This chapter is divided into three parts. First I outline what makes something an objective list theory of well-being. I then go on to look at the motivations for holding such a view before turning to objections to these theories of well-being.

The possibility that nothing really matters can cause much anxiety, but what would it mean for that to be true? Since it couldn’t be bad that nothing matters, fearing nihilism makes little sense. However, the consequences of belief in nihilism will be far more dramatic than often thought. Many metaethicists assume that even if nothing matters, we should, and would, go on more or less as before. But if nihilism is true in an unqualified way, it can’t be the case (...) that we should go on as before. And given some plausible assumptions about our psychology, it’s also unlikely that we would go on as before: belief in nihilism will lead to loss of evaluative belief, and that will lead to loss or deflation of our corresponding subjective concerns. Now if nothing matters, then this consequence also wouldn’t matter. But this consequence will be extremely harmful if we believe in nihilism but things do matter, an asymmetry that gives us, in Pascalian fashion, pragmatic reasons not to believe in nihilism, and reasons not to try to find out whether it is really true. (shrink)

The concept of well-being is one of the oldest and most important topics in philosophy and ethics, going back to ancient Greek philosophy and Aristotle. Following the boom in happiness studies in the last few years it has moved to centre stage, grabbing media headlines and the attention of scientists, psychologists and economists. Yet little is actually known about well-being and it is an idea often poorly articulated. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being provides a comprehensive, outstanding guide and (...) reference source to the key topics and debates in this exciting subject. Comprising over forty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into six parts: well-being in the history of philosophy current theories of well-being, including hedonism, and perfectionism examples of well-being and its opposites, including friendship and virtue and pain and death theoretical issues such as well-being and value, harm, identity and well-being and children well-being in moral and political philosophy well-being and related subjects including law, economics, and medicine. Essential reading for students and researchers in ethics and political philosophy, it will also be an invaluable resource for those in related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

Some disability activists argue that disability is merely a difference. It is often objected that this view has unacceptable implications, implying, for example, that it is permissible to cause disability. In reply, Elizabeth Barnes argues that viewing disability as a difference needn’t entail such implications and that seeing such implications as unacceptable is question-begging. We argue that Barnes misconstrues this objection to the mere difference view of disability: it’s not question-begging to regard its implications as unacceptable, and the grounds that (...) Barnes offers for potentially blocking some of these implications fail to explain our conviction that it’s impermissible to cause disability. (shrink)

Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.

On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.

The appealing idea that knowledge is best understood as a kind of achievement faces significant criticisms, among them Matthew Chrisman’s charge that the whole project rests on a kind of ontological category mistake. Chrisman argues that while knowledge and belief are states, the kind of normativity found in, for example, Sosa’s famous ‘Triple-A’ structure of assessment is only applicable to performances, end-directed events that unfold over time, and never to states. What is overlooked, both by Chrisman and those he criticizes, (...) is a whole range of projects, those like friendship, health, marriage, and sobriety, where the end is not distinct from our pursuit of it. I suggest that such ‘inner projects’ are in fact stative achievements and thus provide a different sort of model for thinking about knowledge as an achievement. Reconceiving the project along these lines also helps to solve another outstanding problem, the charge that being an achievement is not necessary for knowledge because some knowledge, especially testimonial knowledge, is come by with little or no effort. (shrink)

In this essay, I draw out some implications of a position called “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism” for the theory and practice of interreligious communication. After setting out the main tenets of that position, I articulate what its theoretical and practical implications in this area would be if it were true. I thereby sketch a new, Wittgensteinian model of interreligious communication, concluding with a number of suggestions as to some points of focus for further work in this area.

Philosophers have traditionally treated physicalism as an empirically informed metaphysical thesis. This approach faces a well-known problem often referred to as Hempel’s dilemma: formulations of physicalism tend to be either false or indeterminate. The generally preferred strategy to address this problem involves an appeal to a hypothetical complete and ideal physical theory. After demonstrating that this strategy is not viable, I argue that we should redefine physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program seeking to explain the mental in terms of the (...) physical that encompasses the physical sciences, the psychological and brain sciences, and philosophy. Redefining physicalism in this way improves upon previous reconstructive accounts while avoiding the indeterminacy associated with orthodox forms of futurist physicalism. (shrink)

Critics and defenders of William James both acknowledge serious tensions in his thought, tensions perhaps nowhere more vexing to readers than in regard to his claim about an individual’s intellectual right to their “faith ventures.” Focusing especially on “Pragmatism and Religion,” the final lecture in Pragmatism, this chapter will explore certain problems James’ pragmatic pluralism. Some of these problems are theoretical, but others concern the real-world upshot of adopting James permissive ethics of belief. Although Jamesian permissivism is qualified in certain (...) ways in this paper, I largely defend James in showing how permissivism has philosophical advantages over the non-permissivist position associated with evidentialism. These advantages include not having to treat disagreement as a sign of error or irrationality, and mutual support relations between permissivism and what John Rawls calls the "reasonable pluralism" at the heart of political liberalism. (shrink)

This paper describes a cubic water tank equipped with a movable partition receiving various amounts of liquid used to represent joint probability distributions. This device is applied to the investigation of deductive inferences under uncertainty. The analogy is exploited to determine by qualitative reasoning the limits in probability of the conclusion of twenty basic deductive arguments (such as Modus Ponens, And-introduction, Contraposition, etc.) often used as benchmark problems by the various theoretical approaches to reasoning under uncertainty. The probability bounds imposed (...) by the premises on the conclusion are derived on the basis of a few trivial principles such as "a part of the tank cannot contain more liquid than its capacity allows", or "if a part is empty, the other part contains all the liquid". This stems from the equivalence between the physical constraints imposed by the capacity of the tank and its subdivisions on the volumes of liquid, and the axioms and rules of probability. The device materializes de Finetti's coherence approach to probability. It also suggests a physical counterpart of Dutch book arguments to assess individuals' rationality in probability judgments in the sense that individuals whose degrees of belief in a conclusion are out of the bounds of coherence intervals would commit themselves to executing physically impossible tasks. (shrink)

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this article, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in (...) keeping with embodied cognition, focuses on features of physical concepts, and succeeds in explaining the appearance of contingency. (shrink)

Comprising specially commissioned essays from some of the most significant contributors to the field, this volume provides a uniquely authoritative and thorough survey of the main lines of Wittgenstein scholarship over the past 50 years, tracing the history and current trends as well as anticipating the future shape of work on Wittgenstein. The first collection of its kind, this volume presents a range of perspectives on the different approaches to the philosophy of Wittgenstein Written by leading experts from America, Britain, (...) and Europe Provides a much needed overview of the complex landscape of Wittgenstein exegesis and Wittgensteinian approaches to philosophy Assesses the current state, aims, and future of Wittgenstein scholarship An essential guide for both students and scholars. (shrink)

Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by 'scientific' and 'theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...) epistemology to this end, utilizing it most extensively in critique of Alvin Plantinga's "Warranted Christian Belief". Epistemological externalism presages, I also argue, a new demarcation problem, but a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest reasons to think that 'responsibilist externalism,' especially as glossed in virtue-theoretic terms, provides its proponents with the ability to adequately address this problem as we find it represented in a potent thought-experiment developed by Barry Stroud. (shrink)

This is the only general selection available of the writings of the renowned English idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley; it is the ideal introduction to his thought. Bradley's original texts are given an editorial framework in the introductions to each section, allowing students to investigate his philosophy first-hand and yet to be guided through the difficulties presented by his work.

Les Images parlantes : l'étrangeté habite ce titre! Les détournements de l'image vers quelque langage codé, les contrebandes de l'image au gré de textes particulièrement transgresseurs, les transports sur la langue sont multiples. Une évidence s'impose donc : l'image ne parle pas, mais elle doit être parlée. Dès lors s'ouvre le domaine des fables et des fictions émanant de l'image elle-même, aptes toutefois à la spécifier comme à la sonder. Exhiber une fonction inédite et captatrice de l'image en tant qu'elle (...) est parlée, c'est se prononcer pour son capital créateur, son ingénieuse inventivité. Bref, le registre de l'iconique pourrait, au terme de ce livre, se laisser argumenter en ces mots : " Voir, c'est faire parler "! (shrink)

T. 1. Livres I-V -- t. 2. Livres VI-XII.

All the passages are from the writings and translations of Thomas Taylor.

On the basis of an interpretation of key passages in The Gay Science, this paper examines Nietzsche's idea of amor fati—love of fate. Nietzsche's idea of amor fati involves the wish to be able to learn how to see things as beautiful. This gives the impression that amor, love, is supposed to play some role in the beautification of fate. But Nietzsche also explains amor fati in relation to his desire to be a devoted “Yes-sayer.” This pulls the interpretation of (...) amor in a different direction; for now it seems as if the love Nietzsche wants to cultivate is supposed to be expressed in a positive, affirmative attitude toward one's fate. How to think this duality under the single idea of amor fati? I develop a novel reading of amor fati as a form of practice, as something that we can do, and explain in its light how the two moments of love are to be brought together. The relation of amor fati to the “Eternal Recurrence of the Same” is also addressed: mastering the practice of amor fati can enable one to pass successfully the test of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. (shrink)

Ressentiment—the affectively charged desire for revenge that arises in response to a perceived injury1—is for Nietzsche a concept of central psychological explanatory significance, and thus makes up one of Nietzsche’s most important analytic tools in his attempt to delve into the human psyche and fathom its depth. As Walter Kaufmann says, it “constitutes one of [Nietzsche’s] major contributions to psychology.”2 As such, it has been justly awarded ample attention by scholars in the secondary literature. However, while Nietzsche’s employment of ressentiment (...) in the first essay of the On the Genealogy of Morals has been widely addressed and analyzed,3 Nietzsche’s discussion of this psychic force in the... (shrink)

Comment l'idéologie nazie a-t-elle imprégné et corrompu jusqu'au plus intime de la pensée et du langage? Jargon de l'authenticité est l'une des charges les plus féroces écrites contre Heidegger et son jargon. Qu'est-ce que le jargon? C'est un maniement de la langue qui vise à exercer un charme magique sur les lecteurs grâce à une sacralisation du langage et à un pathos de l'authenticité. Nationalisme, repli sur soi, mépris de la réalité sociale sont dès lors autant de voies pour perdre (...) l'objet, le monde, les choses. Un livre qui mérite d'être confronté à la célèbre étude de Klemperer, LTI, qui porte sur le langage totalitaire sous le IIIe Reich. (shrink)

We review an argument that bipartite "PR-box" correlations, though designed to respect relativistic causality, in fact violate relativistic causality in the classical limit. As a test of this argument, we consider Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) correlations as a tripartite version of PR-box correlations, and ask whether the argument extends to GHZ correlations. If it does-i.e., if it shows that GHZ correlations violate relativistic causality in the classical limit-then the argument must be incorrect (since GHZ correlations do respect relativistic causality in the classical (...) limit.) However, we find that the argument does not extend to GHZ correlations. We also show that both PR-box correlations and GHZ correlations can be retrocausal, but the retrocausality of PR-box correlations leads to self-contradictory causal loops, while the retrocausality of GHZ correlations does not. (shrink)

(2013). The Starry Night Sky. World Futures: Vol. 69, The Complexity of Life and Lives of Complexity, pp. 231-247.

The Ottoman fifteenth century has received considerable attention in recent decades. This level of attention can be attributed to the relative wealth of so.

The implicate or quantum connectivity of the coevolving phenomena of the cosmos, the ontohermeneutic complementarity relations between ourselves and the vast and minute systems we coconstitutingly participate, observe, prolong, and contextualize, and the eco-reciprocities among all forms of life afford us an understanding of ourselves as fractal or microcosmic embodiments and performances of what is irreducibly nondual anthropo-cosmogenesis. And if cosmogenesis is a self-referential process having nothing external to itself from which to obtain gain or satisfaction, we may analogously interpret (...) our noninstrumentalizing contemplative experiences in complete attentiveness without regard to external payoffs as the fractal play of its creatively emergent self-delighting anthropocosmic self-awareness in the human dimensionality. Our attentive, noninstrumentalizing, and nonobjectifying contemplativity aconceptually presences connectivity and reciprocity in an aperspectivally transparent enactment of anthropocos.. (shrink)

The problem of self-deception lies at the heart of Nietzsche's account of the slave revolt in morality in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. The viability of Nietzsche's genealogy of morality is thus crucially dependent on a successful explanation of the self-deception the slaves of the first essay are caught in. But the phenomenon of self-deception is notoriously puzzling. In this paper, after critically examining existing interpretations of the slaves’ self-deception, I provide, by drawing on Alfred Mele's (...) work on self-deception, a deflationary account of the slaves’ self-deception; an account which explains the slaves’ self-deceived predicament but without either the attribution of contradictory mental states or an intention to produce or to facilitate the production of the belief the self-deceived subjects end up holding. In light of my account of self-deception, I interpret Nietzsche's intriguing claim that the slaves’ revaluation of ressentiment amounts to their ‘most mendacious artistic.. (shrink)

Résumé Le but de cet article est d’interroger les trois notions de texte, discours et cognition, et les modèles théoriques, complémentaires ou opposés, qui les illustrent et les défendent. Pour cela, les notions ne seront pas analysées à la suite, une par une, mais en parallèle, deux par deux. Reprenant les orientations de mes travaux actuels en linguistique textuelle et en linguistique cognitive, je les confronterai en deux temps : texte vs. discours et texte vs. cognition. Cette double confrontation, avec (...) le texte pour dénominateur commun, laisse ainsi entendre, d’une part, que si je prends en compte le discours comme le cadre contextuel, situationnel, générique, où apparaît le texte, je m’attache au texte comme objet d’analyse, suivant en cela une tradition « pragoise », à la fois structurale ou macro-syntaxique et fonctionnelle ; cela laisse entendre, d’autre part, que cette conception du texte permet de concilier les théories néo-pragoises à celles que développent les linguistiques cognitives d’aujourd’hui, centrées sur diverses compétences, activités ou opérations, mentales, sémantiques, pragmatiques et sémiotiques, souvent regroupées sous le terme englobant ou résultant de représentation : espaces mentaux, projections, mélange (blending), émergence de sens. Pour finir je montre que la procédure de double intégration, conceptuelle et prédicative, permet d’illustrer la complémentarité des deux modèles, mental-cognitif et macrosyntaxique-textuel. (shrink)

Ever since the eighteenth century, when Kant opened the floodgates of subjectivism in aesthetics, common men and philosophers alike have despaired of finding a basis for judgments about beauty. This book provides a comprehensive theory that encompasses beauty in art and nature, as well as intellectual, utilitarian, and moral beauty. The author argues that the beauty of objects can be reduced to the beauty of properties of those objects, which in turn can be understood in terms of "properties of qualitative (...) degree." The theory, developed first with respect to color, is then extended to include all sensory and non-sensory qualities. The author shows how the theory explicates and resolves disagreements about what is beautiful and discusses its relevance to the traditional notions of harmony and sublimity. His is an objectivist theory of beauty, and it enables him, in conclusion, to demonstrate why we enjoy perceiving beauty. Originally published in 1975. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

: Though it is being widely argued that expanding young people's capacity to learn is a viable and desirable goal of education, it it not always clear what this means, how it is to be achieved, and how the effectiveness of interventions is to be assessed. It is argued that the capacity to learn should be interpreted as a portmanteau term that comprises a varied set of positive learning dispositions. These are illustrated, and the idea of ?expansion? is glossed in (...) terms of broadening, strengthening and deepening these dispositions. (shrink)

Pedro Abelardo apresenta na sua obra uma teoria da virtude de natureza, à primeira vista, aristotélica. Ao que parece, essa concepção também contém diferentes elementos estoicos, que não se opõem necessariamente à visão do Estagirita. Todavia, o essencial da interpretação da Escola do Pórtico acerca da virtude difere da explicação dada por Aristóteles. No presente estudo, pretendemos examinar, primeiro, a índole da virtude como habitus na obra de lógica de Abelardo. Nesse caso, não há dúvida de que predomina a influência (...) aristotélica. Em seguida, indicamos outras particularidades da virtude encontradas, desta vez, em tratados éticos e teológicos do nosso protagonista, as quais se revelam antes de caráter estoico. Em suma, projetamos identificar as diferentes fontes antigas e os principais intermediários latinos usados por Abelardo para elaborar a sua própria teoria da virtude. Trata-se de deixar clara a influência filosófica dominante em Abelardo sobre essa questão da virtude, já que este lógico não pode harmonizar teses substancialmente inconciliáveis. Peter Abelard in his work presents a theory of virtue, which is, at first sight, of Aristotelian nature. It seems that this view also contains different Stoic elements, but they are not necessarily opposed to Stagirite's vision. However, the essentials of the Stoa School about virtue differ from the explanation given by Aristotle. In this paper, we intend to examine, first, the nature of virtue as habitus in Abelard's work on logic. In this case, there is no doubt that Aristotle's influence on this topic predominates. Next, we specify other features related to virtue found, this time, in ethical and theological treatises of our protagonist that appear to be basically Stoic. In short, we want to identify the different ancient sources and the main Latin mediators used by Abelard to elaborate his own theory of virtue. In other words, we would like to shed light on the predominant philosophical authority on Abelard's theory of virtue since this logician cannot harmonize theses that are fundamentally irreconcilable. (shrink)

Les « approches » ou « démarches compétences » sont à l’ordre du jour et se multiplient dans les entreprises, les organisations, les administrations publiques, les universités. Mais permettent-elles de faire confiance aux professionnels concernés? Constatant que la plupart de ces démarches sont fondées sur des additions et des classifications de compétences, j’ai créé, dès 1994, la définition de la compétence en termes de « savoir agir avec pertinence en situation en créant et mobilisant une combinatoire de ressources variées internes (...) et externes ». J’expose dans le présent article les changements de raisonnement qui m’ont conduit à faire évoluer les paradigmes avec lesquels sont traitées les approches par compétences. C’est par rapport à ce changement de paradigme que je précise comment j’aborde le concept de « compétence éthique » en le situant par rapport au paradigme que j’expose et en proposant quelques pistes pour la formation à l’éthique appliquée. (shrink)

Natural syllogisms are expressed in terms of classes and properties of the real world. They exploit a categorisation present in semantic memory that provides a class inclusion structure. they are enthymematic and typically occur within a dialogue. Their form is identical to a formal syllogism once the minor premise is made explicit. It is claimed that reasoners routinely execute natural_syllogisms in an effortless manner based on ecthesis, which is primed by the class inclusion structure kept in long term memory.

The Emotions chapter (XXV) in James' Principles of Psychology traverses the entire range of experienced emotions from the “coarser” and more instinctual to the “subtler” emotions intimately involved in cognitive, moral, and aesthetic aspects of life. But Principles limits himself to an account of emotional consciousness and so there are few direct discussions in the text of Principles about what later came to be called moral psychology, and fewer about anything resembling philosophical ethics. Still, James’ short section on the subtler (...) emotions, when read in connection with his later philosophical writings, still provides insight on James’ views about how human emotion colors our moral psychology and agency. The paper tries to articulate how James' somatic account of emotion adds significantly to contemporary discussions at the borders of moral psychology and philosophy: discussions over the foreground/background distinction, emotional temperament, emotional learning, moral imagination, and selfhood and narrativity. The final section focuses on the neo-Jamesian character of "new sentimentalist" moral psychologists. Among the substantial connections I discuss between James and 1) between Jonathan Haidt’s “social intuitionism” and 2) Jesse Prinz’s "emotionism" are the critiques that they each share of the pretensions of hard universalist ethical theories. (shrink)

Issues: We present key aspects of our paper, commissioned by UNAIDS in 2005, entitled, “Revisiting the ethics of HIV prevention research in developing countries.” In 2004 and 2005 we witnessed the closure or suspension of three international clinical trials testing tenofovir in the prevention of HIV infection in high risk groups due to the failure to provide free treatment to those who seroconvert during the conduct of the study. We examine critically moral claims for the provision of treatment to those (...) who seroconvert in HIV prevention trials and ask whether it is a matter of moral obligation or moral negotiation?Description: Using the tools of philosophical and regulatory analysis we examine the moral foundations of research ethics, international regulation, and the contemporary literature in search of valid arguments in support of a moral obligation to treat. Arguments supporting the obligation to provide such treatment are found in a wide variety of documents. These claims are variously rooted in the demand to compensate for research-related injury, maximization of research benefit, justice as reciprocity, and justice as equality.Lessons learned: Our analysis reveals that there is as of yet no robust moral argument supporting a moral obligation to provide treatment to participants in HIV prevention trials who seroconvert. We argue that moral negotiation offers distinct advantages over moral obligation. Moral negotiation finds support in the principle of respect for communities that holds researchers responsible to respect communal values, protect and empower social institutions and abide by the decisions of accepted communal authorities.Recommendations: Moral negotiation, rather than moral obligation, reduces the chance of polarization of positions by inviting trial participants, sponsors, researchers and all other involved parties to the table for discussion. Moral negotiation favors middle ground solutions that fit the specific health needs and priorities of the community in question. (shrink)

Given that Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) account integrates language production and comprehension, it is reasonable to ask whether it is compatible with embodied cognition. I argue that its dependence on rich intermediate representations of linguistic structure excludes embodiment. Two options are available to supporters of embodied cognition: They can adopt a more liberal notion of embodiment or they can attempt to replace these intermediate representations with robustly embodied ones. Both of these options face challenges.

A ‘teoria da virtude’ contemporânea enfatiza a necessidade de voltar à formação moral do indivíduo, seguindo o modelo ético disponibilizado por Aristóteles. Segundo MacIntyre, representante importante dessa teoria, o estoicismo favoreceu o desenvolvimento da ética moderna e contemporânea, ao destacar noções como vontade, assentimento e lei natural ou divina. Por conseguinte, o desenvolvimento do próprio agente moral foi negligenciado. No século XII, Abelardo apresenta uma ética híbrida, que mantém, ao mesmo tempo, a teoria aristotélica da virtude e elementos da moral (...) estoica. No presente estudo, consideramos a crítica feita por MacIntyre da ética abelardiana, estimada ser na origem das concepções morais modernas e contemporâneas. (shrink)

Peter Abelard’s (1079-1142) conception of moral sin contains a fundamental element from Stoicism, which is the notion of “consent” (consensus). After the presentation of the essentials of that Abelardian theory, we return to the source of that same idea in ancient and imperial Stoicism. According to their main representatives, “consent” or “assent” (sugkata/qesij) has a determining function not only in ethics, but also in the process of knowledge as well. We emphasize in passing the resemblance between some important components of (...) Stoic epistemology and the theory expounded by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics on the origin of knowledge. Augustine represents without any doubt one of the main intermediaries through whom this notion of consent is transmitted up to the time of Abelard in the 12th century. Even if he was influenced by the Bishop of Hippo on moral questions in general, Abelard seems to distance himself from Augustine by considering that consent is more a rational matter than a volitional one. (shrink)