concept of form and its elaboration and critique in Lukács’s own work and in works of critical theory and philosophy up to the present. (shrink)

“Desiderius Erasmus sprang from the seed of a priest who refused to follow his vow of celibacy. He himself became a monk against his will, found he had to flee the monastic atmosphere, and scrounged for the wherewithal to study. In time, he became the greatest classical scholar of his day, and wrote a book called Anti-Barbari which speaks to the 1970’s, though it was written nearly half a millennium ago. Like the youth of today, Erasmus lived during a period (...) of intense political, intellectual, and religious change. Burgundy warred with France, the humanists clashed with the medieval order, and Luther destroyed Christian unity. Against this background, Erasmus, whose name is derived from the Greek root meaning “to love,” was able to develop and sustain a profound philosophy of tolerance and pacifism.Erasmus could compromise with the Princes of Church and State, and even flatter them, but he never compromised his beliefs. In an age we think of as fraught with superstition and intolerance, Erasmus summoned his greatness to the side of reason; his integrity speaks to us now, when we can no longer comfort ourselves with the belief that we are living in an age of reason. This grand biography will have added meaning for a generation of students who are trying to revive “humane” as a guideline for human interchange.”- Publisher. (shrink)

From the late seventeenth century on the idea of culture underwent a gradual transformation. Originally this concept referred essentially to the “refined” way of life of the ruling social elite. Popular culture, on the other hand, refers to the usually collective practices of groups of rural and urban workers taking the form of performance. They were not only excluded from refined culture, but it was regarded as completely unsuitable for them, potentially creating dangerous social aspirations. It is with the great (...) social transformation from feudal to bourgeois society that the idea of refined culture was replaced by that of “high culture” encompassing both the arts and the sciences: works claiming universal human significance. This “high culture” for a considerable time coexisted with the remnants of popular culture. It has been only due to the great technical advances that its true opposite, “mass culture” emerged, at the turn to twentieth century, claiming an empirical universality: being understandable and truly interesting to everyone. In economic respect, there is a competitive relation between high and mass culture. However, it is argued that there can be no cultural competition between them. For they posit differing and potentially co-existing receptive attitudes. The characterisation of this difference and the discussion of the seeming exceptions to the so-articulated conceptual scheme occupies the concluding part of this essay. (shrink)

Teleonics is a systemic approach for the study and management of complex living systems, such as human beings, families, communities, business organisations and even countries and international relationships. The approach and its applications have been described in several publications, quoted in the paper. The units of teleonics are teleons, viz, end?related, autonomous process systems. An indication of malfunction in teleons is a high level of telentropy that can be caused by many factors, among which the most common are the lack (...) of well defined goals, inefficient governance, inappropriate interference and undeclared sharing of subsystems between teleons. These factors, as well as other modes of telentropy generation and transfer are described, together with some suggestions about ways to avoid them. (shrink)

Lukács, G. Statt eines Vorworts, ein Brief.--Heller, A. Theorie und Praxis, ihr Verhältnis zu den menschlichen Bedürfnissen.--Vajda, M. Marxismus, Existentialismus, Phänomenologie.--Márkus, G. Der Mensch als gesellschaftliches und bewusstes Naturwesen.--Márkus, M. Hegedüs, A. Gemeinschaft und Individuum.--Heller, A., Vajda, M. Familienform und Kommunismus.--Hegedüs, A. Zur Untersuchung von Alternativen der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung.--Fehér, F. Ist der Roman eine problematische Gattung?

On the basis of these findings, I suggest that the structure and organisation of the field of Hungarian economics under state socialism should be described as a case of “partitioned bureaucracy”.9 The compromise between research economists and the political elite in the New Course era between 1953 and 195510 survived the post-1956 reaction in so far as political economy, with its predominantly legitimatory and ideological functions, remained partitioned from the other sectors in the field through the remainder of the state-socialist (...) period. This secured considerable protection both for Marxist-Leninist political economy—which faced the destabilising effects of exposure to the findings of serious empirical research—and for the other sectors, which were professionally oriented and earnestly interested in the pursuit of unbiased empirical research, free from stifling agitprop interference. Our data concerning the reputational control of the field reflects only one, although very important, aspect of this partitioning. Another and much plainer aspect is that, from the early 1960s, the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee no longer exercised control over the field, except in the political economy sector.The proposition about the “mechanism paradigm” should not be taken seriously as a statement of a Kuhnian type of intellectual organisation of Hungarian economics, with “reform economics” at its “hard theoretical core”. But it should certainly be taken seriously as a reflection of the sociopolitical structure which emerged and developed from the mid-1950s onwards. Neither the politicians nor the economists saw as necessary or even contemplated the integration of Hungarian economic research with Western mainstream economic thought. In exchange for the professional expertise and socio-economic intelligence necessary for the exercise of power, Hungary's state-socialist political class offered their economists relative autonomy and freedom from interference. The price the economists had to pay was partly to refrain from openly and systematically challenging the beliefs perpetuated by the political economy of socialism, and partly to accept in their research the paramountcy of policy orientation. But this burden they assumed willingly since it made them the only group within Hungary's academic intelligentsia—indeed, the only group in Hungarian society outside the political class—with the privilege of being coopted to the institutions with power over some restricted domains of policymaking. After 1989, especially under the conservative Antall government, this proved less than advantageous.11 Although the benevolence of many critics is open to question, it could greatly benefit the field if the economists' expulsion from contemporary politics went hand in hand with provision of the material, intellectual and institutional conditions for a new approach where a fundamentally scientific orientation is paramount. (shrink)

The algebra of all binary relations on a given set is the most important example of a relation algebra . In this note we will examine the possible isomorphisms within some subclasses of a closely related class ; A is a relation set algebra with base U if its Boolean reduct is a field of sets with unit element 2 U, its universe A contains the identity relation on U and it is closed under the operations −1 and |, where (...) R |S = { : ∈ R, ∈ S for some z} and R−1 = { : ∈ R} for any R, S ⊆ 2 U. The class of all relation set algebras is denoted by Rs. (shrink)

In this autobiographical essay, written in 2018 and previously unpublished, the late György Konrád intertwines his memories as a child during World War II with more theoretical reflections (and unanswered questions) on the war, its repercussions, its lessons. Written in Hungarian not long before his death in 2019, Konrád goes back in this essay to the period following the arrest of his parents after the German invasion of Hungary. Aged eleven, he was able to escape the small town where he (...) was born—and hence the fate of its entire Jewish community. “The others had been turned to ash,” in Konrád's chilling words. Seventy years later, he proceeds from these events to reflect on guilt and contrition, on sympathy and empathetic suffering, on how friends can become enemies during war, as well as on the Jewish heritage underlying Christian culture. (shrink)

One of the leading representatives of a “Western” Marxism, György (Georg) Lukács was born in 1885 in Budapest. He joined the Communist Party of Hungary in 1918. During the short‐lived Hungarian Commune of 1919 he was responsible for the cultural policy of the revolutionary regime. After its collapse he lived in emigration in Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow. Following the condemnation of his political views by the Comintern in 1928 he withdrew from direct participation in politics. He returned to Hungary in (...) 1945. A new wave of official attacks in 1949 resulted in his renewed retreat from political activity. During the Hungarian revolution of 1956 he was minister of culture in the government of Imre Nagy. First interned in Romania, he worked then in the situation of an internal emigration and banishment in Hungary till 1967, when he was allowed to return to public cultural life. He died in 1971. (shrink)

RésuméCeux qui s'intéressent à l'heuristique peuvent trouver dans les œuvres de Descartes — plus spécialement dans ses Regulae ad directionem ingenii — des pensées dont l'élaboration pourrait faire avancer cette science nouvellement développée. Descartes, toujours formellement opposé à la logique traditionnelle, peut ětre considéré comme l'un des fondateurs de l'heuristique orientée du cǒté mathématique. Il étudia le mécanisme psychologique de la pensée inventive, mais principalement sa structure logique, et il essaya d'encourager et d'inspirer la pensée inventive et productive.Ses plus importantes (...) découvertes dans ce domaine sont: la nécessité de limiter et de clairement définir le problème; la nécessité d'utiliser des analogies, des modèles et des hypothèses dans la solution des problèmes; l'importance à accorder au rǒle des « expériences de pensée » et — en connexion avec cela — le rejet des manières schématiques de penser. Descartes reconnut que la pensée théorique est semblable à certaines opérations de l'esprit obéissant à des tendances ludiques ou pratiques, aussi bien en ce qui concerne ses motifs psychologiques que sa structure logique.Les analyses cartésiennes des formes et des structures de pensée sont très instructives; ici également il devança des tentatives ultérieures dans ce domaine.Those concerned with heuristic ars inveniendi may find in the works of Descartes—especially in his Regulae ad directionem ingenii—thoughts, the elaboration of which might well promote this newly developing science. Descartes, always sharply opposed to traditional logic, may be considered to be one of the founders of mathematically oriented heuristic. He investigated the psychological mechanism of inventive thinking, but mainly its logical structure, and he tried to encourage and to inspire inventive, productive thinking.His most important findings in this respect are: the necessity of limiting and clearly defining the problem; the necessity of applying analogies, models and hypotheses in problem solving; the stressing of the rǒle of Gedankenexperimente and—in connection with this—the rejection of schematic ways of thinking. Descartes recognized that theoretical thinking is similar to certain operations of the mind with a playful or pratical tendency, with regard both to its psychological motives and often also its logical structure.Descartes' analyses of forms and structures of thought are very instructive; he also forestalled herewith later endeavours in the field. (shrink)

The fact that Gödel's famous incompleteness theorem and the archetype of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar, are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but is a part of the common knowledge of the community of logicians. Indeed, almost every more or less formal treatment of the theorem makes a reference to this connection. Gödel himself remarked in the paper announcing his celebrated result :The analogy between this result and Richard's antinomy leaps to the eye;there is (...) also a close relationship with the ‘liar’ antinomy, since … we are… confronted with a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.In the light of the fact that the existence of this connection is commonplace it is all the more surprising that very little can be learnt about its exact nature except perhaps that it is some kind of similarity or analogy. There is, however, a lot more to it than that. Indeed, as we shall try to show below, the general ideas underlying the three central theorems concerning internal limitations of formal deductive systems can be taken as different ways to resolve the Liar paradox. More precisely, it will turn out that an abstract formal variant of the Liar paradox, which can almost straightforwardly inferred from its original ordinary language version, is a possible common generalization of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, the theorem of Tarski on the undefinability of truth, and that of Church concerning the undecidability of provability. (shrink)