This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is (...) mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. *Received November 2005; revised March 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21, Duesseldorf, Germany D-40225; e-mail: gerhard[email protected]. (shrink)

Schurz draws on modern alethic- deontic predicate logic to address the venerable yet enduring problem of whether what ought to be can be derived from what is. After two extensive introductory chapters supplying the background in philosophy and logic to readers unfamiliar with it, he examines such dimensions as the logical explication of Hume's thesis, the special Hume thesis, weakened versions of it, generalizations, some applications to ethical arguments, problems of identity and existence, whether there are analytic bridge principles, and (...) whether they are scientifically justifiable. The inquiry is expanded from Part II of his 1989 Relevant Deduction in Science and Ethics with a Case Study of the Is-Ought Problem. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 31-42, January 2022. This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between collective emotions as affective experiences and underpinning mechanisms. Second, it elaborates on other types of affective experience, namely the social sharing of emotion, group-based emotions, and joint emotions. Then, it proposes a working definition of collective emotion via (...) a minimal threshold and four structural features. Finally, it develops a taxonomy of five types of collective emotion: emotional sharing, emotional contagion, emotional matching, emotional segregation, and emotional fusion. (shrink)

There are two ways of representing rational belief: qualitatively as yes-or-no belief, and quantitatively as degrees of belief. Standard rationality conditions are: consistency and logical closure, for qualitative belief, satisfaction of the probability axioms, for quantitative belief, and a relationship between qualitative and quantitative beliefs in accordance with the Lockean thesis. In this paper, it is shown that these conditions are inconsistent with each of three further rationality conditions: fallibilism, open-mindedness, and invariance under independent conceptual expansions. Restrictions of the Lockean (...) thesis that have been suggested in the literature cannot remove the inconsistency. In the outlook we discuss two alternative ways of dealing with this problem: restricting conjunctive closure or going for a dual system account. (shrink)

One of the most discussed issues in psychology—presently and in the past—is how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism. Going beyond these contributions, we consider it a good moment for psychologists and philosophers to join (...) forces and work toward a new foundation for the definition of rational cognition. We take a first step in this direction by proposing that the rationality of both cognitive and normative systems can be measured in terms of their cognitive success. Cognitive success can be defined and gauged in terms of two factors: ecological validity (the system's validity in conditions in which it is applicable) and the system's applicability (the scope of conditions under which it can be applied). As we show, prominent systems of reasoning—deductive reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, uncertain conditionals, and prediction and choice—perform rather differently on these two factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that conceptualizing rationality according to its cognitive success offers a new perspective on the time-honored relationship between the descriptive (“is”) and the normative (“ought”) in psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

This paper supplements an earlier one (Wassermann 1978b). Its views aim to reinforce those of Lewontin and other prominent evolutionists, but differ significantly from the opinions of some philosophers of science, notably Popper (1957) and Olding (1978). A basic distinction is made between 'laws' and 'theories of mechanisms'. The 'Theory of Evolution' is not characterized by laws, but is viewed here as a hypertheory which explains classifiable evolutionary phenomena in terms of subordinate classifiable theories of 'evolution-specific mechanisms' (ESMs), each of (...) which could apply to a host of species. Adaptations could result from ESMs that are rooted in molecular complementarities. The status of optimization theories that aim to predict best adapted states of organisms or populations is also discussed. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions which were responsible for T’s success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen theories (...) of combustion, and the classical versus relativistic theories of mass. The ontological consequences of the theorem are worked out in terms of the indirect reference and partial truth. The final section explains how the correspondence theorem may justify a weak version of scientific realism without presupposing the no-miracles argument. (shrink)

In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies about four major kinds of non-classical logics—multi-valued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum (...) logics. Its purpose is to show that there is no particular domain or reason that demands the use of a non-classical logic; the particular reasons given for the non-classical logic can also be handled within classical logic. The result of Sect. 2 is substantiated in Sect. 3, where it is shown (referring to other work) that all four kinds of non-classical logics can be translated into classical logic in a meaning-preserving way. Based on this fact a justification of classical logic is developed in Sect. 4 that is based on its representational optimality. It is pointed out that not many but a few non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. However, the situation is not symmetric: classical logic has ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic, while non-classical logics can have local simplicity advantages. (shrink)

In the first part of my paper I discuss eight arguments in favour of the theory-dependence of observation: realistic content, guidance function of theories, perception as cognitive construction, expectation-dependence of perception, theory-dependence of scientific data, continuity between observational and theoretical concepts, language-dependence, and meaning holism. I argue that although these arguments make correct points, they do not exclude the existence of observations that are weakly theory-neutral in the sense that they don’t depend on acquired background knowledge. In the second part (...) I suggest an experimental method, the method of ostensive learning experiments, by which the degree of theory- and language-independence of a concept can be tested. (shrink)

White (2015) proposes an a priori justification of the reliability of inductive prediction methods based on his thesis of induction-friendliness. It asserts that there are by far more induction-friendly event sequences than induction-unfriendly event sequences. In this paper I contrast White's thesis with the famous no free lunch (NFL) theorem. I explain two versions of this theorem, the strong NFL theorem applying to binary and the weak NFL theorem applying to real-valued predictions. I show that both versions refute the thesis (...) of induction-friendliness. In the conclusion I argue that an a priori justification of the reliability of induction based on a uniform probability distribution over possible event sequences is impossible. In the outlook I consider two alternative approaches: (i) justification externalism and (ii) optimality justifications. (shrink)

One persistent puzzle in the life sciences is the asymmetric lipid composition of the cellular plasma membrane: while the exoplasmic leaflet is enriched in lipids carrying predominantly saturated fatty acids, the cytoplasmic leaflet hosts preferentially lipids with (poly‐)unsaturated fatty acids. Given the high energy requirements necessary for cells to maintain this asymmetry, the question naturally arises regarding its inherent benefits. In this paper, we propose asymmetry to represent a potential solution for harmonizing two conflicting requirements for the plasma membrane: first, (...) the need to build a barrier for the uncontrolled influx or efflux of substances; and second, the need to form a fluid and dynamic two‐dimensional substrate for signaling processes. We hence view here the plasma membrane as a composite material, where the exoplasmic leaflet is mainly responsible for the functional integrity of the barrier and the cytoplasmic leaflet for fluidity. We reinforce the validity of the proposed mechanism by presenting quantitative data from the literature, along with multiple examples that bolster our model. (shrink)

Although I agree with Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) criticisms of is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&E's assumption, not every normative system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&E assume that norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their truth-conduciveness.

This chapter offers a close reading of a passage from the literary and philosophical work Minima Moralia that enacts Theodor W. Adorno's radical concept of nonpropositional truth content in philosophical aesthetics after Auschwitz. Readers of Adorno's texts, especially those devoted to philosophical aesthetics, can hardly fail to be struck by their chiastic structure. The aesthetic theory that Adorno develops constitutes not only a theory of the aesthetic but also a theory that is itself aesthetic, hence a theory of literature that (...) exhibits qualities associated with literary texts, and a theory of music that harbors within itself traces of musical composition. The rhetorically self-conscious tropes of his posthumous Aesthetic Theory, the stylized literary studies of his Notes to Literature, his musically inflected meditations on musicological questions from Ludwig van Beethoven to Arnold Schönberg, and so many of his other texts perform this provocative inversion in a variety of registers and conceptual modulations. (shrink)

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue (...) that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim. (shrink)

In sec. 1.1 I emphasize the meliorative purpose of epistemology, and I characterize Goldman's epistemology as reliabilistic, cognitive, social, and meliorative. In sec. 1.2 I point out that Goldman's weak notion of knowledge is in conflict with our ordinary usage of 'knowledge'. In sec. 2 I argue for an externalist-internalist hybrid conception of justification which adds reliability-indicators to externalist knowledge. Reliability-indicators produce a veritistic surplus value for the social spread of knowledge. In sec. 3 I analyze some particular meliorative rules (...) which have been proposed by Goldman. I prove that obedience to the rule of maximally specific evidence increases expected veritistic value (sec. 3.1), and I argue that rule-circular arguments are epistemically worthless (sec. 3.2). In the final sec. 3.3 I report a non-circular justification of meta-induction which has been developed elsewhere. (shrink)

Two major works in recent evolutionary biology have in different ways touched upon the issue of cultural replicators in language, namely Dawkins’ Selfish Gene and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s Major Transitions in Evolution. In the latter, the emergence of language is referred to as the last major transition in evolution, a claim we argue to be derived from a crucial property of language, called Duality of Patterning. Prima facie, this property makes natural language look like a structural equivalent to DNA, (...) and its peer in terms of expressive power. We will argue that, if one takes seriously Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s outlook and examines what has been proposed as linguistic replicators, amongst others phonemes and words, the analogy meme-gene becomes problematic. A key issue is the fact that genes and memes are assumed to carry and transmit information, while what has been described as the best candidate for replicatorhood in language, i.e. the phoneme, does by definition not carry meaning. We will argue that semiotic systems with Duality of Pattering force us to reconsider either the analogy between replicators in the biological and the cultural domain, or what it is to be a replicator in linguistics. (shrink)

... und was ist hässlich? Gibt es objektive Kriterien für Schönheit? Und welche Rolle spielt dabei die eigene Wahrnehmung? Diesen Fragen geht die Ästhetik nach.

Two conditions guiding permissible use of force in self-defence are proportionality and success. According to the proportionality condition the means used to prevent an attack can be permissible only if they are proportional to the interest at stake.1 According to the success condition, otherwise impermissible acts can be justified under the right to self-defence only if they are likely to succeed in preventing the perceived threat.2 These requirements should not always be interpreted narrowly. Sometimes people are permitted to kill culpable (...) aggressors in order to avoid a non-lethal harm. Sometimes people are permitted to take up arms to defend themselves against culpable aggressors they have little or no hope of .. (shrink)

The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness. In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures are introduced: comparative versus numeric t-measures, t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthlikeness are explicated and developed within a version of conjunctive part accounts based on content elements. The focus lies on measures of probabilistic truthlikeness, that are divided into t-measures for statistical probabilities and single (...) case probabilities. The logical notion of probabilistic truthlikeness can be treated as a subcase of deterministic truthlikeness for quantitative theories. In contrast, the epistemic notion of probabilistic truthlikeness creates genuinely new problems, especially for hypotheses about single case probabilities that are evaluated not by comparison to observed frequencies, but by comparison to the truth values of single event statements. By the method of meta-induction, competing theories about single case probabilities can be aggregated into a combined theory with optimal predictive success and epistemic truthlikeness. (shrink)

The area of biomedicine is one of the fastest developing areas of science and technology. The perception of its possible and expected positive or negative impacts results in the growing number of bioethical discussions in scientific community, politics and public. Their intensity, focus and used methods differ from country to country. Th e authors of the prologue have tried to map the state of the art and expected development of bioethical discussion in the countries of Middle and Eastern Europe. In (...) the beginning, they addressed the bioethical experts with short questionnaire from 7 “new” European countries and two “old” European countries. In the end, seven experts have responded their questions and expressed their expectations and difficulties of the development of bioethical discussions and institutionalisations in their countries. The authors summarize in the prologue the most interesting results. (shrink)

Scholarly correspondence can be as insightful as scholarly work itself, as it often documents the motivating forces of its writers’ intellectual ideas while illuminating their lives more clearly. The more complex the authors’ scholarly works and the more troubled the eras in which they lived, the more substantial, and potentially fascinating, their correspondence. This is especially true of the letters between Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin. The scholars lived in incredibly dramatic times and produced profound, complex works that continue to (...) confound academics. The communication between these two giants of the social sciences, as they sent their thoughts to one another, was crucial to the work of both men. _A Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime: The Correspondence between Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin _demonstrates that Schutz and Voegelin shared a remarkable friendship: they first met as students in Vienna in the 1920s and found themselves great partners in discussion; years later they were pushed out of Europe by Nazi pressure and went to work at separate American universities. For twenty years they wrote each other, developing their respective scientific works in that dialogue. The letters bear witness to their friendship during the years they spent in exile in the United States, and they document the men’s tentative attempts at formulating the theories of “lifeworld” and “gnosis” associated with Schutz and Voegelin today. The entire collection of 238 letters was printed in German in 2004, but this edited volume is the first to present their correspondence in English and offers a selection of the most important letters—those that contributed to the thinkers’ theoretical discussions and served as background to their most significant thoughts. Editors Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss do not analyze Schutz’s and Voegelin’s works in light of the correspondence—rather, they present the collection to create a framework for new interpretations. _A Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime_ takes a unique look at two major social scientists. This volume is a valuable resource in the study of Voegelin’s political philosophy and Alfred Schutz’s contribution to American sociology and marks an important addition to the literature on these remarkable men. Showing how scholarly discourse and the dialogue of everyday life can shed light on one another, the book finally presents this correspondence for an American audience and is not to be missed by scholars of philosophy and sociology. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown that, in spite of their intuitive starting points, Kuipers' accounts lead to counterintuitive consequences. The counterintuitive results of Kuipers' account of H-D confirmation stem from the fact that Kuipers explicates a concept of partial (as opposed to full) confirmation. It is shown that Schurz-Weingartner's relevant-element approach as well as Gemes' content-part approach provide an account of full confirmation that does not lead to these counterintuitive results. One of the unwelcome results of Kuipers' account of (...) nomic truthlikeness is the consequence that a theory Y, in order to be more truthlike than a theory X (where Y and X are incompatible), must imply the entire nomic truth. It is shown how the relevant-element approach to truthlikeness avoids this result. (shrink)

Kant distinguishes two kinds of knowledge of one-self: empirical self-knowledge due to inner sense and a priori self-knowledge achieved by transcendental apperception. This conception encounters a host of problems. I try to solve these problems from the perspective of today’s phenomenology and analytical philosophy. I first introduce a new conception of inner sense and time-consciousness and argue that empirical self-knowledge must be based on the category of person, a category Kant did not list in his table of categories. I explain (...) how the schematism of this category works. Then I introduce the a priori notion of the subject which corresponds to Kant’s ‘I think’. However, unlike Kant I hold that the notion of the subject is the notion of a being which has certain a priori capacities. Kant did not see that the term ‘I’ must be conceived of as an indexical. I argue that this indexical refers to both, the subject who does the thinking and the person who is thought. On this basis I give an answer to the question how genuine de-se knowledge is possible. I further defend—against Wittgenstein and others—the use of a private thought language. Finally, I show that what I have developed is—notwithstanding the refutation of important elements of Kant’s theory—still essentially a Kantian approach. (shrink)

Among the many discussions Kierkegaard had with his Copenhagen contemporaries, his dispute with the Icelandic theologian Magnús Eiríksson over Kierkegaard’s theory of faith is particularly noteworthy. In the various drafts that Kierkegaard developed in response to Eiríksson’s critique, one finds insightful remarks not only on „the absurd“ and „the paradox“ as foundational concepts of Kierkegaard’s theory of faith, but also on the different perspectives of the various pseudonyms in this respect within the intricate tapestry of his writings. Notably, these drafts (...) were omitted from the authoritative Danish edition of Kierkegaard’s works, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (SKS), and have remained largely untranslated into other languages. In this workshop report, Kierkegaard’s drafts are made accessible and presented in their entirety for the first time in German translation. (shrink)

In the first section, five major attempts to solve the problem of induction and their failures are discussed. In the second section, an account of meta-induction is introduced. It offers a novel solution to the problem of induction, based on mathematical theorems about the predictive optimality of attractivity-weighted meta-induction. In the third section, how the a priori justification of meta-induction provides a non-circular a posteriori justification of object-induction, based on its superior track record, is explained. In the fourth section, four (...) important extensions and refinements of the method of meta-induction are presented. The final section, summarizes the major impacts of the program of meta-induction for epistemology, the philosophy of science and cognitive science. (shrink)

This article is a narrative reflection of the author’s perspective on the role of the Church in the unification process of Germany in the last part of the last decade. It is presented from his perspective of being a German citizen, as well a member of the church in Germany. The author situates this experience amidst the political and ideological movements shaping the binary notions ‘East’ and ‘West’.

Der erste Teil dieses Buches zeichnet die wissenschaftstheoretischen Auseinandersetzungen um den Reduktionismus ausgehend von den Positionen des Wiener Kreises bis heute nach, wobei sich das reduktionistische Programm als undurchführbar erweist. Wie kann aber der Einheit der Welt Rechnung getragen werden, wenn eine Fülle von Disziplinen scheinbar beziehungslos nebeneinanderstehen? Diese Frage versucht der zweite Teil mit der Grundlegung einer Allgemeinen Systemtheorie zu beantworten. Mit der Einführung eines allgemeinen Systembegriffs können Brücken zwischen den Disziplinen geschlagen werden, ohne die Existenzberechtigung verschiedener Disziplinen in (...) Frage zu stellen. (shrink)

The paper explores the relation between Kierkegaard’s concept of a “life-view,” understood as a certain quality of a person’s character, and his early account of Christian faith. To claim the need for such an exploration is motivated by two observations: First, defining a “life-view” as “an unshakable certainty in oneself won from all experience” (Kierkegaard’s formula in his debut book From the Papers of One Still Living [1838]) essentially conforms with his characterization of faith as an “a priori certainty.” Second, (...) the relation between Kierkegaard’s notion of “life-view” and his concept of faith has been interpreted in different, at times in-compatible ways by Kierkegaard-scholars. Thus, after outlining the overall argument in Kierkegaard’s debut book, I will compare in detail the notions of “life-view” and faith, and this by using as a vantage point and paradigmatic example the opposing accounts of Emanuel Hirsch and Ulrich Klenke. (shrink)