The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...) accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela’s concern-based accounts and Schmid’s phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features. (shrink)

In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures in the (...) two fields. All future work on contextualism will start here. Contributors: Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, John Hawthorne, Ernest Lepore, Peter Ludlow, Peter Pagin, Georg Peter, Paul M. Pietroski, Gerhard Preyer, Jonathan Schaffer, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

Das Lehrbuch führt voraussetzungsfrei in alle bedeutenden Gebiete der Erkenntnistheorie ein. Es stellt eine Mitte zwischen der zeitgenössischen angelsächsischen Epistemologie und den klassischen Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie her und schlägt auch Brücken zu Nachbardisziplinen. Im letzten Teil wird gezeigt, wie mit den erarbeiteten Methoden grundlegende erkenntnistheoretische Rätsel, wie das Induktionsproblem und das Realismusproblem, aufgelöst werden können. Jedes Kapitel entspricht einer grundlegenden Lehreinheit, die durch Hinzunahme der Exkurse zu einer umfassenderen Einführung erweitert werden können.

Together with its introduction, Language, Mind and Epistemology examines Davidson's unified stance towards philosophy by joining American and European authors ...

This volume features a critical evaluation of the recent work of the philosopher, Prof. Raimo Tuomela and it also offers it offers new approaches to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate. It specifically looks at Tuomela's book Social Ontology and its accounts of collective intentionality and related topics. The book contains eight essays written by expert contributors that present different perspectives on Tuomela’s investigation into the philosophy of sociality, social ontology, theory of action, and decision and game theory. In addition, Tuomela himself gives (...) a comprehensive response to each essay and defends his theory in terms of the new arguments presented here. Overall, readers will gain a deeper insight into group reasoning and the "we-mode" approach, which is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices, and institutions as well as group solidarity. This book will be of interest to a wide range of readers and graduate students and researchers interested in contemporary philosophy of sociality, sociological theory, social ontology as well as the philosophy of mind, decision and game theory, and cognitive science. Tuomela’s book stands as a model of excellence in social ontology, an especially intractable field of philosophical inquiry that benefits conspicuously from the devotion of Tuomela’s keen philosophical mind. His book is must reading in social ontology. J. Angelo Corlett, Julia Lyons Strobel. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions which were responsible for T’s success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen theories (...) of combustion, and the classical versus relativistic theories of mass. The ontological consequences of the theorem are worked out in terms of the indirect reference and partial truth. The final section explains how the correspondence theorem may justify a weak version of scientific realism without presupposing the no-miracles argument. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Geschichtlichkeit" verfügbar.

Let T be Kripke–Platek set theory with infinity extended by the axiom (Beta) plus the schema that claims that every set-bounded Σ-definable monotone operator from the collection of all sets to Pow(a) for some set a has a fixed point. Then T proves that every such operator has a least fixed point. This result is obtained by following the proof of an analogous result for von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory in an earlier work by Sato, with some minor modifications.

Der Wahn untergräbt den westlichen Begriff des Souveräns wie er Israel als Widersacher des ewigen Friedens der Völker attackiert. Wenn dagegen der Judenstaat das Leben derer verteidigt, die unausgesetzt der antisemitische Haß bedroht, verteidigt er zugleich jenen Begriff. Es bleibt das Staunen, mit welcher Bestimmtheit die Erkenntnisse von Hobbes, Marx und Freud die Denunziation des Wahns explizieren können, die Israels Defense Forces täglich in die Praxis umsetzen müssen. Ihm verdankt sich dieses Buch.

Der Autor interpretiert Nicolas Poussins Gemälde »Et in Arcadia ego« (1638–1640) mit der Inschrift »Auch in Arkadien gibt es mich, den Tod« als Darstellung eines Erkenntnisprozesses und schlägt vor, das zuvor moralisch verstandene »Memento mori« als Aufforderung zur Selbsterkenntnis zu begreifen. Damit formuliert er eine Gegenposition zum Programm des »Transhumanismus«, der die Abschaffung des Todes anstrebt. Sodann geht er von Freuds Hinweis auf die Verleugnung des je eigenen Todes aus und interpretiert die Struktur dieser Einstellung mit Freuds spätem Begriff der (...) »Ichspaltung«. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die mit der Ichspaltung verbundene Allmachtsphantasie auf Verleugnung statt auf Anerkennung von Unverfügbarkeit abzielt, deren Repräsentant der Tod ist. »Memento mori« wird so zu einer emotional erkennenden Erfahrung von Unverfügbarkeit als zentralem Aspekt der Conditio humana. (shrink)

Publications of Austrian philosophers of science.

This volume honours the life and work of Solomon Feferman, one of the most prominent mathematical logicians of the latter half of the 20th century. In the collection of essays presented here, researchers examine Feferman’s work on mathematical as well as specific methodological and philosophical issues that tie into mathematics. Feferman’s work was largely based in mathematical logic, but also branched out into methodological and philosophical issues, making it well known beyond the borders of the mathematics community. With regard to (...) methodological issues, Feferman supported concrete projects. On the one hand, these projects calibrate the proof theoretic strength of subsystems of analysis and set theory and provide ways of overcoming the limitations imposed by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems through appropriate conceptual expansions. On the other, they seek to identify novel axiomatic foundations for mathematical practice, truth theories, and category theory. In his philosophical research, Feferman explored questions such as “What is logic?” and proposed particular positions regarding the foundations of mathematics including, for example, his “conceptual structuralism.” The contributing authors of the volume examine all of the above issues. Their papers are accompanied by an autobiography presented by Feferman that reflects on the evolution and intellectual contexts of his work. The contributing authors critically examine Feferman’s work and, in part, actively expand on his concrete mathematical projects. The volume illuminates Feferman’s distinctive work and, in the process, provides an enlightening perspective on the foundations of mathematics and logic. (shrink)

In the first part of my paper I discuss eight arguments in favour of the theory-dependence of observation: realistic content, guidance function of theories, perception as cognitive construction, expectation-dependence of perception, theory-dependence of scientific data, continuity between observational and theoretical concepts, language-dependence, and meaning holism. I argue that although these arguments make correct points, they do not exclude the existence of observations that are weakly theory-neutral in the sense that they don’t depend on acquired background knowledge. In the second part (...) I suggest an experimental method, the method of ostensive learning experiments, by which the degree of theory- and language-independence of a concept can be tested. (shrink)

Proceedings of a symposium held Sept. 24-28, 1996 in Vienna, Austria.

In the enquiry into the import and function of the basic norm in Hans Kelsen's legal theory, the interpretations of special interest are those dealing with the notion of the basic norm as the ‘logico-transcendental’ condition for cognition in legal science, or with the relation of Kelsen's juridico-scientific method to Kant's practice philosophy. Two thinkers in particular have written along these lines, Norbert Leser and Ralf Dreier, respectively. This chapter begins by describing the positions taken up by the two authors. (...) It then asks, whether in terms of Leser's thesis, it is in fact possible to maintain the notion of the transcendental character of the basic norm. It then turns to Dreier's suggested reinterpretation of the basic norm by appeal to the law of reason, examining the suggestion from the point of view of Kant's philosophy. (shrink)

Der Wissenschaftsbegriff kann nicht einseitig auf den Begriff von "science" eingeengt werden. Eine strenge Scheidung in naturwissenschaftliche und geisteswissenschaftliche Methoden ist nicht möglich. Paradigmatisch für die Naturwissenschaften ist die hypothetisch-deduktive für die Geisteswissenschaften die hermeneutische Methode. Praktisch sind beide Methodenschemata immer ineinander verschränkt. Da die hermeneutische Methode auch nicht-wissenschaftlich verwendet wird, ist es notwendig Kriterien ihrer Wissenschaftlichkeit anzugeben. Der Vergleich beider Methoden zeigt, daß beide hypothetisch sind. Konkurrierenden Modellen entsprechen konkurrierende Deutungen. Die naturwissenschaftliche Methode kann im allgemeinen Entscheidungen erzwingen, da (...) sie immer neue Erfahrungen erzeugen kann. Demgegenüber ist das Erfahrungsmaterial in den Geisteswissenschaften vorgegeben und nicht beliebig vermehrbar. Entscheidungen zwischen konkurrierenden Deutungen sind daher nicht erzwingbar. (shrink)