In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Philosophy of the Yogasūtra: An Introduction. Series: Bloomsbury Introductions to World Philosophies by Karen O’Brien-KopChristopher Key Chapple (bio)The Philosophy of the Yogasūtra: An Introduction. Series: Bloomsbury Introductions to World Philosophies. By Karen O’Brien-Kop. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. Pp. xii + 186, Paper $22.95, ISBN 978-135-02-8616-0.This concise book summarizes key parts of the speculative content of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, leaning heavily on Gerald Larson’s translation of the commentary attributed (...) to Vyāsa. True to its title, this book emphasizes the philosophical arguments regarding ontology and the origins of things. It explains the firm distinction made in Sāṃkhya and Yoga between an unchanging consciousness or Self (ātman/puruṣa) and an ever-changing realm of actions (karma) and substances (dravya) emanating from primordial matter (prakṛti) and expressed through her three modes (guṇa-s) of heaviness (tamas), passion (rajas), and lightness (sattva). This perspective differs radically from other Indian systems as well as from ancient Greek thought and the European Enlightenment tradition that gave way to analytical and continental philosophy.Sāṃkhya and Yoga proclaim that all manifestation arises from a pre-existent cause (sat-kārya-vāda). This position distinguishes these schools from Buddhism, which proclaims the constant rise and fall of constituents of reality (dharma-s), and the various schools of Vedānta, which aver toward a unified view of reality that tends to dismiss the realm of change as ultimately insignificant or even unreal. O’Brien-Kop deftly summarizes various debates on causation. The book mentions the theological nuance that the inclusion of the existence of Īśvara brings to the Yoga table. However, these explorations are more in the realm of theory than practice. For instance, the book neglects the important reference to one’s chosen deity (iṣṭa-devatā, II:44) and leaves unexplored some decidedly theological, religious and devotional implications of the Yogasūtra.The author could have been more careful in explicating Jainism. Statements such as “all forms of action are morally dubious” and that “only death can bring liberation” (p. 60) repeat tropes often heard about Jain thought that echo Hindu and Buddhist critiques. This position overlooks the nuances contained in Umasvati’s Tattvārthasūtra that delineate the Jain 14-fold progression of ascent (guṇasthāna-s) wherein an individual attains a state of freedom while living in the human body at the 13th stage.This book sets the stage for further research into under-explored areas of the Yogasūtra. The rich celebration of the efficacy of ethical comportment in [End Page 1] the second chapter, though competently summarized in O’Brien-Kop’s chapter seven, calls out for further explication. The details regarding the body and the subtle body found in the third chapter of the Yogasūtra receive scant attention. One would hope that in future works the author will engage interlocutors such as Merleau-Ponty and Luce Irigaray on breath and embodiment. O’Brien-Kop’s chapter nine, “The Aesthetics of Freedom” calls into focus the centrality of the enlightenment process through which Buddhi, the bridge between conscious awareness and the material real, reverts increasingly toward sattva, the most refined and hence most liberating state of being. Brief mention is made here of the body’s perfectibility (p. 148). The discussion of metaphor at the end of the chapter invites a more extended conversation about light, jewels, and steadiness. This book advances conversations long in process about the nature and purpose of Yoga. The Yogasūtra was rediscovered in the 19th century and popularized by Swami Vivekananda, whose book Raja Yoga introduced the Yoga tradition to millions worldwide. Scholars such as Dasgupta, Eliade, Feuerstein, Larson, Barbara Stoler Miller, Rukmini, Whicher, Bryant and many others have helped bring rigor to the study of this important text, complementing the many popular translations by Swamis and teachers of modern postural Yoga.The book includes discussion questions at the end of each of the chapters. It is written in a manner accessible to undergraduate students of philosophy. O’Brien-Kop reminds us that the philosophical rigor of the... (shrink)

The Upanishads reveal that in the beginning, nothing existed: “This was but non-existence in the beginning. That became existence. That became ready to be manifest”. (Chandogya Upanishad 3.15.1) The creation began from this state of non-existence or nonduality, a state comparable to (0). One can add any number of zeros to (0), but there will be nothing except a big (0) because (0) is a neutral number. If we take (0) as Nirguna Brahman (God without any form and attributes), then (...) from where and how did the universe come into existence? -/- The neutral power (0) cannot produce anything without having an element of duality in it. Although Nirguna Brahman is neutral, it has a positive, negative, and neutral pole, constituting its Prakriti or nature. Prakriti has three latent Gunas (modes or qualities): Satva, Rajas, and Tamas. They are related to Gyana Shakti (the power of knowledge) Sankalpa Shakti (the power of ideation), and Kriya Shakti (the power of action). Science says that Atom is the basic element from which the universe evolved. The Atom has three nuclei- electron, pluton, and neutron. The Satva, Rajas, and Tamas in Indian spirituality are nothing but the mystical names for the nuclei of an atom. -/- According to Bhagavata Purana, Prakriti is also constituted of the elements of Time, Karma (action/destiny) and Swabhava (innate nature). Time disturbs the equilibrium of Gunas. From the aspect of Karma is produced an entity called Mahat, in the form of intelligence. Mahat is dominated by Satva and Rajas. From Mahat manifests the next evolute dominated by Tamas with three predominant qualities – Dravya (substance), Kriya (action), as well as intelligence. It forms to become the Ego principle (Ahamkara). -/- Ahamkara has three modes – Satvic, Rajasic and Tamasic. Satvic is Jnana oriented, Rajasic action-oriented and Tamasic Dravya (substance) oriented. From the Tamasic Ahankara, five gross elements are produced (ether, air, fire, water, and earth - Akash, Vayu, Agni, Jal and Prithvi). From the Satvic Ahamkara, guardian deities (the sun and moon, deities of sense organs, and organs of action) and from Rajasic Ahamkara, ten senses (Indriyas), five senses of perception, five organs of action, the faculties of intellect and Prana (life breath) are produced. -/- Bhagavata says that since these energies, elements, and faculties remained disassociated, they were combined to form a Cosmic Egg. The egg floats in the primal waters for a thousand years. Then God enters this Cosmic Egg and manifests himself as the Cosmic Purusha. He is the first nucleus, the God particle equivalent to the number (1) which is the embodiment of everything in the universe. The concept of creation and dissolution in Hinduism can be compared to the waves in an ocean that appear and disappear incessantly. The Manvantaras are such successive episodes of creation emerging from the Cosmic Person, the Manu who is embodied God-Consciousness, God himself. These episodes of creation are measured in Hinduism in terms of Manvantaras, the epochs of Manus. -/- Manu is the ‘First-Born’ (1) of God, the Cosmic Purusha from whom the world has originated. This Cosmic Person (Purusha) has been described as having fourteen biospheres (heavens) that are inhabited by various life forms in the order of evolution of consciousness. If we begin from the human biosphere (Bhuloka), there are ten astral biospheres that a man must transcend to attain liberation or Mukti from the cycle of births and deaths. -/- The number (1) produces the primary numbers up to (9) through the transmutation of the creational energies and qualities. The process can be related to the descent and cyclical evolution of (1) through ten spiritual stages, finally merging with the nondual (0). The number (10) marks the merger of (1) with (0). The Hindu worldview is that all life forms in an episode of creation must evolve to become one with the non-dual state (0) to attain liberation from the cycle of births and deaths in a cyclical process. -/- . (shrink)

This article will critically examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of substance (_dravya_). The Buddhists are reductionists, who believe that there is no substance over and above its attributes (_guṇa_) or parts (_avayava_). Thus, a pot is a set of a certain shape, size, color, texture, etc. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher thinks that a pot is a substance that houses all of its attributes and actions (_karman_). It holds all these together. Also, it binds its parts. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school defines a (...) substance, it does not seem to offer any theory of the diachronic identity of a substance; it does not discuss a Theseus’-ship-like case. In this article we shall offer a theory of diachronic identity of a substance based on a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of substance. (shrink)

This adhyatma gyana is also a part of Ayurveda because it is related to human health especially with mental health; A group of diseases is described independently in Sushruta as adhyatmika dukha. Contemporary books also mention adhyatmika dukha and adhyatma has been described in details. The subject matter of adhyatma has been mentioned from different point of view, but in fact the adhyatma is related to atman, as it is knowledge of atman and its related subjects are the knowledgeable materials (...) of adhyatma. Here in thispaper is a brief review of adhyatma ,terminology and its different prospects in ayurveda. (shrink)

Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue 2, Page 493-529, Summer 2022.

Gunas personality framework is an inclusive and comprehensive personality framework. Every human being is composed of three gunas or fundamental elements —sattva (intelligence-stuff), rajas (energy-stuff), and tamas (mass-stuff). Some of the prior measures of gunas do not fully capture the content of this variable, and some are not suitable for contemporary use. We conceptualize gunas in terms of an individual’s attitude towards social issues and have developed a new measure of gunas. We have demonstrated the concurrent and predictive validity of (...) the measure through a study of two samples of 60 executives and 356 MBA students. We show that sattva predicts performance, rajas predicts effort, and tamas is positively related to dispositional negativity. We show how the new gunas scale is a useful tool in contemporary times. (shrink)

Concept of matter (Dravya) in Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika and Mimamsa philosophies with special reference to Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana and Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭapāda; a study.

Esta es una reseña del texto de literatura de viajes, Escape a Kuna Yala, de Carolina Jiménez Acuña, publicado por la Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia (EUNED), en San José de Costa Rica en el año 2016. La autora Jiménez es historiadora del arte, artista plástica y escritora. Parte fundamental de su trabajo ha sido la asesoría a proyectos artísticos de los pueblos indígenas Naso-Tjërdi, Bribri y Cabécar. El libro consta de 126 páginas y cuenta con el ISBN 978-9968-48-314-8.

The relevance of the guna theory to applications of Western management practice is seen in this paper as an insight holding capacity to guide managerial behaviour. In its essence, the guna theory depicts values which constitute human personality into a sattwa-rajas delineation of deepened understanding, giving direction to action and which, in turn, illustrates negative values (tamas) likely to cause obstruction. For managers to appreciate this level of understanding, while simultaneously sensing those values which inhibit purposeful action, may (...) be regarded as containing strength in a more intuitive, subjective way than values of moral judgement adopted to guide managerial action in the West. As such, the guna theory has deep relevance in the face of egotistical, contractual or legal values, so often defining the parameters of Western management. (shrink)

On fundamentals of Vedanta and science; a study.

아비달마의 설일체유부는 작용을 기준으로 하여 존재를 파악한다. 물질과 심의 위상을 비등하게 실유로 보고 인식 외부의 실체가 항유한다고 보았다. 사유의 대상인 비량도 실유하지만, 무소연심처럼 타당하지 않다고 판단한 개념은 거북의 털 등에 비유하여 실유를 부정하였다. 설일체유부의 유명한 어구인 삼세실유 법체항유는 삼세에 법체가 항상 실유한다는 의미로도 볼 수 있는데, 유부 교학 논리전개의 특이점은 법체자성과 혼용되는 사극미는 지각불가능하지만, 지각가능한 취극미나 적집상의 인식을 이루는 단계에서의 구성요소로 인정하여 그 체가 항유하는 법이 현행할 때 구생하는 심과 동시인과관계로 보는 것이다. 따라서 유식처럼 마음의 형상을 생성한다는 개념이 없기 때문에 (...) 무소연심을 인정하지 않으며, 경량부와 세친의 대상형상의 인식, 나아가서 승의심이나 일류심 등의 종자설, 심체설과는 달리 체의 작용을 인정한다. 그러나 설일체유부와 유식은 각각 법체자성과 종자식에 대해서 공통적으로 물리적 영향력인 공능으로 설정하였다는 점에서 환원주의적 성격을 보인다. 설일체유부의 철학체계는 물적 환원주의, 경량부의 비판적 태도의 영향을 받은 세친의 유식체계는 심적 환원주의라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Analytical study of metaphysics and reality as elements in Jaina philosophy.

Classical treatise on Jaina philosophy; critical edition.

On the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy and logic.

Based on ethnographic evidence collected over the last two decades in Gunayala Comarca (autonomous territory), Panama, this article explores understandings of human consciousness from the perspective of the Guna people. After a brief account of the linguistic, historical, and political context, it continues with a presentation of the notions of burba, niga, and gurgin, which are used to refer to notions of soul, spirit, and consciousness. After translating these words and describing their particularities, I show the extent to which (...) these notions, with roots in knowledge passed down from generation to generation, or revealed through dreams or visions, make it possible to understand the conception of the human being in relation with other non-human beings. Finally, the article seeks to open up a discussion with works produced over the last few decades by philosophers, psychologists, and neurologists, and to respond from the Guna standpoint to some of the questions that have recently been raised in these fields. (shrink)

This study examined whether transformational leadership would be affected by the predominance of a particular guna in a leader and his or her belief in Karma Yoga. An experiment was conducted using a sample of 110 marketing executives working in a financial services firm in eastern India. A 2 × 2 + 1 factorial design was used to manipulate the three gunas and Karma Yoga. Sattva and rajas were crossed with Karma Yoga to produce four cells, with tamas being (...) the fifth cell. Transformational leadership was the measured variable. Results show that compared to rajas, sattva enhances transformational leadership, whereas tamas reduces it. Further, Karma Yoga enhances transformational leadership when the leader is sattvic, but does not enhance transformational leadership when the leader is rajasic. Results imply that organizations interested in enhancing transformational leadership should develop s attvic qualities in their managers and encourage them to be duty oriented. (shrink)

Memoirs of a political thinker from Nepal.

On Jaina philosophy; includes translation in Hindi.

Study on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar in Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari.

Study of the concept of substance (Dravya) in Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

On the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy and logic.

Study of metaphysics according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy and Jaina philosophy.

용수는 반야경의 공사상을 계승하여 중관사상을 확립하였다. 그의 대표적 저술인 근본중송에서 발견되는 중관사상의 논리적 근거는 연기설인데, 용수는 귀경게에서 연기를 팔불(八不)로 설명하고 있다. 즉 연기는 불생불멸, 불일불이, 불거불래, 불상부단을 특징으로 한다는 것이다. 그런데 용수의 근본중송에는 다음과 같은 게송이 발견된다. ‘존재를 인정하는 [사람]도 단멸(斷滅)이나 상주(常住)에 [떨어지지] 않는다. 생존이란 결과와 원인의 발생과 소멸이 연속하는 것이기 때문이다. 21-15)’논자는 위의 게송이 언급하는 내용에 따라, 유부와 경량부 등의 실유론자들도 용수와 마찬가지로 불상부단을 진실로서 승인한다는 점에 주목하고, 그들이 제시하는 불상부단설과 그에 대한 용수의 비판, 그리고 용수가 제시하는 불상부단의 실상에 (...) 대하여 살펴보았다. 그리고 그 결과 다음과 같은 사실을 확인할 수 있었다. 유부와 경량부 등의 실유론자들은 각기 다양한 실유를 승인하면서도, 찰나멸론과 상속설 등을 채택하여, 자파의 학설이 불타의 근본 가르침 가운데 하나인 불상부단에 위배되지 않음을 입증하고자 하였다. 한편 용수는 ‘순환발생의 모순’ 및 ‘단멸론의 모순’ 등을 제시하여, 실유론자들의 학설이 결국에는 상주나 단멸의 양 극단에 빠질 수밖에 없음을 지적하고, 스스로는 연기설을 통하여 불상부단을 설명하였다. (shrink)

This was presented as part of an assignment, and like all assignments, this is a work in a hurry. Nonetheless, it has interesting points on the three Gunas. This was written in 2018.

The term guṇa, a problem in communication -- The controversy over Dharmakirti's uncaused destruction.

: Aristotle struggles with two basic tensions in his understanding of reality or substance that have parallels in Indian metaphysical speculation. The first of these tensions, between the understanding of reality as the underlying substrate (to hupokeimenon) and as the individual "this" (tode ti), finds a parallel in the concept of dravya in Patañjali's Mahābhāsa. The second tension, between the understanding of reality as the individual this and as the intelligible essence of the individual this (to ti ēn einai), (...) corresponds to an ambiguity in the concept of vastu in Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. (shrink)

Maudemarie Clark adalah salah satu dari sekian akademisi yang cukup tekun menggeluti teks-teks Nietzsche dalam 20 tahun terakhir ini. Buku pertamanya berjudul Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy juga diterbitkan oleh Oxford University Press pada tahun 1990. Sejak saat itu, Clark sering menuliskan kajian-kajiannya mengenai Nietzsche pada berbagai antologi buku maupun jurnal, termasuk Journal of Nietzsche Studies (New York: Penn State University Press). Salah satu kekhasan pendekatan Clark adalah pendekatan kombinasinya yang bercorak analitis. Ia menamakannya kombinasi karena ia mengambil unsur-unsur pendekatan (...) tradisional (Walter Kaufmann dan John Wilcox) dan pendekatan Nietzsche Baru (Alexander Nehamas dan Sarah Kofmann) seraya menganalisisnya dengan gaya analitis (seperti Arthur Danto dan Bern Magnus). Dan hasilnya adalah suatu kajian simpatik mengenai filsafat Nietzsche yang berkaitan erat dengan perkembangan sains, pendidikan, etika, dan politik terkini. Dua tema terakhir itulah (etika dan politik) yang menjadi tema besar buku terbarunya, Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics (NEP). Tentu saja kajian Clark ini menarik karena bertentangan dengan pandangan umum yang sering dikenakan kepada Nietzsche: imoralis dan apolitis. NEP sendiri sebetulnya terdiri dari empat belas artikel yang telah disusun secara terpisah oleh Clark entah sebagai artikel jurnal, konferensi, ataupun kuliah. Namun, untuk memudahkan pembaca, Clark menggolongkan keempat belas artikel tersebut ke dalam tiga topik besar, yakni etika, politik, dan metafisika. Melalui dua tema tersebutetika dan politikClark menghadirkan tafsiran tak lazim atas teks-teks Nietzsche. Meski demikian, tafsiran ter sebut bukanlah hal yang baru di kalangan akademisi Nietzschean yang berkembang pesat dalam satu dekade terakhir ini. Misalnya, tafsir yang memprioritaskan nilai-nilai aristokratis ketimbang institusi/tatanan politik aristokratis sekurang-kurangnya telah muncul sejak tahun 1990-an seperti yang dipaparkan oleh Ted Sadler dalam buku Nietzsche: Truth and Redemption (London: Athlone Press, 1995). Dalam buku tersebut, Sadler mengistilahkannya dengan roh aristokratis yang dibedakan dengan dua jenis roh lainnya: roh kelas jelata dan roh kelas menengah. Selain itu, format NPE sebagai kumpulan esai-esai Clark lebih menekankan kekayaan sudut pandang ataupun kritik atas tafsiran umum mengenai etika dan politik Nietzschean ketimbang kedalaman argumentasi akan suatu isu tertentu. Penekanan tersebut tampak ketika Clark membahas pandangan-pandangan para komentator Nietzsche kontemporer (khususnya Anglo-Amerika), seperti: Lawrence J. Hatab, Bernard Williams, Allan Bloom, Keith Ansell-Pearson, Julian Young, dan Brian Leiter. Meski demikian, NPE menawarkan posisi tafsir yang cukup kokoh karena Clark menunjukkan secara langsung teks-teks Nietzsche yang menjadi sumber rujukannya. Tentu saja iklim tersebut baik guna membuka polemik dan variasi pemahaman yang lebih teruji seiring waktu. (Yulius Tandyanto, Mahasiswa, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta.). (shrink)

Community forms a crux of human living. In the wake of pandemic like Covid-19 to avoid community transmission what is most required of a responsible community member is to follow physical distancing to curb the spread of the infectious disease and this may lead to a feeling of isolation and loneliness. But this essay speaks of isolation with a positive connotation. It talks of isolation as solitude as the Indian philosophy also speaks extensively about this sense of self-contemplation and reflection (...) to understand others as we need to know our own selves. The say speaks of isolation as understood in Sāṃkhya philosophy. This essay talks of isolated consciousness and the three gunas particularly of the sattvic predicaments that enables positive mental development in human beings which is much needed in these tested times as the present pandemic. (shrink)

Theories of interpersonal conflict analysis and resolution originate from sociology, social psychology and political science. These theories took shape during twentieth century after World War I and World War II. Some of the prominent conflict resolution theories are Burton’s ‘human needs theory’, Roger Fisher’s ‘principled-negotiation’ and Lederach’s ‘Conflict transformation’. Conflict is an inevitable part of living because it is related to situations of scarce resources, division of functions, power relations and role-differentiation. In the organizational environment, awareness of each employee’s nature (...) is critical to success. When such employees are self-aware, workplace conflict can be minimized and can become productive to the organization. This study develops a new three energy framework of personality for conflict analysis and resolution. This framework is based on the ‘ guna’ concept of Bhagavad Gita, an ancient Hindu scripture. The term ‘ guna’ indicates the ‘inherent energy’ with which the human mind functions. These three energies are: Positive Energy ( sattva), Dynamic Energy ( rajas) and Potential Energy ( tamas). People work under influence of these three energies all the time and go through various physical, emotional and intellectual experiences. The quality and quantity of these experiences determines their personality, pattern of behaviours and conduct. (shrink)

This article discusses a peculiar Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya-Yoga theory of transformation (pariṇāma) that the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra created by drawing upon Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories of temporality. In developing his theory, Patañjali adaptively reused the wording in which the Sarvāstivāda theories were formulated, the specific objections against these theories, and their refutations to win the philosophical debate about temporality against Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. Patañjali’s approach towards the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories was possible, even though his system of Yoga is based on an ontology (...) that differs considerably from that of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism because both systems share the philosophical view that time is not a separate ontological entity in itself. Time is a concept deduced from change in the empirical world. This agreement results from the common philosophical orientation of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism and Yoga, which takes the phenomenon of experience as the basis of philosophical enquiry into the structure of the world. The intention that guided Patañjali’s adaptive reuse was twofold. On the one hand, he aimed at winning the debate with Sarvāstivāda Buddhism about how the problem of temporality can be solved. He thus integrated four mutually exclusive theories on temporality into a single theory of transformation of properties (dharma) involving a second-level and a third-level theory on the transformation of the temporal characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) and on the transformation of states (avasthā), respectively. On the other hand, Patañjali intended to achieve philosophical clarification regarding the question of how exactly properties relate to their underlying substrate in the process of transformation of the three constituents or forces (guṇa) sattva, rajas and tamas of matter (pradhāna) that account for all phenomena of the world except pure consciousness (puruṣa). Patañjali’s theory of transformation is thus of central importance for his Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya ontology, according to which the world consists of 25 categories or constituents (tattva), i.e., of primal matter (prakṛti) and its transformations and pure consciousness. (shrink)

The book called "Philosophy of the Gita," by Prof. Ramesh N. Patel, is a striking philosophical study of the celebrated Sanskrit text called the Bhagavad-gita which is known simply as the Gita. Patel's book proposes and develops a new hermeneutic called archaic coherentism and applies it to the Gita to distill and decode a comprehensive metaphysic and philosophy of action embedded in the text. A new conceptual translation of the Sanskrit text brings out this philosophy in clear detail. Philosophical essays (...) preceding the translation include analysis of the often-neglected background of war and morality, discussion of action, freedom and self-identity, delineation of a new synoptic philosophy of Hinduism, and unearthing of a strikingly original and innovative metaphysics of existence, energy and triple individuation. The translation of the Gita is followed by two critical essays called "Emerging Philosophy" and "Coherence and Exegesis." Patel's translation focuses on the conceptual rendering of every term, with no Sanskrit word left untranslated, even including the tough ones like guna and Brahman. The essay called "Emerging Philosophy" does away with all Sanskrit terms, to facilitate the understanding of the newly decoded Gita's philosophy as a whole. The essay called "Coherence and Exegesis" critically examines several scholarly standpoints on the Gita with Patel's sound philosophical reasoning. The innovative philosophy of the Gita that emerges through the book's analysis includes an original theory of individuation revealing a Platonic-type Form of individuation evolving at three levels: essential, actional and physical. The book is written for professional philosophers and Sanskritist Indologists. It generally assumes familiarity with logical problems of philosophy and with Sanskrit terms in Indian philosophy. The author has a rare dual training in Sanskrit and philosophy. He skillfully exploits both in this book to achieve an unusual outcome that should be of great interest and challenge to both professional philosophers as well as scholars of Indology. (shrink)

In his Pramāṇaviniścaya 3, Dharmakīrti criticizes the view of the Sāṅkhyas that the word anityatva (“impermanence”) means a process of transformation ( pariṇāma ) of primordial matter ( pradhāna ). In this connection, he deals with the following two explanations of transformation: (1) the disappearance ( tirodhāna ) of the previous dharma of an entity ( dharmin/dravya ) and (2) the cessation ( nivṛtti ) of the previous state ( avasthā ) of an entity ( avasthātṛ ). In response (...) to these explanations, he proves that whenever a transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed, and therefore, impermanence does not mean transformation, but only destruction ( vināśa ). His criticism is basically along the same lines as Vasubandhu’s arguments found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . However, because of developments in the theory of transformation, Vasubandhu’s criticism allows room for a retort from the Sāṅkhya. For this reason, Dharmakīrti augments Vasubandhu’s theory in order to make it sustainable against the more developed Sāṅkhya theory. (shrink)

Medical ethics in the Indian context is closely related to indigenous classical and folk traditions. This article traces the history of Indian conceptions of ethics and medicine, with an emphasis on the Hindu tradition. Classical Ayurvedic texts including Carakasamhita and Susrutasamhita provide foundational assumptions about the body, the self, and gunas, which provide the underpinnings for the ethical system. Karma, the notion that every action has consequences, provides a foundation for medical morality. Conception, prolongation of one's blood-line is an important (...) ethical aim of life. Thus a wide range of practices to further conception are acceptable. Abortion is a more complex matter ethically. At the end of life death is viewed in the context of passage to another life. Death is a relief from suffering to be coped with by the thought of an eternal atman or rebirth. Keywords: India, Hindu, karma, conception, death CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The Sense of I: Conceptualizing Subjectivity: In Indian Philosophy (Sāṃkhya-Yoga) This book discusses the sense of I as it is captured in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition – one of the oldest currents of Indian philosophy, dating back to as early as the 7th c. BCE. The author offers her reinterpretation of the Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā complemented with several commentaries, including the writings of Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya – a charismatic scholar-monk believed to have re-established the Sāṃkhya-Yoga lineage in the early 20th century. The (...) textual analysis of the classical Sanskrit sources and their constructive interpretation is enhanced by some crucial questions and points of dispute commonly picked up in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as the challenge of ontological and categorical reductionism, the criteria of personal identity, the limits of agency and free will, the ineluctability of self-deception, etc. However, defining the sense of ego (ahaṃkāra) and ‘I-am-ness’ (asmitā) is the main focus of this research. Four chapters composing the study are subsequently devoted to: (1) the methodological assumptions of the present author and the basic historical distinctions relevant to the subject matter, (2) linguistic preconditioning of I-consciousness as well as metaphysical coherency and ambiguity of the concept of subjectivity presented by Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers, (3) cognitive and ontological issues concerning the embodied ego being opposed to inactive and contentless consciousness, or the pure self (puruṣa), (4) axiological evaluation of self-discipline and significance of liberation from ego. 1. The method, scope, and problem. In the first chapter, the method of comparative philosophy adopted in this book is introduced by a phenomenological analysis of ‘otherness’ and ‘alienness’ inspired by the considerations of Bernhard Waldenfels and his understanding of xenology. This section is followed by a critical reflection on the incommensurability of the alternative conceptual frameworks, supported by some arguments provided by Ludwik Fleck and Richard E. Nisbett. When explaining the term ‘comparative philosophy’, the author pays special attention to those proponents of the aforementioned current who contributed to the rapprochement of Western and Indian philosophical traditions by tracing both their similarities and divergences. The author makes references to numerous prominent researchers, such as Paul Masson-Oursel, Paul Deussen, Stanisław Schayer, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Bimal K. Matilal, Raimundo Panikkar, Daya Krishna, Wilhelm Halbfass, and many others representing a younger generation. The historical introduction presents a concise survey of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga textual tradition, and distinguishes five phases of its development: proto-Sāṃkhya (7th c. BCA – 1st c. CE), pre-classical phase (1st – 5th c. CE), classical Sāṃkhya (3rd – 9th c. CE), post-classical phase (till 14th c.), and neo-classical phase (since 1927). Here, the author also evaluates the primary sources, including Sanskrit commentaries, and the secondary sources in the light of their relevance and usefulness to the constructive interpretation of Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā. Then, she makes some methodological remarks concerning the specificity of their reading. This section is concluded with highlighting three main strategies usually applied when interpreting Patañjali’s sūtras: (1) anti-philosophical approach – treating the text as a merely mystical report or the yogic vademecum, (2) anti-mystical perspective – which reads the text as a highly speculative divagation of no much use to a practitioner, (3) mystic-and- philosophical approach – emphasizing the fact that the theory of consciousness presented in Yogasūtra is both philosophically coherent and empirically (or mystically) verified. The author argues for the third, heuristic, perspective mentioned above. The last section of the first chapter aims to problematize the I-concept (aham) and the paradoxical situation of the ego searching for self-knowledge. This part starts with the acknowledgement of the deliberation on non-self (anātman) by Śāntideva, a Buddhist philosopher claiming that one’s own ego ought to be identified with the ego of any other. Then, the author unfolds the fundamental assumptions and scope of the constructive interpretation she wants to develop following K.C. Bhattacharyya’s clues. When explaining her reasons, she stresses both the need to reveal the philosophical meaning of the source materials and, at the same time, the need to make them meaningful on the ground of our contemporary philosophical enquiry. Thus, among the main purposes there is a reliable, scrupulous and careful reconstruction of the historical conception of the self as elaborated on in the classical period of Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, as well as reinterpretation of the sense of I as it was grasped by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinkers in terms of modern comparative and ‘polylogical’ discourse. 2. Naming I. In the second chapter, a variety of linguistic categories capturing different aspects of subjectivity is discussed in detail. A textual examination is preceded by clarification of the semantic distinctions made by Patañjali, such as a verbal convention (saṃketa) which stands for uniting or overlapping a word (śabda), its meaning (artha) and a mental state of comprehension (pratyaya) that ascribes the word to a particular object. Among the key concepts there is also explained a spontaneous mental activity referring to pseudo-objects posited only by words (vikalpa), which is unwittingly involved in every process of conceptualizing, designating, and naming objects. Such mental states can neither be ‘valid’ nor ‘invalid’, and are believed to unavoidably accompany one’s use of language. These presuppositions testify to Patañjali’s severe criticism towards all verbal conventions that not only affect the way we formulate and construct our views, but also determine the very process of perception. A major section of the chapter contains the analysis of the ambiguous sense of subjectivity and its basic aspects distinguished by the author in the result of a contextual and comparative study of the Sanskrit terms used in Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā for naming I-consciousness. The six basic aspects of the self comprise: essentializing oneself, perceiving (something), getting conscious (of something), mastering or owning (something), and being capable of self-identifying as well as disidentifying oneself. A majority of the enumerated predicates ascribed to the self refer to different functions and activities of the empirical ego and the embodied mind. Yet, apart from this intentional, active, reactive, sensing, and objectifiable self Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers distinguish a sense of subjectivity going beyond all these psycho-physical characteristics: the self that remains unmanifest, non-active, free from experiencing any joy or pain, said to be the principle of consciousness. The plausibility of its existence as the final cause of the world is to be determined by the embodied ego by virtue of abductive reasoning based on the analysis of all material and psycho-physical phenomena preconditioned by three guṇas that compose the domain of nature (prakṛti). In the subsequent section, three Sanskrit notions – ahaṃkāra, asmitā, and puruṣa, most significant for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga understanding of subjectivity, are discussed closely one after another to expose their semantic, epistemic and metaphysical connotations. The chapter is completed by some pivotal remarks bringing out the problem of discrepancy between the metaphysical position implied by Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the grammatical instruments applied by them to express it. 3. Cognizing I. The third chapter addresses two important issues in the phenomenology of self-perception, namely the question of psycho-physical dualism explained on the grounds of the considered darśanas, and the spiritual quest for the ideal embodiment of consciousness. While emphasizing the unity of human psycho-physical nature the author refers to several contemporary Western thinkers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Thomas Nagel, John R. Searle, David Chalmers and others, by making some comparative remarks on the idea of the embodied mind. Furthermore, three arguments for the plurality of selves (puruṣa-bahutva) are reconstructed and critically considered. The arguments given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (SK 18) include the diversity of ways in which one experiences one’s life and death, the spatio-temporal distinctness of particular embodied egos, and the variations of features manifested by individual selves. The second section of this chapter presents a thorough inquiry into a non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism defended by the adherents of Sāṃkhya- Yoga. God (īśvara) is defined here primarily as an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for yogic pedagogy. In the concluding part of this section four functions of devotional practice (īśvara-pranidhāna) are recognized and explained; they embrace: (1) prevention from mental scattering and dispersion, (2) therapy allowing to form some positive perceptual habits and the right cognitive approach, (3) enhancement of morally and spiritually required qualities, and (4) reinforcement of the sense of subjective identity being a complementary method of self-development. 4. Liberating oneself from I. The final chapter consists of three sections. The first one introduces the concept of liberation through action (pravṛtti-dharma), commonly opposed in Indian tradition to the path of renunciation (nivṛtti- dharma). According to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya’s interpretation, both Sāṃkhya- Yoga and Buddhism follow the latter one, which in terms of spiritual practice dynamics makes them much closer to each other than it is usually believed. In the subsequent section the idea of liberating oneself from one’s attachment to ego is explained in detail, along with the significance of gradual self-negation. Then the author raises the interpretation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga perspective on liberation as self-distinction-through-renunciation. The main focus in this section is placed on the sense of agency (kartṛ), the problem of free will, and the criteria of moral and soteriological evaluation of one’s deeds. Some crucial questions on karmic conditioning of self-knowledge in the form of kleśas are also the subject of careful analysis. The next section undertakes the issue of ownership (mamakāra) of one’s activity and self-esteem (abhimāna) involved in spiritual growth. Again, some comparative remarks are made by referring to the Buddhist philosophers’ positions, such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. Among others, the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept of eternal, inactive, indifferent, irresponsible, and exclusively conscious self (puruṣa) is quoted and partly rejected in favour of the classical Hindu darśanas. In summary, the author emphasized the significance-generating or sense-creating function of I, its engagement in the search for its own raison d’être, its role in self-identification as well as subverting it, and the expediency of liberation from ego. The philosophers of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga indicate a twofold sense of the self; on the one hand, the only appropriate designation: ‘I’ is true self (puruṣa), a passive and unknowable principle of consciousness whose existence makes the empirical phenomena meaningful. On the other hand, the ‘I’ clearly designates the current sense of the self, expressed as “I think”, “I doubt”, “I suffer”, etc. This second meaning of ‘I’, the specific sense of ‘mineness’, is recognized as a secondary and relative one – thus illusive and troublesome. However, its delusiveness does not mean that the empirical ego is an unreal or non-existent entity. What it implies is that the empirical self-identity is fundamentally inadequate and – according to the Indian thinkers – ought to be unveiled and, ultimately, given up. (shrink)