The call for family and medical leave reform in the United States was largely the result of sweeping demographic shifts that occurred in the workforce after the 1950s, coupled with an ever-increasing life expectancy and changing social norms concerning the role of women as caretakers. By the early 1990s, the number of women in the workforce had nearly tripled from 1950. During that same period, life expectancy increased by six years for males and seven for females. Meanwhile, the first wave (...) of the Depression-era generation began to reach the age of retirement. In short, the parents of American workers were living longer and retiring in greater numbers while more women, who were more likely to be informal caregivers, decided to join the workforce. As a result, many families with ill or elder parents began to turn to institutional long-term care. (shrink)

According to moral relativism, there is not a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matter—relative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. It is useful to compare moral relativism to other relativisms. One (...) possible comparison is with motion relativism. There is no such thing as absolute motion or absolute rest. Whether something is moving or at rest is relative to a spatio-temporal frame of reference. Something may be at rest in one frame of reference and moving in another. There is no such thing as absolute motion and absolute rest, but we can make do with relative motion and rest. Similarly, moral relativism is the view that, although there is no such thing as absolute right and wrong, we can make do with relative right and wrong. (shrink)

Theories of adverbial modification can be roughly distinguished into two sorts. One kind of theory takes logical form to follow surface grammatical form. Adverbs are treated as unanalyzable logical operators that turn a predicate or sentence into a different predicate or sentence respectively. And new rules of logic are stated for these operators. -/- A different kind of theory does not suppose that logical form must parallel surface grammatical form. It allows that logical form may have more to do with (...) deeper structures that might be studied in transformational grammar. Adverbs are treated as surface forms of the underlying predicates represented by corresponding adjectives and verbs. 'Slowly' is derived from 'slow'; 'intentionally' from 'intentional' or 'intend'; etc. And new rules of logic are avoided where they can be. -/- In this paper I attempt to state some of the advantages of the second sort of theory. My procedure will be this. First, I will try to say in outline what theories of logical form are. Then I will state five principles for evaluating such theories. Next, I will sketch the sorts of analyses acceptance of principles (1)-(5) leads to. In particular I will talk about adverbial phrases (e.g. locatives) that are best analyzed in terms of implicit references to events, relative modifiers (like 'large') which relate something to a comparison class, and 'that' clauses taken as names of propositions. By appealing to principles (1)-(5) I will defend these analyses against certain others, one that appeals to many logical operators, a second that treats all sentences as names of propositions, and a third that sees implicit reference to possible worlds in the language being analyzed. Finally, I will offer a pragmatic defense of my approach in terms of principles (1)-(5) as against a different approach that appeals to possible world semantics. (shrink)

I begin by describing my relation with Nicholas Sturgeon and his objections to things I have said about moral explanations. Then I turn to issues about moral relativism. One of these is whether a plausible version of moral relativism can be formulated as a claim about the logical form of certain moral judgments. I agree that is not a good way to think of moral relativism. Instead, I think of moral relativism as a version of moral realism. I compare moral (...) relativism with the relativity of motion and with the relativity of language. Moralities are real in a way that is similar to the way that languages are real. Next I discuss resemblances between nonhuman animal behavior and human behavior having to do with language or communication and with moral or proto-moral behavior. However, I am more interested in aspects of language and morality that are not found in nonhuman animals, aspects that appear to depend on a kind of recursive structure in human language and morality but not in animals. This leads me to argue that aspects of moral theory might benefit from a comparison with certain aspects of linguistic theory. Another comparison is between moralities and legal systems: I speculate that the content of legal and moral systems is influenced by legal and moral bargaining. (shrink)

Explaining Value is a selection of the best of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in moral philosophy. The thirteen essays are divided into four sections, which focus in turn on moral relativism, values and valuing, character traits and virtue ethics, and ways of explaining aspects of morality. Harman's distinctive approach to moral philosophy has provoked much interest; this volume offers a fascinating conspectus of his most important work in the area.

Drawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in (...) the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of the correlative personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman. (shrink)

This paper develops sequent calculi for several classical modal logics. Utilizing a polymodal translation of the standard modal language, we are able to establish a base system for the minimal classical modal logic E from which we generate extensions in a modular manner. Our systems admit contraction and cut admissibility, and allow a systematic proof-search procedure of formal derivations.

We might be convinced that the goal of relieving suffering offers a straightforward justification of sacrificing embryos in research. Or we might hold that although embryos merit our respect, the greater the good to be achieved by destroying them, the more respect must give way to research. Or, if we take the notion of respect seriously, we might find that relieving suffering is a real but not supreme imperative.

Harman distinguishes between two uses of the term “logic”: as referring either to the theory of implication or to the theory of reasoning, which are quite distinct. His interest here is reasoning: a process that can modify intentions and beliefs. To a first approximation, theoretical reasoning is concerned with what to believe and practical reasoning is concerned with what to intend to do, although it is possible to have practical reasons to believe something. Practical considerations are relevant to whether to (...) engage in theoretical inquiry into a given question, the extent of time and other resources to devote to such inquiry, and whether and when to end such inquiry. Simplicity and conservatism play a role in theoretical reasoning that can be given a practical justification without allowing wishful thinking into theoretical reasoning, a justification that can also be given a non-practical interpretation. (shrink)

I have a long-standing relation with the noun “technoscience.” In recent years, I have been concerned with its evolution and connotations, since the period when I first thought it up. This chapter presents a survey of the various uses, transfers and significations of the term. It makes a twofold claim technoscientific research and development are conducted by a plural subject in need of a moral conscience; the study of technoscientific objects requires a methodological and operational materialism.Augmented version for this volume (...) of an essay first published in French Regards sur les technosciences, Vrin, Paris, pp. 23–38, 2006). Translation by John Stewart, University of Technology Compiègne. (shrink)

The concept of corporate reengineering provides a rich opportunity to consider certain political implications of using the stakeholder concept. By showing the ethical incoherence of corporate reengineering, as the concept is advocated by Michael Hammer and James Champy, I make the point that the stakeholder concept can be interpreted as a means for advocating just human communities. A new conception of Business & Society as Community Studies is one consequence of this argument.

O principal objetivo deste artigo é ampliar o atual cenário teórico da área "Saúde Mental e Trabalho", de acordo com a filosofia de Henri Bergson e seus conceitos de percepção, cognição, duração, vida psíquica, tempo e subjetividade. Este texto teórico-filosófico objetiva esclarecer, sob um novo ponto de vista, as relações entre filosofia da mente e os atuais esforços em direção a uma teoria científica da cognição, com sua complexa estrutura de teorias, hipóteses e disciplinas. Há, neste artigo, uma nova abordagem (...) para compreender as ciências cognitivas contemporâneas, segundo um tipo de investigação fenomenológica iniciada pela fenomenologia de Husserl. Os métodos empregados foram revisão sistemática e adaptação dos conceitos de Bergson, e sua naturalização no atual contexto dos princípios epistemológicos e ontológicos das ciências cognitivas, para uma análise fenomenológica da relação entre trabalho e saúde mental. As atuais contribuições da Fenomenologia de Husserl foram usadas para compreender as relações entre saúde mental e trabalho. Há também referências à filosofia aplicada nas ciências cognitivas contemporâneas, baseadas na proposta teórico-filosófica de Bergson. The main purpose of this paper is to amplify the current theoretical scenario of "Mental Health and Work" area, according to the Henri Bergson's philosophy and his concepts of perception, cognition, duration, psychic life, time and subjectivity. This theoretical-philosophical article aims to shed new light on the relations between philosophy of mind and present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition, with its complex structure of theories, hypotheses and disciplines. There is in this paper a new approach to understand the contemporary cognitive sciences in a kind of phenomenological investigation initiated by Husserl's phenomenology. The methods employed were the systematic review and adaptation of Bergson's concepts, and its naturalization in the actual context of epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive sciences, to phenomenological analysis of "work-mental health" links. The current contributions of the Husserl's Phenomenology were used to understand the relations between mental health and work. There are also references to philosophy applied in contemporary cognitive sciences based on Bergson's theoretic-philosophical proposal. (shrink)

Parce qu'il a avance comme modele du langage, la machine et le calcul, Leibniz annonce par certains aspects la „techno-logie“ universelle contemporaine. Celle-ci, c'est-a-dire le devenir operatoire ou instrumental du langage en general, presente une face n douce" et une face „dure“. La premiere coincide avec le regne de Pideologie et de la rhetorique qui pratiquent et pensent le discours sous le signe du calcul, de Paction et de l'instrument. La seconde coincide avec le developpement de Pinformatique. Avec celle-ci, Pinstrumentalisation (...) du langage n'est pas une operation simplement symbolique mais bien physique. (shrink)