We propose a view of embodied representations that is alternative to both symbolic/linguistic approaches and purely sensorimotor views of cognition, and can account for procedural and declarative knowledge manipulation. In accordance with recent evidence in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, we argue that anticipatory and simulative mechanisms, which arose during evolution for action control and not for cognition, determined the first form of representational content and were exapted for increasingly sophisticated cognitive uses. In particular, procedural and declarative forms of knowledge can (...) be explained, respectively, in terms of on-line sensorimotor anticipation and off-line simulations of potential actions, which can give access to tacit knowledge and make it explicit. That is, mechanisms that evolved for the on-line prediction of the consequences of one's own actions (i.e. forward models) determine a (procedural) form of representation, and became exapted for off-line use. They can therefore be used to produce (declarative) knowledge of the world, by running a simulation of the action that would produce the relevant information. We conclude by discussing how embodied representations afford a form of internal manipulation that can be described as internalized situated action. (shrink)

In this paper I will compare the concept of explication à la Carnap and the concept of explication à la Kant. This essay should primarily be seen as a comparison of two different philosophical styles, but it is also intended as a vindication of what Kant wrote and what Carnap forgot to read.

Why is interaction so simple? This article presents a theory of interaction based on the use of shared representations as “coordination tools” (e.g., roundabouts that facilitate coordination of drivers). By aligning their representations (intentionally or unintentionally), interacting agents help one another to solve interaction problems in that they remain predictable, and offer cues for action selection and goal monitoring. We illustrate how this strategy works in a joint task (building together a tower of bricks) and discuss its requirements from a (...) computational viewpoint. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the nature of two aspects of human emotional experience—moods and affects—in their relation to the concept of the person. We argue for the importance of the concept of the person in an approach to human emotional experience. This paper differentiates between the concepts of minimal self, extended self, and person. Furthermore, it offers a phenomenological proposal to understand the feeling dimension of moods and affects as critical for the differentiation of human emotional experience, and hence (...) an understanding of that experience. By way of conclusion, we opt for a narrative approach to the question of the normative dimension of emotional experience to clarify the intricate relationship between mood and personhood. (shrink)

Unlike in the phrase “Virtual Reality,” in the phrase “Augmented Reality” the stress is put on the word “reality.” It seems, though, that we still lack a concept of reality which can fit the world of both humans and computers. In connection with this philosophical issue, this paper aims to provide the background for a better insight into the meaning of Augmented Reality and its impact on human behavior. My thesis is that an ecological version of direct perception’s realism constitutes (...) the most natural framework from which to start. The ecological approach to perception – namely, the Gibsonian theory of affordances – together with a non-dualistic, pragmatist and evolutionist notion of reality, perfectly fits this purpose. Thus, after a brief survey of the present state of AR technologies, it should become natural to interpret AR digital contents as implementations of affordances. (shrink)

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the human mind (1764), whose axioms are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. Interpreters of Reid seem to be divided in evaluating the significance of his geometry of visibles in the history of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. (...) The question will be reexamined with particular attention given to his unpublished manuscripts. These include comments on Saccheri’s work and Reid’s repeated attempts to derive Euclid’s parallel postulate from the axioms of incidence. (shrink)

David Harvey : On peut difficilement imaginer vérification plus spectaculaire de ce que tu prédis depuis très longtemps dans tes théories que l’actuelle crise du système financier mondial. Y a-t-il des aspects de la crise qui t’ont surpris? Giovanni Arrighi : Ma prédiction était très simple. Dans The Long Twentieth Century, je qualifiais de crise annonciatrice d’un régime d’accumulation le début de la financiarisation et je faisais remarquer qu’après un certain temps – en général environ un demi-siècle – la (...) crise terminale suivait. L’hypothèse fondamentale est que toutes ces expansions financières ne pouvaient pas tenir parce qu’elles amenaient à la spéculation plus de capital qu’il n’était possible d’en gérer – en d’autres termes, ces expansions financières avaient tendance à créer des bulles de différentes sortes. Je prévoyais que cette expansion financière mènerait à une crise terminale parce que, aujourd’hui comme dans le passé, les bulles ne peuvent pas tenir. (shrink)

In this paper the topic of the relations between scientific theories and scientific models is tackled by considering the former as hypothetical scientific representations and the latter as fictive scientific representations. A classification of the models is also proposed.