Peirce did not achieve a final systematization of his work. Beyond the difficulties in explaining so many philosophical tools that he introduced—suffice it to mention semiotic, abductive logic, a heuristic based on continuity, scholastic realism—, there is a theoretical reason for this incompletion. All those new philosophical tools indicated a conception of synthesis very different from the one he received from Kant. Peirce did not realize the profound direction of his enquiry so that he did not directly question neither Kant’s (...) legacy on this issue nor the idea of necessity that presides over it. Starting from Peirce’s conception of continuity and change, this paper will give a new definition of synthetic and analytic judgments and reasoning, completing the picture with a third “vague” judgment and reasoning. In this new definition a synthetic judgment is a judgment that recognizes identity through changes. An analytical judgment is a judgment that loses identity through changes. A vague judgment is a judgment that it is blind to identity through changes. How do we perform synthetic reasoning? Following Peirce’s semiotic study of elements of Gamma Graphs as the sheet of assertion and the line of identity, the paper will first individuate the semiotic characteristics necessary for the recognition of identity. These characteristics lead us to discover “complete gesture” as the tool that we use in our every-day reasoning in order to acquire new knowledge synthetically. “Complete gestures” are actions through which we carry and recognize significant meanings. This new paradigm should provide an improved account of common-sense knowledge as well as of particular creative and hypothetic stages of conception in both scientific and humanistic thought. (shrink)

Conjectures for the text of three passages in Martial (5, 11, 1; 5, 20, 6-7; 5, 38, 3), with critical notes on the ‚new Gaius‘, inst. 3, 154a-b (P.S.I. XI, 1182, A14-B42).

By starting from the idea of processes of numerical assignment, an explication, á la Kant, of the concept of property is proposed. In this way two results are achieved: on the one hand, the Kantian doctrine of explication is revaluated; on the other hand, the notion of property is tackled from an empiricist point of view based on the representational theory of measurement.

In this work I will put forward the idea that Max Weber's conception of the "ideal type" may have a role in the process aimed at formulating a reliable concept of scientific law and scientific theory. The connection between Weber, theorist of socio–historical science, and postpositivist philosophy of science has been made possible by Carl Hempel, who grasped the importance of Weber's work and, at the same time, interpreted the movement towards modernization of neo-empiricism by supporting the passage to a (...) semantic conception of scientific theories. I will therefore analyze the role of idealizing procedure in the formation of theoretical entities and in the process of organization and coordination of laws that govern complex causal systems. (shrink)

What is it that produces laughter? Or a smile, since, in fact, the verb γελάω has both meanings? Because for someone to laughs or to smile, it requires to be in the company of others, and involved in a certain situation which somehow sparks in us that kind of reaction. This note will provide a sketch for a research on the various situations in which characters laugh or smile in the Platonic dialogues. There is a ridiculous situation that emerges in (...) a discussion, when the interlocutors speak by themselves without taking into account what the other says ; another ridiculous situation emerges involuntarily from an intervention or remark from one of the interlocutors ; another more subjective one emerges from certain behaviors in particular situations. Moreover, there are interesting indications about the very nature of the ridiculous and the proper way to use it in comedy or in the interactions between people. (shrink)