Increasingly there are calls for climate services to be “co-produced” with users, taking into account not only the basic information needs of users but also their value systems and decision contexts. What does this mean in practice? One way that user values can be incorporated into climate services is in the management of inductive risk. This involves understanding which errors in climate service products would have particularly negative consequences from the users’ perspective (e.g., underestimating rather than overestimating the change in (...) an impact variable) and then prioritizing the avoidance of those errors. This essay shows how inductive risk could be managed in climate services in ways that serve user values and argues that there are both ethical and practical reasons in favor of doing so. (shrink)

Our topic is the notion of logical consequence: the link between premises and conclusions, the glue that holds together deductively valid argument. How can we understand this relation between premises and conclusions? It seems that any account begs questions. Painting with very broad brushtrokes, we can sketch the landscape of disagreement like this: “Realists” prefer an analysis of logical consequence in terms of the preservation of truth [29]. “Anti-realists” take this to be unhelpful and o:er alternative analyses. Some, like Dummett, (...) look to preservation of warrant to assert [9, 36]. Others, like Brandom [5], take inference as primitive, and analyse other notions in terms of it. There is plenty of disagreement on the “realist” side of the fence too. It is one thing to argue that logical consequence involves preservation of truth. It is another to explain how far truth must be preserved. Is the preservation essentially modal (in all circumstances [25]) or analytic (vouchsafed by.. (shrink)

It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension - the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension.

This qualitative study was positioned within an emerging scientific field concerned with the interaction between biblical text and the psychological profile of the preacher. The theoretical framework was provided by the sensing, intuition, feeling and thinking (SIFT) approach to biblical hermeneutics, an approach rooted in reader-perspective hermeneutical theory and in Jungian psychological type theory that explores the distinctive readings of sensing perception and intuitive perception, and the distinctive readings of thinking evaluation and feeling evaluation. The empirical methodology was provided by (...) developing a research tradition concerned with applying the SIFT approach to biblical text. In the present study, a group of 17 Anglican clergy were invited to work in psychological type-alike groups to explore two of the biblical passages identified by Year B of the Revised Common Lectionary for the Feast of Christ the King. Dividing into three workshops, according to their preferences for sensing and intuition, the clergy explored Psalm 93. Dividing into three workshops, according to their preferences for thinking and feeling, the clergy explored John 18:33–37. The rich data gathered from these workshops supported the hypothesis that biblical interpretation and preaching may be shaped by the reader’s psychological type preference and suggested that the passages of scripture proposed for the Feast of Christ the King may be a joy for intuitive thinking types, but a nightmare for sensing feeling types. Contribution: Situated within the reader perspective approach to biblical hermeneutics, the SIFT method is concerned with identifying the influence of the psychological type of the reader in shaping the interpretation of text. Employing this method, the present study contributes to the fields of homiletics and hermeneutics by demonstrating how some readers (sensing types) may struggle more than others (intuitive types) to interpret the scripture readings proposed by the lectionary for the Feast of Christ the King. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a new natural deduction system for the logic of lattices, and a number of extensions of lattice logic with different negation connectives. We provide the class of natural deduction proofs with both a standard inductive definition and a global graph-theoretical criterion for correctness, and we show how normalisation in this system corresponds to cut elimination in the sequent calculus for lattice logic. This natural deduction system is inspired both by Shoesmith and Smiley's multiple conclusion systems (...) for classical logic and Girard's proofnets for linear logic. (shrink)

Motivated by contemporary debates concerning whether directors inappropriately deploy corporate funds for corporate political donations and the limited research into managerial influence on corporate political donations, we examine the impact of director influences from a network perspective. Using a sample of large listed Australian corporations and their political party donation activity during 2000–2007, we find that both the professional and non-professional networks of directors influence corporate political donations. We observe these influences in relation to donations at the federal and state (...) levels, and with respect to the choice of recipient political parties. (shrink)

There are certain explanations that scientists do not accept, even though such explanations do not conflict with observation, logic, or other scientific theories. I argue that a common version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism relies upon just such an explanation. First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans neither generates novel predictions nor unifies apparently disparate phenomena. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions, and fails to (...) unify disparate phenomena. Third, Psillos, Boyd, and other proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA. [Publication note: This text is for a talk at the 2008 PSA convention. An expanded version of the talk was later published as a regular article in Philosophy of Science (2010).]. (shrink)

Famously, Saul Kripke proposes that there are contingent a priori truths, and has offered a number of examples to illustrate his claim. The most well-known example involves the standard meter bar in Paris. Purportedly, a certain agent knows a priori that the bar is one meter long. However, in response to a long-standing objection to such examples - the "existential complaint" - generally only modified examples having a conditional form are now considered candidates for the contingent a priori. Gareth Evans (...) argues that these conditionals must be understood free-logically, and on this basis argues against Keith Donnellan's analysis of the contingent a priori. I show Evans' argument mistaken. I also take issue with the existential complaint, and suggest a way of understanding Kripke's original examples that is not subject to it. My approach focuses the debate in its right place, and allows us to take Kripke's original examples seriously. (shrink)

Stephen Neale presents, in Facing Facts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), one convenient package containing his reasoned complaints against theories of facts and non-extensional connectives. The slingshot is a powerful argument (or better, it is a powerful family of arguments) which constrains theories of facts, propositions and non-extensional connectives by showing that some of these theories are rendered trivial. This book is the best place to find the state of the art on the slingshot and its implications for logic, language and (...) metaphysics. It provides a useful starting point for anyone who has wondered what all of the fuss about the slingshot amounts to. Neale shows that the fuss does amount to something, and that theories of facts must “face facts” and present an adequate response to the slingshot. However, Neale’s evaluation of the state of play for theories of facts is too pessimistic. As the book draws near to a close, Neale writes: As I have stressed, Russell’s Theory of Facts, according to which facts have properties as components, is safe. It is certainly tempting to draw the moral that if one wants non-collapsing facts one needs properties as components of facts. I have not attempted to prove this here, but I suspect it will be proved in due course. (page 210) Neale concludes that while theories which take facts to be structured entities are safe from slingshot arguments, and he suspects that this is the only kind of fact theory safe from slingshot-style collapse. If this were the case, then theories such as situation theories or accounts of truthmakers may well be threatened. However, Neale’s suspicion is ill-founded, as I shall soon show. Not only do Russellian theories of facts survive the slingshot unscathed, but so can theories of facts which take them to be unstructured entities. Furthermore, the way that this may be not only argued for, but proved can provide a new weapon in the armoury of the theorist investigating fact theories. (shrink)

The paradoxes of self-reference are genuinely paradoxical. The liar paradox, Russell’s paradox and their cousins pose enormous difficulties to anyone who seeks to give a comprehensive theory of semantics, or of sets, or of any other domain which allows a modicum of self-reference and a modest number of logical principles. One approach to the paradoxes of self-reference takes these paradoxes as motivating a non-classical theory of logical consequence. Similar logical principles are used in each of the paradoxical inferences. If one (...) or other of these problematic inferences are rejected, we may arrive at a consistent (or at least, a coherent) theory. In this paper I will show that such approaches come at a serious cost. The general approach of using the paradoxes to restrict the class of allowable inferences places severe constraints on the domain of possible propositional logics, and on the kind of metatheory that is appropriate in the study of logic itself. Proof-theoretic and model-theoretic analyses of logical consequence make provide different ways for non-classical responses to the paradoxes to be defeated by revenge problems: the redefinition of logical connectives thought to be ruled out on logical grounds. Non-classical solutions are not the “easy way out” of the paradoxes. (shrink)

What are the moral stakes involved when we will have the same power to engineer our bodies as we do our automobiles? Which specific bioethics problems will put the most pressure on our ethical traditions? What should we do now to prepare for this brave new world? With Greg Loeben, Ronald Munson, and Wade Robison.

I offer an interpretation of a familiar, but poorly understood portion of Tarskis work on truth – bringing to light a number of unnoticed aspects of Tarskis work. A serious misreading of this part of Tarski to be found in Scott Soames Understanding Truth is treated in detail. Soamesreading vies with the textual evidence, and would make Tarskis position inconsistent in an unsubtle way. I show that Soames does not finally have a coherent interpretation of Tarski. This is unfortunate, since (...) Soames ultimately arrogates to himself a key position that he has denied to Tarski and which is rightfully Tarskis own. (shrink)

In the presence of large cardinals, or sufficient determinacy, every equivalence relation in L(R) either admits a wellordered separating family or continuously reduces E 0.

This comparative case analysis contrasts two nations – Viet Nam and The United States of America (U.S.) – in terms of processes each employed and results each achieved in respective response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use a general theory of teaching to contrast the countries in terms of their approaches to COVID public health education. Viet Nam followed the recommendations of the theory. The U.S. did not. While our analysis does not and cannot prove educational theory acted as the (...) sole causal factor in realization of the disparate results in the countries, our case study does illustrate that the different approaches to public health education used by the countries may be counted among factors contributing to wide differences in the contrasting cases. The argument proceeds by 1) describing differences in relevant statistics between Viet Nam and the U.S., 2) outlining the theory of teaching we use to analyze differences in public health education in the two contexts, and 3) discussing successful implementation of the theory in Viet Nam and failure to implement in the U.S. Finally, we 4) dismiss competing explanations of differences between the countries and 5) offer considerations about how the U.S. may educate citizens away from turning the pandemic into a pan(en)demic. (shrink)

We attempt to clarify divisions made by us in previous work (Colander et al., 2004a,b) between “orthodox, mainstream, and heterodox” in economics, following very useful remarks in Dequech (2007-08), whom we thank. We also provide specific advice for heterodox economists, namely: worry less about methodology, focus on being economists first and heterodox economists second, and prepare ideas to leave the incubator of heterodoxy to enter the mainstream economic debate.

“Paraconsistent” means “beyond the consistent” [3, 15]. Paraconsistent logics tolerate inconsistencies in a way that traditional logics do not. In a paraconsistent logic, the inference of explosion A, ∼AB is rejected. This may be for any of a number of reasons [16]. For proponents of relevance [1, 2] the argument has gone awry when we infer an irrelevant B from the inconsistent premises. Those who argue that inconsistent theories may have some logical content but do not commit us to everything, (...) have reason to think that these theories are closed under a relation of paraconsistent logical consequence [12, 18]. Another reason to adopt a paraconsistent logic is more extreme. You may take the world to be inconsistent [14], and a true theory incorporating this inconsistency must be governed by a paraconsistent logic. (shrink)

This book presents the first detailed treatment of Gadamer’s account of the nature of meaning. It argues both that this account is philosophically valuable in its own right and that understanding it sheds new light on his wider hermeneutical project. -/- Whereas philosophers have typically thought of meanings as belonging to a special class of objects, the central claim of Gadamer’s view is that meanings are events. Instead of a pre-existing content that we must unearth through our interpretive efforts, for (...) Gadamer the meaning of a text is what happens when we encounter it in the appropriate way. In events of meaning the world makes itself intelligibly present to us in a manner that is uniquely and irreducibly bound up with the concrete situation in which we find ourselves. When we recognize that Gadamer thinks of meaning in this way, we are better positioned to appreciate what his wider views amount to and how they hang together. Gadamer’s accounts of interpretive normativity, the aspectival character of understanding, and the nature of essences, for example, snap into more vivid relief when we see them as outgrowths of his underlying conception of meanings as events. (shrink)

For much of the second half of the 20th Century, the primary role logical empiricism played was that of the argumentative foil. The 'received view' on a given topic (especially in philosophy of science, logic, or language) was frequently identified with some supposedly dogmatic tenet of logical empiricism. However, during the last twenty-five years, scholars have paid serious, sustained attention to what the logical positivists, individually and collectively, actually said. Early scholarship on logical empiricism had to engage in heavy-duty PR (...) work: why should anyone study the now-discarded mixture of blunders and implausibilities collected under the label 'logical empiricism'? However, thanks to the efforts of the pioneers, people studying the logical empiricists today need not articulate an extended apologia for their chosen subject of study -- rather, they can simply get on with their work. Many of the best fruits of these recent labors are on display in The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism (CCLE), edited by Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel. (shrink)

According to Bikas Chakrabarti (2005, p. 225), the term econophysics was neologized in 1995 at the second Statphys-Kolkata conference in Kolkata (formerly Calcutta), India by the physicist H. Eugene Stanley, who was also the first to use it in print (Stanley, 1996). Mantegna and Stanley (2000, pp. viii-ix) define “the multidisciplinary field of econophysics” as “a neologism that denotes the activities of physicists who are working on economics problems to test a variety of new conceptual approaches deriving from the physical (...) sciences.” The list of such problems has included distributions of returns in financial markets (Mantegna, 1991; Levy and Solomon, 1997; Bouchaud and Cont, 1998; Gopakrishnan, Plerou, Amaral, Meyer, and Stanley, 1999; Sornette and Johansen, 2001; Farmer and Joshi, 2004) the distribution of income and wealth (Drăgulescu and Yakovenko, 2001; Bouchaud and Mézard, 2000; Chatterjee, Yarlagadda, and Charkrabarti, 2005), the distribution of economic shocks and growth rate variations (Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford, 1993; Canning, Amaral, Lee, Meyer, and Stanley, 1998), the distribution of firm sizes and growth rates (Stanley, Amaral, Buldyrev, Havlin, Leschhorn, Maass, Salinger, and Stanley, 1996; Takayasu and Okuyama, 1998; Botazzi and Secchi, 2003), the distribution of city sizes (Rosser, 1994; Gabaix, 1999), and the distribution of scientific discoveries (Plerou, Amaral, Gopakrishnan, Meyer, and Stanley, 1999; Sornette 1 and Zajdenweber, 1999), among other problems, all of which are seen at times not to follow normal or Gaussian patterns that can be described fully by mean and variance. The main sources of conceptual approaches from physics used by the econophysicists have been from models of statistical mechanics (Spitzer, 1971), geophysical models of earthquakes (Sornette, 2003), and “sandpile” models of avalanches, the latter involving self-organized criticality (Bak, 1996). An early physicist to assert the essential identity of statistical methods used in physics and the social sciences was Majorana (1942). A common theme among those who identify themselves as econophysicists is that standard economic theory has been inadequate or insufficient to explain the non-Gaussian distributions empirically observed for various of these phenomena, such as “excessive” skewness and leptokurtotic “fat tails” (McCauley, 2004).. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 22-24.

En este trabajo se presentan las estrategias docentes utilizadas para aplicar el modelo de clase invertida en la asignatura “Comportamiento del usuario en entornos digitales” (Máster Universitario en Comunicación Digital), así como algunas de las herramientas utilizadas, y la valoración del alumnado sobre su aplicación.Tras describir la metodología y los recursos utilizados, se realiza un análisis de contenido respecto a la evaluación realizada por el alumnado, orientado a identificar las ventajas e inconvenientes del uso de la clase invertida.Se extraen conclusiones (...) sobre las repercusiones de esta metodología, tanto para el alumnado como para el docente, en tanto que supone una forma más aplicada de formar y de aprender, pero que entraña dificultades especialmente derivadas del esfuerzo que supone el cambio de rol de docentes y discentes en su aplicación. (shrink)

Ecologic-economic systems tend to exhibit greater complexity than systems that are purely ecological or economic. The interactions between the two types often generates nonlinear relations that lead to various kinds of complex dynamics that complicate management and decisionmaking regarding them. Of these, forests have characteristics that lead them to have special problems not usually encountered in the management of such systems. A central one is the long time periods involved managing forests compared to most other such systems. This means that (...) the issues regarding determination of discount rates for valuing future outcomes are more important for forestry management than for many other systems. Also, forests generate a wider range of externalities than do most other ecologic-economic systems, with implications for various hierarchical levels of management. This paper considers the array of these problems as they appear for a variety of forestry management issues. (shrink)

An advanced-level logic textbook that presents proof construction on equal footing with model building. Potentially relevant to students of mathematics and computer science as well.

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism'. Further, on the (...) evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect. (shrink)

Paraconsistent logics are often semantically motivated by considering "impossible worlds." Lewis, in "Logic for equivocators," has shown how we can understand paraconsistent logics by attributing equivocation of meanings to inconsistent believers. In this paper I show that we can understand paraconsistent logics without attributing such equivocation. Impossible worlds are simply sets of possible worlds, and inconsistent believers (inconsistently) believe that things are like each of the worlds in the set. I show that this account gives a sound and complete semantics (...) for Priest's paraconsistent logic LP, which uses materials any modal logician has at hand. (shrink)

This book introduces an important group of logics that have come to be known under the umbrella term 'susbstructural'. Substructural logics have independently led to significant developments in philosophy, computing and linguistics. _An Introduction to Substrucural Logics_ is the first book to systematically survey the new results and the significant impact that this class of logics has had on a wide range of fields.The following topics are covered: * Proof Theory * Propositional Structures * Frames * Decidability * Coda Both (...) students and professors of philosophy, computing, linguistics, and mathematics will find this to be an important addition to their reading. (shrink)

In his doctor's thesis [1], Henkin has shown that if a formal logic is consistent, and sufficiently complex, then it must admit a non-standard model. In particular, he showed that there must be a model in which that portion of the model which is supposed to represent the positive integers of the formal logic is not in fact isomorphic to the positive integers; indeed it is not even well ordered by what is supposed to be the relation of ≦.For the (...) purposes of the present paper, we do not need a precise definition of what is meant by a standard model of a formal logic. The non-standard models which we shall discuss will be flagrantly non-standard, as for instance a model of the sort whose existence is proved by Henkin. It will suffice if we and our readers are in agreement that a model of a formal logic is not a standard model if either: The relation in the model which represents the equality relation in the formal logic is not the equality relation for objects of the model. That portion of the model which is supposed to represent the positive integers of the formal logic is not well ordered by the relation ≦. That portion of the model which is supposed to represent the ordinal numbers of the formal logic is not well ordered by the relation ≦. (shrink)

Whether or not the particular view of generic sentences articulated above is correct, it is quite clear that the study of generic terms and the truth-conditions of generic sentences touches on the representation of other parts of the grammar, as well as on how the world around us is reflected in language. I would hope that the problems mentioned above will highlight the relevance of semantic analysis to other apparently distinct questions, and focus attention on the relevance of linguistic problems (...) to other already established areas of inquiry. (shrink)

Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as theneutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are (...) unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete. (shrink)

The idea that fictions may educate us is an old one, as is the view that they distort the truth and mislead us. While there is a long tradition of passionate assertion in this debate, systematic arguments are a recent development, and the idea of empirically testing is particularly novel. Our aim in this chapter is to provide clarity about what is at stake in this debate, what the options are, and how empirical work does or might bear on its (...) resolution. We distinguish between merely influencing people’s opinions and providing genuine learning, where the latter requires that the source of the change in opinion should be reliable. Other important ideas here are the extent to which authors of fiction may be considered to provide testimony, or something like it, and the possibility of recognizing an unstated purpose in the project of the fictional work. We ask whether fictions can furnish us not merely with ideas but with reasons for believing them, perhaps by constituting thought experiments. We consider whether the focus should be on understanding rather than on knowledge, and whether fictions can inform us about the qualities of another’s experiences. We briefly describe some experimental work of recent decades and suggest that the evidence for learning from fiction is currently meagre. (shrink)

Formal systems seem to come in two general kinds: useful and useless. This is painting things starkly, but the point is important. Formal structures can either be used in interesting and important ways, or they can languish unused and irrelevant. Lewis' modal logics are good examples. The systems S4 and S5 are useful in many different ways. They map out structures that are relevant to a number of different applications. S1, S2 and S3 however, are not so lucky. They are (...) little studied, and used even less. It has become dear that the structures described by S4 and S5 are important in different ways, while the structures described by S1 to S3 are not so important. In this paper, we will see another formal system with a number of different uses. We will examine a substructural logic which is important in a number of different ways. The logic of Peirce monoids, inspired by the logic of relations, is useful in the independent areas of linguistic types and information flow.In what follows I will describe the logic of Peirce monoids in its various guises, sketch out its main properties, and indicate why it is important. As proofs of theorems are readily available elsewhere in the literature, I simply sketch the relevant proofs here, and point the interested reader to where complete proofs can be found. (shrink)