Schurz draws on modern alethic- deontic predicate logic to address the venerable yet enduring problem of whether what ought to be can be derived from what is. After two extensive introductory chapters supplying the background in philosophy and logic to readers unfamiliar with it, he examines such dimensions as the logical explication of Hume's thesis, the special Hume thesis, weakened versions of it, generalizations, some applications to ethical arguments, problems of identity and existence, whether there are analytic bridge principles, and (...) whether they are scientifically justifiable. The inquiry is expanded from Part II of his 1989 Relevant Deduction in Science and Ethics with a Case Study of the Is-Ought Problem. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...) however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded. (shrink)

Among the methodological rules of the social sciences we find the principles of value-neutrality and the principle of criticism. Both principles are of vital importance in the social sciences, but both seem to conflict with one another. The principle of criticism excludes value-judgments from the social sciences, because they cannot be empirically tested. Hence, criticism methodologically implies value-neutrality. Yet there is the opposing view that it is precisely the critical social researcher who looks beyond mere 'social facts' taking into account (...) the value framework of the society. Thus, criticism does not lead to value-freedom, but points to the value impact of the so-called social facts. In this paper, the two principles are stated. Then it is shown how and why they are incompatible. Finally, several suggestions are discussed to resolve this methodological conflict. (shrink)

Publications of Austrian philosophers of science.

Gärdenfors (Conceptual spaces, 2000) argues that the semantic domains that natural language deals with have a geometrical structure. He gives evidence that simple natural language adjectives usually denote natural properties, where a natural property is a convex region of such a “conceptual space.” In this paper I will show that this feature of natural categories need not be stipulated as basic. In fact, it can be shown to be the result of evolutionary dynamics of communicative strategies under very general assumptions.

, Pietroski and Rey ([1995]) suggested a reconstruction of ceteris paribus (CP)-laws, which — as they claim — saves CP-laws from vacuity. This discussion note is intended to show that, although Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction is an improvement in comparison to previous suggestions, it cannot avoid the result that CP-laws are almost vacuous. It is proved that if Cx is an arbitrary (nomological) event-type which has independently identifiable deterministic causes, then for every other (nomological) event-type Ax which is not strictly (...) connected with Cx or with ¬Cx, ‘CP if Ax then Cx’ satisfies the conditions of Pietroski and Rey for CP-laws. It is also shown that Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction presupposes the assumption of determinism. The conclusion points towards some alternatives to Piectroski and Rey's reconstruction. (shrink)

This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...) are important in science, not reducible to each other. (2) One must distinguish between (cause giving) explanations and (reason giving) justifications and predictions. (3) The adequacy of deductive as well as probabilistic explanations is relative to a pragmatically given background knowledge-which does not exclude, however, the possibility of purely semantic models. (shrink)

"Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde im Jahre 1991 von der Philosophischen Fakulteat der Universiteat Teubingen als Dissertation angenommen"--P. 11.

Das Lehrbuch führt voraussetzungsfrei in alle bedeutenden Gebiete der Erkenntnistheorie ein. Es stellt eine Mitte zwischen der zeitgenössischen angelsächsischen Epistemologie und den klassischen Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie her und schlägt auch Brücken zu Nachbardisziplinen. Im letzten Teil wird gezeigt, wie mit den erarbeiteten Methoden grundlegende erkenntnistheoretische Rätsel, wie das Induktionsproblem und das Realismusproblem, aufgelöst werden können. Jedes Kapitel entspricht einer grundlegenden Lehreinheit, die durch Hinzunahme der Exkurse zu einer umfassenderen Einführung erweitert werden können.

In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies about four major kinds of non-classical logics—multi-valued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum (...) logics. Its purpose is to show that there is no particular domain or reason that demands the use of a non-classical logic; the particular reasons given for the non-classical logic can also be handled within classical logic. The result of Sect. 2 is substantiated in Sect. 3, where it is shown (referring to other work) that all four kinds of non-classical logics can be translated into classical logic in a meaning-preserving way. Based on this fact a justification of classical logic is developed in Sect. 4 that is based on its representational optimality. It is pointed out that not many but a few non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. However, the situation is not symmetric: classical logic has ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic, while non-classical logics can have local simplicity advantages. (shrink)

Dieses seit langem angekündigte, in drei Bänden geplante Handbuch, das sein Erscheinen mit dem zweiten Band über das byzantinische Hochmittelalter und die nachbyzantinische Epoche eröffnet, könnte mit seinen betont lapidaren Titel den Eindruck erwecken, erstmalig eine breite oder gar erschöpfende Darstellung der byzantinischen Theologie zu bieten; doch im Unterschied zu H.-G.Becks Klassiker „Kirche und theologische Literatur in byzantinischen Reich“ (München 1959, 1977), in dem ein lückenloser Überblick über die Gesamtheit der theologischen Produktion in Byzanz(330 bzw. Mitte des 6. Jahrhunderts – (...) 1453) angestrebt ist, setzt sich das vorliegende Werk das Ziel, eine Reihe herausragender Theologen eingehend in Biographie und Werkanalyse darzustellen; dabei nehmen die Bearbeiter, wie im Vorwort J. Norets (S. 3f.) betont, an der „Clavis Patrum Graecorum“ Maß, so daß erstmalig alle echten, unechten und zweifelhaften Werke eines Autors dieser Epochen eine feste Nummer tragen, der dann noch Angaben zu den Handschriften, evtl. Editionen und Übersetzungen folgen. Als weiteres Neuheitsmerkmal ist eine umfassende, internationale Bibliographie zu jedem behandelten Autor beigegeben. Diese immense Arbeitsleistung konnte nur auf möglichst viele Mitarbeiter und Berater, besonders aus dem Forschungspersonal der „Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes“ und des „Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique“, verteilt werden, die neben den ausländischen Kollegen in den Einführungen und Danksagungen (S. 1–6) erwähnt werden. Andererseits besitzen die seitenlangen bibliographischen Listen leider nicht den Charakter einer „Bibliographie raisonnée“, insofern wichtige und unwichtige Titel gleichberechtigt nebeneinanderstehen; nur in Einzelfällen sind auch kritische Rezensionen mitberücksichtigt. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown that, in spite of their intuitive starting points, Kuipers' accounts lead to counterintuitive consequences. The counterintuitive results of Kuipers' account of H-D confirmation stem from the fact that Kuipers explicates a concept of partial (as opposed to full) confirmation. It is shown that Schurz-Weingartner's relevant-element approach as well as Gemes' content-part approach provide an account of full confirmation that does not lead to these counterintuitive results. One of the unwelcome results of Kuipers' account of (...) nomic truthlikeness is the consequence that a theory Y, in order to be more truthlike than a theory X (where Y and X are incompatible), must imply the entire nomic truth. It is shown how the relevant-element approach to truthlikeness avoids this result. (shrink)