In its comprehensive overview of Alain Locke's pragmatist philosophy this book captures the radical implications of Locke's approach within pragmatism, the critical temper embedded in Locke's works, the central role of power and empowerment of the oppressed and the concept of broad democracy Locke employed.

The Daily Show is simultaneously one of the funniest television programs ever made and one of the most earnest voices calling for political change in the United States. Why engage in political mockery like that seen on The Daily Show? Obviously, we like to be entertained, and The Daily Show is very funny; but like the work of other political satirists throughout history, The Daily Show also serves to promote a political agenda. Yet it's precisely The Daily Show's ability to (...) make us laugh that makes it politically useful—people are reminded about important political issues as a side effect. Jon Stewart and the team behind The Daily Show may not be warriors in anybody's army, but signing up to take and give orders in the regular army isn't the only way to contribute to a war effort. (shrink)

© Mind Association 2017Shapiro’s wide-ranging and thought-provoking book marks a major milestone in the recent debate initiated by JC Beall and Greg Restall’s influential Logical Pluralism. Pluralism about a given subject, such as etiquette or logic, is loosely characterized as ‘the view that different accounts of the subject are equally correct, or equally good, or equally legitimate, or perhaps even true’. Shapiro’s book offers us many ways to adopt ‘an eclectic orientation to logic’. But his official position, which sometimes (...) takes some unexpected twists, is incrementally developed over the seven main chapters. Before we delve into some of the details, it’s worth outlining the overarching argument, helpfully summarized in a short closing chapter....The first chapter presents the framework Shapiro employs for discussing pluralism and related issues. The key notion is Crispin Wright’s folk-relativism—slogan: ‘There is... (shrink)

Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, implicit awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or what-it-is-like, dimension of conscious experience, defending (...) the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (shrink)

Carruthers offers a refreshing piece of “substantive philosophy.” Going beyond the limitations of pure analysis, he adopts a methodology which is one part analysis, one part empirical data, and a heavy dose of inference to the best explanation. The overarching goal is to advance the commonsense—yet unfashionable—thesis that natural language is the primary medium of thought, and to defend the related cognitive conception of NL. In particular, Carruthers argues that imaginative phonological representations of “inner speech” are constitutive of conscious thoughts, (...) and that thinking involves operations on such symbols. While there is still a role for mentalese cognition, such thinking is always unconscious, and probably of limited innate conceptual resources. The weak thesis is that, of natural necessity, all conscious propositional thought requires NL. The strong thesis is that, of natural necessity, distinctively human thoughts can only be tokened in natural language—hence even much of our unconscious thinking occurs in English. (shrink)

A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning, and accomplishments may be a robust framework for the measurement, management and development of wellbeing. While the original PERMA framework made great headway in the past decade, its empirical and theoretical limitations were recently identified and critiqued. In response, Seligman clarified the value of PERMA as a framework for and not a theory of wellbeing and called for further research to expand the construct. To expand the framework (...) into organizational contexts, recent meta-analyses and systematic literature reviews showed that physical health, mindset, physical work environments and economic security could be seen as essential contextually relevant building blocks for work-related wellbeing and are therefore prime candidates to expand the PERMA framework for use within organizational contexts. Through expanding the original PERMA framework with these four factors, a new holistic approach to work-related wellbeing and work performance was born: the PERMA+4. As such, the purpose of this brief perspective paper is to provide a conceptual overview of PERMA+4 as holistic framework for work-related wellbeing and work performance which extends beyond the predominant componential thinking of the discipline. Specifically, we aim to do so by providing: a brief historical overview of the development of PERMA as a theory for wellbeing, a conceptual overview of PERMA+4 as a holistic framework for work-related wellbeing and work performance, empirical evidence supporting the usefulness of PERMA+4, and charting a course for the second wave of positive organizational psychological research. (shrink)

We examine George Boolos's proposed abstraction principle for extensions based on the limitation-of-size conception, New V, from several perspectives. Crispin Wright once suggested that New V could serve as part of a neo-logicist development of real analysis. We show that it fails both of the conservativeness criteria for abstraction principles that Wright proposes. Thus, we support Boolos against Wright. We also show that, when combined with the axioms for Boolos's iterative notion of set, New V yields a system equivalent to (...) full Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with a principle of global choice. This advances Boolos's longstanding interest in the foundations of set theory. (shrink)

It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there being something it is like for the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what-it-is-like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states: conscious mental states, unlike unconscious mental states, are such that there is something it is like for their (...) subjects to be in them. The ‘what-it-is-like’ phrase, however, has not gone unopposed; some very clever philosophers have vigorously disputed it. Peter Hacker, for example, has argued that the phrase should be abandoned because it is ungrammatical, and Paul Snowdon has argued that it should be abandoned because the propositions expressed by its usage are either trivial or false. This paper mounts a case for the claim that neither of these conclusions is warranted. Against Hacker, it is argued that the arguments he produces for the ungrammaticality of the phrase are unpersuasive, and against Snowdon it is argued that he fails to consider a plausible and independently motivated interpretation of the phrase, and that, on this interpretation, the propositions expressed by its usage are non-trivially true. (shrink)

According to just war theory, a resort to war is justified only if it satisfies the right intention condition. This article offers a critical examination of this condition, defending the thesis that, despite its venerable history as part of the just war tradition, it ought to be jettisoned. When properly understood, it turns out to be an unnecessary element of jus ad bellum, adding nothing essential to our assessments of the justice of armed conflict.

Draft for the Oxford Handbook of Margaret Cavendish (edited by Julie Crawford with Jacqueline Broad). -/- This chapter looks at Margaret Cavendish's treatment of the supernatural, beginning by asking how she distinguishes the natural from the supernatural, and then by examining her treatment of a series of alleged supernatural beings: fairies, ghosts, witches, the human supernatural soul, angels, and God. Throughout, it argues that Cavendish's approach to the supernatural is often similar to Thomas Hobbes's.

Interest in the notion of the possible financial sacrifice suffered by socially responsible investment (SRI) fund investors for considering ethical, social and environmental issues in their investment decisions has spawned considerable academic interest in the performance of SRI funds. Both the Australian and international research literature have yielded largely mixed results. However, several of these studies are hampered by methodological problems which can obscure the significance of reported results, such as the use of small sample sizes, inconsistencies in the time (...) frames selected to analyse performance and different modelling frameworks used to estimate investment returns. This study attempts to redress some of these issues by investigating the returns performance of 89 ethical funds in Australia over the period 1986-2005. Using a multi-factor CAPM model [Fama, E. F., and K. R. French (1996) J. Finance 51(1), 55] (which controls for factors such as size, book-to-market value and momentum) we find that ethical funds significantly under-perform the market in Australia, particularly in the most recent 5 years of our sample period (2000-2005). Risk adjusted returns (using Jensen's alpha) indicate that average annual underperformance is around 1.52% in the 2000-2005 period for our sample and .88% over the whole sample period. Our results contrast with many previous studies (both Australian and international), which have not found statistically significant differences in the performance of ethical funds relative to market benchmarks and/or a matched sample of conventional funds. (shrink)

Louis Charland has argued that the Cluster B personality disorders, including borderline personality disorder, are primarily moral rather than clinical conditions. Part of his argument stems from reflections on effective treatment of borderline personality disorder. In the argument from treatment, he claims that successful treatment of all Cluster B personality disorders requires a positive change in a patient’s moral character. Based on this claim, he concludes (1) that these disorders are, at root, deficits in moral character, and (2) that effective (...) treatment of these disorders requires a sort of moral education rather than clinical intervention. In this paper, I evaluate the argument from treatment through a critical analysis of two psychotherapeutic interventions that have shown recent effectiveness against borderline personality disorder. I suggest that both Dialectical Behaviour Therapy and Mentalization-Based Treatment indicate that borderline personality disorder is, at root, a deficit in non-moral cognitive and emotional capacities. I suggest that these non-moral deficits obscure the expression of an otherwise intact moral character. In light of this, I conclude that effective treatment of borderline personality disorder requires primarily clinical intervention rather than moral edification. (shrink)

In his seminal paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Harry Frankfurt argues against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)—the principle that persons are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise—by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though, due to the presence of a counterfactual intervener, he could not have done otherwise. According to a compelling (yet relatively under-discussed) response to Frankfurt’s attack on (...) PAP, Frankfurt has not succeeded in showing that the principle is false, since in the scenario he asks us to imagine the agent has an alternate possibility: he can (unwittingly) force the intervener’s hand by revising his decision to perform the action in question and thereby avoid performing the action himself. This response to Frankfurt has been objected to, however, on the grounds that the agent does not avoid performing the action since the intervener acts upon an involuntary prior sign. The goal of this article is to show that this objection fails. While it is true that the prior sign upon which the intervener acts is involuntary, it is a consequence of a change of mind that is voluntary. It follows that the agent does what is needed to avoid performing the action in question (in the counterfactual sequence). (shrink)

The second wave of devastating consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic has been linked to dramatic declines in well-being. While much of the well-being literature is based on descriptive and correlational studies, this paper evaluates a growing body of causal evidence from high-quality randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that test the efficacy of positive psychology interventions (PPIs). This systematic review analyzed the findings from 25 meta-analyses, 42 review papers, and the high-quality RCTs of PPIs designed to generate well-being that were included within (...) those studies. Findings reveal PPIs have the potential to generate well-being even during a global pandemic, with larger effect sizes in non-Western countries. Four exemplar PPIs—that have been tested with a high-quality RCT, have positive effects on well-being, and could be implemented during a global pandemic—are presented and discussed. Future efforts to generate well-being can build on this causal evidence and emulate the most efficacious PPIs to be as effective as possible at generating well-being. However, the four exemplars were only tested in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic) countries but seem promising for implementation and evaluation in non-WEIRD contexts. This review highlights the overall need for more rigorous research on PPIs with more diverse populations and in non-WEIRD contexts to ensure equitable access to effective interventions that generate well-being for all. (shrink)

Jednym z głównych pytań w filozofii logiki jest to, czy jest jedna, czy wiele logik. Pytanie to doczekało się różnych odpowiedzi, które formułują opozycyjne stanowiska: monizm logiczny contra pluralizm logiczny. Za reprezentatywnego przedstawiciela monizmu uznawany jest Willard Van Orman Quine, a pluralizmu — Susan Haack. Oba te stanowiska są kontynuowane współcześnie: monizm (m.in. Michael Dummett, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson) oraz pluralizm (m.in. Jc Beall i Greg Restall, Johan van Benthem, Ottavio Bueno i Scott Shalkovski, Stewart Shapiro i Roy (...) Cook). Monizm jest znacznie mniej preferowany niż pluralizm. W artykule wskazano na źródła pluralizmu w logice (m.in. wieloznaczność spójników języka naturalnego, prawdy i wynikania) oraz przywołano argumentacje wybranych przedstawicieli tego stanowiska. (shrink)

This book discusses five philosophers and writers, Hume, Kierkegaar, Camus, Simone Weil and Dostoevsky, who represents different strands of our cultural inheritance which are all theologically and religiously alive today. What they have in common is willingness to explore the borderlands between belief and unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief an (...) unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief and unbelief are two homogeneous wholes which have nothing to say to each other and no ground for common discussion other that that of agnosticism. Equally, however, they disdain the implications that the only possibility of dialogue is a marshmallow middle ground where the only rule is that you avoid saying what you really think. Theologians and believers have often stood back from exploration on this middle ground. Encounters with secular philosophies or systems of belief are risky and dangerous. On the other hand, a theology which avoids such encounters is a much impoverished theology. Professor Sutherland's discussion considers the nature and extent of the risk, and the title of his book indicates where the believers who live close to the boundaries often share more with neighbourly unbelievers than they do with fellow believers who view the pastures of unbelief as far distant and dangerou lands from which they will for ever remain separated. (shrink)

It was, I believe, Thomas Arnold who wrote: ‘Educate men without religion and all you make of them is clever devils’. Thus the Headmaster of one famous school summarized pithily the view of the relationship between religion and ethics which informed educational theory and practice in this country for at least a further century. There is a confusion of two different assumptions usually to be found in this context. The first is that religious belief can provide an intellectual foundation for (...) moral belief; the second is that the effect of religious teaching is to improve behaviour according to the norms of some particular set of moral beliefs. (shrink)

In their recent book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker attack neural materialism (NM), the view, roughly, that mental states (events, processes, etc.) are identical with neural states or material properties of neural states (events, processes, etc.). Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled “Reductionism,” they argue that NM is unintelligible, that “there is no sense to literally identifying neural states and configurations with psychological attributes.” This is a provocative claim indeed. If Bennett and Hacker are right, then (...) a sizeable number of philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, etc., subscribe to a view that is not merely false, but strictly meaningless. In this article I show that Bennett and Hacker's arguments against NM, whether construed as arguments for the meaninglessness of or the falsity of the thesis, cannot withstand scrutiny: when laid bare they are found to rest upon highly dubious assumptions that either seriously mischaracterize or underestimate the resources of the thesis. (shrink)

It is well known that, according to some, philosophical reflection on zombies (i.e., bodies without minds) poses a problem for physicalism. But what about ghosts, i.e., minds without bodies? Does philosophical reflection on them pose a problem for physicalism? Descartes, of course, thought so, and lately rumours have been surfacing that has was right after all, that ghosts pose a problem for both a priori and a posteriori physicalism, and for any kind of physicalism in between. This paper argues that (...) physicalists have nothing to fear from ghosts, since the central consideration employed to motivate ghostly arguments against physicalism--viz., that ghosts are conceivable--is false: ghosts aren't conceivable. (shrink)

This paper argues that Pascal's formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one's rational self-interest. In particular, it is argued that if we accept Pascal's premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.

If placebos have been squeezed out of medicine to the point where their official place is in clinical trials designed to identify their own confounding effect, the placebo effect nevertheless thrives in psychotherapy. Not only does psychotherapy dispose of placebo effects that are less available to medicine as it becomes increasingly technological and preoccupied with body parts, but factors of the sort inhibiting the use of placebos in medicine have no equivalent in psychology. Medicine today is disturbed by the placebo (...) effect in a way psychotherapy is not. Psychotherapy does not have to grapple with such a disconcerting paradox as successful sham surgery, and unlike those physicians who once pretended to treat the patient’s body while actually attempting to treat the mind, the psychotherapist can treat the mind in all frankness. Perhaps it is because psychotherapy is less burdened by doubts about the placebo effect that it was able to come to its aid when it was orphaned by medicine. It is vain to expect something with so long a history as the placebo effect to disappear from the practices of healing. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The late Richard Titmuss made a persuasive case against allowing the sale of human blood in his book, The Gift Relationship. His arguments have been developed further by Peter Singer in recent articles. While the issues of quantity and quality of blood under market and non‐market systems have received much attention, the moral and political aspects of the Titmuss‐Singer case have gone relatively unexamined. First, I question their claim that a donation‐only system promotes greater freedom, which rests on a (...) confusion of liberty and opportunity. Next, I consider reasons for doubting their view that altruism is fostered significantly more under the non‐market approach. Finally, I survey recent developments in the quantity‐quality debate and possible implications of the blood controversy for national health care. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by the presence (...) of a counterfactual controller. This article argues that this response to Frankfurt does not undercut his attack on PAP, since there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle—‘brain-malfunction’ cases—that evade the dispositionalist analysis. (shrink)

When prostate-specific antigen (PSA) testing was introduced, proponents expected it to cut prostate-cancer mortality and did not expect it to unleash an epidemic of unnecessary treatments. Now that evidence of a mortality benefit remains unclear while evidence of overtreatment in undeniable, there is understandable interest in reducing the human costs of the PSA system. Two related drugs, finasteride and dutasteride, both proven to reduce the incidence of prostate cancer and the “risk of diagnosis,” are being promoted accordingly. However, if not (...) for the flaws of the PSA system the use of these drugs for purposes of prevention would lose its rationale. Not only are the drugs in this sense dependent on a faulty system, but their own mortality benefits are as speculative as PSA's—in addition to which, they introduce new risks. (shrink)

Narrative medicine is predicated on the importance of narrative to human life. Although that in itself is not controversial, an extension of this principle that has sprung up in narrative psychiatry—namely, that by coming to imagine a different life story one can become a different person—ought to be. One reason one cannot remake one’s life in the image of a story is that life is not to be mistaken for a story in the first place. The seminal study of psychotherapy, (...) Persuasion and Healing, although recommending that the demoralized absorb more uplifting stories about themselves, appears to recognize some limit to the possibility of modeling life on story. The same study likens therapeutic stories to placebos, but as it happens, placebos themselves have their limits, alleviating symptoms but not curing or “healing.” In order for someone to become a different person through the agency of the placebo effect, it would have to be more robust than it is. The argument that life follows narrative is an ironic one for a discipline devoted to narrative to make, given the salience in the tradition of the novel, from Don Quixote forward, of works that explore the fallacies of that presumption. In keeping with its attention to narrative, this article challenges the use of a short story by Chitra Divakaruni as an illustration of the principles of narrative psychiatry. (shrink)

According to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic theological tradition, or "classical theism," disembodiment (or non-physicality) and psychologicality are two of God’s necessary or essential attributes. This paper mounts a case for the thesis that these attributes are incompatible. More exactly, it provides compelling evidentiary support for the claim that, given the basic structure of consciousness, it is impossible for a psychological being to be disembodied (and vice versa). But if it is impossible for a psychological being to be disembodied (and vice versa), then, (...) since psychologicality and disembodiment are both essential to God under classical theism, the God of classical theism does not--and cannot--exist. (shrink)

Over the decades of experimentation on the placebo effect, it has become clear that it is driven largely by expectation, and that strong expectations of efficacy are more likely to give rise to the experience of benefit. No wonder the placebo effect has come to resemble a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, this resemblance is considerably exaggerated. The placebo effect does not work as strongly as it is advertised to do in some efforts to elicit it. Half-truths about the placebo effect are (...) now in circulation, reinforced by a number of other equivocations that it seems to attract. As the deceptive use of placebos has fallen into discredit, the use of half-truths and exaggerations—neither of which is technically a deception—becomes an ever more inviting possibility. However, there are risks and costs associated with the half-truth that the doctor possesses the power to make his or her words come true by the alchemy of the placebo effect. (shrink)

This article takes up the call of feminist thinkers to reconsider the importance of the utopian. I offer a view of the utopian that is situated, critical, and relevant to transformative politics, a view that is structured by embodiment. To this end, I consider some epistemological and ontological connections of situated utopian thinking that enable us to think the utopian differently. Finally, I argue that this view of the utopian can be found in the political efforts of “integrative feminisms.”.

Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic or relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail in a rather obvious way--they beg the question--and so even though there may be arguments that provide (...) grounds to fuss about whether our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness are defective, Thomson, Lewis, and Sider's arguments are not among them. (shrink)

Adverbialism, broadly construed, is the thesis that pains (and other sensations) are modes of awareness, and objectualism, broadly construed, is the thesis that pains are objects of awareness. Why are we inclined to say that pains are modes of awareness and yet also inclined to say that they are objects of awareness? Each inclination leads to an account of pain that seems to be incompatible with the other. If adverbialism is correct, it would seem that objectualism is mistaken (and vice (...) versa). And yet each inclination is sufficiently well grounded that neither seems reasonably rejectable. It will not do to present each theory with greater and greater sophistication on the assumption that if it is correct the other must be mistaken. What we must do is give an account of pain that shows how it is possible to retain the central insights of both adverbialism and objectualism. I propose to do that in this paper, mounting a case for the claim that the most plausible view of pain is one that combines adverbialism and objectualism. (shrink)

This book offers a sustained engagement with the political philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and demonstrates both the significance of the political in his own thinking throughout his career, and how his understanding of the political offers something valuable to current discussions of issues in political philosophy.

This book brings together an impressive group of leading scholars in the sciences of complexity, and a few workers on the interface of science and religion, to explore the wider implications of complexity studies. It includes an introduction to complexity studies and explores the concept of information in physics and biology and various philosophical and religious perspectives. Chapter authors include Paul Davies, Greg Chaitin, Charles Bennett, Werner Loewenstein, Paul Dembski, Ian Stewart, Stuart Kauffman, Harold Morowitz, Arthur Peacocke, and (...) Niels H. Gregersen. (shrink)

Readers looking for an articulate, well‐informed exposition of Hayek's multifaceted intellectual achievement will be pleased with Bruce Cald‐well's new book, Hayek's Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek. Readers interested in a more critical consideration of Hayek's ideas, or in their ability to withstand cross‐examination from the positions Hayek himself criticized, are less likely to be satisfied. But even for the latter group, Caldwell has performed a useful service, compressing the varied elements of Hayek's complex thought into a lucid (...) synopsis that should facilitate engagement with those outside the Austrian camp. (shrink)

These sixty contributions from researchers in ethology, ecology, cybernetics, artificial intelligence, robotics, and related fields delve into the behaviors and underlying mechanisms that allow animals and, potentially, robots to adapt and survive in uncertain environments. They focus in particular on simulation models in order to help characterize and compare various organizational principles or architectures capable of inducing adaptive behavior in real or artificial animals. Jean-Arcady Meyer is Director of Research at CNRS, Paris. Stewart W. Wilson is a Scientist at (...) The Rowland Institute for Science, Cambridge, Massachusetts. (shrink)

Abstract In the ideal market of general equilibrium theory, choices are made in full knowledge of one another, and all expectations are fulfilled. This pre?harmonization of individual plans does not occur in real?world markets where decisions must be taken in ignorance of one another. The Austrian school grants this, but claims that real?world price systems are nonetheless effective in coordinating saving and investment decisions, which are motivated by disparate considerations. In contrast, Keynes held that without the pre?reconciliation of individual plans, (...) investment and employment would be less than optimal, and the resulting distribution of income arbitrary and inequitable. (shrink)

G.L.S. Shackle stood at the historic crossroads where the economics of Hayek and Keynes met. Shackle fused these opposing lines of thought in a macroeconomic theory that draws Keynesian conclusions from Austrian premises. In Shackle 's scheme of thought, the power to imagine alternative courses of action releases decision makers from the web of predictable causation. But the spontaneous and unpredictable choices that originate in the subjective and disparate orientations of individual agents deny us the possibility of rational expectations, and (...) therewith the logical coherence of market equilibrium over time. (shrink)

Reason, objectivity, and human nature are now suspect ideas. Among postmodern thinkers, Richard Rorty has advanced an especially forceful critique of these notions. Drawing partly on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, Rorty contends that objectivity is no more than a metaphysical name for intersubjective agreement, and that “human nature” is an empty category, there being nothing beneath history and culture. Wittgenstein himself, however, recognized within the world's many civilizations “the common behavior of mankind,” without which Rorty's ethnocentric “solidarity” would be inconceivable. (...) This common form of life—the life of those who speak—encompasses countless human activities that presuppose and are interwoven with the concepts of reason and objectivity. (shrink)