Confucian ethics play a pivotal role in guiding Chinese thinking and behaviour. Aesthetic leadership is emerging as a promising paradigm in leadership studies. This study investigates the practice of aesthetic leadership in Chinese organizations on the basis of Chinese philosophical foundations. We adopt a process perspective to access the aesthetic constellation of meanings present in the Chinese understanding of leadership, linking normative Confucian values to a pragmatic value rational world view, that rests on an ontology of vaguely defined norms that (...) are malleable to different cultural contexts. Value rational pragmatism is explored in order to develop a deeper understanding of normative aesthetic leadership in China and to contrast it to instrumental aesthetic leadership. We empirically demonstrate the contextual specificity of aesthetic leadership in eight Chinese private- and state-owned enterprises (POEs and SOEs) through qualitative case studies. The findings provide a deeper insight into Chinese aesthetic leadership by proposing a dynamic leadership approach, from both ethical and instrumental perspectives, in the Chinese context. (shrink)

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...) is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind. (shrink)

Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of credal states. Both assume we can make cognitive progress in an (...) inquiry even while falling short of the target. I show that the prospects for combining these two programmes are bleak. A core accuracy principle, proximity, that is universally embraced within the truthlikeness programme turns out to be incompatible with a central principle within the epistemic utility programme, namely propriety. 1Truthlikeness and Epistemic Utility 2Inquiries 3Accuracy for Propositions 4Proximity 5Accuracy for Credal States 6Propriety 7Proximity for Credal States 8Extensionality 9Admissible Weightings 10Propriety Violates Proximity 11Possible Responses 11.1Retreat to convexity 11.2Reject boundedness 11.3Reject additivity 12The Upshot. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga argues by counterexample that no naturalistic account of functions is possible--God is then the only source for natural functions. This paper replies to Plantinga's examples and arguments. Plantinga misunderstands naturalistic accounts. Plantinga's mistakes flow from his assimilation of functional notions in general to functions from intentional design in particular.

PURPOSE—A substantial fraction of the observations made by clinicians and entered into patient records are expressed by means of negation or by using terms which contain negative qualifiers (as in “absence of pulse” or “surgical procedure not performed”). This seems at first sight to present problems for ontologies, terminologies and data repositories that adhere to a realist view and thus reject any reference to putative non-existing entities. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and Referent Tracking (RT) are examples of such paradigms. The (...) purpose of the research here described was to test a proposal to capture negative findings in electronic health record systems based on BFO and RT. METHODS—We analysed a series of negative findings encountered in 748 sentences taken from 41 patient charts. We classified the phenomena described in terms of the various top-level categories and relations defined in BFO, taking into account the role of negation in the corresponding descriptions. We also studied terms from SNOMED-CT containing one or other form of negation. We then explored ways to represent the described phenomena by means of the types of representational units available to realist ontologies such as BFO. RESULTS—We introduced a new family of ‘lacks’ relations into the OBO Relation Ontology. The relation lacks_part, for example, defined in terms of the positive relation part_of, holds between a particular p and a universal U when p has no instance of U as part. Since p and U both exist, assertions involving ‘lacks_part’ and its cognates meet the requirements of positivity. CONCLUSION—By expanding the OBO Relation Ontology, we were able to accommodate nearly all occurrences of negative findings in the sample studied. (shrink)

(2001). Critical Realism, Sociology and Health Inequalities: Social Class as a Generative Mechanism and its Media of Enactment. Alethia: Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 35-42.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

As Holderlin was to Martin Heidegger and Mallarme to Jacques Derrida, so is H.P. Lovecraft to the Speculative Realist philosophers. Lovecraft was one of the brightest stars of the horror and science fiction magazines, but died in poverty and relative obscurity in the 1930s. In 2005 he was finally elevated from pulp status to the classical literary canon with the release of a Library of America volume dedicated to his work. The impact of Lovecraft on philosophy has been building for (...) more than a decade. Initially championed by shadowy guru Nick Land at Warwick during the 1990s, he was later discovered to be an object of private fascination for all four original members of the twenty-first century Speculative Realist movement. In this book, Graham Harman extracts the basic philosophical concepts underlying the work of Lovecraft, yielding a weird realism capable of freeing continental philosophy from its current soul-crushing impasse. Abandoning pious references by Heidegger to Holderlin and the Greeks, Harman develops a new philosophical mythology centered in such Lovecraftian figures as Cthulhu, Wilbur Whately, and the rat-like monstrosity Brown Jenkin. The Miskatonic River replaces the Rhine and the Ister, while Holderlin's Caucasus gives way to Lovecraft's Antarctic mountains of madness. (shrink)

My discussion in this paper is divided into three parts. In section I, I discuss some fairly familiar lines of approach to the question how moral considerations may be shown to have rational appeal. In section II, I suggest how our existence as constituents in collective entities might also influence our practical thinking. In section III, I entertain the idea that identification with collectives might displace moral thinking to some degree, and I offer Marx's class theory as a sample of (...) collective identification for the purposes of practical deliberation. (shrink)

The proposal to create a chamber selected by sortition would extend this democratic procedure into the legislative branch of government. However, there are good reasons to believe that, as currently conceived by John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright, the proposal will fail to realize sufficiently two fundamental democratic goods, namely, political equality and deliberative reasoning. It is argued through analysis of its historic and contemporary application that sortition must be combined with other institutional devices, in particular, rotation of membership and (...) limited mandate, in order to be democratically effective and to realize political equality and deliberative reasoning. An alternative proposal for a responsive sortition legislature is presented as more realistic and utopian: one that increases substantially the number of members, makes more extensive use of internal sortition and rotation, and recognizes the importance of establishing limited mandates. (shrink)

More Speculative Realism Graham Harman. GRAHAM HARMAN BELLS AND WHISTLES MURE SPEBLILATIVE REALISM Bell and Whistles More Speculative Realism Graham Harman Winchester, UK. Front Cover.

Using data drawn from a racially/ethnically diverse sample of participants ( N = 1,489; 52% female; Mage_T1: 18.10; 34% Latino, 21% White, 20% Asian, 11% Black, 11% multiracial/multiethnic, and 3% other), we conducted a binary logistic regression to identify which factors during adolescence and early adulthood were associated with voting behavior in the 2020 presidential election. There were three main findings. First, young adults who had more cross-racial/ethnic friendships and those who participated in volunteer activities during their senior year of (...) high school were more likely to vote. Second, having cross-racial/ethnic friendships and endorsing self-transcendence values (benevolence, universalism) in early adulthood were positively associated with voting behavior, even when controlling for high school factors. Third, those who endorsed self-enhancement values were more likely to vote when they had more cross-racial/ethnic friendships during high school. Implications for voting patterns among young adults in future presidential elections are discussed. (shrink)

This collection contains chapters under eight headings: (1) Individual Thinkers; (2) Philosophical Movements; (3) Critiques of Theism; (4) Metaphysics; (5) Epistemology; (6) Ethics; (7) Politics; and (8) Critiques of Atheism.

Incorporating a diverse and eclectic range of theory and cultural forms, both Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek have persistently foregrounded Marxist questions of ideology, totality and utopia at points where they seem unfashionable and outmoded. As a phrase attributable to both thinkers, Jameson and Žižek share a commitment to writing in and against a time where it has become “easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.” Broadly speaking, in terms of a shared politics, both (...) advocate seeing the system whole and keeping open the possibility of an “outside” to capitalism... There are, however, some significant differences between Jameson and Žižek that should not be overlooked. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of whether Berry's Pardox presupposes the Principle of Excluded Middle, with particular reference to the work of Ross Brady.

This paper presents the Obstetric and Neonatal Ontology (OntONeo). This ontology has been created to provide a consensus representation of salient electronic health record (EHR) data and to serve interoperability of the associated data and information systems. More generally, it will serve interoperability of clinical and translational data, for example deriving from genomics disciplines and from clinical trials. Interoperability of EHR data is important to ensuring continuity of care during the prenatal and postnatal periods for both mother and child. As (...) a strategy to advance such interoperability we use an approach based on ontological realism and on the ontology development principles of the Open Biomedical Ontologies Foundry, including reuse of reference ontologies wherever possible. We describe the structure and coverage domain of OntONeo and the process of creating and maintaining the ontology. (shrink)

Tyler Burge famously argues in his 1993 paper "Content Preservation" that it is not only a priori true that we enjoy a prima facie warrant to take what others assert as true, but also that there our warrant to believe what we are told in certain special cases is a priori. So just as our warrant for believing certain mathematical truths might be a priori, so too there are cases of belief through testimony that are a priori. Then in a (...) 2013 Postscript to "Content Preservation" he took it all back. All of Burge's ideas and arguments for and against are interesting and important, and deepen our understanding of testimony, comprehension, warrant, and the a priori. But his ideas and arguments are hard to understand. This paper explains all of ideas and arguments, both for and against, in a clear and comprehensive way. Along the way, Anna-Sara Malmgren's interpretation and criticism of Burge's position is also expounded and criticized. (shrink)

Illusionism about consciousness holds that consciousness merely seems or appears to have a phenomenology, although this appearance is incorrect. On this view, the notion of phenomenology is sourced directly from introspection. It is therefore not merely introduced as a result of a conceptual error in theorizing about consciousness. This paper raises some difficulties for illusionism and argues for the latter eliminativist view. The characterization of conscious states as having a phenomenology is not one whose conceptual basis is sourced directly from (...) introspection. Rather, it is introduced theoretically after reflection on what introspection tells us. This introduction is mistaken and the notion of phenomenology should therefore be eliminated. (shrink)

These essays explore the religious dimensions to a number of key features of well-being, including marriage, crime and rehabilitation, work, inequality, mental ...

Graham Haydon; Autonomy as an Aim of Education and the Autonomy of Teachers, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 219–228.

The judicial appointments regime in England and Wales is unbalanced. The pre-2005 appointments regime conferred excessive discretion on the Lord Chancellor, but the post-2005 regime has gone much too far in the opposite direction. Today, the Lord Chancellor is almost entirely excluded from the process of selecting lower level judges and enjoys only limited say over the selection of senior judges. In this article I argue that the current regime places too little weight on the sound reasons for involving the (...) minister in individual selection decisions, including the scope for ministerial input to enhance judicial independence, to supply political leadership on judicial diversity and to render more effective the discharge of the Lord Chancellor’s systemic responsibility for the justice system as a whole. I argue that shortlists reconcile the need to more fully involve the Lord Chancellor whilst at the same time ensuring that candidates satisfy a merit threshold. (shrink)

In Chapters 6 and 7 of Language, Truth and Poetry I attempted to solve the ancient problem of fictional reference by claiming that a fictional construct ‘points’ or refers to certain features of reality in rather the same way as an abstraction like ‘gravitation’ or ‘cruelty’ does. I now believe that this theory of mine is unsatisfactory; and I should like to propose a new solution to the problem.

Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the 'Propositional Account'. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non-propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a 'non-conciliatory' attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge (...) is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non-propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non-propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense. (shrink)

What is the role of political theory in the real world of politics? Opinions have varied about this, ranging from Plato’s arguments for philosopher‐kings to Marx’s relegation of political philosophy to the realms of mere ideology. This paper contrasts the competing claims of intellectualism vs pragmatism in politics. It explores the ends/means relation as one account of how ideas and actions might be connected. This relation is found to be inadequate, and with it the more ambitious claims of intellectualism. But (...) an argument is advanced for the qualification of pragmatism with a more modest account of the role of ideas in politics. (shrink)

Every theory of justice presupposes a theory of agency which specifies the nature, capacities, and needs of the agents to whom it applies. Likewise, every theory of agency can serve as the basis for a theory of justice which specifies the social conditions in which persons can develop and exercise their capacities for agency. Contemporary liberal, communitarian, and feminist theories of justice all share an abstract understanding of agency as involving the capacity to pursue a conception of the good and (...) the capacity to fit that pursuit into a moral vision. Liberalism, communitarianism, and feminism do not differ primarily over what agency amounts to or whether agency is morally valuable, but over what social conditions persons require in order to develop and exercise their capacities for agency. ;I develop analytic models of a liberal and a communitarian theory of social justice, and I derive from each of these an analytic model of the theory of agency on which it tacitly depends. I show that neither the liberal nor the communitarian theory of agency can accommodate the needs of subordinate social groups such as African-Americans, women, and lesbians for a society in which denigrating racist, sexist, and homophobic cultural images are absent and in which the different needs for agency of members of different social groups can be addressed. ;I also develop a feminist dialogical theory of justice which leaves the demands of justice open to determination by an open, ongoing, egalitarian social dialogue about the social conditions required for agency. I then derive from it a theory of agency which is, I argue, better able to meet the differing needs for agency of members of different social groups, to uncover hidden forms of injustice, and to address changes in prevailing forms of domination and oppression over time. (shrink)

This concluding chapter addresses the conceptual questions that arise in connection with identifying a philosophical tradition, and giving it a distinctive national label. It argues against the common identification of ‘Scottish philosophy’ with the ‘School of Common Sense’, and argues that Francis Hutcheson initiated an approach to philosophical questions that pre-dates the appeal to common sense developed by Reid. It contends that the ‘School of Common Sense’ was just one attempt to formulate a satisfactory response to David Hume. By examining (...) the work of Andrew Seth and Henry Jones, it explores the idea of a shared philosophical agenda, and argues that a common project rooted in a long-standing institutional framework is what sustained the Scottish philosophical intellectual tradition. The chapter ends by considering the factors that may be said to have brought that tradition to an end. (shrink)