Gerald Sykes -- Aldous Huxley -- Gerald Heard -- Christopher Isherwood -- John van Druten -- Marianna Masin -- J. Crawford Lewis -- Dorothy F. Mercer -- Kurt Friedrichs -- Swami Atulananda -- Jane Molard -- The Countess of Sandwich -- John Yale -- Joan Rayne -- Durgacharan -- Pravrajika Saradaprana.

Gerald Sykes -- Aldous Huxley -- Gerald Heard -- Christopher Isherwood -- John van Druten -- Marianna Masin -- J. Crawford Lewis -- Dorothy F. Mercer -- Kurt Friedrichs -- Swami Atulananda -- Jane Molard -- The Countess of Sandwich -- John Yale -- Joan Rayne -- Durgacharan -- Pravrajika Saradaprana.

Horst Dietrich Preuss, Old Testament TheologyRolf P. Knierim, The Task of Old Testament Theology: Essays, Substance, Method and CasesDaniel Patte, Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: A Re‐evaluationBrian D. Ingraffia, Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology: Vanquishing God's ShadowJohn Barclay and John Sweet, Early Christian Thought in its Jewish ContextStephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O'Collins, The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of JesusMaureen A. Tilley, Donatist Martyr Stories: The Church in Conflict in Roman North AfricaMaureen A. Tilley, The (...) Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist WorldL. G. Patterson, Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom and Life in ChristJ. H. D. Scourfield, Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60C. Moreschini and D. A. Sykes, St Gregory of Nazianzus: Poemata ArcanaPeter O'Dwyer, Towards a History of Irish SpiritualityUinseann Ó Maid'n, The Celtic Monk: Rules and Writings of Early Irish MonksDáibhíÓ Cróinín, Early Medieval Ireland 400–1200Gerhard Ladner, God, Cosmos, Humankind: The World of Early Christian SymbolismKevin Trainor, Relics, Ritual and Representation in Buddhism: Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravãda TraditionSteven F. Ostrow, Art and Spirituality in Counter‐Reformation Rome: The Sistine and Pauline Chapels in S. Maria MaggioreDavid Morgan, Visual Piety: A History and Theory of Popular Religious ImagesColleen McDannell, Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in AmericaSarah Coakley, Religion and the BodyPaul F. Bradshaw and Lawrence A. Hoffman, Life Cycles in Jewish and Christian WorshipGordon P. Jeanes, The Day Has Come! Easter and Baptism in Zeno of VeronaJohn Macquarrie, A Guide to the SacramentsMegan McKenna, Rites of Justice: The Sacraments and Liturgy as Ethical ImperativesDouglas J. Davies, Death, Ritual and Belief. (shrink)

This essay responds to David Enoch’s “The Disorder of Public Reason,” published in a previous issue of Ethics. I seek to set the record straight on several of the many charges Enoch makes. More importantly, having clarified some of the more basic points, I make some preliminary efforts at identifying when his brand of moral realism and my version of public reason differ—and, perhaps, where they are more compatible than one might think.

In this issue of Philosophical Studies, Richard Arneson, Jonathan Quong and Robert Talisse contribute papers discussing The Order of Public Reason (OPR). All press what I call “agent-type challenges” to the project of OPR. In different ways they all focus on a type (or types) of moral (or sometimes not-so-moral) agent. Arneson presents a good person who is so concerned with doing the best thing she does not truly endorse social morality; Quong a bad person who rejects it and violates (...) the basic rights of others, and Talisse a morally ugly person, a hypocrite, who criticizes others for failing to do what he does not do. All suggest that OPR does not give a satisfying account of what we are to say to, or how we should act towards, such agents. In my response I highlight some core concerns of OPR, while also seeking to show that OPR does not say quite what they think it says, and it often leaves them room for saying what they would like to say about such agents. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Concept of Neutrality Liberal Moral Neutrality Liberal Political Neutrality The Implications of Liberal Political Neutrality Notes.

This experiment examined responses to excerpted episodes from short stories that either focused on action or on the experiences of the characters. The effects of instructional sets to approach the texts from the viewpoint of subjective involvement or objective detachment were also studied. The two story types and two reading sets were factorially combined in a within-subjects design. Scale ratings of the story excerpts and reading times (syllables per second) were measured. A total of subjects (20 males and 20 females) (...) read six segments from each of the episodes as quickly and accurately as possible. Pretest data were obtained for each segment indicating how much it “provided insight into the characters' experiences”, and its level of suspense and surprise. Segments which “provided in sight” were read more slowly, whereas surprising segments were read more quickly. Under the Subjective Set, subjects slowed the pace of reading if they judged the text to be “rich in meaning about life”. For the Objective Set, stories that were judged to have evoked “images” were read more slowly. Females were more responsive to the Subjective Set than were the males, finding the stories to be “richer in meaning” and more “personally relevant”. Females also slowed their reading pace for segments that they judged to be “rich in meaning about life”, while males slowed down if the stories evoked “images”. (shrink)

In this article, we examine how affect influences judgment and thought, but also how thought transforms affect. The general thesis is that the nature and impact of affective reactions depends largely on their objects. We view affect as a representation of value, and its consequences as dependent on its object or what it is about. Within a review of relevant literature and a discussion of the nature of emotion, we focus on the role of the object of affect in governing (...) both the nature of emotional reactions and the impact of affect and emotion on cognition and action. Although emotion is always about the here and now, the capacity for abstract thought means that the human here and now includes imagination as well as perception. Indeed, the hopes and fears that dominate human lives often involve things only imagined. (shrink)

Epistemic reasons exist indubitably, yet confusion surrounds just what exactly they are, in and of themselves. In this paper I argue that there is only one thing they could credibly be: the favoring attitudes a god is adopting toward us believing what is true and following methods of belief formation likely to result in true beliefs. As the existence of epistemic reasons is indubitable then if this analysis is correct, it will provide us with an apparent proof of a god’s (...) existence. (shrink)

In his Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, T. H. Green characterizes a right as ‘a power claimed and recognized as contributory to a common good’ (LPPO §99). Scholars such as Rex Martin have noted that Green’s characterization of a right has multiple elements: it includes social recognition and the common good,1 as well as the idea of a power. More formally, it seems that Green wants to say that R is a right if and only if R is (...) (i) a power that is (ii) recognized by some others or by society as (iii) contributing to a common good. Much of the scholarship on Green has been devoted to explicating and defending this third feature, which grounds rights on Green’s core idea of a common good.2 In this chapter I shall stress claim (ii) —the recognition thesis —though we shall see that pursuing claim (ii) will enlighten us as to why Green links the recognition thesis to the common good claim, (iii). And claim (i), I shall argue, reinforces the plausibility of the recognition thesis. So.. (shrink)

If a warring side may fight in pursuit of an aim up to some proportionality‐respecting limit, then an important question is whether that side is morally required to stop fighting when it reaches that limit, despite not yet having attained its aim. The ‘Quota View’ answers this question affirmatively, while other views hold that the fighting may continue just as long as the projected future losses fall within certain limits. I criticize some of these other views, as well as a (...) further argument that can be distilled from these sources, and advance a qualified version of the Quota View. (shrink)

Richard Paul changed the face and the practice of critical thinking for hundreds of thousands of educators, professionals, and reflective persons across the world. In this paper I describe Paul’s goals and, briefly, some of his achievements in articulating his robust approach to critical thinking. I focus primarily on its direct orientation to practicality; its comprehensiveness, its applicability in any domain; and its systematicity, its coherent, interlocking way of laying out all the significant dimensions of critical thinking consistent with use (...) in practice. I also describe some implications of Paul’s work: its relation to other models or approaches that are more limited in their comprehensiveness, systematicity, and/or practicality; the contrast between Paul’s maximally flexible account and accounts or teaching practices based on specific directives; and the capacity Paul’s articulation carries with it of being able to enhance any approach to thinking things through. (shrink)

J. St. Mill's System of Logic (1843) is reexamined from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy of the social sciences. His naturalistic epistemology, "state", "general/universal laws", "social statics/dynamics" are discussed, as well as his four methods. His nomological-behavioral position is analysed, along with his theoretical approach.

A partir de las reflexiones propuestas por Buenaventura en Breviloquium, I, 6, los conceptos trascendentales unidad, verdad y bondad pueden ser pensados como resultado de las diversas relaciones de indivisión interna del ser. Estas “condiciones nobilísimas y generalísimas del ser”, como las llama Buenaventura, son presentadas en el texto a modo de apropiaciones divinas y por esa razón triádica no incluyen en principio a la belleza. Sin embargo, enseguida es mencionada bajo la forma de una correspondencia esencial verdad-belleza. De esta (...) manera, la belleza comporta una cualidad formal intrínseca de la verdad, que le permite transmitir a la percepción tanto sensorial cuanto intelectual la trama íntima de la estructura del mundo. El presente trabajo señala las instancias deductivas y simbólicas de esa belleza participada. (shrink)

El lenguaje ha sido desde sus orígenes y en sus variadas formas el instrumento privilegiado para transmitir el conocimiento. Por ello, en los contextos teóricos de la gnoseología y la metafísica, la historia del pensamiento se ha cuestionado incesantemente la relación entre lenguaje, conocimiento y realidad. En el siglo VI d.C., Damascio de Siria, último escolarca de la Academia platónica de Atenas, plantea la paradoja de un principio o fundamento metafísico inaccesible al conocimiento y a la vez un uso del (...) lenguaje que, desde la conciencia de la propia construcción, remite a la instancia inaccesible para elaborar una representación simbólica de lo inefable. El presente trabajo analiza esa paradoja en el tratado De principii (Περὶ ἀρχῶν), donde Damascio niega la identidad entre el conocimiento y su objeto en favor de una trascendencia unitaria que se despliega como Verdad y Bien. Se examina por último la posibilidad de considerar esta última afirmación como un antecedente para la doctrina medieval de los conceptos trascendentales del ser. (shrink)

Pope Francis has called for the Church to be a sign of mercy and hope to the world. Mercy stands at the center of the Gospel, and the family is a fundamental seat of mercy within the culture, responsible for bestowing the most valuable of God’s gifts, human life. Because of its mission to bestow life, marriage is necessarily a “lifelong covenant of love and fidelity between a man and a woman”. As the Church upholds the view of marriage exclusively (...) as the union of a man and a woman who are capable of reaching the deepest kind of unity, she also affirms that persons of the same sex can achieve unity in meaningful ways. Upholding the traditional, comprehensive view of marriage does not belittle the dignity of homosexual persons, because all are our brothers and sisters. (shrink)

There is no paucity of academic studies, medical literature, or media attention given to concerns about gender ideology and being transgender. When reporting their findings, however, some researchers and practitioners working from a purely secular perspective overstep medical observations to make metaphysical pronouncements. This causes considerable confusion and stifles dialogue that could occur if the line between medicine and philosophy were clearly delineated. Properly understood, transgender describes an observable distress due to incongruence between one’s birth sex and gender identity. Conversely, (...) gender ideology is a metaphysical conclusion, which argues that a person’s gender is fluid and open to personal choice. Clearly distinguishing between these can help families, clinicians, and society provide medically appropriate and culturally competent care to those with gender dysphoria, especially children. (shrink)

In any attempt to present an overview of the conceptions of reality and divinity in classical Indian (Hindu) civilization, it is helpful, first of all, to highlight some of the basic cultural and intellectual presuppositions that appear to be operative in classical Indian thought (which, for the purposes of this article, will be taken as consisting of the so‐called six classical schools of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Advaita Vedānta during the classical period, from the first centuries of the (...) Common Era up to the coming of Islamic traditions in the eleventh century). This can be accomplished in various ways, but perhaps the simplest way is to articulate some basic questions to which classical Indian thought provides some interesting, albeit unusual, answers. The questions can be framed as follows: (1) What truly is? (2) How does one know what truly is? (3) Who knows what truly is? (4) With whom does one know what truly is? And, finally: (5) What does God have to do with what truly is? The questions have to do, respectively, with (1) ontology, (2) epistemology, (3) psychology, (4) social anthropology, and (5) theology. Classical Indian thought, of course, provides a variety of answers to all of these questions, and there was much vigorous debate and polemic through the centuries about precisely how to form satisfactory answers. Generally speaking, however, it appears to be the case that the classical Indian philosophical schools tended to deal with these basic questions in a manner quite different from the way these questions have been dealt with in traditional or modern Western thought, and it is important to understand some of these differences if one wishes to appreciate the unique conceptual frameworks in classical Indian thought. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Born in periods of crises, utopias adopt a threefold structure: a critique of society, a spatial arrangement, and a new society sustained by this spatial arrangement. Accordingly, space and architecture are recognized as spatial levers to address crises and change societies. However, three problematic characteristics emerge from an analysis of past and contemporary utopias. First, utopias do not always advocate for new societal orders, as some tend to consolidate the existing ones. Second, they have evolved to be increasingly tangible. (...) Third, while appearing as collective narratives, they are written by a single hand, allowing little variations. To address these issues and revitalize their critical potency, utopias could act as beacons rather than concrete projects, work on processes rather than goals, and build collective narratives rather than monologues. Eventually, the article illustrates architecture’s twofold rationale: a means to physically build space and a critical tool to reflect on society. (shrink)

Can corporations remain socially responsible in today's fiercely competitive global economy? For several decades after World War II, companies like IBM, which exemplified what journalist Robert J. Samuelson called the 'good corporation,' poured forth material comforts and technological ideas while guaranteeing full employment and adequate retirement. In the 1980s all of that changed, as corporations moved to 'downsize' and become lean, mean global competitors. In this collection, thirteen prominent scholars in business ethics, finance, management, and religion and six corporate leaders (...) respond to a new essay by Samuelson that sounds the death knell of the 'good corporation.' They propose new approaches to corporate integrity and social responsibility in the global economy. The book will be useful in corporate workshops and will make an excellent business ethics text in philosophy departments and business schools. (shrink)